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The Christian Socialism Of R. H. Tawney
Abstract
The thesis examines a particular application of Christianity to social and political 
theory in the thought of R.H. Tawney and the distinction between the Christian 
foundation of his thought, and the pragmatic or humanist expression of his argument. It 
considers a variety of criticisms of egalitarianism in so far as it casts a light on or 
challenges Tawney’s arguments. It considers, too, the nature of his recommendations for 
a common culture as the basis for contemporary democratic socialism.
CHAPTER I
Why Tawney?
“The memory of the righteous is a blessing”
(After Proverbs, 10:7)
Michael Walzer (dedication in memory of his father) 
Spheres of Justice, Basil Blackwell, 1983.
Why Tawney?
“Those who neither make after others* goods nor bestow their own are to be admonished 
to take it well to heart that the earth they come &om is common to all and brings forth 
nurture for all alike. Idly, then, for themselves the common gift of God. In not giving 
what they have received they work their neighbours’ death”.
St. Gregory the Great
In the closing years of the twentieth century British politicians of all parties have 
once again begun to reach for the high moral ground. Such attempts to “reclaim the 
ground” ^  serve to illustrate the tensions and the problems which arise when religious 
principles are invoked as a recommendation of political policy. Clearly the stronger the 
religious foundation the greater the moral force of the recommendation. But the more 
precisely located is the religious foundation grounded in a particular faith or even a 
particular denomination, the narrower the appeal. The problem, then, is how to base a 
broad political appeal on deep religious conviction in a multi-religious yet increasingly 
secular society. The strengths and weaknesses, the problems and the possible solutions of 
such a position are well illustrated in the thought of Richard Henry Tawney.
The social and political philosophy of Richard Henry Tawney derives from a 
tradition which Norman Dennis and Professor A.H. Halsey identify as ‘English Ethical 
Socialism’.i The tradition, grounded in moral teaching, is, they argue, the only brand of 
socialism which ever enjoyed the mass support of the English people. Such a socialism is 
inevitably concerned with social change. Yet, beyond a commitment to social reform its 
philosophy is permeated by the conviction that an equitable society necessarily demands a
^  Reclaiming The Ground, Christianity and Socialism. John Smith and others, edited by Christopher 
Bryant. Written in memory o f RM. Tawney, Christian Socialist Movement, 1993.
* English Ethical Socialism, Thomas More to RM. Tawney, Norman Dennis and A.H. Halsey, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988.
moral foundation. In Tawney*s case it is a philosophy of socialism motivated by Christian 
principles which seeks to combine the aspirations of a humanistic socialism with a code of 
moral conduct. It is a philosophy illuminated by a code of ethical values which “assert the 
superiority of moral principles over economic appetites’’.^  It is, too, a philosophy 
dedicated to the provision of such social and political institutions as will extend to each 
individual the opportunity to develop to the fullest measure their intellectual, physical and 
spiritual capacities. It is, then, a humanistic, even pragmatic philosophy whose roots are 
nourished by Christian faith and Christian principles.
The tradition “is part of our history”.^ It evolved out of a philosophy m il le d  by 
conscience and motivated by faith which nourished an ethos peculiar to a people which 
respected the rule of law and historically cherished the liberty of the individual. In Britain, 
the philosophy is frequently imbued with Christian moral principles. It demands that each 
social and all political organisation be motivated and judged in accordance with a body of 
moral teachings which proclaims that “we are all members one of another”. (Eph: 4:25) 
Indeed, an eminent advocate of its aims and practices claims that “The Christian heritage 
calls on us to bring Christian ideals into every realm of life” (and) “establish a fellowship 
among all His people”.
Richard Henry Tawney would not dispute this claim: his own socialist values are 
inspired by Christian faith. Yet, as David Marquand submits in his cogent analysis of the 
constitutional, political and social crises confronting the British State, “for most of this 
century the Tawneian tradition has been submerged”.^  Henry Dubb, Tawney’s archetypal 
Englishman, has been confronted with three political orthodoxies.^ He has been asked 
to accommodate a vision of ‘whig imperialism’ with its ideals of “balance between ruler
* Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, R.H. Tawney, first published 1926, See Pelican Edition,
1938,p.279.
“  ‘The Twilight o f the British State? Henry Dubb Versus The Sceptred Awe’, David Marquand,
Political Quarterly, Spring 1993, p.210-221 
Ibid,p210-22L
^  With reference to Tawney’s apparent neglect o f Henrietta, see Chapter VI.
and ruled, progress and stability”.^  Similarly, he has been presented with a vision of 
‘democratic collectivism’, “in which political authority is rational and secular in character” 
... “not sacral”. Clearly, too, the Tawneian tradition derived from Christian principles has 
been challenged by what Professor Marquand designates (with acknowledgement to 
Jonathan Clark) as ‘authoritarian individualism’ with its emphasis on order and discipline, 
its passion for ritual, its concern for property rights, its defence of social hierarchy, its 
support of libertarian values.
Yet, if the Tawneian tradition has ‘been submerged’, it is now, in one view, “the 
only tradition available to us that offers the possibility of re-fashioning the state and re­
constructing identities through negotiation and debate rather than manipulation and 
force”.“ We are compelled, then, at the end of a century of carnage, conflict and 
confrontation to recognise the appeal of an ethical socialism which proclaims “an appeal 
to principles” as “the condition of any considerable re-construction of society”.^  We are 
forced, in the face of failed policies, faded hopes and false recoveries to consider the 
notions of mutual obligation and collective responsibility. Such consideration is 
expedient, not only for the sake of equity, but also in the name of pragmatism. When the 
dictatorship of the proletariat has been exposed as the tyranny of the party, when the 
materialist interpretation of history has patently failed to produce material piety, it is time 
to re-examine the social philosophy of R.H. Tawney. When the ‘economic miracles’ of 
libertarianism have proved to be unsustainable, when cities decay, when drugs and 
disease, poverty and pollution, riots and racism are rampant, it is time to reassess a 
political philosophy which insists that man’s claim to equal rights, to equal respect and 
equal worth is established ultimately, not by his material wealth, but by his spiritual value.
* ‘The Twilight o f The British State? Henry Dubb Versus The Sceptred Awe’, David Marquand,
Political Quarterly, Spring 1993, p 210-221.
“ Ibid,p210-221.
The Acquisitive Society, R.H. Tawney, G. Bell & Sons Ltd, 1926, p.5.
8There are, William Temple proposes, “three principles of a moral social order... 
Freedom, Fellowship and Service’’.^  Tawney fought for these principles. The ideal of 
fellowship, Ross Terrill submits, motivates his resolve to “reclaim fraternity for 
socialism”.^ Fellowship, Terrill insists, is at the heart of Tawney’s thought. He would 
support William Temple’s unqualified declaration that “to establish and secure true 
freedom is the primary object of all right political action”.^  Freedom, Tawney would 
agree, “is the goal of politics”.^ ^
Indeed, a critical analysis of Tawney’s work, and in particular EQUALITY which 
after sixty years remains the classic interpretation of the egalitarian case, plainly 
demonstrates that while his objective is to secure fundamental equalities, to equalise 
opportunities of education, of environment, of welfare, his essential concern is with the 
extension and more equal distribution of freedom. And, Tawney not only presses for 
freedom, he is prepared to define i t  Liberty, for Tawney, is made effective not by the 
proclamation of formal rights or even by legislation which purports to guarantee i t  
Liberty, he argues, is secured by making men and women capable of freedom. It is made 
effective, when, through an equalisation of power, the individual has control over his or 
her economic life. It demands, too, such social and political arrangement as will allow 
every man and woman to develop their endowments, to employ their talents, to deepen 
their spiritual understanding.^
As for the third principle of moral social order - Service, Tawney advances the 
notion of Function. The confrontations, the resentments and the privileges of industrial 
capitalism, he argues, must give way to an industrial order motivated not by private
* Christianity and Social Order, William Temple, SJ^.C.K., 1942, p .77.
a R Ji. Tawney and His Times, Ross Terrill, Andre Deutsch, 1974, p.199.
Christianity and Social Order, William Temple, p.67.
Ibid, p.67.
^  Freedom, William Temple proposes, "is a great word sometimes superficially understood". 'To
those who have enough o f this world's goods", he suggests, "the claim to freedom often means 
'Leave us alone'". 'To those who have not enough", he submits, "it means 'Give us a chance'". 
See Christianity and Social Order, William Temple, p.68.
interest but by public service. Industry, he insists, must be subordinated to the 
community. Its purpose, he proposes, “is to render service...it should find its 
satisfaction...in the end which it serves”.^  “It’s function”, he declares, “is service; its 
method is association”."
For Tawney, industrial capitalism has no such function, no such method. It grants 
reward without contribution; its concern is with profits and property rights rather than 
with service. What it implies, he asserts, “is that the foundation of modem economic 
civilisation is found not in functions but in rights which are anterior to, and independent 
of, any service which an individual may rendef’.^  Such a foundation destroys fellowship; 
such rights nullify fireedom. For Tawney, where men and women enjoy fellowship, they 
fineely serve: brothers and sisters do not exploit each other. Where there is equality there 
is mutual consideration. Where men and women, motivated by social responsibility, 
render service each to the other, they confirm fellowship; they establish rights; they 
respect rights. Tawney’s philosophy then, endorses William Temple’s postulation that 
“the combination of Freedom and Fellowship as principles of social life issues in the 
obligation of Service”.^  ^ It issues, too, in accordance with the Christian principle which 
commands all men... “Brethren, you have been called unto liberty...by love serve one 
another”. (Gal: 6:13)
It is this appeal to fundamental Christian principles which distinguishes Tawney’s 
thought and which at the same time creates its greatest problem. While in Britain the 
declared aims and aspirations of socialists have traditionally encompassed a distinct ethical 
component, Tawney’s socialism has a specific Christian content. His socialism is not only 
sustained by moral principles but by moral principles which he understands as specifically 
Christian. All forms of social and economic activity, he insists, “which hinder a Christian
* The Acquisitive Society, p 5
“ Ibid,p5-7.
Ib id ,p^ .
Christianity and Social Order, William Temple, p 5 .
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life, stand, ipso facto, condemned'*.  ^ A moral life, in acoordance with “God’s purpose”, 
he asserts, demands of men and women “a distinctively Christian way of life”." His 
socialism is motivated by his understanding of Christianity as “a dynamic and 
revolutionary force” which, he submits, challenges “‘not only the vices but the 
conventional virtues of the established society”.^  For Tawney, this ‘revolutionary force’ 
challenges that notion of charity which impels men and women to philanthropy in the 
belief that they are alleviating distress. For Tawney, such philanthropists act, in fact, to 
endorse an exploitive economic order, which, against all Christian principles, “refuses to 
treat men as ends or respect their personalities’’.^  ^ Indeedl, it is the respect for individual 
personalities, this commitment to the full development off such personalities which fuels 
his rejection of a Fabian inspired paternalistic, managerial social order. In England, he 
submits, “intellectual socialism has concentrated on sttate regulation; it has been 
collectivist; it has almost surrendered to the policy of communal o w n ersh ip ” .^ The 
middle class reformer, he insists, “is either moved to pity of the poor, anxious to relieve 
their suffering or tidying up regulations, etc.” For Tawney;, sympathy for the poor is in its 
way commendable. Yet, ultimately, sympathy is not enough. It is empathy, an 
understanding of the miseries and frustrations of the disadvantaged, which will move men 
and women to demand such social and economic arrangeiments as will ensure the rights 
and restore the dignity of their fellow citizens. The ‘miiddle-class reformers’, Tawney 
assets, “are convinced that principles are valueless”. Tawney, the Christian moralist, 
disagrees. “What we want”, he declares unequivocally, “is a restatement of principles”.^
* ‘A Note on Christianity and The Social Order’, 1937, sæe The Attack and Other Essays,
RJl.Tawney,
p . m .
“  Ibid, p.172.
lbid,p.l68.
The Commonplace Book, RH . Tawney, edited by J.M. Winter <and DM . Joslin, Cambridge 
University Press, 1972, entry for Aug. 20,1913.
^ Ibid, entry for Feb. 26,1913.
Ibid, entry for Feb. 26,1913.
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Yet while Tawney’s social philosophy is groumded in his Christian faith, as 
Anthony Wright points out, “his writings are not generalUy framed in Christian terms or 
presented as examplifications of Christian doctrines”.  ^Indleed, his appeal for EQUALITY 
calls on the spirit of Humanism, which, he argues, is not the exclusive possession of any 
particular body of religious doctrine. Humanism, he insists, is the anti-thesis of 
materialism. The humanist spirit, like the religious spirit, hie contends, “regards the whole 
fabric and mechanism of social institutions as means to  an end...the growth towards 
perfection of individual human beings”. ^ The humaniste spirit, he insists, upholds the 
dignity of man. It recognises “that the differences which diwide men are less important and 
fundamental than their common humanity”.^  There is, therefore, for Tawney, a Christian 
foundation to the arguments which he recommends to Chrüstians and non-Christians alike. 
In this way he addresses the obvious problem which arüses fiom his proposals. If the 
arguments were dependent solely on Christian moral pirinciples, they would have no 
relevance to non-Christians, and could to that extent be note only ineffective but divisive. If 
on the other hand the argument is presented in broad pragmatic or humanist terms, this 
difficulty is avoided.
For his own purposes and so far as Christians are concerned, Tawney, in the 
tradition of Christian Socialism rests his philosophy on this; recognition of men as brothers 
before God. This recognition, he holds, will move men and women to service, 
conscientiously extended in fellowship. Freedom, “the goal of politics”, is actualised, he 
insists, through such institutional organisation as will eqmalise the opportunity of each 
individual to develop their distinct qualities, to exercise their particular powers. For 
Tawney, such development compounded by fellowship wiill not only activate a sense of 
obligation towards the community, it will foster the undeirstanding of the individual as a 
responsible and participating citizen. This understanding endorses Tawney’s own
* R H . Tawney, Anthony Wright, Manchester University Press, 11987, p.l9
“  Equality, R.H. Tawney J931, (1964 edition used throughout this thesis), George Allen & Unwin,
p. 85186, passim.
Ibid, p. 86.
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commitment to a moral social order in which change is achieved by debate and 
negotiation which will enlist the “intelligent collaboration of contentions human 
beings...whom mutual confidence alone can enable to co-operate”.^  It is an order, W.H. 
Greenleaf proposes, of “collective responsibility for the welfare of all and the replacement 
of competition by co-operation”.^ It is an order which, for Tawney, “the social democrat 
par excellence”,^  rejects the scientific, calculating and paternalistic tendencies of 
^authoritarian collectivism* and replaces it with a democratic socialism of responsible and 
participating individuals. Such a socialism not only promotes individual development as 
an expression of a possible self: it seeks to establish a social order which will realise that 
possibility.
This concern to realise a possible self derives fix)m a tradition of Protestantism 
which commands individual responsibility, respects diligence and demands self-discipline. 
From this tradition there evolves an ethic which emphasises community, enjoins charity 
and judges spiritual development more valuable than material wealth. It is a tradition 
which acknowledges that fallible man, tempted by sin, is equally capable of salvation, that 
all men, equally, are “one in Christ Jesus’*. (Gal: 3:28) It is sustained by an unyielding 
belief in fireedom of conscience. Its adherents cherish the ideal of individual liberty which 
R.H. Tawney, even as he demands equality, insists is “the supreme political good”.^ ^
In insisting on freedom of conscience, Tawney thus detaches liberty from 
dependence on any particular Christian or indeed any other religious belief. He defines 
freedom in a way which makes it both precise and secular. There is, he submits, “no such 
thing as freedom in the abstract, divorced firom the realities of a particular time and
* Equality, RJI. Tawney,1931, (1964 edition used throughout this thesis), George Allen & Unwin,
p.188.
“ The British Political Tradition, W.H. Greenleaf, (Vol. 1), The Rise o f Collectivism, Routledge,
1983,p.293.
Postscript An Appreciation’, Hugh Gaitskell, see The Radical Tradition (essays by R.H. Tawney), 
George Allen and Unwin, 1964.
Equality, p.225.
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place”. He rejects as invalid a concept of freedom which defines liberty in terms of the 
absence of state coercion and demands, in the name of freedom of choice and individual 
action, the minimum of restraint.^ “The perpetual state of morbid irritation”,... “the 
unnatural tension”,... “the embittered struggle of classes, interests and groups”  ^ within 
industrial capitalism, he argues, is engendered precisely through such an interpretation of 
liberty. For Tawney, liberty does not mean comparative freedom from regulation: it 
inches the equalisation of power. Without the power to choose, he would agree, “the 
right to choose has no value”.^ For Tawney, then, a more equal distribution of economic 
power adds to the sum of effective liberty. It in creases the opportunity for self­
development; it promotes social cohesion; it fosters fellowship.
And fellowship is at the heart of Tawney’s philosophy. Fellowship, he insists, will 
not only encourage co-operation, it will ensure the rule of law, which, Tawney recognises 
as the necessary condition for the fiee exercise of mutually respected rights. In a fi:ee 
society, he acknowledges, “the primary, essential and fundamental liberties are normally 
secured by law”.^  The same laws, he allows, protects life, limb and property against a 
brutish Hobbesian ‘state of nature’ . Law, he perceives, safeguards liberty. It is law 
which will guarantee the conditions for individual development just as law demands self 
restraint in the interest of social harmony. Yet, for Tawney, liberty and the claim for “a 
life worthy of a human being which no decent man will withhold fix>m his fellows”^^  is 
ultimately secured when, in fellowship, men and women in co-operative effort (are united) 
by moral principles.
^  Professor Frederick Rosen disputes this concept o f negative freedom. 'Those who fight for 
liberty", he argues, “are usually intent upon resisting oppression and tyranny. What they seek is 
not necessarily to be left alone by government, but another government which will not be 
tyrannical", see Thinking About Liberty, F. Rosen, Inaugural Lecture, University College, 
London, Nov. 29,1990, p.13.
\ The Acquisitive Society, p.223-224, passim.
"  See Democratic Socialist Aims and Values, Labour Party Pamphlet, 1988.
Equality, p.227.
The Acquisitive Society, p J .
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Henry Dubb, it must be conceded, has not had an easy ride. He has, Tawney 
submits, endured the excesses of Capitalism... **a juggernaut sacrificing human ends to the 
idolatry of material means”.^  Dubb has survived the barbarity of war, faced the fear of 
unemployment, the disadvantages of bad education, the nniseries of ill-health. Henry has 
been tempted. Totalitarians of both left and right have appealed to his “muddled soul”. 
Yet, Tawney contends, “the loveable, pigheaded, exasperating Dubb, will not lightly yield 
such fragment of equality and liberty as he has contrived to snatch from his masters”." 
Nor, Tawney insists, will Henry support a Socialism which “puts him on a chain and 
prevents him from teaching manners to his exalted govermors”.^  Tawney approves. “In 
the interminable case of “Dubb V Superior persons and Co.,” he declares, “I am an 
unrepentant Dubbite”.^ ^
Henry, then, has no intention of surrendering the rights, which, so long denied, 
have been so reluctantly granted. Henry, Tawney reflects, has “respect for the elementary 
decencies”. He is sensitive on the subjects of personal liberty, freedom of speech, 
tolerance, the exclusion of violence from politics, parlianmentary government. He holds 
his independence dear, he resents paternalist interference,.... “the way in which they make 
us ignorant people live in the way they think we ought”.^ Henry (like Tawney) has no 
enthusiasm for the intrusions of “the progressive mandaiinate which set the tone of British 
public policy”^  in the immediate post-war period. Henry, “‘poor bloody infantryman”, has 
fought a war: he has been wimess to the tyranny of totalitarianism.^ Now, in an 
economic crisis, Henry, never at ease in ‘a culture of enterprise’, is disenchanted with the
* ‘Christianity and The Social Revolution’, 1935, see The Attack, R.H. Tawney, p .163.
lbid,p.l63.
Ibid, p .164.
Ibid, p.l64.
^ The Commonplace Book, entry for April 19,1912, record o f conversation with John Elkin, miner.
Christianity and The Social Revolution, p .l 63.
NB "Our home-grown theorists" (who have sympathised with some very repressive authoritarian
regimes) argue that "totalitarianism is distinguishable from amthoritarianism by the state’s need to 
conscript not just passivity, but assent and even enthusiasm, by its determination to abolish the 
private life". See Christopher Hitchens, The Twilight qjf Panzercommunismus’. The New 
Statesman, August, 1988.
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neo-libertarians. Disturbed by ‘the triumph of the economic virtues’ he is uncomfortable 
with it social values; he questions its individualist ideology. As always, he is suspicious 
of those who trawl the wilder shores of political thought. Perhaps, as Professor 
Marquand suggests, in the late part of the twentieth century, “the Tawney tradition may 
have more to say to Henry than any other”. Perhaps, Henry, “the common, courageous, 
good hearted, proletarian fool”  ^ will now demand a social order which ernphasises 
community and co-operation rather than economic egotism and the pursuit of self- 
interest.
Henry’s confidence in the established order is eroding. Certainly, he concedes, his 
children enjoy material benefits he only dreamed of. They are better educated; some have 
travelled; they are healthier. Yet, Henry has been scarred by the past; he is insecure in 
the present; he is fearful of the future. He fears for his livelihood; technology dents his 
pride, threatens his painfully acquired skills. And class divisions persist. There still 
remain inequalities of education, of environment, of health provision, even of life 
expectancy.^ Henry has seen privilege perpetuated; he has borne the ‘insolence of 
office’, suffered the cynicism of incumbency. Perhaps, now, at the edge of a new century, 
as Professor Marquand proposes... “it is time for Henry Dubb to come out of the cold”.“
The Tawney tradition as Professor Marquand suggests “is highly subversive”. It 
questions every established political orthodoxy. It even challenges the views of those 
democratic collectivists who erroneously suppose themselves to be followers of Tawney. 
Indeed, there are those conscientiously dedicated to the ideals of social democracy who.
* 'The Twilight o f The British State? Henry Dubb Versus The Sceptred Awe’, David Marquand,
(quoting Tawney).
^  Tables in the Central Statistical Office show the gap between rich and poor to be widening. The
relative income o f the poorest fifth o f households fell sharply from 6.9 o f the total in 1989 to 6.6 
in 1991. The post-tax income o f the richest fifth increased from 43 percent in 1989 to 44 percent. 
In 1991 the poorest fifth paid 292 percent o f disposable income on indirect taxes while this 
proportion dropped to 14.3 percent for the wealthiest 20 percent o f households. See Central 
Statistical Office Publication, ’Economic Trends’..June 1993.
"  'The Twilight o f The British State? Henry Dubb Versus The Sceptred Awe’, David Marquand,
p210-221.
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in the interest of what they perceive to be socially equitable, do not, as did Tawney, apply 
the litmus test of moral principle to social action. There are those socialists, too, who 
develop “a rather personal theory of democracy, who adopt the role in politics that is best 
characterised as that of the intellectual as expert”.^  such ‘experts’, John A. Hall proposes, 
tend to produce elitists political theories. Tawney, he argues, did not act as a political 
intellectual elitist but rather as a political intellectual moralist The distinction is easily 
determined. “Where I think the Fabians go wrong”, Tawney contended, “is that they 
seem to think you can trick statesmen into a good course of action without changing their 
principles, and that by taking sufficient thought, society can add several cubits to their 
stature”.^
Patently it is impossible to separate Tawney’s Christian principles fix>m the social 
and economic policies which evolve from them: they are intertwined. The one is informed 
with Christian social theory, the other with a universal and non-sectarian humanism. The 
whole body is illuminated by the ideals of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, values which a 
celebrated defender of a hierarchical order cursorily dismisses as “the device of the 
Revolution” (The Social Theories of T.S. Eliot, see Chapter IV). Yet, for Tawney, these 
ideals which have been perverted by the tyranny of totalitarianism and emasculated by the 
inequalities of industrial capitalism are vital, imperative, worth the struggle. His Christian 
understanding of men and women as “one as children of God” (John 11:52) is confirmed 
in the ideal of equality. Fraternity endorses that understanding. It motivates men and 
women to charity and tolerance. It makes an appeal, in multi-cultured, multi-ethnic 
societies diverse in religions, moral and philosophic principles, to the problematic 
conception of community culture; it encourages “the notion of citizenship and the 
common good”.^
* The Roles and Influence o f Political Intellectuals : Tawney vs Sidney Webb‘, see British Journal
o f Sociology, Vol28, No3, Sept. 1977, John A. Hall, p.351-361.
(( The Commonplace Book, RH . Tawney, see entry for Dec. 2,1912.
Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship, Andrew Vincent and Raymond Plant, Basil Blackwell, 1984,
p.180.
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This notion of “the common good” does not demand that each individual plan of 
life be directed towards a democratically agreed common objective. Certainly to secure 
the interest of the powerless and establish equity, Tawney demands a redistribution of 
material resources and economic power. Yet, for Tawney, “the common good” is not 
satisfied merely by re-distributive measures. The notion resides in a teleological concept 
which seeks to provide equally the opportunities for individual self-development For 
Tawney, the pursuit of “the common good” will foster the spirit of community, maximise 
individual liberty, and allow scope for the fulfillment of legitimate individual aspirations.
As for Liberty...
“When Liberty goes out of place it is not the first to go.
Nor the second or the third.
It waits for all the rest to go.
It is the last”.^
Liberty, then, for Tawney, “is the goal of all right political action”. He cherishes it. It is, 
he declares, “the supreme political good”."
Yet in spite of this unyielding commitment to liberty there are clearly difficulties 
with Tawney’s social and political philosophy. Even those who have shared his general 
political sympathies have worried about the practical application of an “appeal to 
principles” particularly when at the end of the twentieth century the notion of a unitary 
Christian Church is in no sense a feasible basis for social life. This thesis, therefore, will 
set out the principle features of Tawney’s moral argument and consider some of the 
difficulties associated with i t  It will compare it with other political arguments stemming
* To A FoiVd Revolutionaire’, Walt Whitman, 184811849, see Penguin Book o f Socialist Verse,
1970, p.80.
"  Equality, p.l64.
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from religious faith and assess the contemporary relevance of Tawney’s thought, To this 
end use has been made of unpublished material together with subsequently published 
material such as Tawney’s COMMONPLACE BOOK, (1912-1914). Principal attention, 
however, has been given to the published works since this work constitutes the public as 
opposed to the private Tawney.
In Chapters II and in  (and throughout the thesis) I will undertake a critical 
examination of Tawney’s principle writings both as social theorist and economic historian 
(including his COMMONPLACE BOOK, 1912-1914). Whilst this section will stress the 
moral content and the influence of Christian faith on his philosophy, I will argue that an 
analysis of his writings reveal that his socialism was motivated by political pragmatism as 
well as by moral principles.
Since Tawney and his contemporary T.S. Eliot the poet, playwright, essayist and 
social theorist were both committed Christians, I will seek to demonstrate, in Chapter IV, 
through a textual examination of their writings, the philosophic differences which evolve 
out of their personal interpretation of Christian teaching. I will demonstrate Eliot’s 
disapproval of democracy in contrast to Tawney’s defence of the democratic ideal. I will 
argue that although both Eliot and Tawney were united by their rejection of the 
institutions and values of industrial capitalism, they were divided by their understanding of 
the nature of man and the concept of human perfectibility.
In Chapter V I will present the principal anti-egalitarian argument which in the last 
quarter of the Twentieth Century has been levelled against the egalitarianism which 
Tawney defended. I will critically analyse these arguments which reject egalitarianism as 
deriving from envy, reacting against industrial efficiency and contrary to the ‘natural’ 
social order. Referring to Tawney’s writings and the views of various contemporary 
political philosophers, I will examine the pragmatic as well as the moral arguments for 
equality. I will, drawing on these writings, evaluate the anti-egalitarian argument which
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dismiss as incoherent and a threat to liberty the egalitarian notions of equality of 
opportunity, equality of education and equality of environment
In the Final Chapter I will address specific criticisms both sympathetic and 
censorious of Tawney’s philosophy. I will indicate the tensions, weaknesses and strengths 
of Tawney’s thought. I will emphasise Tawney’s commitment to democratic process in 
conclusion, in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society beset by social, political, economic and 
environmental problems, I will argue the contemporaiy relevance of the appeals to both 
moral principles and pragmatic reasons which permeate Tawney’s ethical socialist 
thought.
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CHAPTER n
T h e  Significant Connections”
Religion, The Church and the Principles of Social and Economic Life.
Puritanism
Mr. Griffith Jones:
Richard Hoggart: 
Mr. Griffith Jones:
(prosecuting) “You described this as a puritanical book. Is that 
your genuine and considered view?”
(defence witness) “Yes.”
(with gentlemanly superiority) “I think I must have lived my life 
under a misapprehension of the word ‘puritanical*. you help 
me?”
Richard Hoggart: (earnest and Mendly) “Yes, I will. Many people do live their lives 
under a misapprehension of the meaning of puritanical. The proper 
meaning (in Britain) to an historian is somebody who belongs to 
the tradition of British Puritanism, and the main weight of that is an 
intense sense of responsibility for one’s conscience. In that sense 
the book is puritanical. Heavy with conscience.”
Mr. Griffith Jones: “I am obliged to you for the lecture.’
Chorus:
(From the transcript o f the trial o f LADY CHATTERLEY’S 
LOVER'). Regina Versus Penguin Books, Ltd., 1960.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
“Nature sent man into the world alone without all company, to 
serve but one that I’ll do.”
Baterville: “True City Doctrine, Sir.”
‘The Shoemaker* s Holiday, published circa 1600, Thomas Dekker, 
1570-1632.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
“Thus far it appears what a vast circumference this world “Puritan” has, and how by its 
large acception it is used to cast dust in the face of all goodness, theological, civil or 
moral: so that scarce any moderate man can avoid its imputation.”
(Henry Parker) A DISCOURSE CONCERNING PURITANS. (2ND ED., 1641 ), P.60
quoted by Christopher Hill, SOCIETY AND PURITANISM IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY 
ENGLAND: Penguin Books, 1964.
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Introduction
Tawney had been witness to carnage. He had endured the horrors of trench 
warfare, he had been seriously wounded on the Somme in a battle of senseless slaughter. 
Yet in 1916 after the destruction of war, the world was not at peace. In Russia, the civil 
war had left the country devastated and on the brink of famine. At Versailles, the 
victorious allies had imposed harsh conditions on a defeated enemy; an army of 
occupation ruled over a hungry and resentful Saar and Rhineland. In Germany, there was 
fighting in the streets. Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Leibnecht had been murdered. In 
Bavaria, the premier had been assassinated, so too, had the Reich Finance Minister, 
Mathias Etzberger. In the east, the Baltic States were threatened by a ‘Frei Koips* 
composed of disaffected war veterans led by officers of extreme right-wing views 
motivated not only by patriotism but by promises of land for settlement. In Berlin, a 
bloody and abortive coup d’ état was staged by ultra-nationalists. The fall in the value of 
the Mark heralded the beginning of a runaway and crippling inflation. There was hunger, 
despair, disillusion. In Hungary, a short lived ‘Soviet Republic’ had been overthrown; its 
leaders had fled. There followed a ‘white’ terror of savage ferocity. In Italy, riots and 
widespread industrial unrest had led to the formation of workers’ councils, occupation of 
the factories and a general strike. Meanwhile, the squadristi of Mussolini’s Fasci di 
Combattimento were gathering the support which culminated in the ‘March on Rome’. In 
Britain, as the discharged servicemen returned to the factories, fields and offices, they 
were confronted with a less idealistic reality than the ‘Land Fit for Heroes’ which they had 
been promised. There were already present the seeds of social unrest and the declining 
economic conditions which were to bring about mass unemployment, deprivation and 
social strife. It was then, an uneasy peace, and as for the Treaty of Versailles which was 
to uphold it, Tawney warned... “it is the Macht-Politik of the ‘Acquisitive Society’ writ 
large”... “the consequences of which is war”. If, as Tawney declared... “the test of the 
objects of war is the peace which follows it”, then the forecast he had made in 1916 was
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prescient.... “We have slaved for Rachel”, he noted sombrely, “but it looks as if we have 
got to live with Leah”.i
Yet, inspired by his Christian Socialist belief, Tawney, in spite of the 
disappointments and betrayed hopes, set out in books, articles, pamphlets and journalism 
the principles of a new equitable social order. In these writings, Tawney “brought to the 
study of economic history the same assumptions which underline his critique of social 
thought”. ^ The works, are informed by a central concern .. “ to deepen the discussion 
of economic issues by reference to ethical dilemmas”. ^  This central concern is made 
particularly apparent in his first full-length work of social theory, THE ACQUISmVE 
SOCIETY, as it is in his most celebrated work of economic history, RELIGION AND 
THE RISE OF CAPITALISM.
Tawney and the Ethical Tradition in English Radical Politics
Tawney’s work, both as social theorist and academic historian is always concerned 
with the ethical dimension. It evolves out of a socialist conviction which rejects a vision 
of society as merely an economic mechanism in thrall to unmonitored market forces. It 
derives from a tradition of English ethical thought which encompasses such thinkers as 
Thomas More, John Ruskin, Charles Kingsley, Wm Morris, Wm Cobbett, Robert 
Blatchford, L.T. Hobhouse, and more recently figures such as T.H. Marshall and Richard 
M. Titmuss. The writing is permeated by Tawney’s understanding that ethical values 
cannot be divorced firom social, political and economic issues. It derives, too, from a 
socialism grounded in the religious conviction that “morality is superior to dogma and that
* ‘Some Reflections o f a Soldier^ R.H. Tawney. (first published in The Nation), Oct. 1916, see The
Attack, p.22.
"  The Agrarian Problem In The Sixteenth Century. RJI. Tawney, first published by Longman Green,
1912, see Introduction by Lawrence Stone, 1967 edition. Harper and Row.
Introduction to Tawney's Commonplace Book, April 1912 - December 1914, JM . Winter Æ D. 
Joslin, 1970, Cambridge University Press 1972, pXIX-XX.
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the quality of people’s lives matters more than their material achievements”.^  Tawney’s 
argument is illuminated by a Christian faith which demands, ‘porro unum necessaiium’, 
the practical application of Christian morality into every sphere of human activity 
regardless of economic or political expediency. It is informed by... “a socialist Christian 
ideology in which”, Donald Soper insists, “the ultimate value is always Christianity”.^ 
The work, then, is an expression of a socialism so buttressed by Christian ethical thought, 
so impregnated with Christian faith, that Norman Dennis and A.H. Halsey are prompted 
to declare that... ‘Tawney’s conception of the social order began with the New 
Testament”.^
Tawney’s Understanding of The Role of Ideas Values and Principles
While Tawney the historian is concerned to trace the ecclesiastic, economic, 
political and social changes which evolved out of the Reformation, Tawney the social 
theorist and Christian socialist is equally concerned to identify the consequences of these 
changes on contemporary industrial capitalism. But beyond the eloquence, beyond the 
facts and the findings, the assessments and the conclusions, his work is permeated by a 
sense of regret. The regret does not, however, evolve 6om a nostalgic longing for a 
‘Merrie England’ that never was. Tawney had no illusions about the miseries, ignorance 
and superstitions of the middle ages. He did not yearn for the return of an idealised 
‘golden age’ in which each man, might live his life within a ‘chain of being’, a hierarchy of 
responsibility and duty, of command and obedience according to God’s divine will 
Nevertheless a sense of regret persists throughout his historical works. It persists as he 
records how in the face of a changing social order the traditional Christian values were
* The New Statesmen, 'A Man For All Seasons', Obituary on the death o f R.H. Tawney, Jan. 19,
1962.
“  'Socialism...an Enduring Creed'. The Reverend The Lord (Dr. Donald) Soper, see 'Lecturers in
memory o f R.H. Tawney’ and see 'Fellowship, Freedom & Equality', David Ormrod (editor), 
published by Christian Socialist Movement, 1990, p.47.
English Ethical Socialism, Norman Dennis and A.H. Halsey, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, 
p.151.
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eroded within a society which, “intoxicated by material possibilities, divorced economic 
from moral considerations”.  ^ It persists in RELIGION AND THE RISE OF 
CAPITALISM as Tawney records the triumph of economic individualism as homo 
credulous gave way to homo economicus. The regret is patent as Tawney chronicles how 
traditional social bonds were broken and long established ethical premises discarded. 
There is regret as the ... “appetitus divitiarum infinitus” prevails over recognised 
obligations of stewardship and service. It is manifest even as Tawney insists that... “the 
task of an historian is not to appraise the validity of an idea but rather to understand its 
development”.^ It is, however, in the preface of the 1937 edition of RELIGION AND 
THE RISE OF CAPITALISM that the source of the regret can be most clearly identifîed. 
He wryly notes that eleven years after the book was first published, to employ the term 
Capitalism, once regarded as unsuited to an historical study, was no longer perceived as a 
manifestation of... “sinister intent” but was now acknowledged as a recognisable 
economic phenomenon. ... “Capitalism”, he declared, “is a fact” and... “no historian will 
make much of the last three centuries if they ignore it”.^  There is another equally 
significant fact, he ruefully insists, which evolved fix>m changes brought about by 
Capitalism. The premise that... “Trade is one thing, and religion another”,^  ^ which, he 
claimed, would have been... “an audacious novelty” before the advent of Capitalism was 
now accepted as a commonplace. This distasteful premise, Tawney insists, rests on the 
notion conceived in the sixteenth century, encouraged in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and triumphant in the nineteenth, that religion and commerce were two separate 
spheres neither of which had the right to encroach on the other. It was a victory, Tawney 
grimly notes, which was... “a long time being won”.^ Constantly propounded and 
commonly accepted during the great era of industrial expansion, Tawney ironically 
suggests that... “its early proponents would have felt some embarrassment at its later
* The Agrarian Problem In The Sixteenth Century, R.H. Tawney, First Published by Longman
Green, 1912 see Harper & Row, 1967 edition, p. 4081409.
“  Religion and The Rise o f  Capitalism, Introduction, p. Vlll.
Ibid, p.Vlll.
Ibid, p.Vlll.
V Ibid, p.Vlll.
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inteipretations”. The ‘victory* had ultimately produced industrial capitalism. It had 
created an economic system which acted against fellowship, nourished self-seeking and 
rejected social responsibility. The seeds of the religious and social changes which were 
sown in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries have blossomed into the ACQUISITIVE 
SOCIETY which Tawney, historian, Christian moralist and social theorist, so vigorously 
denounces.
The notion of the separation of religion and commerce, had, Tawney insisted, been 
historically opposed, first by the Schoolmen, then by the Reformation. It had been 
strenuously resisted by those Tudor Statesmen anxious to preserve the traditional 
religious sanctions. It had been reviled by the Calvinists who had sought to establish an 
economic order in keeping with their religious principles. However, Tawney argued, 
whatever differences of doctrine or ecclesiastic procedure divided the opposition, they 
were held together by one cardinal assumption,... “the institutions of property, the 
transactions of the market-place, the whole fabric of society and the whole range of its 
activities, stand by no absolute title’*...but... “must justify themselves at the bar of 
religion**.^  The entire opposition was united, if not by Christian brotherhood, then at least 
by a Christian precept. Christianity, they all agreed... “has no more deadly foe than the 
unbridled indulgence of the acquisitive appetite”. All would have denied a common 
understanding of Christian faith with those... “Who run greedily after the error of Baalam 
for reward” (Jude XI). The established order in which the authority of the Church had 
maintained social cohesion and imposed social discipline was challenged by a new 
philosophy which encouraged individualism and rewarded, not the obedient, but the 
enterprising. It was, as Tawney noted, an erosion of... “a social philosophy based 
ultimately on religion” (in favour of)... “an age of economic enterprise, which enclosed
Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, Introduction, p.VIII.
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land and speculated on the exchanges”; it led, he concluded... “to the collapse of public 
morality in a welter of disorderly appetites”.^
For Tawney, “tracing the significant -connections”, ‘the rise of capitalism’ was 
inextricable intertwined with the erosion of the traditional Christian values. The notion 
that in a Christian community... “the higher must consider the lower and the lower answer 
in like manner to the higher so that each is in turn a member of the other” gave way to an 
ethic which saw in economic prosperity a sign of spiritual grace. It is this lost notion of 
mutual responsibility, this idea of fellowship sustained by the Christian precept.. “For we 
are members one of another” (EPH. 4.25) ... which Tawney regrets. The Church, he 
insists, in the face of the growth of individualism, expanding financial and commercial 
enterprise, was... “theoretically abandoned”. It was abandoned, he argues, because it 
had... “turned its face from the practical world”.^ In an age of new discoveries, new 
perceptions and new demands, it had nothing to offer save... “piety imprisoned in a 
shrivelled mass of desiccated formulae”"^  In the new environment of... “economic energy 
in action and realist intelligence in economic thought”, the Church was no longer 
effectual. Its social teachings discounted, its moral authority rejected, it slowly ceded its 
claims to spiritual and temporal leadership. Where society had been seen as a spiritual 
organism, there was now installed a doctrine which saw in the pursuit of economic self- 
interest the operation of... “the providential plan which is the law of God”.^  ^ The Church 
which had once been... “the keystone which held together the social edifice” had been 
relegated... “to one department within in”.  ^ In the two centuries fix)m the Reformation to 
the Restoration, the secular and religious aspects of life which were once regarded as 
inseparable were now separate and independent provinces. The “struggles of moral 
resistance” which Anthony Wright argues Tawney admired and “sought to retrieve for his
* R.H. Tawney's introduction to A Discourse Upon Usury by Thomas Wilson, 1572, Frank Cass &
Co. Ltd, London, 1925.
“  Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p.189
Ibid,p.l89.
Ibid, p.257.
V Ibid,p.273.
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own generation, were lost”.^  The... “secularisation of political thought”, Tawney argues,... 
“had profound reactions of social speculation”. In England at least, he insists,... “the 
whole perspective had been revolutionised”. From this revolution, there evolved political 
liberty, democratic process, social progress. From this revolution in religious thought 
which... “helped to mould the social order and was in turn moulded by it”," there evolved 
those forces, political and economic, which prepared the way for industrialism - the ‘Rise 
of Capitalism’ and the ‘Acquisitive Society’.
In his inaugural lecture delivered at the London School of Economics in 1932, 
Tawney, in an attempt to define the task of the historian, argued that it was a Professor of 
Moral Philosophy, Adam Smith, rather than an “annalist or an antiquarian” who had 
first., “seen the clue to the progress of civilisation in Europe”. It was Smith’s attempts at 
philosophic history which had traced the emancipation of economic interests from... “the 
tyranny of custom, predatory class ambitions and the obstruction of governments pursuing 
sinister ends”. The central theme of the ‘WEALTH OF NATIONS^ Tawney insists, is 
historical and no one who studies the work will doubt that, without... “several generations 
of historical investigation”, it could not have been w ritten.^ Similarly, he pays tribute to 
De Tocqueville and Saint Simon for their perceptions concerning the connections between 
economic and political history. He acknowledges, too, the contribution to the study of 
history by the young Marx particularly for his understanding that... “juristic relations and 
political forms are not to be understood by themselves but are rooted in the material 
conditions of life”. Tawney the historian, in spite of his disagreements with Marx the 
social theorist, argues, that as far as history is concerned with the economic foundations 
of society... “serious history today, whether Marxian or not, is inevitably post Marxian”.^
* RH . Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.123.
"  Religion and The Rise o f  Capitalism, Introduction to 1937 edition, pJCII.
^  Tawney (in 1932) remarks on the naivete o f those 'political populisers' who select from Adam
Smith's writings those quotations and 'snippets o f doctrine' which suit their interests. The
practice, unfortunately, is still prevalent.
‘The Study o f Economic History’, R.H. Tawney, 1933, see History and Society, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978, p.48-65.
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It is unreal, Tawney argues, for an historian to isolate political and religious development 
from its economic and social background; the only adequate history, is T’histoire 
integral*. In the same lecture Tawney argues that the study of history is not only 
concerned with... “a series of past events but of the life of society and with the records of 
the past as a means to that end’* .^  Part of the historian’s business, he argues,... “is to 
substitute more significant connections for those of chronology”. It is important to 
understand that if society...
“is to be master of its fate, if reason is to conquer chance, and conscious direction 
deliver human life from the tyranny of nature and the follies of man, the first condition is a 
realistic grasp of the materials to be handled and the forces to be tamed”.^
The historian, Tawney claims... “serves on his own humble plane, that not ignoble end”.
In the first of the Scott Holland lectures, Tawney argued that the most suitable 
beginning for a foundation established to commemorate the late Canon of Christ Church 
would have been... “either an examination of the spiritual problems concealed beneath the 
economic mechanism of our society or a philosophic discussion of the contribution which 
religion can make to their solution”. Indeed, as Charles Gore reminds us in a prefatory 
note to the first edition of RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, the course of 
lectures which were to be delivered triennially were to have as their subject “the religion 
of the reincarnation in its bearing on the social and economic life of man”. Tawney, 
somewhat modestly, declared that he had chosen the humbler task of trying to... “give an 
account of the history of opiition during one critical period - the period immediately 
preceding the Reformation and the two centuries which followed it”. Clearly this task is
^  The lecture was subsequently published in 1933 under the title The Study o f Economic History'. 
It is now included in History and Society, a collection o f essays by R H . Tawney, edited by JM . 
Winter, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1978.
* The Study o f Economic History’, R.H. Tawney, 1933, see History and Society, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1978, p M .
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an expression of the economic historian’s belief in the impact of ideas and the influence of 
moral values on the historical process. It is this belief compounded by Christian faith 
which motivates the commitment of the social theorist to a politics of moral principles.
An Appeal to Principles: The Functional Society and Social Reconstruction
Firm in the conviction that “social institutions are a visible expressions of the scale 
of moral values”,  ^ Tawney insisted that society re-evaluate the values of industrial 
capitalism. The confrontations, the inequalities of wealth, power, status and opportunity, 
he argued are the inevitable consequences of an economic order predicated on self interest 
and motivated by the spirit of acquisition. This economic order, he insisted, must give 
way to “The Functional Society” in which men and women in co-operation rather than 
competition fulfil the true purpose of industry and “provide the community with some 
service which it requires”. Such a social order grounded in community entails the 
recognition of rights mutually extended of responsibilities mutually accepted. It must 
appeal to standards other than the demands of the market place or the pressures of 
economic expediency. It must, in short, have “recourse to principles” which for Tawney 
is a necessary condition for social reconstruction.
Tawney castigates the class-ridden structure of British economic and social life. 
He attacks an educational system which perpetuates class division and creates class 
conflict He rails against an industrial system in which men who contribute neither labour 
nor expertise are permitted to enjoy the fruits of another’s toil. Yet in this relatively early 
work, although Tawney is concerned with equity, he is not primarily concerned with 
equality, a value to which he gave much subsequent attention. Nor, except in a wider 
sense, does he present a case for liberty, although he insists that the industrial problem is a 
question “first of function, secondly of Freedom”. There is, however, running through the
The Acquisitive Society, p.l3.
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work an implicit plea which permeates everything that Tawney ever wrote, every battle he 
ever fought. It is a plea for fraternity. It is for the sake of fraternity, ‘the right order of 
life’ that Tawney insisted in 1912... “the industrial problem is a moral problem, a problem 
of learning as a community to reprobate certain courses of conduct and to approve 
others”.^  It is for the sake of fraternity that Tawney proposes a community of common 
purpose, a society directed towards agreed common ends.
Tawney’s commitment to social unity is grounded in the belief that social 
organisation is an expression of moral values. Yet, if, as Hugh Gaitskell asserted, Tawney 
was “the best man I have ever known”," he plainly demonstrates that apart from 
saintliness, he could also display the wrath of an Old Testament prophet.^  ^  As Richard 
Crossman proposed, even as Tawney postulated a vision of an equitable and fratemal 
society, he denounced an “England of privilege in which a whole apparatus of class 
institution make not only the income, but the housing, education, heath and manners, 
indeed, the physical appearance of different classes of Englishmen almost as different from 
each other as though the minority were alien settlers established among the rude 
civilisation of a race of impoverished aborigines’’. ^ ^  There is righteous anger for a 
society in which the rights of property are absolute, ‘irrespective of any social function, 
any contribution to social purpose which the owner may perform’. There is contempt for
i The Commonplace Book, entry for June 10,1912.
"  Hugh Gaitskell, 'An Appreciation ofR.H. Tawney’, see The Radical Tradition, p.214..
In the 1930’s "when a Labour Government had tried and failed, Tawney became not the visionary 
preacher o f Christian Socialism but a fierce Micah, castigating the chosen people for their 
shortcomings and prophesying doom unless their leaders repented". Richard Crossman, 1960, 
quoted by David Ormrod in Introduction to Fellowship, Freedom and Equality, published by 
Christian Socialist Movement, 1990.
Tawney’s disgust with the social conditions endured by his fellow countrymen was shared by 
Robert Blatchford, 1951-1943, editor the The Clarion’, "Britain", Blatchford asserted, comparing 
the owning classes to an "alien force" exploiting an "aboriginal" population, "does not belong to 
the British: it belongs to a few o f the British, who employ the bulk o f the population as servants or 
as workers". There exists, he argued, "among the owning classes a state o f useless luxury and 
pernicious idleness, among the working class a state o f drudging toil, o f wearing poverty and 
anxious care". Like Tawney, Blatchford moved by moral indignation declared, "this state o f  
affairs is contrary to Christianity ... justice and reason". See Britain for the British, Robert 
Blatchford, Clarion Press, 1902, (frontispiece). Ironically, this title, used as a slogan by the 
British Union o f Fascists in the 1930’s, is still employed, against every Christian principle o f  
brotherhood, by racist groups.
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“a society which values neither culture nor beauty but only the power which belongs to 
wealth”... “in which gain is divorced from service, in which privilege is established as a 
national institution”. Tawney’s indignation is fired by “a doctrine in which economic 
rights are anterior and independent of function”.* Such a doctrine, he insists, will surely 
find no place in a society of co-operation and common purpose. On March 26, 1913, 
Tawney wrote in his Commonplace Book... ‘Too much time is spent today upon 
outworks by writers who pile up statistics and facts, but never get to the heart of the 
problem”... “that heart is not economic”; it is a question of moral relationships. This is 
the citadel which must be attacked... “the immoral philosophy which underlines modem 
industry”.
Tawney attacks the citadel; he pillories the injustices of modem industrialism; he 
denounces the waste, the extravagance. He derides a philosophy which holds that private 
and public interests are coincidental, and that “man’s self-love is God’s Providence”.^ He 
rejects the notion that individual rights are the centre and pivot of society; he condemns 
the fact that such rights are still the “most powerful element in political thought, the 
practical foundation of industrial organisation”. He wams against the “fetish worship of 
economic activity”... “which Industrialism has elevated into the standard by which all 
other interests are judged”.*** We have witnessed, Tawney claims a breakdown of the 
organisation of society in which individual rights are divorced from obligation. The Great 
War, he asserts, was a manifestation of that perversion of nationalism which produced 
imperialism just as the perversion of individualism is industrialism both of which are based 
on the defective principle that the rights of nations and the right of individuals are 
absolute. Here, Tawney’s warning is apocalyptic. In a world in a world of unlimited 
claims, where the possibilities of increasing military power is limitless, there can be no 
peace between nations. In the same way, in a community of unrestrained individualism
The Acquisitive Society, p23. 
Ibid, p.30.
** Ibid, p.48.
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and absolute rights, there can be no harmony. For Tawney, individualism is the outwork 
of the citadel; it has not fulfilled the noble ideas of The Enlightenment; it has instead 
degenerated into a competitive and exploitive commercialism. As long as men move on 
this plane, Tawney argues, there is no solution to the economic and social ills which beset 
mankind. If society is to be healthy, if men and women are to live in unity and fellowship, 
they must first regard themselves as trustees for the discharge of functions, as instruments 
of social purpose.
In certain respects, Tawney’s proposals for a Functional Society share an affinity 
with Guild Socialism as projected by S.G. Hobson or A.J. Penty. They even share some 
common ground with Hilaire Belloc’s notion of ‘distributism’, although Tawney would 
reject the strong traditionalist and hierarchical elements of Belloc’s system .^ In the 
early 1920’s, Tawney declared a broad sympathy for such schemes ‘ ... though possibly an 
unorthodox Gild (sic) Socialist”, he stated, and certainly disagreeing with some of its 
opponents ... “I welcome it because it has drawn English Socialism into the mainstream of 
the socialist tradition which has as its object not merely the alleviation of poverty but an 
attack on the theory of the functionless society.”^
Raymond Williams suggests that “the two most important elements in THE 
ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY are the general discussion of changes in social theory and an 
analysis of the idea of industrialism”, h The two elements, however, are interdependent
^  See Restoration O f The Guild System A J. Penty, 1906 see also S.G. Hobson National Guilds and 
other works. The Servile State, Hilaire Belloc (1912), GD.H. Cole, Guild Socialism Restated and 
other works. See also the writings o fR A . Orage, editor o f the Literary and Political Journal New 
Times, who also wrote for G.K. Chesterton's Distributorly, see Rodney Barker Political Ideas In 
Modern Britain, M. Methuen and Company, 1978, page 98-104 passim.
Curiously, Orage, an early Fabian and member o f the Independant Labour Party "became an 
ardent Theosophist, a diciple o f Gurdjieff". Hollbrook Jackson, the literary historian and critic 
(1874 -1948) wrote in The Windmill, Volume 3, Number 11,1948, that Orage wanted "to create a 
Nietzsche circle in which Plato and Blavatsky, Fabianism and Hinduism, Shaw, Wells and 
Edward Carpenter should be blended with Nietzsche as the catalytic". See Mcuiame Blavatsky's 
Baboon. Peter Washington, Seeker and Warburg 1993, page 202 
* See The Tawney Papers, British Library o f Political and Economic Science (speeches on various
occasions, undated). 
h Culture and Society, Raymond Williams, Hogarth Press, 1987, p.217.
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Certainly, Tawney the historian traces the changes in social and political thought which 
emerged in the 18th century. He analyses the economic, social and philosophic evolution 
of industrial capitalism, pointing to its genesis in the Enlightenment and its endorsement in 
the American Constitution and French Declaration of the rights of Man. Tawney 
identifies the roots of Industrialism as evolving fix>m the just demands and social and 
economic fi:eedom which resulted not only from man’s changed perception of the world 
but also of their place within it. These legitimate claims for the abolition of economic 
privilege, which were the driving force for the demands for equality, he argues, have been 
largely counter-balanced by the growth of the inequalities springing from Industrialism.
The answer to these problems, Tawney argues, is not to be found by middle-class 
reformers seeking to alleviate the sufferings of the poor. The problem, he insists, (with a 
veiled reference to the Fabians), will resist paternalistic adjustment to the social order. He 
demands a radical moral transformation rather than a more benevolent Capitalism. ... 
“What is required”, he declares, “is a restatement of principles”. What is required is 
moral reform rather than social tinkering which left intact the ethical assumptions of 
industrialism. As for the working class, Tawney, in spite of his admiration for the good 
sense and common decency of Henry Dubb, is not optimistic. ... “They look to the 
recovery of the booty as the greatest social reform” ... but in a society where the... “moral 
relations are felt to be unjust, “there is no use devising relief schemes”. Nor, Tawney 
insists, can we look to the English Labour Movement to correct the iniquities of 
functionless ownership. The ‘Movement’ he had written in 1914... “had made one tragic 
mistake”... “it has aimed at comfort, instead of aiming for their rights”... “they can be 
bought off by instalments of social reform”.^  This sad, rather than scornful assessment of 
The Labour Movement has its contemporary supporters among those who value social 
justice. ... “The Left”, David Marquand asserts,... “has been in certain respects as 
individualistic in its assumptions and behaviour as the Right”... “it has advocated public
* The Commonplace Book, entry for November (undated, 1914).
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intervention not in the interests of the community, but, as a means of satisfying private 
aspirations and sectional demands”.^  The Left, in short, has shown a willingness to put 
the narrow interests of particular groups before the common good, an assessment which 
coincides with Tawney’s reflection that... “The Labour Movement aims at comfort, not 
rights, including the right to do their duty”.“ Industrialism, which creates dissension, also 
grants power, but for Tawney, it is power without moral purpose. Such power, he 
submits, cannot inspire men and women to value social duty before narrow self-interest.
In presenting his arguments for a society of Function, Tawney subjects the notion 
of functionless property to critical examination. His main thrust is centred upon what, he 
insists, is a substantive principle of Industrial Capitalism; its maintenance of the absolute 
rights of property. ... “Property Rights”, Tawney insists, are in essence. Rights secured 
by the state.^ He sees such rights as instruments by which the economically powerful, 
can, in the name of individual liberty, determine the economic lives of the economically 
powerless. Against those champions of property who see any attack on such rights as a 
manifestation of the desire of egalitarians to create a system entirely wedded to the total 
abolition of private property, he argues that certain types of property must be protected. 
There must be no strictures against “the simple property of the small landowner, the small 
proprietor, the craftsman and especially the household ‘gods’ and ‘dear’ domestic 
amenities which is what the word property means to the guileless minds of clerks and 
shopkeepers when the cry is raised ‘property’ is threatened”.^  ^ Tawney insists that the 
free disposal of a sufficiency of personal possessions is the condition of a healthy and self 
respecting society. There will be, therefore, in a ‘Functional Society’ no desire to 
establish... “a visionary communism in which all property is held in common”. Property 
must be allowed to return to its true nature which has been perverted by a doctrine which
* 'A Language o f Community’, David Marquand, see The Alternative, edited by Ben Pimlott, 
Anthony Wright, Tony Flower, WH. Allen, 1990.
The Commonplace Book, entry for November ( undated, 1914).
The Acquisitive Society, p.92.
Ibid,p.79.
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insists that... “the particular forms of private property which exist at any moment are a 
thing sacred and inviolable’’.^  A theory of property which had been advanced by the 
English Parliamentarians and the French philosophers in defence of the small holdings of 
yeomen, the tools of craftsmen and the stock in trade of merchants against... “the hangers 
on at St. James or the country parasites at Versailles”^ had been hijacked in the name of 
economic development and acquisitive industrialism. This, he submits, is a false concept 
of individual rights. There is a difference, he argues, between property used by its owner 
in the conduct of his profession or in the upkeep of his household, and property which is 
in effect a claim on wealth produced by other men’s labour. Such claims are a product of 
‘Functionless’ property; they act against fellowship; they carmot unite men, for what 
unites them is a bond of service to what they perceive as a common purpose. 
Functionless property, for Tawney, sustains a society which dissolves moral principles 
into a choice of personal expedience; a society which elevates the individual into the 
centre of his own universe. Functionless property is a denial of what for Tawney is the 
‘essence of all morality’. ... “The belief that every human being is of infinite importance, 
and therefore no consideration of expediency can justify the oppression of one by 
another”.^
Yet if Tawney deplores the institution of property without function on moral 
grounds, he also lambastes it for its inefficiency and wastefulness. He is appalled at the 
reliance on the uncontrolled mechanics of the market place and the ensuing proliferation 
of luxury goods which fill the shop windows of Regent Street when there is so evident a 
need for basic necessities. Yet he does not propose a centralised productive system. His 
criticism of the arbitrary and profligate nature of Capitalism evolves from the belief that 
the institution of functionless property, compounded by the assumption that the free 
exercise of individual rights is the main interest of society, turns social life... “into a scene
* The Commonplace Book, entry for November ( undated, 1914). 
Ibid, entry for November (undated, 1914).
Ibid, entry for 13 Aug. 1913.
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of fierce antagonism”...and a... “barely disguised social war” within a society which holds 
that all economic activity is equally justifiable. This notion of property rights is perverse 
and wasteful. It makes unnecessary payments to superfluous middlemen, to owners of 
royalty rights, to beneficiaries of ground rents, all of whom receive in the name of 
property, none of whom contribute. Property thus becomes a sleeping partner, a 
residuary legatee without responsibility. ... “Possession”, remarks Tawney (quoting 
Meredith’s Sir Willoughby Patteme), “without obligation to the object possessed, 
approaches felicity”. ^  A society so organised without social obligation or responsibility 
cannot be harmonious. Where there should be unity there is division. Where there should 
be common purpose there is rancour. Where there should be camaraderie there is 
conflict
Ethics and Usury: An Emerging Order
Tawney, Lawrence Stone proposes, saw history as “a branch of moral 
philosophy”... he “saw moral judgement as central to the historian’s task”.i Nowhere, is 
this concern with moral judgement as evident as in Tawney’s discussions of usury. For 
Tawney, the recognition of usury as a respectable tool of commercial enterprise destroyed 
a scheme of social ethics which saw economic interests as a secondary aspect of human 
life. That a man might without sin loan money upon interest set the scene for change 
which brought about a new social and economic order. These changes, Tawney argues, 
were revolutionary: fuelled by economic initiative and restless experimentation “they had 
no regard either for the word of God or the welfare of this realm”.^ Yet while the 
economic historian argues that these changes “ushered in the modem world”, the social 
theorist questions the benefits of modem commercialism and the modem conceptions of 
economic expediency. Social arrangements, the Christian moralist claims, which, in the
^  See The Egoist, George Meredith, 1828-1909.
* The Agrarian Problem In The Sixteenth Century, R.H. Tawney, first published Longman Green,
1912, see Introduction by Lawrence Stone, 1967 edition. Harper and Row.
"  Ibid, p.409.
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pursuit of self-interest have “contempt for the restrictions which fetter them”, must be 
challenged... “whether in the Sixteenth Century or in our own day”. ^
Tawney, seeking the “significant connections” takes as a starting point the 
Christian attitudes of the sixteenth and seventeenth century towards the usurer ... “a great 
taker of advantages, an oppressor of his neighbour (who) fears not God, neither regards 
he man”. " Indeed, Richard Baxter’s judgement provides inspiration for Tawney’s regret 
for a vanished, more Christian, more firatemal social order. It is lawful, Baxter, a pious 
and pragmatic Presbyterian asserts, to... “lend upon usury”... “when it does not violate 
either the rule of piety to God or is against justice or charity to men”.^  It is sinful, he 
insists, “when it is used against justice or charity to our neighbour”...(for) ... “justice 
obligeth me to give him more than his own”.^  ^ As for lending, Baxter argues... “it is a 
duty when we have it and our brother’s necessity requires it”.  ^ Where a loan granted to 
relieve the temporary misfortune of an unfortunate neighbour was seen as an act of 
Christian charity, usury “the brat of heresy” was denounced as un-Christian, exploitive, 
extortion.
Usury, Tawney suggests in his introduction to Dr. Thomas Wilson’s *A 
DISCOURSE ON USURY\ was the most burning social question of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. The practice of usury, he argues, in RELIGION AND THE RISE 
OF CAPITALISM, was, after the swift rise of a commercial civilisation, at the centre of 
the struggle for economic and social change. The issue at stake, was more than ... “a 
legal technicality” or even a matter of scriptural interpretation. Baxter’s answers, then, 
reflect a society in which the actions of men towards their fellows is determined not
* The Agrarian Problem In The Sixteenth Century, R.H. Tawney, first published Longman Green,
1912, see Introduction by Lawrence Stone, 1967 edition. Harper and Row., p.409.
“  A Christian Directory, Richard Baxter, 1673, Vol.l, p .l llA , Soli Deo Gloria Publication, p.837-
839.
Ibid, p.837-839.
Ibid, p.837-839.
V Ibid,p837-839.
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merely by self-interest, but is monitored rather by a system of ethics which insists that 
they respect and comply with Christian teaching. It is a social order in which 
considerations of economic expediency are subordinate to the moral authority of the 
Christian Church. As for the Church... “what man would be afraid to live desperately in 
that state of life that he seeth manifestly condemned by heathens, by Christians by the olde 
fathers, by the ancient counsels, by Emperors, by Bishops, by decrees, by Canons, by all 
sects of all regions and of all religions, by the Gospel of Christ, by the mouth of God”, 
wrote John Bishop of Salisbury in 1569.  ^Yet, if a more temperate view of usury... “that 
most heinous (sic) offence against God and his Church”^^ was at the source of the revolt 
on which was borne a new ethic, slowly with the growth of individualism and the erosion 
of the Church’s moral authority the revolt became a stream, until with “the triumph of the 
economic virtues,”^  the floodgates opened. A new commercial order embraced an ethic 
which recognised neither... “that justice obligeth me to give him his own”, nor, that ... 
“charity obligeth me to give him more than his own”. It was an ethic which responded 
to... “a brothers necessity”, not with charity, for it saw in his distress a proof of dismerit 
and it judged his misfortune as punishment for... “idle, irregular and wicked courses”.^  ^ It 
was a stem code; if it tightened the bonds of discipline it loosened the bonds of 
brotherhood.
The Historical Relationship: Ethical Principles and the Social Order
Tawney’s examination of the origins of Industrialism in political works such as 
THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY is not detailed. His concern is not to render a full 
historical account of the rise of Industrialism, but rather to illustrate that the ideals of the 
Enlightenment, inspired by that high sense of human dignity which had desired that all
* See John Bishop o f Salisbury’s letter to Dr. Thomas Wilson, Dr. Thomas Wilson, A Discourse on
Usury, (1572) reprint, Frank Cass, 1962.
(( See Thomas Cartwright quoted by RH . Tawney, p215 in Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism.
Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, title o f Chapter TV, Part 111.
Ibid, p264.
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men be free to become themselves, had been distorted by *a deluge’ which had changed 
the social and economic face of society and led to Industrial Capitalism. In his historical 
writings and in particular in RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAFIFAUSM, it is with the 
impact of these changes brought about by this ‘deluge* — The Reformation — that 
Tawney concerns himself. He examines the effects on social, political and economic life 
as the medieval theories of social ethics were confronted by the erosion of ecclesiastic 
authority and the ensuring secularisation of political philosophy which followed the 
Reformation. Yet, if Tawney the historian is concerned to demonstrate the development 
of religious opinion on questions of social ethics in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
and the intellectual changes which followed, Tawney, the social theorist, aware that these 
developments and changes... “ushered in the modem world” is concerned to show their 
effects on the twentieth century. Tawney examines the medieval background to the 
Reformation, analyses the role of the ‘Continental Reformers’ and evaluates the part 
played by the Church of England as defenders of the established order.
Tawney is faithful to the ‘historian’s business’. He seeks to substitute more 
‘significant connections than those of chronology’; at the same time he attempts to 
identify the ‘materials to be handled’ and the ‘forces to be tamed’. Like Adam Smith, he 
understands how the history of the past can fashion and effect the conditions of the 
present. He recognised that the material and forces which shaped the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries continue to exercise an influence on contemporary society. For 
Tawney, the religious, political and economic changes which brought about... “the 
triumph of economic virtues” find current expression in industrial capitalism and the 
‘acquisitive society’. The new religious and social thought which loosened the bonds of 
duty and obedience imposed by the medieval Church have, in consequence, created an 
order which places more value on individual economic ‘success’ than on social cohesion. 
An organic conception of society, in the wake of the Reformation, has given way to the 
notion that the individual, protected by juristic rights, should pursue his own ends in 
competition rather than in co-operation with his fellows. A social unity sustained by both
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custom and discipline had succumbed to a doctrine which proclaims individual rights and 
fosters individual autonomy. One of Tawney’s continuous concerns as a historian is to 
trace the religious, social and economic changes which allowed for the final triumph of 
this ‘individualist’ doctrine. Even as he quotes John Locke’s assertion that... “the great 
and chief end of men uniting in commonwealth and putting themselves under government 
is the preservation of their property” ,^ he perceptively notes that while the political 
significance of this development has often been described... “the analogous changes in 
social and religious thought have received little attention”.iiNB Tawney, however, in the 
belief that each generation... “steps into a social inheritance to which it adds its own 
contribution”... “which it bequeaths to its successors”, is engaged not only to record the 
political changes; he is anxious also to examine the effects of these changes on social and 
religious thought. His evaluation of the influences of Luther and Calvin, the examination 
of the role of the Church, the analysis of the sources of Puritanism, do not therefore 
derive solely from an historian’s concern with a chronological record. They evolve also 
from a search for the ‘significant connections’. Tawney argues that the distinctive note of 
Puritan teaching was... “its emphasis on individual responsibility rather than a social 
obligation”."! When, therefore, as in CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER, he 
quotes John Maynard Keynes’ assessment that., “modem capitalism is absolutely 
irreligious without internal unity, without much public spirit, a mere congeries of pursuers 
and possessors”!!^ , he has, in accordance with own judgement traced the ‘more significant 
connections’.
! Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p.20.
"  Ibid, p20.
^  Marx, Christopher Hill recalls, gave the matter some attention,..."Cromwell and the English
people”, Marx asserts, "had borrowed speech, passions and illusions from The Old
Testament...When the bourgeois tran^ormation had been accomplished, Locke supplanted 
Habakkuk", see Karl Marx The 18th Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte’, see Selected Works o f Marx 
& Engels, 1935 Edition, Vol. 11, p.l37, quoted by Christopher Hill, The English Bible and the 
Seventeenth-Century Revolution, Alan Lane, 1993, p.40.
!" Religion and The Rise o f  Capitalism, p.270.
!!' ‘Christianity and The Social Order’, 1937, see The Attack, p .l 70.
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Tawney, asserts that the changes by which the secular State separated itself from 
the Church revealed themselves gradually... “the seeds sown by the Reformation” came to 
fruition in England, only after the Civil War. Only slowly, he insists, did... “reason take 
the place of revelation” and religious authority yield to political and economic expediency. 
The changes, however, were revolutionary even if their impact was not immediately 
apparent. In spite of a drawn out and sometimes fierce resistance, a ‘new economic 
order* ultimately replaced a traditional society derived from the Bible, the teachings of the 
Fathers and the Schoolmen. Yet, Tawney argues, society is not only the product of 
economic and material circumstances; the religious and moral environment also sets it 
stamp upon it. Why and how, he demands, did changes in religious and moral perceptions 
create and endorse an economic order which was regarded as mechanistic, dependent... 
“upon impersonal and almost automatic forces*’? How did ‘individualism*... “first 
denounced, and, then triumphantly justified” succeed in overturning social doctrines 
enshrined in law and hallowed by custom? Tawney is an concerned to examine the 
transformation as he is anxious to analyse the results. He acknowledges the revolutionary 
impact of Machiavelli’s social philosophy and argues that they were... “at least a powerful 
solvent of traditional, ethical restraints, as was Calvin”.^  He recognises in Locke’s 
theories of property and rights the ideological foundation for economic individualism. 
The... “economic categories” of modem society are a part of its... “intellectual furniture” 
as are its political conceptions. Yet there was a schism, between the medieval conception 
of society and that of the late seventeenth century. It was a schism, he insists, (no doubt 
anticipating his Marxist critics) that... “no theory of the permanence or ubiquity of 
economic interests can bridge.” The schism evolved from two opposing views of society. 
It derived on the one hand from the notion that economic activity was... “one among 
other kinds of moral activity”, and, the contrary view that “business was one thing, 
religion another”. The division, Tawney claims, confronted men with three moral 
questions. Should society be regarded as... “a community of unequal classes with varying
Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, notes on Chapter IV, p.312l313, passim.
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functions organised from common ends”? or as a self-adjusting mechanism, which, 
through the play of economic motives, creates a market to satisfy economic needs?”  ^
Should the doctrine that one must not take advantage of a neighbours necessity persist or 
should it give way to the Puritan belief that... “man’s self-love is God’s providence”?^ 
Should economic appetites be restrained in accordance with religious principles? or, 
should man embrace an attitude which... “regards expediency as the final criterion?”^
There was, Tawney insists, action and reaction between a burgeoning commercial 
environment and changing religious perceptions, and, while a movement such as 
Puritanism helped to mould the social order, it was, in its turn, moulded by it. Weber’s 
thesis, Tawney argues, is that a new conception of religion encouraged a parvenu class to 
... “regard the pursuit of wealth not only as an advantage but as a duty”. The significant 
fact about the ensuing challenge to the established aristocracy of land and commerce was 
not that it was motivated by self-interest, for Tawney insists, such motivation has never 
been absent from the affairs of the man. It was rather that the radical change in moral 
standards how now come to recognise as virtue that which had traditionally been regarded 
as vice. Weber’s objective, Tawney submits, was to establish that western Christianity as 
a whole, and in particular certain varieties of it, which acquired an independent life as a 
result of the Reformation had been more favourable to Capitalism than some other creeds. 
Tawney, however, is concerned not only to demonstrate the fundamental changes in 
religious perceptions and economic behaviour which resulted from the Reformation; he is 
prepared to condemn a system in which “economic interests are still popularly treated as 
though they formed a kingdom over which the Zeitgeist bears no sway”.^  ^ For Tawney, 
then, the Reformation not only altered the relationship between religious assumption and 
economic practice. It endorsed an ethic of self interest and individualism...it created
* Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, notes on Chapter IV, p.3121313, passim.
» Ibid, p.26.
lbid,p.26. 
lbid,p.271.
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Capitalism, and, he insists... “Capitalism was the social counteipart of Calvinist 
theology.”^
Christianity and a Social Vision
Tawney’s conception of a social order, Anthony Wright argues, is “concerned 
with the moral premise of Christianity” which demands that Christian principles be 
extended to the realm of social and economic affairs (and) that there must be... “a unity of 
personal and social life”.^ It is this conception of a social order which motivates 
Tawney’s challenge to the values of the acquisitive society which he perceives as... “a 
juggernaut sacrificing human ends to the idolatry of material means’’.^  The conception is 
crucial to an understanding of Tawney’s attack on a society whose whole tendency, 
interest and pre-occupation is to promote the acquisition of wealth; a society “without 
principle beyond the pursuit of self-interest without discrimination between different types 
of activity”... “between enterprise and avarice, energy and unscrupulous greed, property 
which is legitimate and property which is theft”.*^  Such a society of atomic individualism 
with its encouragement to personal gain, its appeal to make self-interest is, for Tawney, 
against the Christian concept of brotherhood.
Tawney’s socialism demands in the name of equity an equalisation of power and 
such political and economic measures as will extend to each individual the equal right to 
liberty. His socialist understanding recognises that it is only by such equalisations that the 
illegitimate exercise of power may be prevented. Yet ultimately, Tawney’s socialist 
convictions are inextricably intertwined with his Christian understanding. Atomistic man, 
he perceives, bereft of ethical principles, seeks, within industrial capitalism, to exploit his
* 'Max Weber and The Spirit o f Capitalism', R.H. Tawney, 1930, see History and Society, Routledge
and Kegan, Paul, 1978, p.l92.
“ RH . Tawney, Anthony Wright, 1987, p.93.
'Christianity & The Social Revolution', R.H. Tawney, see The Attack, p.l65.
The Acquisitive Society, p.34.
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fellows.^ A society bound by the Christian precept of brotherhood will not tolerate such 
exploitation or suffer that one man may rob another of his dignity. Fellows, Tawney’s 
Christian faith proclaims, neither demean nor exploit each other. The extend, each to the 
other, respect and consideration without servility, without coercion.
Tawney’s plea for fellowship, then, is engendered by an understanding which 
condemns the values of the Acquisitive Society as “not so much un-Christian as anti- 
Christian”. Industrial Capitalism, he argues, “shares with its totalitarian rivals some of the 
characteristics of a counter-religion”.^  To a Christian, he insists, employing the language 
of moral judgement rather than the statistics of the economist or the theories of the 
political scientist, “the qualities which Capitalist societies hold to be all important are 
more ruinous to the soul than most of the conventional immoralities”.^ For Tawney, the 
divisions between the human family which evolve out of the competitive nature of 
Capitalism are an afîfont to the Christian imperative which rejects as morally repugnant 
the notion that a man may use his fellows for his own ends or place his individual appetite 
before the interest of society. Such an imperative, grounded in fellowship, demands of 
men that they acknowledge that “all ye are brethren” (Math 23:8). This Christian 
injunction, while it cannot ensure perpetual and universal social harmony, will, for 
Tawney, create the conditions for justice, equality and authentic liberty. It is an injunction 
grounded in Tawney’s personal understanding of God “as a fact of experience” and of 
Christianity as a manifestation of God’s nature. Christianity, for Tawney, is not only the 
personification of an imminent God, but the basis of true morality. This belief is sustained 
by what he identifies as the unique and characteristic Christian contribution which 
proclaims that God not merely exists “but that the God who exists is like Christ”...a man.
^  Tcnvney's attitude to individual interest as opposed to common purposes is firmly rooted in 
Christian theology. The essential point was made by Archbishop Laud preaching before the King 
on June 19,1621..."If any man is so addicted to his private, that he neglect the common state, he 
is void o f the sense o f piety, and wisheth peace and happiness to himself in vain". Quoted from 
The Social Hope o f the Christian Church, Canon Stanley Evans. Hodder & Stoughton, 1965, 
p227.
* 'Christianity and The Social Order', R.H. Tawney, 1937, see The Attack, p.l70.
“  Ibid, p. 170.
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an individual, limited and defined. This belief underpins Tawney’s entire social 
philosophy even if, as Anthony Wright points out, ‘Tawney’s writings are not generally 
framed in Christian terms or presented as examplifications of Christian doctrine”.
This perception is undeniably valid. Tawney’s writings, are however, informed ly  
Christian principles. Tawney, as Wright acknowledges, “was no less attentive to 
questions of means, even while ensuring that the discussion did not lose sight of the 
fundamental values and ends involved”.  ^ Yet, Wright submits, in his “efforts to get the 
principles right first”, Tawney was “forced to adopt a flexible stance in relation to 
methods of implementation and machinery”. In this way, it was possible and desirable to 
combine “a dogmatism about ends with a pragmatism about means”. “ Yet, as Wright 
argues, ^  Tawney’s “agreement about ends did not preclude fundamental disagreement 
about means”. Indeed, it may be ultimately argued that it is this obsession with values 
and ends rather than with methods and mechanics which distinguishes Tawney’s social 
philosophy from those of most contemporary liberal theorists. Tawney is a Christian 
Socialist: his socialism demands in the name of equity and morality the extension of 
individual liberty, the equal opportunity of self development. It demands that all 
organisation and policy be directed to theses ends, be motivated by these values. His 
ethical socialism rejects those “enlightened friends with philosophies of history”. A 
socialism, “free of dogmatic petrifaction”, will, in pursuit of its “obstinate and 
unashamedly ethical” ends, pragmatically “adopt a flexible stance in relation to the 
difficulties of machinery and implementation”.^  Such a socialism, inspired by Christian 
principles, will never lose sight of its fundamental values, will never compromise its 
objective ends, will always “get the principles right first”
* R Jl. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.94!5.
“  Ibid,p.94l5.
^  Leaving "aside Tawney’s failure to say anything substantial about how a socialist economy may 
operate", Anthony Wright draws attention to Tawney’s "flexible stance" with reference to 
questions o f public ownership, educational provision and in particular Tawney’s attitude to Public 
Schools.
’British Socialism Today’, 1952, see The Radical Tradition, p.l68ll69.
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Yet, ultimately for Tawney, this recognition that in Christ *God is made flesh’ 
exposes the infinite smallness of man and reveals the infinite greatness of God. This 
recognition permeates Tawney’s social vision : it demands that “each man and his 
neighbour” acknowledge themselves, subject to “a higher power above them both”, so 
that each individual must be regarded as an end in him or herself. For Tawney, then, “the 
essence of all morality consists in the belief that “no consideration of expediency can 
justify the oppression of one by another.^ Yet, he insists, moral conduct is not enough: it 
demands “a spiritual basis”. Such a basis, predicated on a belief in God, illuminated by 
the example of the living Christ, will, he argues, reject the notion that men be estimated 
sinq)ly by their place in a social order and sacrificed to that order in the name of material 
benefit or economic advantage.
Ultimately, it is to ethical principles that Tawney turns. He may insist on a society 
of co-operation, united by collective responsibility; he may advance a theory of Function 
and Obligation to achieve it, but underpinning his socialist demands for political and 
economic reorganisation is his understanding of Christian faith.NB This understanding 
derives from the special new and characteristic contribution of Christianity which 
proclaims that “God became, or was fully expressed in, a particular historical individual as 
to whose life we have records”. This God, “who exists”, he asserts, “is like Christ”. 
Christianity shows HIM, not as universal, but as individual, not as infinite but as limited 
and defined, not as a principle but as a man”." Tawney’s Christianity is predicated on this 
understanding of God, since, he argues, it reveals to us what kind of God he is “and what 
he is like in ordinary human intercourse”. This revelation, is at the heart of Tawney’s
* The Commonplace Book, entry for August 13,1913.
^  Perhaps a contemporary Christian Socialist most succinctly encapsulates Tawney's political
philosophy and his Christian understanding. We are. The Reverend the Lord Soper insists,
"ultimately moral or immoral beings and (for Christian Socialists) the question o f morality must 
take precedence over political suitability" ..."vfhat is morally right". Lord Soper insists, "can never 
be politically wrong", see 'Fellowship, Freedom and Equality', p.47, 'Lectures in memory o fRJI. 
Tawney', edited by David Ormrod...published by the Christian Socialist Movement, 1990, see 
Socialism, an Enduring Creed, Donald Soper, 1980.
"  The Commonplace Book, entry for July 12,1914.
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Christianity for it demands of men and women that they live their “ordinary human lives” 
in accordance with Christian teachings and in accordance with Christ’s example. For 
Tawney, then, the essential characteristics of Christianity are unique. Christianity must be 
‘lived it is not, he insists, “some kind of personal, naturalistic, semi- mystical religion”.^
There are signs, Tawney proposed, of... “an attempt to restate the practical 
implications of the social ethics of the Christian faith”. There have been periods in 
history, he insisted,... “which excluded economic activities and social institutions from 
examination or criticism in the light of religion”." For Tawney, however,... “after the last 
seven years both in international affairs and in industry, of the breakdown of the 
organisation of society based on rights divorced from obligation”, there was a pressing 
need to re-examine the role and the duties of the Church. In a world of nationalism, 
inçerialism and industrialism in which, Tawney argues, confrontation was permanent and 
war inevitable, contemporary man, perplexed and disillusioned, demands answers to the 
fundamental questions of personal morality and economic practice. ... “Men”, Tawney 
insists, “were asking the same questions, though in different language, throughout the 
sixteenth century” "i before the ultimate triumph of individualism and the ‘economic 
virtues’. If men had asked of Richard B ax ter^B  in the tremendous storm of the Puritan 
movement., “directions about contracts in general and about buying and selling, 
borrowing and lending, and usury in particular”, how much more does modem man, 
alienated, an atomistic individual, need guidance in a more complex, competitive and 
acquisitive society. Tawney’s understanding of the duty of the Church are clearly stated 
both in CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION and in ‘A NOTE ON 
CHRISTIANITY AND THE SOCIAL ORDER*. There is, he asserts, a distinctively 
Christian way of life and it is the duty of the Church... “to affirm openly and ceaselessly
The Commonplace Book, entry for July 12,1914.
Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p.l8.
» lbid,p.27.
^  A Christian Directory, Richard Baxter,(1615-1691), published 1673, Part IV, Chapter X, 
questions XII - XIII - Soli Deo Gloria Publications. Reprint 1990, p.837-839.
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that men can fulfil the purpose of God only in so far as they follow that life”.^  Religion, 
he agrees, is... “a thing of the spirit”, but so too, he insists, is the social order. The 
Christian Church, Tawney argues in RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, 
abdicated its authority over those spheres which it had traditionally claimed and which 
men had traditionally recognised. It surrendered in the face of a system of ideas which 
was destined to revolutionise all traditional values. To examine the struggle of 
individualism, to see it triumphant” justified in the name of economic liberty is not, in our 
age, to indulge a vain curiosity”. It is rather to... “stand at the source of rivulets which 
are now a flood”.^ To stand at the source of the rivulets, to trace the causes of the flood, 
to analyse its economic and social consequences is as important for Tawney, the moral 
philosopher, as it is for Tawney the economic historian. Indeed, Anthony Wright 
suggests that for Tawney ... “economic history was at bottom a branch of moral 
philosophy”.^  Tawney, a Christian socialist, convinced that men can only fulfil God’s 
purpose in a life of Christian duty, seeks not only to identify the ‘source of the rivulets’. 
He seeks also to restore to modem man... “sick through the absence of a moral ideal”, the 
Christian morality which asks of men ... “Sirs, ye are brethren; why do ye wrong one 
another?” (Acts 7.26).
Puritanism and Service: Analysis and Prescription
The notion of service and social purpose is central to the tradition of Ethical 
Socialism. It is a tradition inimically opposed to the libertarian view which so recently 
proclaimed that “there is no such thing as society”, for its vision of community coincides 
with the dream of ‘the new day of fellowship’ for which William Morris yearned. It is 
necessary, Tawney argues, after the catastrophe of war, to reassess the stmcture of 
England’s economic and social order. He calls for a moral regeneration. ... “There can be
\ ‘Christianity and The Social Order’, 1937, see The Attack, p .l 72.
(( Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p.27.
R H . Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.25.
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no reconstruction of society”, he argues, without an appeal to principles”.^  The whole 
direction of society, its economic and social institutions are, he insists, “visible expressions 
of the scale of moral values”. The problems of industrialism wiU not respond to the 
exhortations of those ‘commercial teachers’ who demand higher production, for as 
important as productivity is, it is not the answer. The problems can only be solved by co­
operation. ... “Plenty”, Tawney contends, “depends on co-operative effort and co­
operation on moral principles”. It was the lack of a unifying social ethic which had 
prompted Tawney to write in 1912... “it is through the absence of a moral ideal that 
modem society is sick”... “to cure this by politics is like making a surgical experiment on a 
man who is dying of starvation”."
Function, Tawney asserts, “is an activity of social purpose; it is performed not 
merely for personal gain but as a responsibility to some higher authority”. For Tawney, 
the higher authority is the community, and all industry, all property, and all economic 
activity should be tested at every point by their relation to social purpose. The purpose of 
industry is plain, Tawney insists. It is to... “supply men with things that are necessary, 
useful or beautiful and thus bring alive body and spirit”.^  An industry, Tawney insists... 
“is in essence nothing more mysterious than a body of men associated in various degrees 
of competition and co-operation to win their livelihoods by providing the community with 
some service which it requires”.^  ^ For Tawney, this definition of the principles upon 
which industry should be based is self evident;... “it is capable of being apprehended by 
the most elementary intelligence”, he asserts. The first principle is that industry should be 
at the service of the community; that “those who faithfully serve should be honourably 
paid and those who render no service should not be paid at all”.^ The second principle is 
that the direction of an industry should be in the hands of persons who are responsible to
\ The Acquisitive Society, p.3.
The Commonplace Book, entry for April 29,1912. 
The Acquisitive Society, R Jl. Tawney, p.9.
Ibid, p.6.
V Ibid,p.7.
50
those engaged in the industry, to those who are directed and governed because ... “it is 
the condition of economic freedom that men should not be ruled by an authority which 
they cannot control”.^  These two ‘elementary’ principles incorporate the values of 
function and service within an economic and social structure in which men and women, in 
concert, may attain the control and direction of the industry by which they live. It is a 
structure designed, Tawney insists, quoting Bacon, ... “For the Glory of God, and the 
relief of man’s estate”.
Tawney’s understanding of the purpose of industry, then, evolves from an ethical, 
as well as a material foundation. He is concerned not only with the provision of service 
and goods, (for the relief of man’s estate) but also with the system of values, the moral 
direction, the concepts and ideals within the community (For the Glory of God). 
Industrialism, Tawney argues, has overlooked the principles on which industry should be 
based.... “Its function is service”, he insists,... “its method is association” and “within the 
association different parties have rights and duties towards each other”.^ By its very 
nature. Industrial Capitalism, with its perverted notion of individual rights, has created 
conflict and division. Duties towards the association are neglected or ignored as each 
party strives to receive what they perceive to be their entitlements and just rewards. This 
conflict win persist’ it is socially, morally destructive; it engenders class warfare; it will 
end in chaos.
Puritanism: Its Sources and Effects
While Tawney acknowledges the importance of Max Weber’s THE 
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAUSM, there are differences 
between his conclusions concerning the social and economic consequences of the 
Reformation and Weber’s. Weber claims his work is an attempt to trace the face and
\ The Acquisitive Society, p.8.
“  Ibid, p.6.
51
direction of ‘ascetic Protestantism’ (Puritanism) on the ‘spirit of capitalism*. It is further 
necessary, he allows, to investigate how Puritanism was in turn affected... “by the totality 
of social conditions especially economic”. In the United States, he argues, where ascetic 
Puritaitism is most fully developed, the pursuit of wealth stripped of religious and ethical 
content tends to ... “become associated with purely mundane passions”.^  Concerning 
Capitahsm, the last stage of this ‘cultural development’, Weber suggests it might well be 
truly said... “Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that 
it has attained a level of civilisation never before achieved.”^ But, he insists,... “this 
brings us to the world of judgements of value and of faith, with which this purely 
historical discussion need not be burdened”.^  Yet Tawney, the Christian moralists, is 
under no such restraint. As he investigates the sources and the strengths of ‘ascetic 
Puritanism’, as he chronicles its development, as he traces the connections between piety 
and property, he neither hesitates nor retreats from the world of judgement, of value and 
of faith.
Puritanism, Tawney insists, was not one single social philosophy. It contained 
several elements whose social outlook was widely different The battle between collective 
discipline and individualism had, in fact, to be fought out within it. He recognises that 
within Puritanism there was... “an element which was revolutionary”... “a collectivism 
which grasped at an iron discipline and an individualism which spumed the savourless 
mess of human ordinances’’.^  ^ If the qualities of thrift, sobriety and frugality were 
diligently applied, there was, too, a... “reckless divinity” ready to sweep away the 
established order. This ‘element’ out of the crucible of Reformation, fired by religious 
fervour, fuelled by mysticism, by asceticism and redemption did not disappear. It was 
subsumed rather, within a comprehensive ethic which determined not only methods of
* The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit o f Capitalism, see Chapter V, ‘Asceticism and The Spirit o f
Capitalism’, Max Weber first published 190415 (first translated by Talcott Parsons, 1930), George 
Allen and Unwin, 1990, p.l82.
“  Ibid, p  182.
lbid,p.l82.
Religion and The Rise o f  Capitalism, p212.
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worship and Church government but political direction, commercial relationships, family 
life, personal duties and all aspects of social conduct. For the Puritan, the revelation of 
God was made manifest to his individual soul. His eternal salvation rested on his response 
to this communion with his Maker. His moral self-su£5ciency must guard him from the 
temptations of extravagance or the sin of sloth. Only through self-discipline, through 
industry, prudence and piety might he find Grace. He was enjoined to... “Be ashamed of 
idleness as thou art a man but tremble at it as though art a Christian”.^  The same stem 
doctrine which sanctioned labour and enterprise as service to God, saw in poverty and 
idleness not only a denial of Heavenly favour but sufficient grounds for earthly contempt
... “What more wretched estate can there be in the world? First to be hated of 
God as an idle drone, not fit for His service; then through extreme poverty to be 
condemned of all the world”.“
Puritanism was a doctrine for the disciplined and the dedicated. A ‘calling*, which 
requires of each adherent a life of quiet application, of modesty, of piety. It is a doctrine 
of personal responsibility in which all men are answerable to God, the Father, and each 
man is accountable to God the Judge. In isolation, the Puritan engaged in a battle of the 
spirit seeks a solitary salvation fix)m an awesome God who will reward the industrious 
and punish the feckless. Alone, there is no power between each man and the Almighty, 
neither meditating Church of close community. By God’s will, and, in God’s service, in a 
hostile world of vanities and vain glory, he applies his heart and soul to prayer, and his 
acumen and energy to the practical affairs of man. His actions and his conduct will 
determine God’s Grace: he will be rewarded or punished according to his application and 
his devotion....
* The Mother's Legacy to Her Unborn Child', Elizabeth Joceline, 1632, see Society and Puritanism
in Pre-Revolutionary England, Christopher Hill, Penguin Books, 1964, p.l21.
“  Ibid,p.l21.
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“Whatever, Lord, we give to thee 
Repaid an hundredfold shall be 
Then gladly. Lord, we give to thee”.^
It is an uncompromising creed - austere, demanding. ... “Be wholly taken up in 
diligent business of your lawful callings, when you are not exercised in the more 
immediate service of God”.“ It is a doctrine of thrift and pmdence in which prosperity is 
a sign of the favour of God, in which improvidence invites the disdain of man. It is an 
ethic of diligence, for... “God hath commanded you some way or other to labour for your 
daily bread”.^  Character is all; poverty is not misfortune but a sign of moral failing. It is 
a faith for the independent of spirit, for those who will submit to the unyielding judgement 
of God will not patiently submit to the restraints of man. The Puritan who will suffer no 
intercession in his transaction with his Maker will not lightly allow interference in his 
transactions with his neighbour. As he demands liberty of conscience, so he demands 
other wider liberties for... “Where the Spirit of Lord is, there is liberty” (Cor. n.3.17). If 
he is a willing servant of the Lord, he will not willingly be a servant to man. ... “Art thou 
called being a servant. Care not for it, but if though mayst be made free, use it rather. 
You are bought with a price; be not ye servants of men” (Cor. 1.7.23). It is action and 
reaction... “L’esprit Calviniste et L’esprit des hommes nouveaux que la révolution 
economicque de temps introduit dans la vie des affairs”. ^  Out of the Reformation, the 
expansion of commerce, the growth of the money market came a new ethos. Out of the 
new ethos came a new ethic, which, though its demand had been individual discipline, its 
practical result was individual liberty. Yet, Tawney argues,... “if the moral self-sufficiency 
of the Puritan nerved his will, it corroded his sense of social solidarity”.^  ^ An
* Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England, Words o f Hymn quoted by Christopher
Hill, p.282.
"  A Christian Directory, Richard Baxter,(1615-1691), published 1673, Part IV, Chapter X,
questions XII - XIII - Soli Deo Gloria Publications. Reprint 1990, p.839.
Ibid.
^  H. Pirenne, Les Périodes de UHistoire Sociale Du Capitalisme (Quoted by RH . Tawney in the 
Preface to 1937 edition, 1914, Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism.
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individualism more conducive to the world of commerce than Christian brotherhood 
threw up a theory of individual rights, which, Tawney insists,... “secularised and 
generalised, was to be among the most potent explosives that the world has known”.'
It was an explosion which gave birth to a new force and a new system of ideas 
which prepared the way for the commercial civilisation which... “finally triumphed at the 
Revolution”. It created a new scale of ethical values, which, Tawney argues, almost 
reversed the traditional Christian virtues. Where there had once been compassion, there 
was now ‘impatient indignation’ at those who had... “sinned their mercies”. Where 
Christians had recognised that... “the greatest of these (virtues) is charity” (COR. 
1.13.13), there were now those who looked with dismay at the Puritan’s response to his 
brother’s misfortune....
“And when the poor his charity entreat
You labour not, and therefore must not eat”.''
A new order determined that where once men had heeded the warnings and 
denunciations against worldly ambition, against power, against pride in possession, a new 
ethic had transformed the traditional vices into economic, and therefore, hallowed virtues. 
The Puritan, Tawney insists, with his ideal of personal responsibility, his dedication to 
the... “punctual discharge both of his public and private duties” was a spiritual aristocrat... 
“who sacrificed fraternity to liberty”.^  Yet if liberty is not to be despised, liberty, for 
Tawney, must be monitored. Tawney rejects the notion of liberty proposed by those who 
see in individualist enterprise the discharge of a duty imposed by God and argue that to 
restrict such enterprise is to restrict liberty. Such a definition of liberty, Tawney insists, in 
its modem manifestations militates against the weak and disadvantaged. It is a liberty
'  Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p229.
“  London's Charity Inlarged (sic) Samuel Hartlib, 1650, p .l, see Religion and the Rise o f
Capitalism, p.262.
Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p247.
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which, unrestrained and unthwarted, fosters a society in which... “a systematic and 
methodical accumulation”... “encourages a shrewd calculating commercialism which tries 
all human relations by pecuniary standards, an acquisitiveness which cannot rest while 
there are competitors to be conquered or profits to be won”.^  It is a bleak and 
uncharitable prospect, a Hobbesian vision of life as... “a race in which we must suppose to 
no other good, nor other garland, but being foremost”. In a doctrine of work and 
worship, of prayer and property, Tawney has traced the “significant connections”. He has 
identified the roots of THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY in a philosophy in which... “the 
conscientious discharge of the duties of commerce is amongst the loftiest of religious and 
moral virtues”.— calculation, a religion of austerity and abstinence. Tawney, the 
historian, again seeking the ‘connecting link’, enlists the perceptive insight of John 
Maynard Keynes. ... “Victorian England”, he quotes, “the great cockpit of industrial 
capitalism”... “was inducted to the austere splendours of her ascetic shrine by the pious 
hands of Puritan moralists”.^ It was, for Tawney, “an ascetic shrine” at which 
individualism took precedence over common purpose and self-interest over fellowship.
Tawney argues in THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC HISTORY' that the evidence of 
a character of a society derived from a single century is misleading. Yet, he insisted, such 
materials are indispensable... “because they are specimens cut from a continuous life of 
which past and present...are different aspects”.^  History impinges upon the present, 
informs it and forms it. Society today refiects the past; our codes of conduct, laws, 
institutions evolve over the centuries, affected by social, political and economic changes, 
influenced by new ideologies, intellectual theories, religious beliefs. Tawney records not 
only a series of past events, he analyses the records of the past in order to present and 
comprehend the character of a society. If he is concerned with England then  ^ he is 
concerned/or England now. With erudition and insight he has examined the materials of
Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p.247.
Ibid,p249.
“  ‘Study o f Economic History’, p.48-65,1933, see History & Society, published 1978, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul.
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the past, and, in the perception that they are “specimens cut from a continuous life”, he 
has illuminated the present. He has demonstrated how Puritanism helped to mould the 
social order of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and how it was in turn moulded by 
it. Indeed, his own understanding of Christian teaching allows for a judgement which no 
ascetic Puritan would dispute. “If a man has important work, and enough leisure and 
income to enable him to do it properly”, he proposes, “he is in possession of as much 
happiness as is good for any of the children of Adam”.  ^NB Yet, while Tawney fieely 
acknowledges that Puritan ethics made an enormous contribution to political freedom and 
social progress, the assessment is not altogether free of censure. It was Puritanism, he 
submits, with its emphasis on individualism which led, insensibly, to an individualist 
morality. It is, he insists, this morality which led to the loss of the traditional sense of 
community. In the victory of Puritan individualism, it must be acknowledged, Tawney 
identifies not only seeds of industrial capitalism, he traces the erosion of Christian values.
The Responsibility of the Church
It is this erosion of Christian values which prompts Tawney’s demand that a 
Christian church must proclaim Christ’s Gospel without concessions or apologies to 
materialism or temporal powers. The church must win converts to common social 
purpose... “not because membership involves no change in their lives, but because it 
involves a change so complete as to be ineffaceable”.^ This ‘ineffaceable change’ will 
permeate the consciousness of society; the Church must recover, reassert and exercise its 
moral authority and endeavour to create a new kind, a Christian kind of civilisation. The 
Church must not allow its “sphere to be determined by the convenience of politicians or 
by the conventional ethics of the world of business” in a society dominated by a feverish
* The Acquisitive Society, p.239.
^  Neverless, Tawney’s social vision is not infused with the spirit o f Puritan abstinence. " A society 
is free”, he wrote, “in so far  ... (as) ... its institutions and policies ... enable all its members to 
grow to their full stature, to do their duty as they see it, and, ... since liberty should not be too 
austere, ... to have their fling when they feel like it”. Equality, concluding paragraph.
"  Acquisitive Society, p239.
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concern... “a transitory, irrational obsession...with economic issues”. Instead, the Church 
Militant.. “has a duty to harmonise the discords of industrial capitalist society by relating 
its activities to the spiritual purpose from which they derive their significance”.^  If, as 
Anthony Wright perceptively argues, Tawney’s appeal is... “to moral sensibility which 
needs to be cultivated rather than to a philosophic sensibility requiring argument and 
explanation”,ü then, it is to a committed and engaged Church that Tawney looks to 
“cultivate the moral sensibility and expel the poison which inflames every wound and 
turns every trivial scratch into a malignant ulcef’.üi Furthermore, if as Wright also 
argues,... “Tawney is engaged in the politics of moral exhortation rather than of social 
explanation”,iv then it is the Church which he perceives as the instrument of exhortation, 
and it is the Church which must instil into the hearts and minds of men and women the 
fundamental moral axiom,... the key to everything else in Tawney’s thought, that there is 
a moral imperative in treating people as ends not as means. The duty of such a Church is 
clear, it is to oppose exploitation and propagate the ideals of service and community 
within a regenerated moral order in which fellowship is the vital expression of Christian 
faith.
Certainly, in contemporary Britain the notion of the Church Militant successfully 
demanding and effectively sustaining a crusade of moral regeneration appears unrealistic. 
Yet it may be argued, that in 1921 (when the Acquisitive Society was published) The 
Church of England commanded a greater moral authority and a greater respect that it can 
presently claim. Indeed the presence and the pressures frx)m non-Christian religious 
groups were minimal. The Anglican Church might in such circumstances, achieve through 
its unique relationship with State and Crown an ecumenical pluralism composed of 
different Christian sects dedicated to a moral crusade, which, William Temple insisted...
( Acquisitive Society, p  240.
“  RM. Tawney, Anthony Wright, 1987, p .l 07.
The Acquisitive Society, p.242.
R.H. Tawney, Anthony Wright, 1987, p.l07.
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“would affect people not only as private individuals but in their social attitudes as well”.' 
Indeed, in 1942 William Temple while conceding that “the Church has to recover lost 
ground”, nevertheless proposed a set of Christian principles which he argued provide a 
Christian interpretation of the Church’s social duties. To the question “How should the 
Church interfere?” he insisted; 1) its members must fulfil their responsibilities and 
functions in a Christian spirit; 2) its members must exercise their purely civil rights in a 
Christian spirit; it must itself supply them with a systematic statement of principles to aid 
them in doing these two things and this will carry with it a denunciation of the customs or 
institutions in contemporary life or practice which offend against those principles”.^ 
Currently, it may be argued, Tawney’s social philosophy, precisely because it is grounded 
in the Christian ethic of mutual tolerance and fellowship demands, within a multi­
religious, multi-cultural society, a Church dedicated to achieve through ecumenical 
measures, social unity rooted in moral values which are com m unally  respected by aU 
creeds. Such a Church, a contemporary Anglican intellectual proposes, must advocate “a 
model of education which will introduce the values of Christianity, Judaism, Islam, 
scientific humanism et al because these are the genuine constituents of our religious scene 
in Britain”.^  Further, he submitted, in 1989 “we are educating children who will will-nilly 
be citizens of the world”.'^
Tawney’s charge that the Christian Church, had failed, and was failing in its duty 
to uphold Christian values in the face of “the growth of individualism” and “the triumph 
of the economic values” is more than an historical judgement. The charge must be seen as 
a reflection of his demand that the accepted values of ‘the acquisitive society’ must be 
challenged by a militant Christian leadership dedicated to the restoration of the traditional
* See Address to The Church Assembly, 1917 Report, William Temple, Archbishop o f Canterbury,
1881-1944, a lifelong friend ofR.H. Tawney.
(( Christianity and The Social Order, William Temple, Shepheard-Walwyn, 1942, p.43.
See Religion, State and Society in Modern Britain edited by P. Badham Lampeter, E. Mellen 
Press, 1989.
See ‘Church, Party and State’, as above, Ninian Smart, p.38H393 passim.
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Christian ideal of fellowship; an ideal which proclaims the superiority of moral principles 
over economic appetites.
Tawney’s purpose, however, is not only to identify the roots, economic, political 
and religious of Puritanism; it is also to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of 
Christian teaching as... “the line of division between the spheres of secular business is 
shifting”... “and the boundaries are once more in motion”. Tawney recognised that the 
Church had lost the power, and, abnegated the traditional responsibility to impose a 
cohesive social ethic. The social economic relations of Capitalism, he perceived, “had 
produced a distorted Christianity that in turn gave support to the established order”.^  The 
Church had surrendered to the pressures of economic and social changes supported by 
new religious precepts which lauded self-reliance and encouraged individualism. For 
Tawney the Church had failed to accommodate itself to the changes. It had failed to 
retain its moral leadership in the face of new doctrines which challenged established 
Christian ethics and established social order. The Church had failed to uphold traditional 
Christian values which had sought to unify the social life of those whose guardian it 
claimed to be. Instead, it had yielded to a morality which fostered individual 
independence and encouraged self-interest. This failure had opened the way to atomic 
individualism; it had allowed for the triumph of self-interest at the expense of social 
harmony. Yet, after the carnage of war, the ravages of revolution, amid the waste of mass 
unemployment, of malnutrition, of exploitation, Tawney, sustained by Christian faith, 
firmly held that hope lay in the Christian message of brotherhood, of community, of 
common purpose. For Tawney, the Church has an obligation to persuade men to 
reconstruct the social order in accordance with Christian faith. A Christian has a 
responsibility to his fellow men, he insists, and the Church must not allow this 
responsibility to be repudiated. Christianity, he asserts... “must not be ruled out as 
irrelevant when the problem of organising society more justiy is under consideration”.
* The Gospel and Marxism’, Irene Brennan, see Fellowship, Freedom and Equality, published by 
The Christian Socialist Movement, Lectures in memory o f R H . Tawney, 1990, p.72.
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While he decries the past failures of the Church to respond to social and political changes, 
he also demands of the Church that it fulfils its present duty to assert itself on behalf of 
Christian values. It demands that in an age dominated by socially destructive egoism, the 
Church dedicate itself to socially constructive Christian fellowship.
Tawney poses some fundamental questions. He asks whether... ‘^ ligion can 
admit the existence of a sharp antithesis between personal morality and the practices 
which are permissible in business”?^  He asks, too, if the Church should propagate a 
standard of social ethics? and whether it had a duty to enforce it as among the obligations 
of its members? He insists that if in the past the Church has... “regarded questions of 
social organisation and economic conduct as irrelevant to the spirit”,... does it now, in 
fact., “endeavour to make a Christian civilisation”?^  ^Tawney, then, inspired by the ethical 
standards derived from the traditional teachings of the Christian Church, has written both 
an historical study and at the same time, in what Dr. Charles Gore^B describes as... “a 
just and well grounded judgement”, delivered a moral message and instigated an ethical 
inquiry.
In Tawney’s historical writings the research is prodigious; the perceptions are 
original and astute; the language crackles with wit and irony. There is a Biblical sweep 
and grandeur. The great historical moments are matched with majestic prose. Tawney’s 
gift of narrative, his sensitive response to the drama of the age find deliberate expression
* Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p,27.
» Ibid,p27.
^  Charles Gore, 1853-1932, Canon o f Westminster, 1894-1902, Bishop o f Worcester, 1902-1905,
Bishop o f Birmingham, 1905-1911, Bishop o f Oxford, 1911-1919, Dean o f Theological Faculty, 
London University, 1924-1928, see Prefatory Note to 1937 edition, and Religion and The Rise o f 
Capitalism, Peregrine books Reissue 198417. While at Balliol Tawney was influenced by "the 
socially oriented religious liberalism o f Charles Gore", see Ross Terrill, R.H. Tawney and His 
Times, Andre Deutsch 1974, p.24. Tawney’s friend at Rugby and Balliol, William Temple (1881-
1944) was also influenced by Gore’s "social idealism". Temple who was President o f The
Workers Educational Association in 1906, later became Archbishop o f Canterbury. When a 
friend said to Temple one day... What we need are more men like Tawney", The Archbishop 
replied "there are no men like Tawney", see reprint o f the Memorial address to R.H. Tawney, 
delivered by Hugh Gaitskell (Leader o f the Labour Party) St Martin’s in The Fields, 8 February 
1962.
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in memorable descriptive passages as he records... “the tremendous storm of the Puritan 
Movement”.
... “The forest bent; the oaks snapped, the dry leaves were driven before the gale, 
neither all of winter nor all of spring, but violent and life giving, pitiless and tender, 
sounding strange noises of yearning and contrition, as of voices wrung from the people 
living in Meshech, which signifies Prolonging, in Kedar which signifies Blackness, while 
amid the blare of trumpets, and the clash of arms, and the rendering of the carved work of 
the Temple, humble to God and haughty to man, the soldier saints swept over battlefield 
and scaffold, their garments rolled in blood”.^
Yet, beyond the passion and the poetry, Tawney seeks to answer some 
fundamental questions concerning the role of the Church. In medieval times, he argues, 
the Church had accepted responsibility over all the affairs of man. Slowly he insists the 
Church abdicated its authority and forgot its responsibilities. Even today, he notes 
regretfully, men in search of spiritual guidance turn in vain to a Church which is uncertain 
as to its duties, its province and its mission. For medieval thinkers, Tawney asserts, the 
questions posed no problems; they saw society as a spiritual organism, not as an economic 
machine. They regarded economic activity as one element within a complex unity which 
needed to be ... “controlled and repressed by reference to moral ends”. That these ‘moral 
ends' were threatened by self-interested economic appetite seemed to them so self- 
evidently true that they insisted tha t... “no sane philosophy would allow them free rein”. 
As for Tawney, his understanding of the duty of the Church, it is as unequivocally 
advanced in his political writings as it is in his historical studies. The duty of the Church, 
he insists, is not only to act on the individual conscience, it is also to condemn ... “aU 
forms of economic and social organisation which hinder a distinctiy Christian way of life.“
* Religion and The Rise o f  Capitalism, p.I97.
“  'A Note on Christianity and The Social Order*, see The Attack, p .172.
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Yet, Tawney does not yeam for the re-establishment of the medieval order; he 
recognises that... “economic ambitions may be good servants”. Harnessed to a social 
purpose, he agrees... “they turn the mill and grind the com”. He acknowledges the 
achievement of science, the contribution of practical energy and technical skill which have 
beneficially transformed... “the face of material civilisation”. Only an incorrigible 
sentimentalist, he argues, would depreciate the significance of economic efficiency; it is, 
he asserts... “a necessary element in the life of any vigorous and sane society”. 
Nevertheless, he warns, to make a fetish of efficiency is to destroy it, and Tawney, the 
social theorist, returns to a theme which illuminates his entire work. The condition of 
effective action in a complex society, he insists, is co-operation... “and the condition for 
co-operation is agreement, both as to the ends to which effort should be applied, and the 
criteria by which its success is to be judged.^ A standard of values is therefore necessary; 
men in co-operation, taking into account the resources available and the economic 
possibilities, must reorganise society in the interest not only of economics but of those 
other qualities which are truly valuable. Certainly, Tawney argues, economic factors are 
important, but men in co-operation will sacrifice material goods in order to ... “extend 
leisure or develop education or humanise toil”." A philosophy which appeals only to 
economic benefit, he had long argued, can never win men’s souls. Tawney perceives in 
industrial capitalism a society in which isolated individuals strive in their own self-interest 
to achieve maximum economic advantage. The existing order, in its pursuit of material 
increase, neglects the truism that... “even quite ordinary men have souls”. Benefits 
interpreted in terms of quantity and mass do not then sufficiently compensate for social 
organisation which... “insults their self-respect and impairs their freedom”.
For Tawney, then a revitalised Church must once again commit itself to a code of 
social ethics. It must, in accordance with the Christian message, encourage co-operation 
for it is only in a co-operation in which men acknowledge their common humanity that
* ‘A Note on Christianity and The Social Order’, see The Attack, p277.
« Ibid,p277.
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moral principles wiU supplant economic expediency. A common environment can only be 
realised when men in co-operation agree to common ends which create the conditions for 
dignity and mutual respect. It is in such an environment sustained by Christian principles, 
Tawney believes, that isolated individualism will give way to communal solidarity.
Tawney attempts to evaluate the consequences of the changes social, religious and 
economic he has examined. Judiciously and critically he seeks to establish how in the two 
centuries between the Reformation and the Enlightenment a new doctrine of economic 
conduct and social theory gradually supplanted the traditional values of the Christian 
Church. This doctrine, he argues, not only created an order in which... “pecuniary gain” 
was enthroned as the... “idol of the philosophers”, but, as it came to be increasingly 
respected, as the motivating force of society, so, too, was the authority of the Church 
gradually dissipated. The Church, Tawney argues, was overwhelmed by... “the storm and 
fury of the Puritan revolution”. It neither recognised the potency of the new religious 
beliefs or the strength of the new social forces. With a singular lack of common sense, it 
refused to revise the old formulae - refused, perhaps failed, to comprehend the new spirit 
of the age. The Church, Tawney insists, had in the past asserted “the superiority of moral 
principles over economic appetites”.^  Yet against the new commercialism and the new 
creed of individual responsibility, it was unable to translate this principal into a practical 
code of ethics. Its authority over the spiritual and temporal lives of man contracted; it 
yielded” territory” to a doctrine more committed to economic interest than to the spiritual 
destiny of human kind. Where all human activities had been treated as falling into a 
‘single scheme* in accordance with Divine WiU, there now existed a dichotomy. Men 
now recognised a realm of religion and a world of business, each with its own accepted 
sphere of interest, each with its own standards of morality. The hegemony of the 
estabUshed Church was chaUenged by a phUosophy which conveniently, but with firm 
conviction, held the view that to involve religion in the everyday affairs of man was to
Religion and The Rise o f  Capitalism, p.279.
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tarnish and degrade it. The established Church, Tawney sadly concludes, without the 
vigour or the creative energy either to withstand the onslaught, or, effectively restate the 
traditional doctrine of social ethics, succumbed before a more complex, more aggressive, 
and,... “more mobile social order**.
Yet if sorrow is evident, so too, is understanding, so too is charity. Men, Tawney 
suggests, must be judged... “by their reach as well as their grasp**. Charitably, he 
proposes, the Church of England, if it had failed to... “work the Christian virtues into the 
spotted texture of character and social conduct*',  ^deserved respect for the ends it aimed 
at, even if those aims were defeated. There is an understanding, too, of the 
Nonconformist Churches which, Tawney insists, were prevented from reasserting the 
social obligations of religion not through weakness but rather by the most distinctive of 
their virtues. They saw the world of commerce and society as a battlefield on which the 
faithful might temper their characters and thereby more resolutely serve God*s )^ 11 in the 
patient pursuit of commercial success. It did not occur to them, Tawney sadly comments, 
that... “character is social, and society, since it is expression of character - spiritual**." 
But if there is regret for the past, there is also a plea for the present and a warning for the 
future. There is, too, a condemnation of the naive assumption shared by both the 
defenders and the opponents of the existing order, that the attainment of wealth and 
material riches is not only... “the supreme object of human endeavour** but also the final 
criterion of human success**.^ Such an assumption, he insists, is sharply opposed to the 
teachings of the Founder of the Christian Faith. Furthermore, he argues,... “between the 
idolatry of wealth**... (“the practical religion of Capitalist society’*) (and)... “the Church of 
Christ, there can be no compromise**. Such a ‘practical religion* of acquisition and 
accumulation is, he declares,... “the negation of any system of thought or morals which 
can be described as Christian**.^  ^ In a world of limited resources, Tawney urges that men
* Religion and The Rise o f  Capitalism, p.279.
» Ibid, p.275.
Ibid,p.280.
Ibid,p280.
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reach agreement as to ends and engage in co-operative effort to achieve those ends. A 
standard of values must be agreed, which is based on some conception of human nature as 
a whole. A society of social cohesion must replace a society of competition, which for all 
its conquests of the environment,... “has not yet learned to master itself*. It is a plea for a 
society which taking account of economic possibilities, recognises that there are social 
benefits and moral objectives beyond the satisfaction of material needs. It is a plea for a 
society in which men may express their true natures, and in co-operation, are ready to 
make sacrifices in order to... “develop education, extend leisure, humanise toil’*. It is a 
plea for a social order which recognises in Ruskin’s declaration that... “there is no wealth 
but life**.^  a confirmation of an ideal which will encourage fellowship rather than the 
isolated pursuit of self-interest. It is, too, a plea to the Church, to once again restate and 
reassert the social obligations of religion, and demand, in accordance with its Christian 
mission that men and women... “work the Christian virtues into social conduct**. 
“When to speak is unpopular**, he asserted, in tribute,... “rashness is more agreeable than 
cowardice; it is less pardonable to be silent than to say too much**.^  In a later age of 
‘possessors and pursuers*... “without internal union or much public spirit** an age in which 
brothers “profaned the covenant of our fathers**, Tawney, historian, moralist, philosopher 
and Christian socialist, did not stay silent
Towards the Spirit of Community
Yet the authority of a church presiding over a community united in a common 
faith is curtailed within a multi-cultural pluralistic society. Furthermore, men and women 
within an economic order which has encouraged a tradition of atomistic individualism 
pursue many and varied ends. They have different, sometimes opposing values and are 
encouraged in the name of individual freedom and self-fulfilment to pursue their own 
ends. Legislation may prevent those abuses of personal liberty which militate against the
* Vnto This Last', John Ruskin, Essay IV, Cornhill Magazine 1862, p . 77.
“  Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism, p.281.
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rights of others. Certainly, the absolute right of the citizen to dispose of income without 
regard to social obligation is curtailed. The obligation to contribute through taxation to 
the defence the nation, to education, to health care, to welfare and those services which 
are perceived to be a communal benefit is either generally accepted or legally enforced. 
But how to arrive at agreement of the common purposes for which each individual is 
prepared to subordinate self interest? How to achieve common purpose without recourse 
to collectivist authoritarianism? How to reconcile the claims of individual freedom and 
social equality, of private interests and the demands of the wider community? Certainly, 
there exists the general recognition that for the majority of citizens such fundamental 
‘social goods* as roads, hospitals, welfare services, etc., can only be maintained by 
collective provision so that in such circumstances there is no tension between the common 
good and individual self-interest.
Yet, how to inspire the co-operation which contribution to common purpose 
entails? The answer, for Tawney, lies in ‘a moral renaissance’, ‘a change of heart*. The 
belief in the primary rights of the atomistic individual must give way to a perception of a 
society based on common interests and common objectives. This demand, Tawney 
insists, is not ‘Sentimental Idealism*. Those who have endured the nightmare years, 
1914-1918, will have not only realised the futility of war, but will question the assertions 
of the right to unlimited economic expansion both for individuals and nations which has 
resulted in “mankind tearing itself to pieces every century or oftener since 1648**.^  
Tawney, the historian, may identify what he perceives as the roots of war, he may pin the 
blame for the discontents of man onto a competitive industrialism driven by a distorted 
conception of individual liberty perverted in the interest of property and privilege. 
Nevertheless, for Tawney, the Christian moralist, a society motivated by the atomistic 
pursuit of individual appetites must give way to a society fraternally committed to the 
achievement of democratically agreed social ends. Such ends, however, are not to be
The Acquisitive Society, p224.
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achieved through the agency of an all powerful state nor must they be determined by a 
governing elite within a society in which individual democratic responsibility is superseded 
by collectivist action. Nor can they be achieved by an appeal to Christian principles in a 
multi-religious society in which the moral authority of the Christian Church is 
acknowledged only by those who profess the Christian faith.
Tawney’s “appeal to principles” derives from his Christian faith. Yet it is 
addressed to a wider moral constituency. It is an appeal to the “spirit of universal 
humanism” which for Tawney rests on the faith that the differences that divide men are 
less important than their common humanity, their common moral understanding. Yet if 
the appeal is to a universal moral sensibility, it has a pragmatic as well as an ethical 
dimension. Tawney’s critical analysis of industrial capitalism had re-inforced his 
conviction that the system is not only unequitable, inefficient and wasteful by a catalytic 
agent of social disorder. He demanded therefore, a reassessment of the purposes of 
industry; he challenged the accepted patterns of ownership and control. He proposed a 
new system of industrial relationships which will foster fraternity where there is now 
confrontation and create equity, where there is now exploitation. Tawney, is engaged, as 
Anthony Wright properly asserts,... “in the politics of moral exhortation”. Yet, his 
critique of industrial capitalism, his proposals for its fundamental reorgartisation, 
constitute more than ‘moral exhortation’, for as Isaiah Berlin proposes... “beliefs about 
how life should be lived, the relations of human beings to each other, the systems of 
values on which ends of life are based when applied to groups and nations are called 
political philosophy... which is but ethics applied to society”.^
Since Tawney identifies ‘Functionless’ ownership as a principle defect of industrial 
capitalism, he is confronted with the problem of how to replace it with a society of 
function and obligation. How to eradicate the fear, discipline, ‘social war’ and selfish
Isaiah Berlin quoted in New York Review o f Books, April 1989.
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individualism  of ‘The Acquisitive Society’ and create a new economic and social 
psychology of social responsibility and efficient co-operation? Tawney analyses the 
methods by which functionless ownership can be replaced He rejects the call for the total 
nationalisation of industry which many socialist theorists regard as the fundamental 
panacea against the exploitive nature of private ownership. Nationalisation, Tawney 
insists, is only one method of gaining public accountability and preventing private 
exploitation. It is not in itself a cure-all; it may be suitable for some industries but not for 
all industries. The peculiarities and special factors which obtain in each industry must be 
recognised, and, accommodated within its ownership structure.^ Nevertheless, he 
insists, the fundamental purpose of industry must not be forgotten, nor its duty to the 
community it serves, neglected. Tawney, although convinced of the benefits of 
nationalisation in some industries, argued in 1952 that... “industrial control was after all 
no more than machinery”... “what matters is the kind of life people lead and the 
satisfaction they find in it”.^  To encourage this sense of satisfaction and to obviate the 
bureaucratic strictures which may be placed on it by a central administrative authority, 
Tawney insisted that nationalised industries should be managed and controlled by those 
engaged in them. For Tawney, nationalisation is not an end in itself; it is a means by 
which, in some industries, (but not all industries) the best interest of the community may 
be served, the best service provided.
Tawney examines alternative methods of abolishing existing functionless property 
rights. He is wedded to no particular or sacrosanct method. He proposes no doctrinaire 
or ideologically motivated programme. He considers guild committees which will allow 
for workforce participation and control so that those engaged in notoriously seasonal 
trades, wiU enjoy a livelihood even when conditions made their work impossible. He
^  There are as Ronald Preston points out various forms o f ownership, ''centralised state 
corporations, autonomous state corporations, varied forms o f co-operative enterprise, private 
companies, public companies and one man freelance businesses", see 'Church and Society in the 
Late 20th Century'. The Economic and Political Task. The Scott Holland Lectures for 1983. 
S.CM. Press Ltd, 1983.
* 'British Socialism Today’, RH . Tawney, 1952, see Socialist Commentary, June 1952.
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considers a policy of attenuation by which in accordance with pragmatic judgement, 
participating directors of certain expropriated enterprises may, in the interest of efficiency, 
continue to contribute at a salary, to the management of the company’s affairs. However, 
the right to own or control any enterprise without consultation must not be granted to 
non-working investors or bearers of royalty rights. His objective is to create a more 
efficient, less wasteful, industrial system, subordinated always to the public interest and 
public need, a system in which there is neither private profit nor functionless control. The 
combination of function and obligation, he insists, demands new attitudes and calls for the 
conscientious application of the experience and expertise within each industry. It requires 
a code of practise, a standard of efficiency which will ensure reliable and responsible 
service. Tawney turns to the established professions as examples of those occupations in 
which personal gain is not the first consideration. The Professions, he argues, have a 
tradition of service; they are not motivated solely for profit The esteem of one’s 
colleagues, pride in one’s work, the respect of the public, acknowledgement of social 
contribution all serve to cultivate an ethic of conduct, a culture of responsibility. A 
professional body will demand of its members standards of qualification and skill in the 
interest of its reputation and the public it serves. Industry, in Tawney’s view, should be 
organised and imbued with the spirit of public service as are the professional associations. 
The social responsibility, the ensuing public trust, would restore to the workforce, 
management and technicians, a sense of self-respect and professional pride. They would, 
in consultation with consumer bodies be obliged to give priority of both investment and 
production to those goods and services mutually agreed as satisfying consumer needs. 
Such responsible co-operation would give authentic purpose to their work, give dignity to 
their labour. Thus, while Tawney rejects ‘Marxist materialism’ in favour of ‘an appeal to 
principles’ as a condition for any radical reconstruction of society he shares Marx’s 
perception that under Industrial Capitalism the worker is “alienated fiiom the produce of 
his labour” and “degraded to the most miserable commodity”.^  Tawney’s doctrine of
* The Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts, Karl Marx, circa 1844 (first translated and 
published in English 1932), Viking Press, 1983, p.l31.
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Function and Obligation is designed to end this degradation and create in its place a 
culture of fellowship, a society of social responsibility, and co-operation.
Tawney’s criticism of The Labour Movement, therefore, is not accompanied by a 
demand for more militant action, or a call for a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. Even 
though he demands the abolition of obstmctive property rights, his plan of industrial 
reconstruction has no recourse to property seizure without compensation. The 
expropriated proprietors will receive the commercial value of their assets either as a fixed 
salary commensurate with their contribution should they continue to work, or receive a 
reasonable rate of interest based on the capital value of their expropriated property if they 
are unable or unwilling to participate in the ongoing enterprise. In all cases, however, a 
share in profits (as opposed to compensatory payment) is precluded, as is the 
unmonitored responsibility for control and organisation. If he agrees with the Marxian 
forecast that... “capitalist society was doomed because the worker did not receive the 
equivalent of what he produces”, he argues that this is not the paramount condemnation 
of the Capitalist spirit. The condemnation, he thundered, is... “contained in a barbarous, 
inhuman, sordid doctrine that would weigh immortal souls and scale them down because 
they are not economically useful”.^  In this polemic against Capitalism, Tawney shares 
with Marx the perception that the system degrades all that are subject to it, both the 
exploited and the exploiter. ... “The exploiters”, he insisted, “are more to be pitied that 
those that envy them”.“ He rejects, however, the Marxist materialist solution. ... “The 
heart of the matter”, he wrote in 1912, “is not economic”... “it is a question of moral 
relationships...the need to find some moral standard in economic life”.^  In the notion of 
Function and Obligation, Tawney believed he had found i t
( The Commonplace Book, entry for Sept. 10,1913.
(( The Acquisitive Society, p.39.
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Tawney saw a world tom apart; he feared for its future. He saw in Christian 
teaching the ethical foundation of an equitable and moral community to which all might 
contribute in which man would be exploited, in which all would be respected. It is this 
vision which prompts him to insist that it is necessary for the Church... “to define the lines 
of conduct and organisation which approaches most nearly to being the practical 
application of Christian ethics in the various branches of economic life”.^  It is this vision 
of a democratic socialism illuminated by his understanding of the Christian message which 
informs both his life and his work. Yet Christian faith and moral exhortation do not 
necessarily persuade men and women to share an ethical vision. How, then, to convince 
his fellow-citizens to embrace the values and aspirations of democratic socialism? 
Confronted with this problem Tawney the moral theorist, compounding “an appeal to 
principles” with the language of pragmatic persuasion, presents his case for equality.
The Acquisitive Society, p239.
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CHAPTER m  
Equality
“Of the three great European democratic principles, most working-class people 
have not spoken much about LIBERTY. They have always fought for it when the need 
came. They have a deep seated belief in EQUALITY in so far as that means that each of 
us is at bottom, in basic humanness, as good as every other; and that is different from a 
populist levelling. As for FRATERNITY, they have lived that out day by day for 
centuries. It is the strongest working class principle.” ^  Richard Hoggart.
Introduction
In 1931, thirteen years after the war to make the world safe for democracy, 
democracy was not thriving. In Italy, the Fascisti were in power, the opposition silenced, 
Matteotti murdered. In Austria, the failure of the Osteiiechische Kredit-Austalt had led to 
financial crisis and economic slump throughout Central Europe. In Spain, as the 
dictatorship of Primo de Rivera collapsed, the divided and unhappy country squared up 
for bitter, bloody conflict In Germany, a weak and unloved government watched 
ineffectually as opposing extremist factions fought in the streets preparing the way for the 
vicious triumph of National Socialism. In the United States as the Depression deepened, 
industrial production fell by fifty percent; one third or one fourth of the work force (no 
one knew exactly) was out of work. In Britain, as a perplexed economist posed the 
question... “Can Government Cure Unemployment?”, John Maynard Keynes published his 
Treatise On Money'. Then, as industry contracted and unemployment ballooned, hope 
subsided and fear flourished; the nation grimly surveyed
^  T  know I  wrote this passage but I  can’t remember where. Perhaps you can say since forgotten by 
author” . Letter from Richard Hoggart to E.M. Passes, March 3,1993.
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“Smokeless chimneys, damaged bridges, rotting 
wharves and choked canals.
Rails buckled, smashed trucks lying on 
their side across the rails.
Power stations locked, deserted, since they 
drew boiler fires.
Pylons fallen on subsiding, trailing dead 
high tension wires'*^
It was at this “particular hour of crisis and dismay” that Tawney published 
EQUALITY, his attack on ‘the religion of inequality’, which he insisted... “inflicted upon 
England a class system so venerable, so sanctified and hallowed by tradition, so 
permeated by pious emotion, and, so all pervading that foreigners remarked that England 
was not one country but two”." No assessment of Tawney’s contribution to socialist 
thought can disregard the importance of the principle of equality to his socialist vision. 
His understanding of the ideal as the necessary condition of an equitable society 
permeates even those writings which are not directly concerned with egalitarianism. 
EQUALITY, informed as it is with moral passion, presented as it is with pragmatic 
argument, remains after more than sixty years Tawney’s most celebrated work of social 
theory, the classic presentation of the egalitarian case. Yet, Tawney, in EQUALITY, did 
not, as in his other major works, emphasise his belief in the transforming power of 
Christian principles. His arguments, “are not generally framed in Christian terms’’,^  nor 
do they derive directly riom Christian doctrine. His appeal for equality is not addressed 
solely to those who would accept the precepts which motivate his own Christian 
Socialism. The appeal is addressed, rather, to the universal spirit of humanism, which, 
Tawney insists, “is not the anti-thesis of Christianity or theism.” For Tawney, such a spirit
* "Get There I f  You Can’, W.H. Auden, April 1930, see British Writers o f the Thirties, Valentine
Cunningham, Oxford University Press, 1988, p.37.
“ Equality, p.36.
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is compatible with his Christian faith. Humanism, he argues, “rests on the faith that the 
(differences between men are less important and fundamental than their common 
humanity”, i
In THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY, Tawney demands “ a recourse to principles” 
as “a condition of any reconstruction of society”. Industrial capitalism, he argues, “must 
appeal to standards more stable than the monetary exigencies of its commerce and 
industry”. A Christian Socialist, firm in the belief that there is an interaction between 
ideas and social condition he appeals to the Christian Church to reassert its moral 
authority. Society, he argues, “must have a clear apprehension of both the deficiency of 
what it is and the character of what it ought to be”." The Church, he insists, must 
militantly restate its ethical principles so that it may become, once again, an organ of 
collective thought, the agency of a common moral will. Again, in RELIGION AND THE 
RISE OF CAPITALISM, convinced that a moral regeneration will bring about social 
change, he urges the Church to re-establish its traditional authority and re-affirm those 
Christian values which, her asserts, were eroded in the face of “the triumph of the 
economic virtues”.
The work of the social theorist and the work of the economic historian both derive 
from Tawney's understanding of Christian teaching. Yet while the same moral vision 
illuminates all of Tawney’s writings, and while, in EQUALITY, he is, as always “engaged 
in the politics of moral exhortation”, the work is not, in essence, an appeal to Christian 
values. The work expresses the pragmatic understanding that equality will create the 
conditions for fraternity. Such conditions, Tawney believes, will eliminate exploitation 
and foster that spirit of mutual obligation and responsibility which will, in fellowship, 
secure social harmony. The appeal for equality is not specifically addressed to those who 
share Tawney’s Christian faith. It is an appeal, rather, to that universal spirit of
* Equality, p.86.
"  The Acquisitive Society, p.2/3.
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humanism, which Tawney insists, rests on the faith that “the differences between men are 
less important and fundamental than their common humanity”. ^
For Tawney, equality will solve the problem of the imbalance of power. Equality, 
as a practical policy will provide the conditions in which the powerless majority may find 
protection from the economically powerful. Further, he proposes, equality will sustain 
such social arrangements as will make available to all the means of self-development, 
intellectual, spiritual and physical. Equality, he perceives, is an instrument of 
empowerment; it will enable each citizen to responsibly contribute to what is 
democratically recognised as the common good. A society of equals, he holds, will 
engender that sense of self esteem which, in industrial capitalism, derives principally from 
material acquisition within the competitive market. A strategy of equality wül ensure that 
each citizen has access to all those amenities which are necessary for a life of human 
dignity. Equality, he insists, will provide the conditions of fraternity in which men and 
women, in co-operation, may create a moral community.
The Concerns Of Equality Two Levels of Argument:
Faith and Pragmatism
While Tawney’s socialism çlearly derives fiom his Christian faith, his appeal for 
equality, since it is not predicated on an acceptance of Christian principles, is not 
grounded in Christian teachings. Indeed, the appeal for equality is an expression of the 
pragmatic understanding that the conditions of an equitable social order are tied to an 
equitable distribution of material resources and economic power. Ultimately, such an 
appeal is not addressed to specifically Christian values but to the wider constituency of 
universal humanism. Such an appeal serves to underline the tensions which exist between 
Tawney the moralist seeking to persuade by reference to Christian principals and Tawney
Equality, p. 86.
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the pragmatic scholar seeking to instruct by reference to empirical evidence. Tawney, as 
Richard Titmuss asserts, did not write of equality in the naive sense of equality of talent or 
merit or personality. His concerns, rather, are with ... “equality before the law, the 
removal of collectively imposed social and economic inequalities, the equalising of 
opportunities for all to secure certain goods and services, the education of all children to 
make them capable of freedom and more capable of fulfilling their personal differences; 
the enlargement of personal liberties through the discovery of each individual of his own 
and his neighbours endowments”.^  Tawney himself, in his Preface to the 1938 edition, 
protested at social and economic inequalities which involved a perpetual misdirection of 
limited resources and an economic and social structure which allowed... “human energies, 
the source of all wealth” to be systematically underdeveloped in the case of the majority... 
“from birth to maturity”. Tawney denounced inequalities as producing inefficient 
industrial practices; he saw them as constituting an economic liability. He noted, too, 
that those who had traditionally benefited by inequalities would stubbornly resist all 
attempts to reconstruct the social and economic order on more just, or more rational 
lines, in the belief that reconstruction will diminish their profits and lower their social 
status.
Yet, Tawney’s argument is more than a plea for equality; it is a plea for a moral 
order, a manner of life, a type of society. Such a moral order will “substitute the canon of 
convenience for the canon of right or wrong”.^ This appeal to “the canon of right or 
wrong” is at the heart of Tawney’s philosophy of equality. Ultimately, it must be argued, 
there can be no fiill understanding of Tawney’s social vision without a recognition of the 
overriding importance of this moral dimension. Indeed, the Christian moralist is equally 
anxious to “see set out the conditions of a moral scheme of the universe” as is the 
economic historian concerned to trace the significant connections between moral
[ See Introduction', Richard M. Titmuss, Equality, (1964 Edition), George Allen and Unwin, p.IS.
“  Handwritten notes for the New Leviathan (circa 1919-1920), RM. Tawney, see Tawney Papers,
Box 11, File WHO. British Library o f Political and Economic Science.
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standards and economic and social change. Essentially, the appeal to the “canon of right 
or wrong” is an appeal motivated by a moral conviction which extends beyond the 
demands for equality of economic power, of opportunity, of environment, education and 
welfare provision. It is an appeal underwritten by an article of Christian faith which 
proclaims “all men and women as equally children of God, equally heir to eternal life, 
equally possessing rights which are superior to the claims of the temporal order”.  ^Such a 
proclamation demands equality. It serves to endorse a “moral scheme” which repudiates 
the assumptions of the existing order, rejects its institutions, rebuts its moral values. 
Bound by “a body of Christian principles it insists that human methods of procedure and 
conduct” ^ be judged by moral precepts. Such a “body of principles”, is, of necessity, 
concerned with equal rights; it is concerned with equal respect and equal consideration. It 
is concerned, too, with fellowship.
Equality for Tawney, engenders fellowship. Indeed, it is proposed that “this 
dialectical relationship between equality and fellowship is one of Tawney’s major 
contributions to socialist thought”.^  Equality is more than a political ideal. It is an 
expression of Tawney’s Christian faith, the vital component of his socialismu It confirms 
his belief that “the laws by which man is to seek well-being” are animated by “divine 
principles”, and sanctioned by an immanent God. From these principles, Tawney submits, 
“may be deduced a conception of the nature of man and his relationship with God”. 
From these laws “may be deduced the notion of duties and rights, of fineedom and 
responsibility, of justice”.  ^ From this submission, may be deduced the strength of 
Tawney’s Christian faith and its contribution to his Christian Socialism.
* Handwritten notes for the New Leviathan (circa 1919-1920), R.H. Tawney, see Tawney Papers,
Box 11, File lOllO. British Library o f Political and Economic Science.
“  Ibid.
R H . Tawney And His Times, Ross Terrill, Andre Deutsch, 1973, p. 171.
Handwritten notes for the New Leviathan (circa 1919-1920), R.H. Tawney, see Tawney Papers, 
Box 11, File 10/10. British Library o f Political and Economic Science.
V Ibid.
78
Patently though Tawney does not always present his philosophy of equality in the 
language of Christian morality. He demands “that the quality of all practical activity be 
tested by reference to principles”,  ^nevertheless, his case for equality employs pragmatic 
arguments; he is concerned to demonstrate its practical advantages; he argues its 
economic, as well as its social benefits. Yet, while the social theorist disputes the 
libertarian proposition of inequality as the engine of economic efficiency, the Christian 
moralist rejects the proposition as not only economically unsound, but as morally 
perverse. Ultimately, it must be argued that notwithstanding the pragmatism, the realistic 
appraisals, the prudent judgements, “a deduction fix)m divine principles” is never absent 
firom Tawney’s notion of democratic socialism.
Yet, Tawney attacks inequality, not only out of a sense of justice and morality but 
also because of the economic inefficiencies which he argues it inevitably produces. The 
established order sustains a perpetual class struggle which is ... “fatal to the mobilisation 
of common effort”. Equality, Tawney argues, is an essential condition for an 
economically efficient, just and harmonious society. Yet he does not argue for a primitive 
equality in which “all men, strong and weak, sane and insane, capable and incompetent 
should be offered identical provision”. Equality of treatment, he insists, is not necessarily 
the same as identical treatment. It is, instead, an equality predicated on the Christian 
moral precept which insists that “all men merely because they are men, are of equal 
value”. It is an equality, which, in fellowship, demands of men, “to make for all, the 
provision appropriate to their needs”." It is an enabling equality which will maintain such 
social arrangements as wül provide equally to each individual, the opportunity to develop 
their particular talents and achieve their individual spiritual, physical and intellectual 
potential.
* The Acquisitive Society, p . l .
h ‘Christianity and The Social Order', see The Attack, p .l83.
79
If, as. Professor, Titmuss insists, the fundamental equalities which Tawney 
demands... “wül enlarge personal liberties through the discovery by each individual of his 
own and his neighbour’s endowments”,^  then equality, as Bernard Crick has noted, wül 
not only need to be related to liberty but also to that “most rhetorical, potent, but 
politicaUy lease defined of values, fraternity”.^ Tawney’s vision is of a society which 
fosters individuality but discourages individualism ... a society which generates mutual 
respect and mutual consideration. It is a society in which inequality needs moral and 
social justification; a society in which equality is not only the guarantor of equity but a 
necessary condition for a participatory, responsible, democratic society.
Furthermore, as Nick Ellison^ insists, Tawney believed that the improved social 
and economic conditions, whüe contributing to greater material equality, would also 
ensure a measure of real fieedom for the great mass of the people. For Tawney, equal 
rights demand not only that they be proclaimed and legaüy granted, but, also that they 
may be effectively exercised. They are rights which wül allow men and women control 
over the economic circumstances of their lives. Such rights wül enlarge the practical 
liberty of the many, just as they wül contain the license of the powerful few. Such 
equality wül not only disprove Lecky’s melancholy assurance “that liberty and equality are 
irreconcüable enemies”, i t  wül serve, too, as the bedrock of a fraternal society.
Fraternity is central to Tawney’s socialism and at the heart of his vision of society. 
In EQUALITY, he sets out to expose, with the moral indignation of an Old Testament 
prophet, the eloquence of Müton and the irony of Swift, that obsolete tradition of class 
subordination and class superiority ‘which frustrates that vision and denies feUowship’. 
He castigates “the ruinous vices of our existing social system”. ... “The odious business
* Introduction to Equality, Richard M. Titmuss, 1964 edition, p.l5.
"  ‘Equality’, Bernard Crick, see Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought, Ben Pimlott editor, 1984,
p.164
The Idea o f Equality in The British Labour Party, 193H1964, see Nick Ellison, L.SÆ. PhD. 
Thesis, 1988.
See Introduction, Democracy and Liberty, William E.H. Lecky, 1838-1903.
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of class advantages and class disabilities”. He sought to lay the ghost of that ‘mentalité 
hiérarchique’  ^ that English disease which strikes observers according to their 
temperaments, as amusing, barbarous or grotesque. But Tawney is concerned with more 
than the naive English idealisation of class as the final and infallible criterion of public 
expediency and private judgement. Inequality, he insists, with its class distinctions and its 
class confrontations, represents not only a threat to social cohesion, it poses a threat to 
democracy. An equality of effective political and civil rights which is the essence of 
democracy, does not easily combine with inequalities of economic power or inequalities 
of social opportunity. A system which encourages the acquisition of individual wealth 
and the accumulation of capital resources must necessarily create an imbalance of 
economic and political power to the detriment of that democratic principle which 
demands that civil and political rights be equally effective. Tawney recognises that there 
are liberal democratic societies which possess and respect representative institutions and 
enjoy both wide franchise and responsible government. Yet, he insists, while such 
‘democracies’ in which the mass of the people “exercise little influence on the direction of 
economic enterprise and where economic and cultural graduations descend precipitately 
fijom one stratum of the population to another” ^ may be recognised as “political 
democracies” they should more properly be described as “social oligarchies”. To ignore 
the profound differences which exist between those “democracies” in which class 
divisions are all-pervasive and those in which they play a comparatively unimportant part 
in the life of society is, Tawney insists, “to do violence to reality”.^
As for the working-class movement, Tawney fears that its ideals are being eroded 
in a society in which money and power are the supreme values. It does not fight to 
change the social order but will instead allow itself to be bought off with the small 
advances in wages, small social benefits and a more advantageous distribution of money
* Equality, p.37.
» Ibid.p.79.
Ibid,pJ8.
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and power. The workers are cowed, compliant, insecure. Fearful that they may lose their 
jobs, they lose their dignity as human beings. They come to believe that their masters 
possess a mysterious wisdom, that the ruling class has a magical influence which can bring 
about prosperity or misfortune. For Tawney, such attitudes represent a moral humiliation; 
they are a betrayal of the principle of the equal worth of each man and woman which is 
fundamental to his Christian faith. But beyond economic powerlessness and the tyranny 
of money, these victims of the ‘‘religion of inequality” are denied adequate education, 
decent living conditions; they are deprived of security; they lose initiative and self- 
respect. In a society which prides itself on individual liberty and equality of opportunity, 
both liberty and opportunity are limited by economic restraints. In a nation in which 
political and legal rights are fiercely defended, many are disbarred by economic 
circumstances not only from the means of self-development, but also from participation in 
that common culture which marks a society concerned to promote the dignity and 
refinement of all the citizens who compose i t
It is true, Tawney concedes in the Preface to the 1951 edition of EQUALITY 
that... “the last decade has seen a considerable expansion of collection provision of 
common needs”. Tawney recogrtises that in many cases such provision had been 
reluctantly and grudgingly granted. The provision was certainly not made either in the 
spirit or in the conviction that the purpose of democracy was to enable each individual, 
within the limits set by nature, knowledge and resources to grow to their full stature. 
Clearly, in his judgement, a society in which some children are obliged to “end their 
education just when their powers are beginning to develop” and are “sometimes 
encouraged to believe that the qualities most desirable in common men are docility, and a 
respect for their betters” ‘ is an abomination. For Tawney, an economic system which 
treats the mass of mankind not as partners in the co-operative enterprise of subduing 
nature to the service of man but as instruments to be manipulated for the pecuniary
* Equality, p.79.
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advantage of a minority of property owners is morally repugnant. Tawney’s demands for 
the elimination of all forms of privilege, of all unjustifiable inequalities, education, 
environmental or economic, his demand that economic power by converted into a servant 
of society with clearly defined objectives are expressions of that moral repugnance. They 
are also manifestations of Tawney’s understanding and insistence that men and women 
have the capacity to become ‘responsible partners’ in the co-operative enterprise of 
subduing nature to the service of mankind rather than victims of a system which 
dehumanises existence to the degradation of both exploiter and exploited. Equality then, 
for Tawney, is an instrument; it wiU prepare the ground for an equitable society of equal 
responsibility in which men and women may work together in co-operative enterprise 
towards agreed common ends. It will provide the base for a true democracy; it will 
maintain a system not only of formal rights but of mutual respect and fellowship. It will 
seek to achieve the ultimate objective of Christian socialism; the socialisation of 
Christianity and the Christianisation of socialism.
Equality Identified
Equality, Professor Bryan Turner insists, is almost as difficult to define clearly as it 
is to achieve politically. Nevertheless, he argues, “there is some consensus concerning the 
dimensions along which equality should be measured”  ^ There are, he suggests, four 
commonly identifiable types of equality. The first is ontological, based on the 
fundamental equality of persons. Secondly, there is equality of opportunity to achieve 
desirable ends. Thirdly, there is equality of condition which attempts to make the 
conditions of life equal for the relevant social groups. Fourthly, there is equality of 
outcome or equality of result. Certainly, there are contemporary social theorists who will 
accept Turner’s somewhat concise yet serviceable definition of the types of equality. As 
for Tawney’s definition, it derives, as does his entire social philosophy, from his Christian
Equality. Bryan S. Turner. Ellis Harwood. 1986. p.34.
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faith predicated in the belief in God and holds, as the essence of all morality, that every 
human being is, in the sight of God, of infinite and equal importance. Such a definition 
precludes as an article of faith the exclusion or subordination of any individual on the 
grounds of race, religion, gender or creed. Such a definition insists that “no consideration 
of expediency can justify the oppression of one by another'*.  ^Yet while for Tawney such a 
definition clearly derives from his understanding of Christian morality, his arguments for 
equality do not draw directly on Christian teachings. Instead, his case against “the religion 
of inequality” and his “strategy for equality” is predicated on a pragmatic demand for “the 
conditions of economic fi:eedom” which is addressed to that “universal humanist spirit” 
whose end he insists, “is the growth towards perfection of individual human beings”. " 
His argument, then, is on two levels; it is both moral and pragmatic. Yet while his own 
demand for equality clearly derives fix>m his Christian faith, his appeal is directed to an 
ethical understanding which is not the exclusive possession of those “who accept or reject 
some particular body of religious doctrine”.^
Yet, notwithstanding Turner’s four identifiable types of equality there are many 
theorists who, in their recognition of the complications which the ideal of equality 
presents, have critically probed its various social, economic and moral implications. 
Michael Walzer, for instance, is concerned to demonstrate in “a defence of pluralism and 
equality”, that even within a society dedicated to democratic and egalitarian principles, 
justice demands that “different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, 
in accordance with different procedures, by different agents”.^  ^ These differences of 
procedure and agents, Walzer judiciously argues, are determined by different 
understandings of the ‘social goods’ themselves and their distribution derives from 
“historical and cultural particularism”. Each ‘social good’ fulfils specific individual needs 
or rights, which Walzer proposes, do not follow finom our common humanity but follow
\ The Commonplace Book, entry for 13 August, 1913.
“ Equality, p.85.
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instead from shared cultural conceptions of ‘social goods’ which are not universal “but 
local and particular in c h a ra c te fF o r  Walzer, the aim of political egalitarianism is to 
create a society “free from domination”, whether political economic or social. Equality, 
he asserts, does not derive, as its opponents often claim, firom envy or resentment “but 
from the experience of personal subordination”. Walzer, then, committed to the notion of 
an egalitarian, pluralistic and democratic society argues that equality does not require the 
repression of persons. It requires, instead, the control and distribution of ‘social goods’ in 
respect of the exercise of particular powers, particular privileges and benefits so that no 
individual or group shall be dominant in any sphere of ‘social good’.
In respect of a just distribution of needs D.D. Raphael argues that while 
philosophic analysis cannot provide a universal standard, the egalitarian idea of just 
distribution according to needs implies a positive notion of equal rights and a positive 
notion offactual equality among men. Yet, Professor Raphael suggests, a commitment to 
the “equal satisfaction even of basic needs does not always imply the equal distribution of 
the material means to such satisfaction”.^  Particular circumstances, Raphael argues, 
determine that a particular need is greater than is normal, so that the distribution of 
benefit is in one sense unequal. It is a distribution, he submits, derived fix>m equity not 
fi’om arithmetic equality. Indeed, Professor Raphael argues in defence of both equality 
and equity that the ideal of universal equality requires that the inequalities of nature be 
mitigated or rectified. Within an egalitarian society, he proposes, social policy should aim 
to compensate those who are disadvantaged and seek to redress the balance between 
those bom with superior talents (for which, it is argued, they can claim no merit) and their 
less gifted fellows. Raphael’s proposal differs firom Walzer’s in respect of the notion of 
particular cultures defining their own ‘social goods’, coincidental to historical and cultural 
particularisms. Yet, clearly both Walzer and Raphael regard the equitable distribution of 
‘social goods’ in accordance with egalitarian principles as being directed not only to
Problems o f Political Philosophy, DJ>. Raphael, Macmillan, 1970, p.l83.
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redress unjustifiable inequalities but also to nullify those specific social arrangements 
which endorse and perpetuate them.
Similarly, David Miller who seeks to demonstrate that the equal distribution of 
income is “an imperfect expression of equality”, argues that in spite of accusations by its 
critics, egalitarians are not moved by a desire to create a uniform, undifferentiated society. 
Their overriding objective. Miller argues, is “to achieve a state in which, as far as possible, 
each man enjoys the same level of well being as every other”.^  Miller examines the 
relationship between the principle of equality and the principle of individual need, the 
satisfaction of which, he proposes, can be regarded in two ways: “either as a matter of 
justice or as a matter of humanity”." Humanity, Miller submits, demands that human 
suffering should be avoided. Justices, he argues, demands the understanding that while 
men differ in moral virtue, in merit, in personal success, in usefulness to society, there is 
an underlying equality which consists of the fact that each man is a unique individual with 
his own aims, ideals and outlook on the world, and that consequently he must be treated 
as such.
Yet, while Miller evaluates the claims of justice and humanity, his concern is to 
ensure “as a matter of justice” an equitable distribution of essential human needs, which 
extends beyond providing the conditions which allow each individual the equal 
opportunity to carry out his or her plan of life. It is concerned, also, to provide for those 
non-essential needs which, whüe they differ from individual to individual, serve to express 
the individuality of each individual which, he argues, “violate the principles of human 
respect” if they are not equitably distributed.
People, Müler insists, have varied needs and wants and “no serious egalitarian 
thinker” believes that “physical resources”... “should be assigned in equal quantities, but
* Social Justice, David Miller, Clarendon Press, 1975, p.l46ll49 passim.
"  Ibid, p.1461149 passim.
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rather in different proportions to different people according to their peculiar 
characteristics”. Egalitarian principles, he concludes, demand that justice consists 
(minimally), in a distribution of resources according to individual needs. Miller’s view 
serves to endorse the egalitarian principle of distribution in accordance with specific, 
identifiable and socially legitimate needs. It serves, also, to ensure the equalisation of 
those ‘social goods’ which Tawney perceives to be essential ingredients of a full and 
dignified human life.
Clearly, beyond appeals for what Professor Turner identifies as “ontological 
equality”,' - that is the equal consideration due to all men because they are men, there are 
demands for equality in respect of specific social issues. There are demands for racial 
equality which reject any social arrangement which denies to human beings on grounds of 
skin pigmentation, cultural or religious affiliation, the inalienable rights which Jefferson 
claimed as self-evident There are demands for gender equality which insist that men and 
women (the latter comprising one half of the world’s population) are treated as equals in 
every realm of public activity. There is, too, central to egalitarian doctrine, the demand 
for that equality which extends to every individual the equal opportunity to develop to the 
fullest extend their human capacities irrespective of race, religion, gender, social or 
economic position. There are demands, also, for such social organisation as will obviate 
those inequalities of environmental conditions, of education facilities, of health care 
provision, which, m equity, are held to be unjustifiable. There are demands for equality 
predicated on the distribution of economic resources which allow not only for an 
equitable distribution of economic power but, it is argued, will result in a consequent 
equalisation of effective political power.
Tawney’s egalitarianism as Michael Quinn argues, does not derive fiom the claim 
that men are identical, but, rather that they share an equivalence of value” (which)
Equality, Bryan S. Turner, Ellis Harwood, 1986, p.34.
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“assumes a core capacity for reflective self conscious choice as definitive of mature 
human agents”.^  From this understanding of “equivalence of value”, Tawney, like David 
Miller, recognises the underlying principle of equality which acknowledges “the unique 
individuality of every man”. Like Michael Walzer and D J). Raphael, he calls for a society 
“free from domination” in which social policy is directed against those inequalities which 
divide those with special talents from their less gifted fellows. He distinguishes, too, 
between the individuals right to equal treatment and the right which Ronald Dworkin 
claims is fundamental, '*the right to treatment as an equaU that is the right to be treated 
with the same respect and the same consideration as anyone else.”“
Tawney, then, like “other serious egalitarian thinkers” recognises that there is no 
equality which does not relate to a particular power, a particular benefit or a specific 
social circumstance. Equality, therefore, can have no abstract or absolute meaning. 
Nevertheless, equality for Tawney, in accordance with his Christian understanding, does 
have a moral foundation. While his most celebrated work of social theory is concerned 
with the practical rather than the moral application and meaning of equality, it clearly 
demonstrates the two levels, ethical and pragmatic, of Tawney’s thought. Indeed, 
Tawney’s case for equality is presented through the pragmatic arguments of the social 
theorist rather than by the exhortations of the Christian moralist. Ultimately, for Tawney, 
equality demands the equal ability to exercise specific powers. It is this recognition which 
motivates his understanding that equality is a necessary condition of individual liberty. 
“The fundamental idea of liberty is power’, he insists, “power to control the conditions of 
one’s own life”. ^
Equality for Tawney, then, is authenticated within a social order which provides 
the conditions in which men and women, regardless of class, status or wealth, may
* Justice And Egalitarianism, Formal and Substantive Equality in some Recent Theories o f Justice,
Michael Quinn, Garland Press, 1991, p.32135 passim.
“ Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin, Duckworth, 1977, p.277.
The Commonplace Book, entry for July 21,1912.
88
effectively exercise those rights which constitute individual liberty. That such liberty may 
be exercised in the pursuit of self-interest is evident. The aim of equality, Tawney 
argues, is not to provide the conditions for individual self-advancement^ it is to offer to 
all, equally, the maximum conditions for individual self-development. Its emphasis is on 
solidarity, on communal, rather than individual purpose. Its aims are clearly consistent 
with Tawney’s concept of a Christian life. The emphasis, however, is more than an 
expression of Christian faith. It underlines Tawney’s vision of the ends to which human 
nature may aspire. We seek, he insists, “a society in which men (and women) are happy 
to continue in familiar surroundings, because they enjoy, not only economic security, but 
the dignity, the social contacts, and, if they please, the intellectual interests and culture, 
which human nature demands”. ^
It may be argued that this notion of equality within a Christian Social Order 
shares the aspirations of a purely secular socialism. Nevertheless, Tawney’s vision of 
equality derives directly finom his Christian belief. It is, then, a Socialism which denies 
that the ideal of equality is relevant only in man’s relation to God. It demands, in the 
name of Christian morality, that the ideal persists in man’s relationships with man. It is a 
socialism which believes, as the essence of all morality, that every individual is of infinite 
and equal importance. It is a Christian Socialism which holds, as an article of faith, that 
“to believe in equality, it is necessary to believe in the greatness of God”. “ Yet while his 
socialism is inspired and motivated by Christian faith, Tawney’s case for equality does not 
directly invoke Christian values. Its appeal, ultimately, is to the common humanity which, 
for Tawney, is the instrument by which men and women may, in fellowship, be united in 
justice and common purpose.
* 'A Note On Christianity and the Social Order', R.H. Tawney, 1937, seeThe Attack, p. 191.
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Equality And Class Structure
Tawney acknowledges that there have been a variety of theories advanced to 
explain the facts of class formations and class differentiation. War, the institutions of 
private property, biological characteristics, the division of labour, Tawney insists, have all 
been claimed as factors in determining and justifying class relationships and class 
divisions. There is, Tawney argues, no simple or single explanation; each factor may in 
particular circumstances be wholly or partially responsible for creating class hierarchies. 
Yet, Tawney insists, class is not necessarily defined by economic organisation and even a 
group which shares economic interests may not necessarily be described as a class. Class 
is more difficult to define than the simple division imposed by occupation or shared 
economic interests. It... “relates to a totality of conditions by which several sides of life 
are affected”. In England, Tawney insisted,... “it is elusive and fundamental”; it 
makes a rough division of individuals according to their... “resources and manner of life, 
their income, both the amount and its source, their ownership of property or their 
connection with those who own it, the security or insecurity of their economic position, 
the degree to which they belong by tradition, education and association to social strata 
which are accustomed, even on a humble scale, to exercise direction ... or be directed by 
others”. Conventional usage, Tawney argues, with all its crudity, has come nearer to 
grasping certain significant sides of the reality of class than those who see in the idea of 
class merely the social expression of the division of labour between groups engaged in 
different types of economic activity. Class divisions, Tawney asserts, have... “a vitality 
and momentum of their own”.^  They create differences of status, differences of power. 
Within industrial Capitalism, Tawney insists, society, is seen as an ‘economic mechanism’ 
the main elements in whose structure correspond to different classes. Yet, it is evident, as 
Tawney notes, that this ‘economic mechanism* and the different classes within it have
^  Tawney, it must be noted is specifically, perhaps curiously concerned with 'England', he does not 
extend his class arguments even as far as Great Britain.
* Equality, p. 61
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created varying traditions, manners and habits of life. Different classes attend different 
types of school, create different types of social institutions, live in different environments.
It is, then, over-simplistic to see society as a mere ‘economic mechanism’, a 
productive machine; it must be seen, rather, as an organism composed of groups each 
with its varying standards of life. There are certainly, economic groups consisting of 
employer and employed, capitalist and wage earner, farmer and labourer. There are a 
series of social groups distinguished from each other by different standards of expenditure 
and consumption, varying not only in income but in education, environment, social 
standing, family connections, their leisure and their amusements. There exists a 
separation between the small and powerful group which owns, organises and directs the 
material apparatus of industry, and those, the majority, who accept direction and perform 
the routine work. This system of class relations, in England, because of its particular 
historical development, is marked by two sets of division evolving from the rapid 
industrialisation of the nineteenth century and the remnants of a feudal past softened by 
the social changes of the democratic era. There exists (in England), almost uniquely,... “a 
blend of crude plutocratic reality combined with the sentimental aroma of an aristocratic 
legend”. Tawney, at his most ironic, pronounces the English class system to be at once 
as... “businesslike as Manchester and as gentlemanly as Eton; its hands can be as rough as 
those of Esau; its voice as mellifluous as that of Jacob”... “a god with two faces, 
hypocritical, elusive”.^  It answers ... “social protests and obvious economic grievances 
with admonitions to social respectability”." It separates and divides; it creates and 
sustains varying standards of life and culture. It prevents the establishment of a common 
culture, a culture in which... “each citizen might participate with his fellows in a shared 
enterprise which serve each first and foremost because it serves all”.
I Equality, p.64.
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Clearly, Tawney’s understanding of a common culture extends beyond a belief in a 
more equitable distribution of material goods. ^  For Tawney, a common culture is 
necessarily a classless culture in which each citizen not only shares in civic responsibility 
but is bound to uphold such social and economic organisation as will provide the 
conditions in which he and his fellows may develop to the full their human potential. 
Tawney regards the English class system with its peculiar toughness and cohesion, its 
endorsement of unjustifiable inequalities, its own petty snobberies, social nuances and 
hierarchical graduations of men, not as personalities but as tools, as the “essence of 
slavery”. It is, Tawney insists, the consciousness of such injustice, the moral abhorrence 
against such treatment, that, even more than poverty causes men to strike when they have 
everything to lose and nothing to gain. Such treatment is an affront to what is sacred in 
man, - the sense of human dignity. It is a denial of what Tawney argues is the essence of 
all morality, the belief that every human being is of infinite importance, and therefore, no 
consideration of expediency can justify the oppression of one by another. For Tawney, 
therefore, such disregard for the infinite importance of each human being is not only a 
betrayal of moral principles; it is also an abnegation of brotherhood. It perpetuates a 
society of narrow self-interest; it props up a house divided in which the ideals of 
fellowship and individual self-development are... “muffled and blunted”, strangled even,... 
“by the arithmetical criterion of profit and loss”.^  In such a society power is exercised not 
for the common benefit but in order that privilege and special advantage may be 
maintained and consolidated. Tawney recognises that some people sincerely hold that 
such a class system is inevitably the raw material out of which civilisation had to be made, 
but, he insists, such a perception is neither lovable nor admirable. Nor for Tawney, is it 
acceptable. Privilege breeds tyranny, he insists, and together they create a spirit of 
domination and servility which promotes callousness in those that profit from them and 
resentment and suspicion in those that do not. The attack is a reflection of Tawney’s
^  Indeed, David Reisman suggests, see State and Welfare, Tawney, Galbraith and Adam Smith, 
Macmillan 1982, '*the first think to remember about Tawney is that he regarded material 
prosperity not as an end in itself, but as a means to some higher end", p.23.
* Equality, p.64.
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conviction that such treatment denies to men their humanism - a term which he uses to 
mean... “their superb sense of the dignity of man”.^  Humanism, Tawney argues, has many 
meanings, but it is not, as some claim, the antithesis of theism or of Christianity and its 
essence is simple. ... “It is the attitude which judges the externals of life by their effect in 
assisting or hindering the life of the spirit”.^ It is the belief that the ‘machinery of 
existence’ - property, material wealth and industrial organisation - is to be regarded as a 
means to an end. It is this ‘humanist spirit’ which recognises what is truly valuable in the 
life of mankind. It is this ‘human spirit’ which will promote that ‘spiritual life’ which, 
Tawney argues will liberate ‘the divine and unique personality’ of each individual and 
cultivate those individual powers which make for energy and refinement in all men. 
Humanism, as Tawney defines it, rejects “material prosperity as of secondary and 
instrumental importance”;^  clearly, he respects its aspirations. Nevertheless, firm in his 
own Christian faith, he declares, “in order to believe in human equality, it is necessary to 
believe in God”.
This view may be rejected; there are many who defend equality who do not share 
Tawney’s Christian faith or his belief in God. Yet, for Tawney, it is only when one 
contemplates the infinitely great that is God, that human differences appear to be “so 
infinitely small as to be negligible”. It is because modem man had ceased to believe in the 
greatness of God, and therefore, the infinite smallness (or greatness - same thing) of man, 
Tawney argues, that mankind had to invent or emphasise the differences between men. It 
is this Christian perception of each man as God’s creature, that leads Tawney to insist 
that man has claims on man, because men are men and that nothing can justify... “my 
using my neighbour as a tool”.^ ^
Equality, p.84.
Ibid, p.84.
“  David Reisman, State and Welfare, Tawney, Galbraith and Adam Smith, David Reisman, 
Macmillan 1982, p.23.
The Commonplace Book, entry for March 6,1913.
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Patently, Tawney’s demands for equality are rooted in his revulsion at “the plague 
of class”... “the obsolete tradition of class superiority and class subordination”.i Yet, his 
protests against “the tranquil inhumanity” which engenders “servility and resentment on 
the one hand and patronage and arrogance on the other”^ are expressed in a language 
which is not confined to the vocabulary of Christian Socialism. Tawney in EQUALITY, 
employs a language which is shared with secular but no less morally motivated social 
visions. Such visions place the same emphasis on human dignity, make the same demands 
for equity, the same call to brotherhood. Yet, while Tawney, in the interest of equality, 
employs the language of a universal humanism, his own socialism ultimately rests on a 
fundamental Christian injunction ... “Be kindly affectioned one to another with brotherly 
love in honour preferring one another”. (ROM. 10:12)
Property, Power, Equality And Freedom
Tawney, in his concern for equality and liberty, promotes ideals that have often 
been seen as antipathetic. His response is that within industrial capitalism both values have 
been subverted by an economic and social stratification which has created and sustains “a 
hierarchy of industry and labouf’.^  This hierarchy, invested with, and supported by 
economic power, exercises a tyranny and sustains organised forces, both of labour and 
capital, each intent, on curbing the power of the other, each intent on consolidating and 
extending its own power. From the confrontation between these powers, between that 
power which would maintain inequality and that power which would diminish it, evolves 
the frictions, the collisions and breakdowns which divide Industrial Capitalist society.
Equality as Tawney defines it involves an equalisation of economic power just as it 
requires a large measure of economic equality. His demand is not for an identical level of
* Equality, p.35.
“ Ibid, p.37.
Ibid,p.l58.
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pecuniary income, but of equality of environment, of access to education and the means of 
civilisation of security and independence... “and of the social consideration which equality 
in these matters usually carries with it”.^  Equality, he argues, requires the deliberate 
acceptance of social restraint upon individual expansion; it involves constraints legally 
imposed and recognised to prevent extremes of wealth and power in the interest of the 
public good. This understanding of equality must necessarily be in conflict with an 
interpretation of liberty which allows the individual the freedom (within the mle of law) to 
indulge without restraint his appetites, to pursue his self-interest without regard to the 
social or economic consequences for his fellows. Equality, too, as Tawney defines it, is 
founded on a mutual respect and mutual consideration which cannot tolerate an 
infringement on the freedom of one’s fellows in the name of individual liberty. 
Furthermore, equality cannot exist in a society in which the economically powerful, can 
exploit to the full extent of their economic strength their less economically powerful 
fellow citizens.
For Tawney, inequalities of power not only frustrate individual liberty; they 
threaten the democratic process. Inequalities of power, as Michael Quinn argues, overlap 
with inequalities in education, in environment “even, with the effects of deprivation on the 
awareness of the individual, even on the conception of what his or her legitimate interests 
are”." They create a society in which equal rights, bereft of equal power, initiate and 
sustain a substantive inequality of status and class, even of self respect. There evolves, 
and we are witness to it, a powerless underclass which, resentful and alienated, not only 
threatens social stability, but calls into question the notion of a civilised society. While 
citizens in such a society share equally the rights of citizenship, they are denied an equal 
share in public power. For Tawney, this denial negates authentic equality which can cxily
( Equality, p.43.
“  Justice And Egalitarianism, Formal and Sidfstantive Equality in some Recent Theories o f  Justice,
Michael Quinn, Garland Press, 1991, p  250.
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exist when each individual can equally assert his or her rights, can equally enjoy their 
effective exercise, can equally participate in responsible citizenship.
Tawney concedes that there are circumstances in which inequality is a necessary 
condition of liberty. Organisations invested with the authority of consensus and 
recognised as agents with the right to act in the interest of society necessarily require 
extraordinary powers in order to effectively perform their duties. Conversely, inequality 
of power can be a menace and in order to preserve civil liberties, there must be legal 
requirements which serve to protect the individual finom the power of the State. Yet, 
Tawney insists, while there are rules of law to restrain political power ... “the dangers 
arising from the inequalities of economic powers have been less commonly recognised” 
“and they exist recognised or not”.‘ The abuses of power are, Tawney argues, not 
confined to political organisation; there are abuses of power finom which political rights 
offer no protection. It is only in unity that a worker may purchase security against 
exploitation; it is only in association that he may demand that the conditions of his 
employment be specified, his rights and his duties defined. In such circumstances, the 
struggle for a livelihood becomes not only economic, but also social and political. The 
whole productive process, the provision of those goods and services which men need to 
fulfil their desire for a civilised life, Tawney argues, demands co-operation.
Furthermore, Tawney argues, the accelerating tendency towards merger and 
association, towards financial and industrial alliances have created groups so dominant in 
their industry that it is impossible, unless one is engaged in their service, to find 
employment in their particular field. They are effectively fiefdoms, with power and 
influence, politically and economically, over the nation, over its policies domestic and 
foreign and certainly over the work force whose economic and social environment they 
have the power to determine. This plutocracy therefore defines, within the limitation of
Equality, p.l65.
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the law, the direction of industry; they act in accordance with their own interests even if 
such interests do not coincide with the interests of the community or of their work force. 
Certainly there are trade unions, who, on behalf of their members fight for better working 
conditions, higher wages, shorter working hours, larger entitlements, etc. Inevitably, 
there are confrontations, often prolonged, often bitter, always dominated by the spirit of
“The good old rule 
SufSceth them, the simple plan.
That they should take, who have the power 
And they should keep who can".*
Such confrontations do not make for social harmony; they defeat common purpose; they 
destroy fellowship.
Freedom, for Tawney, then, is not freedom as the libertarians understand it; it is 
not adequately guaranteed by formal equality before the law, or by political franchise. 
Even the paradigm, so beloved by libertarians, of freely contracted agreement between 
parties equally free to accept or reject particular arrangements, is invalid if one party has 
the advantage of economic power. Realistically, there can be no freely contracted 
agreement in which one party can dictate the terms, demand and obtain concessions by 
reason of its superior economic strength. As C. Perelman rightly argues ... “When 
relations are economically and socially unequal, freedom leads to the oppression of the 
weaker party"." A society, therefore, dedicated to preserve freedom and protect, in the 
name of equal rights, “the weaker party” must legislate so that liberty does not become 
license. As for political equality, while it may be formally proclaimed it cannot be 
effectively realised in the absence of the necessary resources of education, time and
* 'Memorials o f a Tour in Scotland', 1808, Rob Roy's Grave, Stanza XI, William Wandsworth.
"  'Liberty, Equality and The Public Interest' see Equality And Freedom, Past, Present and Future,
C. Perelman, Weisbaden, 1977, p.2.
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money which are the requirements of sustained political engagement. Similarly, a 
declaration that all are equal before the law has no substance when one party to legal 
action has the financial resources to engage in costly litigation against a party who, for 
lack of funds caimot adequately pursue a legitimate grievance.
For Tawney, property equals power and power equals privilege and privilege, he 
insists, reacts against the spirit of community. While he approves the independence which 
small scale ownership engenders, large scale ownership, he argues, iressponsibly 
exercised, promotes exploitation and economic dependency. The liberal philosophy of 
property, he demonstrates, protects, in the name of equal rights, the inequalities of power 
which ownership authenticates. In spite of its proclaimed respect for the individual and 
the rights of the individual, he argues, it is reluctant to interfere with the rights of 
property. Yet, as Anthony Arblaster argues, “consistent regard for the equal rights of all 
individuals, requires such interference”.^  Indeed, it must be argued, such a system of 
rights cannot equally protect each individual. Large scale ownership, through the 
economic power invested in it, inevitably sustains inequalities of economic power. 
Clearly, to distribute power unequally, is to unequally distribute liberty. Certainly, where 
the rights of property are inviolable, the rights of the unpropertied are prejudiced by the 
economic power which property generates.^ Indeed, even the right to small property 
ownership is insecure against the power of large economic interests. Ultimately, this 
tension between formal rights and effective freedom exposes a contradiction between the 
political system and the economic dynamics of industrial capitalism. While it proclaims 
equal rights, its economic structure is sustained by inequality.
Freedom, then, must be concerned not only with political power but also with 
economic relationships. Ultimately, it is this economic relationship which defines the
\ The Rise And Decline O f Western Liberalism, Anthony Arblaster, Blackwell, 1984, p  88.
"  In The Agrarian Problem In The Sixteenth Century, Tawney had demonstrated how '’the political
and economic omnipotence o f the landed aristocracy” had overridden, ’’with obstinate in­
difference, the vested interest o f the weaker rural class”, see p2!3 passim.
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conditions of both freedom and equality. Furthermore, it may be argued against the 
libertarian champions who regard the &ee market as the self-evident guarantor of liberty, 
that while “it may be true that equality is inversely related to the freedom to dispose and 
make use of property under the social arrangements of Capitalism, the latter condition is 
not singly to be identified as freedom”.^  Certainly, freedom is more than the right to buy 
and sell, to acquire and dispose, although restrictions against such activity without 
reasons of public interest are constraints on liberty. Yet, as Tawney insists, liberty 
demands that the economically weak shall not be at the mercy of the economically strong; 
it demands that control of economic life should be ... “amenable to the will of the 
community” not solely motivated by reasons of hope and fear in the interests of the 
powerful. Tawney’s conditions for liberty and equality are inextricably bound up with the 
ideal of fellowship and, in his judgement, the very nature of industrial Capitalism 
invalidates this ideal. How can there be a community of interests when the interests of 
one power group is contrary to the interests of the other? How can there be common 
purpose when one group imposes its purpose against the will of the other? How can 
there be a common culture where disparities of wealth create educational, social and 
economic divisions? How in a society of self-interest can social cohesion and communal 
responsibility thrive? How may a society “concentrated all in itself’ live in brotherhood?
Tawney’s perceptions of liberty and equality, then, are founded on a deep sense of 
social justice, compounded by the firm conviction that to deny fellowship is to violate 
both principles. Justice and morality he insists, cannot allow that one individual may 
exploit a fellow human-being for his own ends. If he demands of liberty more than the 
formal recognition of the fight to pursue self-interest, the demand is engendered by the 
notion that such pursuit may result in the disregard of the interest of others. For Tawney, 
liberty, which is defined merely as freedom from restraint, cannot create and sustain social
 ^ ‘Language Development, Human Intelligence and Social Organisation*, Noam Chomsky, 1976, 
The Chomsky Reader, Serpents Tail, 1987, p.186, Chomsky quoting David Ellerman, 'Capitalism 
and Worker's Self-Management', 1973.
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harmony. Furthermore, Tawney would argue, the powers and the privileges which derive 
from such a definition will ensure that... “the notions of freedom and equality which must 
be taken together in the idea of the equal value of individuals as free or self-determining 
human beings'*  ^is incoherent within a society of atomistic individuals free of the ideals of 
social co-operation and fellowship. Yet, while Tawney supports ... “the idea of the equal 
value of individuals as free or self-determining beings”, as an essential ingredient of 
freedom and equality, the idea would not fully satisfy his understanding of the principles. 
For Tawney, freedom and equality require not only self-determination, but such social 
organisation as will encourage the moral development of each individual within a 
community motivated for the common good and nourished by a common culture. 
Tawney would agree with Charvet’s perception that ... “Crudely, not individuals but 
men’s associated wiUs in community constitute the basis of our ethical experience”.^ He 
would however, extend it to encompass the notion that “men’s associated wills in 
community” are most effective within a society in which there exists a mutual respect for 
the liberty and the equality of each individual. He would argue that it is only when the 
social and political structure is so organised that such respect is the inalienable right of 
every individual that a moral order and a fully civilised life can evolve.
Tawney suggests that the theory that liberty and equality are in an unyielding 
opposition derives from a pre-industrial Europe and should be re-examined in the light of 
the conditions of industrial civilisation. Liberty, he declares, “is composed of liberties”.^  
Some liberties are fundamental, others are secondary. If equality is indicted as an ... 
“assassin of liberty”, he argues, then it must be plainly shown which particular liberty is 
threatened. There are liberties which, in free societies, are regarded as essential; they are
* A Critique o f Freedom and Equality, John Charvet 1981 ,p .l.
“  Ibid,p.L
Tawney shares this perception with Michael Oakeshott. There are, Oakeshott asserts, "many 
species o f liberty which compose the freedom we enjoy, amplifying and making more secure the 
whole. Some he argues, “may be more general or more settled and mature than others". There 
are, he insists, "a coherence o f mutually supporting liberties, none o f which stands alone".
'Rationalism in Politics'. See The Political Economy o f Freedom. Michael Oakeshott, Liberty
Press. First published Cambridge Journal, Volume II, 1949, p.3841406.
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secured by law to every citizen and are recognised as ... “the principles on which the State 
is based”. There are other less crucial freedoms; these may be seen as expedients or 
devices. They may be extended or curtailed according to circumstances. These 
‘secondary’ freedoms do not, therefore, represent the inviolable principle on which the 
State is based. Such a ‘secondary’ freedom, Tawney maintains, is the right to the private 
ownership of the means of production, an opinion for which he turns to the authority of 
Sir A^ ^Uiam Beveridge who had argued that such ownership “is not enjoyed, never has 
been enjoyed, and is unlikely to be enjoyed by more than a small proportion of the British 
people.^ In industrial societies, he insist, the practical realities determine that economic 
power is firmly controlled by privileged classes, and for the State to intervene in order to 
curtail it is deemed an infimgement on liberty. Yet, Tawney argues, when the State does 
not intervene, it is not fi:eedom that remains; quite fijequently it is tyranny. Tawney 
asserts that the freedom most commonly- claimed to be menaced by State intervention is 
that freedom of the economically powerful to make decisions and execute policies in
matters relating to their economic interests. Tawney advises that when there are protests
!
against an alleged curtailment of freedom, the first question which must be asked is ... 
freedom for whom”? Because, he insists, “there is no such thing as freedom in the abstract 
divorced from the realities of a particularly- time and place”.^ Liberty, then, lie a formal 
declaration of equality is in Tawney’s view an abstract concept; without meaning since 
liberty, like equality always depends on the individual’s ability to equally pursue self- 
determined ends.
It may be argued that such an ability is dependent on the structure of the power 
relationship existing at a particular time, and within a particular society. This power 
relationship may prevent the pursuit of the particular end either by laws which forbid it, or 
by economic pressure which frustrates it. The structure of the power relationship, 
therefore, may either inhibit or extend liberty in accordance with the objectives, or, in the
* Equality, p228.
“  Ibid,p228.
101
interest of those who control it. Freedom, Tawney submits, involves ... “the power of 
choice between alternatives, a choice which is real, not nominal, between alternatives 
which exist in fact, not only on paper.” “Liberty”, he insists, “is the ability to do or refrain 
from doing definite things, at a definite moment, in definite circumstances”.^  The question 
which must be asked, therefore, is whether this liberty has been increased or decreased by 
those measures which correct or nullify inequalities? The answer, as Tawney has argued, 
is dependent upon a definition of liberty. Again a question must be posed. Who benefits 
from this liberty? Tawney’s position is clear. Liberty and equality which many have 
declared to be implacable foes can ... “live as friends” if the measures taken to increase 
equality extend the range of alternatives open to ordinary men and women. If the 
measures ensure that the chosen alternative is in fact realisable, then equalisation has 
enlarged the sphere of freedom. Tawney recognises that there still exists within Industrial 
Capitalism a ‘hierarchy of authority* which by the very nature of the system is actuated by 
its own economic interests. This ‘hierarchy’ exercises extensive economic power on 
countless human lives. It is a power which can be arbitrary and autocratic, and, Tawney 
insists, it must be made accountable and brought under public control. Tawney 
acknowledges that historically there has been powerful resistance to such control, but he 
argues, there appeared to be a growing recognition that in many circumstances public 
control was not only desirable, but, in many instances a necessary safeguard against an 
infringement of liberty. Furthermore it may be argued, such restraint furnishes a practical 
and equitable contribution to democratic process. A democracy, as Tawney insists must 
not only proclaim formal rights and incorporate them as primary principles on which the 
State is based, it must create such conditions as allow for their effective exercise. It is 
also an essential condition of democracy that the exercise of what might be perceived as a 
right does not impinge on the rights of others. Equality demands that each citizen has an 
equal right to exercise these rights, providing there is not breach of this condition. If 
there is such a breach, then the right cannot be exercised, for just as there must be
Equality, p228.
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equality of the right to freedom of action, so must there be equality of restraint. It may be 
properly argued that rights of action and rights of restraint demand also an equality of 
economic and political power and without a redistribution of such powers the rights are 
merely formal and ineffective. Thus, for Tawney, equality entails a redistribution of 
power so that Henry and Henrietta Dubb may be protected from its illegitimate, socially 
damaging and inequitable misuse.”^  Insofar as this redistribution has been implemented, 
Tawney argues, no primary liberty has been lost, although, he concedes, the ability of 
particular groups and individuals to conduct economic operations at their own discretion 
has been circumscribed by legislation and taxation. However, he insists, freedom for the 
majority has been extended, and, what for many wage earners were merely formal rights 
can now, in practice, be exercised. The erosion of certain secondary liberties, such as the 
automatic entrance into certain public schools based on ability to pay rather than 
scholastic merit has not, Tawney insists, resulted in the death of freedom. Indeed, he 
insists, as long as only a minority enjoy the conditions which allow for a civilised life, 
many so called ‘freedoms’ may properly be seen as privileges. If freedom inches the 
power of self determination, then “any action which causes such opportunities to be more 
widely shared is twice blessed. It not only subtracts from inequality, it adds to freedom”.^
Freedom, Tawney insists, must always be defined; its beneficiaries always 
identified. Freedom for whom? is always the question. But a freedom which makes 
possible a life worthy of human beings for ordinary men and women is certainly “twice 
blessed”. Indeed it is thrice blessed. It not only extends opportunity and recognises the 
equal value of every man and woman, it also recognises the right of every individual to 
pursue, without hindrance, their self-determined, legitimate ends. Yet Tawney provides 
more specific definitions of liberty. Civil liberty, he submits, depends on “fijeedom of 
worship; fi:eedom of speech and writing; freedom of meeting; freedom in the choice of
^  Curiously, and welcomely, Tawney has been almost exclusively confined to Henry Dubb now turns 
his attention to "the mental and moral traditions o f plain men and women". Equality, p200.
* Equality, p.235 (concluding sentence o f1938-1950, Epilogue).
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occupation; ticedom to combine”. Political liberty, he insists, depends “partly on civil 
liberty, partly on the existence of constitutional arrangements for the maintenance of 
representative and responsible government”. The sole security for the preservation of 
both civil and political liberty”, he asserts, “is a public opinion which is determined to 
preserve them”.i
For Tawney, such determination grounded in Christian values, will serve to sustain 
those social structures and those social relationships which he holds as essential 
components of a moral order. The concern of British Socialism, he insists, is to establish 
the conditions for a civilised, self-respecting life which is available to every individual. It 
must seek to create a community which gives priority to “the activities of the spirit” and 
encourages the institutions which promote them. British Socialism, he argues, must 
regard civilisation not as a matter of possessions but of a quality of life. It must recognise 
that the most important aspects of human beings are not the superficial circumstances of 
income or wealth which divides them ... but the common humanity which unites them”. 
In the essay ‘British Socialism Today’ Tawney argues that the impulse behind the British 
Socialist movement as far as the rank and file is concerned ... “has been obstinately and 
unashamedly ethical”.^ It has evolved out of hatred o f ... a system which corrupts human 
relations” by allowing the exploitation of one man for the gain of another. We must 
replace this system, Tawney demands ... (with) “a community of responsible men and 
women working without fear in comradeship for common ends, all of whom can grow to 
their full stature, develop to the utmost limit the varying capacities with which nature has 
endowed them.”^  This demand is an expression of Tawney’s Christian faith which 
exhorts men to fellowship in the conviction that fellowship will maintain justice, endorse 
equality and extend liberty. This exhortation is compounded by an appeal to the 
Humanist values of charity and tolerance. It derives from the conviction that liberty
[ ‘Social Democracy in Britain’, 1949, see The Radical Tradition 1964, p.165.
“  ‘British Socialism Today’, 1952, see The Radical Tradition 1964, p.l68.
Ibid,p.l68.
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demands that each individual may fieely pursue (or not pursue) in accordance with their 
conscience, their legitimated ends, may fieely develop their intellectual and spiritual 
capacities, fieely exercise their religious faith. For Tawney, the Christian Socialist, his 
social philosophy sustained by Christian principles, freedom of worship is a necessary 
condition of democracy.
Equality Of Opportunity
For libertarians equality of opportunity is most equitably expressed within a social 
order which allow each individual, in fair competition, to exercise his or her capabilities. 
The argument recognises that there are differing human capacities but, they insist, 
guarantees of equal political rights and equal economic liberty ensure equality of 
opportunity. By application and talent, it is argued, each individual has an equal 
opportunity to gain reward. It is acknowledged that such arrangements, will, necessarily 
engender economic inequalities. In a system of free enterprise, it is admitted, chances are 
not equal, since such a system, “based on private property and inheritance, necessarily 
creates differences of opportunity”.  ^ This advocacy of free-market capitalism grants that 
within the system the man who starts poor is less likely to succeed (in terms of amassing 
wealth) than is a man who has inherited property. Nevertheless it is argued, a free-market 
ultimately defines a fiee society. The free-market, they claim, is the guardian of individual 
freedom, a bulwark against the coercive, all powerful state. The system, it is proposed, 
needs disparities of wealth and income in order to function. They act, it is claimed, as an 
engine of economic efficiency. Furthermore economic inequalities are part of a natural 
order which are, (or ought to be) outside explicit political decision. As for formal rights, 
there is a clear dividing line between the allocation of resources and fundamental 
constitutional rights. Politics, must not be allowed to corrupt economic transactions or 
interfere with the market mechanism. This insistance on the separation of politics from
The Road to Serfdom, FA . Hayek, 1944, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979 edition, p .77.
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economics, it must be argued, does not make for social harmony. The market system, 
while it may vigorously respect equal rights, unarguably favours, in terms of economic 
advantage, the exceptional few. There are, it is conceded, winners and losers. No one can 
predict who wiU identify or create or satisfy a new demand or even when changes in 
demand force others out of the market. We may judge the results to be unfair, but it is 
argued, our complaint is unwarranted. The outcome is not due to the actions or 
intentions of any definable group. The market, neutral, and, the final arbiter, has decided. 
Who, then it is asked, has been unjust?
Yet, while the champions of the fi-ee-market system concede that it inevitably 
results in inequalities they neglect to emphasise the consequent imbalance of economic 
power. Yet, as Tawney argues, it is precisely this imbalance of economic power which 
reacts against social cohesion and the spirit of community. It is this imbalance which, in 
industrial capitalist societies, underline the division between constitutional rights and the 
exercise of effective power. Ultimately, it is this imbalance which negates the libertarian 
argument Patently, constitutional rights and equality of economic liberty do not secure, 
equitably, equality of opportunity. Indeed, it must be argued inequalities of economic 
power endorse those distinctions of class and status which sustain ‘the religion of 
inequality’, such distinctions crate social conflict; they fuel envy and resentment. They 
destroy fellowship; they breed privilege.
Tawney concedes that the ancient forms of privilege have been overthrown. 
Privilege, he asserts, is now though to belong to an age of darkness which has vanished. 
Indeed, he argues, men regard it as extravagant and fantastic when it is suggested that 
there exists an element of privilege in industrial society which “cripples their energies and 
poisons their spirit”. Yet he asserts within Industrial Capitalism, even without legal 
barriers, even with franchise, the concept of a hierarchical social order survives and 
thrives. The defenders of the order, the opponents of education for the ‘lower orders’, 
the upholders of submission to superiors still revere inequality as an article of social faith.
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and, in the name of that faith exercise political, social and economic authority. For 
Tawney, the issue is clear, formal rights, both civil and political are acceptable and 
desirable, but without powers they are always enfeebled, sometimes unavailing. 
Furthermore, the proclamation of formal rights, the abolition of the traditional privileges 
do not, by themselves, guarantee equity or create a harmonious society. While the 
champions of the established order insist that where economic liberty and legal equality 
are recognised, an equality of opportunity exists in which all may by application and 
enterprise aspire to be rich and powerful, Tawney argues that such a notion of equality 
where there are disparities of economic power are, in effect, equal opportunities of 
becoming unequal. Equality of opportunity within our social system, Tawney insists, is a 
concept honoured by all... “even by those who most strenuously resist attempts to apply 
it”. The idea of equality of opportunity .has been determined by its history ... “it was 
formulated as a lever to overthrow legal inequality and juristic privilege”.^  It has been 
presented in negative terms as freedom from restraints rather than as the possession of 
power. It is uncertain, Tawney mischievously reflects, whether the powers that be, 
would... “be more horrified if the principle of equality of opportunity was denied, or if an 
attempt was made to apply it”.“ For Tawney, the notion of equality of opportunity, so 
defined, leaves the way open for social and economic inequalities within a society of 
atomistic individualism in which
“Each for himself is still the rule.
We learn it when we go to school.
The devil take the hindmost”.
I Equality, p.103.
“  Ibid, p.103.
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It sustains a society of US and THEM, and Tawney comments “what a view of 
human life such an attitude implies!”  ^ It debases any notion of common purpose and 
common humanity; it negates Tawney’s vision of... “ultimate and profound fellowship”.
The concept of equality of opportunity has thrown up a vast literature not only by 
advocates and adversaries, but also by those who seek to define it. Tawney, too, held 
strong views on what he argued was a misinterpretation of the concept. The concept, he 
insisted, can have no reality except within a society in which every member, irrespective 
of birth, social position or occupation, has in fact (and not merely in form) the equal 
opportunity of using and developing to the full their natural endowments of physique, of 
character and intelligence. Within Industrial Capitalism the idea of equality of opportunity 
was ‘purely formal’ for as long as some are... “stunted and sterilised by their social 
environment” and others by poor education or inadequate health provision, the concept 
had the... “unreality of a majestic phantom’’.^ Certainly there was small chance of 
fraternity in a society in which ... “a beneficial private war makes one man strive to climb 
on the shoulders of another and stay there”.^
Tawney’s concept of equality of opportunity is far removed from the 
misrepresentation of Darwinian theory advanced by the advocates of economic 
libertarianism. In Tawney’s view, equality of opportunity does not exist by the mere 
proclamation of formal equality, abolition of legal privileges or the absence of restraints 
on individual enterprise. He rejects the claim that equality of opportunity gives each 
individual an equal chance to... “ascend and get on”. As for the argument that an 
educational ladder provides the means by which talent can be recognised and rewarded 
and, that therefore, the... “skimped quality of our primary education, the over-crowded 
classes, the mean surroundings and the absence of amenities” were matters of secondary
* Equality, p.105.
“  Ibid. p.103.
h* R.H. Tawney, critical remarks with reference to Popular Government, Sir Henry Maine, 1885,
Equality, p.104.
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importance, Tawney, with the aid of statistical evidence, shows the falsity of this claim, i 
But Tawney’s contention against this concept of equal opportunity does not only rest on 
the success or failure rate of Industrial Capitalism to provide social mobility. Tawney 
recognises that the encouragement and exercise of fresh talent is necessary in order to... 
“avoid economic and social stagnation”. He also argues that to deny some individuals the 
opportunity to ‘rise’ while others through wealth, birth, education, social and social 
connections are able to do so, is injurious not only to individual happiness, but also to 
social well being. But, he insists, opportunities for some to ‘rise’ are no substitute for a 
large measure of authentic equality because, he argues, a community requires unity as 
well as diversity. It is, Tawney argues, important to... “discriminate between different 
powers”, but it is even more important to... “provide for common needs”.
The foundation of Tawney’s concept of equality of opportunity is clear ... 
“equality of opportunity”, he insists,... “inçlies the establishment of conditions which 
favour not only the expansion of the opportunity to asset oneself in the market place but 
also the conditions in which men should be able to lead a life of dignity and culture”." ... 
“whether they ‘rise’ or not”. Equality of opportunity, for Tawney, does not end merely 
with the opportunity to ‘rise’; it inches a... “high level of general culture”... “a strong 
sense of common interest” within a society that acknowledges not only that ... 
“exceptional men should be free to exercise their exceptional powers” but also that... 
“common men should be able to make the most of their common humanity”.^  Tawney’s 
concept of equal opportunity acknowledges that talent and the qualities of leadership 
should be respected and rewarded, because they promote the well-being of society. The 
concept is buttressed, however, by the conviction that society depends on solidarity and 
cohesion and that civilisation is a common enterprise to which each individual is obliged 
to give of his or her best to which all, in fellowship can contribute. His concern.
* Equality, see Appendices, p.246-250.
“  Ibid,p.lOS.
Ibid,pJ08.
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ultimately, is how to unite the values of fellowship and common purpose with an effective 
and exercisable liberty which will extend to every individual the opportunity of realising 
their human potential. His notion of equality of opportunity is permeated by the belief 
that men and women must not sacrifice ‘the cultivation of spiritual excellencies’, which 
are possible for all, to the acquisition of riches which he suggests is possible, “happily, for 
a few”.^  This conviction that economic success can not, by itself, provide the spirit of 
community and fellowship is dictated by a faith which urges that men be “No more 
strangers and foreigners, but fellow citizens with the saints and the household of God”. 
(EPH. 11-19).
Education And Equality
Tawney’s arguments for social change, as it has been noted, “are not generally 
framed in Christian terms”. " Yet, his understanding that equality demands equality of 
educational opportunity is deeply informed by religious conviction. “Knowledge”, he 
asserts, “like religion, transcends all differences of class and wealth”; “to sell education for 
money”, he insists, “is like selling the gifts of God for money”. ^  In the eye of learning, 
he argues, “as in the eye of God, all men are equal”. For Tawney, knowledge, “the gift of 
God”, is in itself “a centre of moral authority”. It upholds a moral standard “by making 
the discipline of learning accessible to all who will submit to it”. It unites men and women 
in an understanding “of what is false and what is true”. It provides the framework for 
an ethical appeal to equality in its commitment to truth, which, transcends all the 
differences of religious belief. It confirms Tawney’s commitment to knowledge as the 
agency through which men and women regardless of faith may respond not only to the 
pragmatic arguments but to the moral appeal of equality.
\ Equality, p.108
“  R Ji. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.19.
The Commonplace Book, entry for 30 October, 1912. 
Ibid, entry for 30 October, 1912.
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Yet while Tawney’s arguments derive from religious faith, they are pragmatic as 
well as evangelic. Inequalities of educational opportunities, he submits, not only frustrate 
talents which react to the disadvantage of the individual; they impede that process of self 
development by which men and women may equally contribute to a common culture; and 
equally participate in the responsibilities of citizenship.
For Tawney, the English education system, or as he censoriously describes i t ... 
“The two systems” - one private - one public - represent perhaps the most vicious, unjust 
and unjustifiable expression of the English class system. It creates and perpetuates class 
divisions; it acts against social solidarity. I t ... “thwarts the very purposes of education”, 
which, Tawney declared, “was partly at least, the process by which ... we transcend the 
barriers of our isolated personalities and become partners in a universe of interests which 
we share with our fellow men, both living and dead alike”.^  Education, he insists, is 
plainly a question of Knowledge, but it is still more ... “a question of imagination, 
reflection, of the mental initiative which sees through shams to realities”. In the field of 
education, out of regard for the qualities common to all mankind, out of their common 
humanity, Tawney insists, the spirit of equality should ... “establish its kingdom”. Since, 
as Tawney argues, the purpose of the educationalist is to aid the self-development of all 
human beings, this perception of man’s common humanity demands a common effort 
which will create an educational system which extends, equally, the opportunity to 
cultivate the powers with which nature has endowed them. Furthermore, Tawney argues 
the purpose of education apart from the question of knowledge and self-development is to 
strengthen the spirit of social solidarity and to prepare men for the better service of their 
fellows in order to raise the general level of society.
Education then, for Tawney, is not only an instrument for the imparting of 
knowledge, nor is it solely a training ground for the encouragement of individual
‘The W.EA. and Adult Education’, R.H. Tawney. 1953, see Radical Tradition, 1964, p.84.
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achievement without regard for social responsibility. An educational system must 
recognise the equal worth of each individual; it must, in this recognition, foster and seek 
to nourish a common culture in the best interest of the nation, in the best interest of social 
harmony. To the Federation of British Industry which had declared support for an 
improved educational system yet had found economic reasons for frustrating it, Tawney 
reserved his most ironic comments. He denounced their objections to the 
recommendations of The Board of Education which had proposed a statutory minimum 
school leaving age at fourteen and “comprehensive measures to provide some form of 
education for all children until the age of sixteen and eventually to the age of eighteen”.* 
He enthusiastically supported the subsequent Education Bill which preceded the Fisher 
Education Act of 1918. It is impossible to reconcile Tawney’s ideals of fraternity and 
equality in a society in which the majority of children leave school at fourteen amidst 
warnings from industrialists against ... “creating a class whose education is unsuitable for 
the employment they will eventually enter”.^ Where is the conviction that education is ... 
“a partnership in a universe of interests” when it is argued that eight hours taken out of 
the working week for the education of juvenile workers would impose on industry a 
burden it would be ... “quite unable to bear”? Can a society in which powerful interests 
insist that education should not be extended to the majority of children beyond the age of 
fourteen claim to be civilised in accordance with Tawney’s conditions for a civilised life? 
Where, in such a society is mutual regard, mutual respect, common concern, common 
provision? Where is fraternity! Where is equality! Where, Tawney demands, is the 
heritage into which to welcome the children of men ... “who fell in the illusion, that in 
their humble way they were the servants of freedom*"!^ Education, Tawney argues, 
which should act as an agent of social unification, was, under industrial Capitalism,
* Education and Politics (1900-1951), A Study o f the Labour Party: Rodney Barker, Clarendon
Press, 1972, p.28.
“  ‘Keep The Worker’s Children In Their Place’, R.H. Tawney, see Daily News, 14 August 1918, see
Radical Tradition, p.47-51.
Ibid, p.47-51.
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perpetuating the division of society into the exploiters and the exploited. In a society of 
... “masters and servants”, how could there be a common language, a common purpose?
Tawney reserves perhaps his most scathing attack for the English public school 
system; it is, he insists, “grotesque”, “repulsive”, “barbarous”, “an educational 
monstrosity”, “a grave national misfortune”, and educationally vicious”.  ^ Socially, he 
argues it is disastrous, for more than any other cause (apart from Capitalism itself) it 
creates class divisions so that, within the nation one class is “almost unintelligible to the 
other”. In a political democracy, he insists the publicly provided educational system 
should provide an education ... so excellent and so generally esteemed that all parents 
desire their children to attend it”. It is English snobbery, English class attitudes which 
allows the economic lines between parties to coincide with education lines. It is the 
isolation of one class from another which allows even some members of Parliament to 
regard ... “the children of common persons as not quite human in the same sense as their 
o w n ” . N B  In a society in which such class attitudes persist, is it to be expected that an 
improvement of the educational system will be seen as a priority? Can it be assumed, 
notwithstanding the declarations of commitment to a classless society that the objective 
will be vigorously pursued?
It may be argued that in the exclusive attention paid to the specific inadequacies, 
anomalies and injustices of the English educational system Tawney’s social and 
educational concerns are curiously parochial. However, if he deplores the system which 
perpetuates the “Them and Us syndrome”, he has firm convictions about the direction and
* Equality, p.l45.
^  The ingrained nature o f English class division is illustrated by George Orwell ...“Here I  am a 
typical member o f the middle-class. It is easy for me to say that I  want to get rid o f class 
distinctions, but nearly everything I  do is a result o f class distinctions" ... "to get outside the class 
racket, I  have to suppress not merely my private snobbishness but most o f my other tastes and 
prejudices as well". The Road to Wigan Pier, 1937. Virginia Woolf wrote in her diary, 13 Dec. 
1917... "the poor have no chance, no manners or self control to protect themselves with, we have 
a monopoly o f all the generous feelings". Diaries o f Virginia Woolf, Vol.l, Hogarth Press, 1977, 
p.91.
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the requirements of an egalitarian educational system. He contrasts the requirements 
necessary for social cohesion and even economic efficiency with what, in a society of self- 
interested individualism, is shamefully made available. In England, he insists, an 
elementary school education has always meant, and still means, a cheap education. There 
is a deficiency of school libraries, playing fields, laboratories, a shortage of books, mean, 
sometimes unhealthy buildings, under-staffing. Such surroundings, such conditions, 
Tawney argues, “poison the soul” “cause the spirit and temper to be smitten by a blight of 
social inferiority”.^  For Tawney, the English educational system with its organisation 
along lines of social class is a powerful force actively obstructing social unity, actively 
endorsing class division. This ... “hereditary curse” which plunges so many children of the 
working class into premature employment, denies to the over whelming majority the 
opportunity for self-development^ ^  It also deprives the community of the contribution, 
which, cultivated and encouraged, their developed talents might make.
Inequality of educational opportunity, then, stunts the self-realisation of the 
individual, robs the nation of talents and capacities, firustrates the ideal of social solidarity. 
The ‘hereditary curse’, its emphasis on social class, can never accept that every human 
being is of infinite importance and each is of equal worth. Such a ‘curse* reacts against 
the notion of Christian brotherhood, which irrespective of ‘class’, extends to all mankind 
equal respect and consideration. Curiously, in view of Tawney’s antipathy to the private 
public school system, he does not demand its complete a b o l i t i o n . N B 2  h  jg perhaps the 
recognition that there ... “are diversities of gifts which require for their development 
diversities of treatment” that make him insist that such institutions should be required to
* Equality, p.l42.
Almost sixty years after the publication o f Equality, the 'staying on rate' for higher education in 
the United Kingdom is still the lowest among the major industrial nations. In the age group 16- 
18, 35% o f British young people enjoy full-time higher education as against 77% Belgium, 47% 
Germany, 77% Japan, 66% France, 76% Sweden, 79% USA. Source: Department o f Education 
Statistics, 1986.
Nevertheless, Tawney argued (in 1943), "1 think... " at least half o f the Public school population, 
should, at the end o f five years, be ex-elementary schoolboys", see 1943 Committee on Public 
Schools. Note on Draft to Finance Chapter 22, see R.H. Tawney Papers, London School o f 
Economics, Archives.
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hold a license from the Board of Education specifying certain conditions which make 
them equally accessible to all children qualified to profit by it irrespective of the income or 
social position of their parents. Tawney, in his COMMONPLACE BOOK, had written, 
“we must think of knowledge like religion, as transcending all differences of class and 
wealth, and in the eye of learning, as in the eye of God, all men are equal because all are 
infinitely small” “to sell education for money”, he added, “is the next thing to selling the 
gifts of God for money.”  ^ For Tawney, ‘a humane education’ should be open to all, and a 
university, he argued, is not singly to be regarded as a ... “professional school of the 
brain-working classes”. “
Tawney, then, does not propose a uniform school system. Clearly, he is appalled 
by the effects which the class system imposes upon English education, which, he asserts, 
“exists in no other country on the same scale”.^  For Tawney, however, equality and 
social solidarity require more than equality of educational opportunity. He demands an 
educational system which will provide the means not only for “/a carrière ouverte aux 
talents but also égalité de fait, a universality of provision”.!^  Such provision, Tawney 
asserts, will not only enable men to develop those human faculties, which, he insists, are 
“the attributes of man, not the attributes of any particular class or profession of men”. 
For Tawney, the purpose of education is “to give equally to all classes of the community a 
greater opportunity of entering into those great heritages of literature, art and beauty that 
should enrich the lives of the community.”  ^ To this end he demands that higher education 
should be available not only to those who enter it for specialised avocations but also to
* The Commonplace Book, entry for October 30,1912.
"  Notes on a confidential paper o f the Home Policy Sub-Committee o f the Labour Party (sent to
Tawney by Lena Jagger MP) April 1961, shows that 55 % o f entrants to the University o f  
Cambridge were ex-Public School pupils. The statistic for Oxford was 45% , see R Jl. Tawney 
Papers, London School o f Economics Archives.
Equality, p.l45.
‘An Experiment in Democratic Education’, R.H. Tawney, see The Radical Tradition, p.73-74. 
First printed in The Political Quarterly, May 1914 
^ Secondary Education for All: A Policy for Labour, edited for the Education Advisory Committee
o f the Labour Party by RM. Tawney, 1922, quoted in Education and Politics, 19(X)-1951, Rodney 
Barker, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1972, p.l39.
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those whose goal is not material success but who seek education not to become 
something else but because “they are what they are”. For Tawney, a society must be 
judged by its educational system, by its dedication to provide equal and adequate 
educational facilities so that each individual may equally be afforded the opportunity for 
self-development. Tawney asks a question of society, “if its schools are sordid will its life 
be generous”?^  Perhaps, too, we may ask ... and if they are underfunded? and if their staff 
is underpaid? and if their professional skills are not respected? ... will they be able, 
properly, to undertake that most responsible of all social tasks ... the education of the 
young for useful, self-fulfilling lives? Surely the words of St Paul are apposite? “Be not 
deceived: God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap” (Galatians 
6:7).
Redistribution, Communal Provision and A Strategy For Equality
Tawney, proposes a ^Strategy o f Equality*. The strategy incorporates methods of 
wealth distribution; it examines the growth and significance of communal provisions and 
sets out the necessary measures for the extension of the social services. He addresses the 
arguments against redistribution, communal provision, extension of social services and 
submits a programme of priorities which he claims would eliminate... “the most shocking 
of existing inequalities” ... “in which the penalty of the poor is not merely poverty” ... “but 
ignorance, sickness and premature death”.^ The English, Tawney argues, have learned 
that to dogmatically oppose any notion of equality is liable to create some practical social 
inconveniences. They have come, therefore, albeit unwittingly, to mitigate or even end, 
some forms of inequality. But, he insists, the privileged classes have put up a determined 
resistance against every method and every measure which would realise the ideal of 
equality. Tawney argues that the means of achieving a greater degree of equality are no 
mystery. Progressive taxation, increased death duties (which will react against the
* Equality, p.l45.
» Ibid.p.l49.
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privileges of inherited wealth) and an extension of the social services are, he insists, 
obvious methods. So, too, are legislative measures designed to curb the powers of those 
whose economic muscle allows them control over the economic lives of their fellows. For 
Tawney the equalisation of economic power will release men and women 6om the 
tyranny of unaccountable authority. It will fiee them, too, from paternalism which 
however well intentioned or scientifically informed, inhibits men and women fijom the free 
exercise of their own intellectual and spiritual capacities.
As long as private interests control the key positions of the economic system, 
Tawney insists, resistance to welfare provision wül be fierce and progress will be slow. 
There are those, Tawney recognises, who argue that the provision of social services and 
adjustments to the laws of taxation are merely palliative. He admits that such measures 
do not achieve the necessary and desirable degree of equality, but confronted by a 
determined and ruthless ruling class which will check and oppose every step towards the 
ideal of equality, such measures, even if not wholly effective, are instrumental in relieving 
many of the miseries and anxieties which confront large sections of the population. 
Furthermore, such palliatives are not to be derided, for they provide practical assistance in 
the everyday lives of the sick, the needy, the unemployed and the aged. Tawney’s answer 
to those who deprecate these mere palliatives is an expression of his disagreement with 
those militant political factions which demand drastic action, even the use of force to 
overthrow the Capitalist system. Tawney, in obedience to his Christian principles rejects 
the notion of violence, just as in accordance with his Fabian principles he accepts that the 
assault on Capitalism will demand ... “a prolonged effort of intelligence and resolution”. 
But, he argues, even if the measures which he has proposed do not produce the desired 
radical social changes, they are to be seen not as alternatives but complementary to more 
stringent methods. Meanwhile, Tawney asserts, such measures do more than solve 
stricken consciences or alleviate the more glaring social injustices. They create conditions 
in which men and women, relieved of some of the pressures which result from competitive 
individualism, may be rid of the social humiliation which inequality engenders. Ultimately,
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it may be argued, such measures serve to create relationships in which men and women 
may acknowledge, and seek to strengthen, the bonds between the isolated individual and 
the community.
For Tawney, the redistribution of wealth represents an important step towards 
equality. He dismisses as an ... “argument won over shadows” the argument which 
insists, in defence of the status quo, that an arithmetical division of wealth would yield an 
insignificant improvement to the existing order. Furthermore, Tawney submits, it is not 
only the nominal value of the amounts transferred in redistribution which are important 
but also the uses from which they have been diverted. Unearned income from urban 
ground rents, fiom mineral rights, firom dividends received without either participation or 
responsibility, create class divisions. They do not make for social equity nor do they 
contribute to social welfare or common purpose. It is possible, Tawney proposes, that a 
society even with a lower average income but greater equality may be happier than one 
with a higher average income with less equality. For most men and women, he argues, a 
sense of self-respect and a general acknowledgement of their human worth is ultimately 
more important than material benefit
Redistribution, for Tawney, involves the pooling of the nation’s surplus resources 
by means of taxation. It is through this pooling, rather than the division of wealth and 
income into equal fractions, that inequalities of opportunity and circumstances will be 
overcome. It is, Tawney claims, ... “the economies of collective effort and massed 
expenditure” utilised for the ... “advantage of the whole community” which can create the 
“grand achievement of industrial society”.^  ‘Collective effort’, ‘pooled resources’, 
‘common advantage’, - these, for Tawney, are necessary elements of a civilised life. Yet a 
civilised life, beyond the benefits of welfare provision, demands mutual respect, the 
opportunity of all for self development; it demands spiritual as weU as material ends. The
Equality, p.l24.
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heritage of our common civilisation, Tawney contends, must be equally available to alL 
Man, “that timid staring creature”, he insists, “needs not only money, but light, air and 
water”. He requires also those precious uneconomic goods, “tranquility, beauty and 
affection”.^
Tawney not only demands an egalitarian society, he proposes the extension of 
communal provision towards that end. There are, however, vociferous and dissenting 
voices against the notions of equality and communal provision. There are those who fear 
that the spread of egalitarianism will threaten that tradition of culture, preserved by an 
elite “against the hooves of the multitude”." There are those who argue that advantages 
shared are no longer advantages, and that in a society in which everybody is somebody, 
nobody will be anybody. There are those who argue that public provision will create 
dependence, rob men and women of the initiative, allow them to abnegate their personal 
responsibilities, weaken the fibre and morale of the nation. For Tawney, however, 
inequality is not only socially unjust; it is a catalyst of social division and class resentment 
Furthermore, his experiences in the Workers Educational Association, his work at 
Toynbee Hall and his army service had convinced him that inequality was wasteful of 
human talen t.^  In 1931, the year in which EQUALITY was published, the majority of 
school children were forced at fourteen years of age into the labour market, into shops, 
offices, factories or workshops. An equal opportunity for self-development, the chance to 
discover and extend their capabilities was denied them to the detriment both of the 
individual and of the community. For Tawney, only egalitarian measures will redress this 
needless waste of human talent. “A strong sense of equality”. The Christian moralist 
insists “is a necessary corollary of The Christian concept of man.” "i
* Equality, p.l26.
“  Ibid,p.l26.
^  “We crossed three lines that had once been trenches and the man beside me ... the bravest o f 
friends" ... "whom no weariness could discourage or danger daunt" ... "a bricklayer by trade, but 
one who could turn his hand to anything, the man whom o f all others I  would choose to have 
beside me at a pinch, but he's dead". The Attack, RJl. Tawney, August 1916, published in the 
Westminster Gazette
‘A Note on Christianity and The Social Order’, see The Attack, p.182.
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Yet the Christian concept which insists on the equality of man does not present a 
plan for a moral, social, economic and political order. Such an order requires a practical 
programme as well as an ethical foundation. To achieve this objective, Tawney, the social 
theorist, set out a strategy which demands the allocation of such public provision as is 
necessary to eliminate poverty and ignorance and guard against sickness and premature 
death. It is, in effect, a demand for an efficient and classless educational system and a 
national health service both equally in the service of the whole community.^ He 
endorses the recommendation of Hugh Dalton for the public provision ‘as a civil righf 
and therefore ... “detached from any odour of charity or patronage” of funds to alleviate 
the distress caused by abnormal circumstances which unhappily arise ... “in different 
stages of social development”. Such provisions, Tawney insists, should be recognised as 
vital elements in the national well-being; they are in the public interest and it is desirable 
to make them as adequate as the resources of the nation at any time allow. Tawney 
realises that changes in the taxation laws, an extension of public expenditure to fund 
welfare provision, indeed any method which proposed even a gradual redistribution of 
wealth and reallocation of resources would encounter fierce and powerful opposition. He 
dismisses the notion, still defended by libertarian economic theorists that every million 
spent for social purposes was an additional burden on industry. He argues instead that 
social expenditure is for the most part an investment rather than a liability, since, free of 
the anxieties which public provision allays, there is created an atmosphere of co-operative 
effort and strengthened individual energies. He calls for a National Investment Board to 
guard against the misuse or waste of capital in the best interest of industrial efficiency. He 
insists that the state must concern itself with determining the division of available 
economic resources in order to balance future productive efficiency with necessary social 
requirement. Certainly, his suggestion that a National Investment Board should be
^  In 1937 death from bronchitis was about eight times as frequent among the poor as among the 
rich, while tuberculosis killed three o f the former to one o f the latter. A National Health 
Service, which was vigorously opposed by many champions o f individual responsibility, has done 
much, in spite o f its deficiencies, to correct these alarming statistics. (Figures provided by Dr H. 
Roberts, Daily Herald, 4 August 1937).
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responsible for an overall strategy of national investment would be seen as an intolerable 
interference by the champions of laissez-faire enterprise. To suggest, also, that such a 
Board should... push forward the transference of the major industries to public ownership 
did not meet with the wholehearted approval of the majority of the recipients of 
dividend income. True, there were those who opposed nationalisation because, they 
argued, it would detract firom efficiency, create bureaucracy and deprive the consumer of 
the choice which a free market economy engendered. There were those, however, who 
opposed nationalisation on what to them were the compelling and unanswerable 
arguments of their self-interest and the preservation of the existing order which 
safeguarded it
Tawney proposes a national programme of social expenditure publicly funded 
through taxation and insurance contribution. Each individual, in sickness and in health, in 
employment and unemployment, in old age and adversity would be entitled to the benefits 
of communal provision ... “from the cradle to the grave”, an expression which, depending 
on social or political viewpoint, could be one of disdain or of approbation. The strategy 
advanced in the name of equality is designed to eradicate those social and economic 
injustices which result fix>m an industrial system which upholds the advantages and 
privileges based on the power of capital and which are sustained by a socially divisive 
class structure. Yet if it is a ‘strategy for equality*, if it seeks to succeed by redistribution 
of wealth, by a national policy of investment and by the public provision of amenities 
which are necessary for a self-respecting life, for Tawney it is also a strategy for 
fellowship. It is true, Tawney argues pragmatically, that an investment in social provision, 
in education, in health is to the benefit not only of the individual, but to the economic 
efficiency of the nation ... “to under-invest is”, he insists, “the most stupid, the most cruel
^  With reference to the nationalisation o f industry, Tawney argues ('Christianity and the Social 
Order' (1935)) that ... "the question is not whether the State owns and controls the means o f 
production. It is also who owns and controls the State". Economic control will not by itself 
guarantee democratic process or efficiency nor will it ensure a degree o f  service in the best 
interest o f the community.
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of extravagances”.^  But beyond the claims of industrial efficiency, there is the plea for ... 
“a common affection for the qualities which belong not to any class or profession of men 
... “but to man himself’.^ It is this ‘common affection’, this sense of a common humanity 
which permeates Tawney’s demands for the acceptance of communal responsibility for 
the welfare of others. Communal provision of health, of education, a communal 
undertaking to end squalor, to create living conditions which will allow for a life of 
dignity will, Tawney insists, increasingly dissipate that sense of social inferiority which has 
paralysed the working class in the past. It will increasingly stimulate that sense of social 
responsibility and active social participation which Tawney had advocated in THE 
ACQUISmVE SOCIETY. It will, too, for Tawney, satisfy that Christian injunction 
which demands “that because men are men they are bound to acknowledge that man has 
claims on man”.^
Socialism: A Moral Crusade
Tawney postulates ^THE PREMISE OF SOCIALISM* and sets out ‘77/E TASK 
BEFORE THE LABOUR PARTY*. He acknowledges the divisions within the British 
Socialist movement; he attacks the extremists of the ‘Left’ who sneer at social democracy 
and civil liberty as “illusions of bourgeois ideology”. He castigates the “Bloomsbury 
intelligentsia”, who in their anxiety to be seen as ultra-revolutionaries call for impractical 
and unrealistic action. He acknowledges the split between the trade union leadership 
which does not seek confrontation yet fights for improved pay and better conditions for 
its membership and the mostly middle-class militants who would cultivate the 
communists, (whose programme, Tawney insists, they do not properly comprehend) in 
order to bring about a social revolution. On the one hand, Tawney asserts, the Labour 
Party is denounced for the mildness of its socialism; on the other hand because of its
\ Equality, p .l 55.
“  The Commonplace Book, entry for March 6,1913.
Ibid, entry for March 6,1913
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reluctance to accept into its ranks those liberals who share with them common objectives, 
it is accused of intransigence. Meanwhile, as it tears itself apart with internal quarrels and 
talmudic disputations, the electorate lose all confidence in this patently divided party’s 
ability to govern. The Labour Party, he insists, compounding his appeal for moral 
regeneration and moral standards with hard-headed, political pragmatism, can never win 
an election until it is able to convince its fellow countrymen that it is united behind a 
programme that is attainable, that its idealism is realistic, and its methods are practicable. 
The factions must take cognisance of the fact that it is a British public to whom they must 
appeal and the socialism it offers must pay respect to the political and social tradition 
from which it evolves; it must, he insists, “wear a local garb”. ^  The Labour Party must 
be able to persuade the British public that its policies recognise the particular 
circumstances of British life and that they offer solutions relevant to the particular 
problems of British society. British Socialists must remember that for two centuries 
Britons have lived within a liberal tradition; that they are sensitive to issues of personal 
liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and all the benefits of parliamentary 
government. It may be, Tawney argues, that meaningful liberty has been hamstrung \jy 
lack of economic power; yet, he insists, if the electorate is presented with the choice 
between ‘capitalist democracy’ (with all its nauseous insincerity) and an undemocratic 
socialism, it will always choose the former. Henry Dubb, that archetypal Englishman 
deserves a socialism which will uphold the rights for which he and his forefathers had so 
vigorously fought
Ultimately, Tawney insists, the Labour Party must choose. It can either be the 
agent of the trade unions and engage itself in factional interest, or it can engage in a
^  Tawney is always aware o f the particular character o f Dubb’s Socialism just as he understands 
that an appeal to principles is valid within the British political ethos. These qualities are nicely 
captured by Philip Snowden (1864-1937). "Now look here, Fred, don’t be trying any o f that 
scientific socialism, Karl Marx, surplus value, that sort o f stuff. Put in a long word now and 
again so as to make them think tha’ knows a lot. When tha’art finishing up, tha mum put a bit o f 
Come to Jesus in" Quoted from the ’Autobiography o f Philip Snowden', see ’Christian Socialism’, 
John C. Cort, Orbis Books, 198S,p.l68.
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crusade not for sectarian advantage, but for radical, social change. For Tawney, even 
while he welcomes any political measure or any material gain which alleviates the 
hardships of the working class, the choice is clear, “the cause of the present unrest”, he 
had confided to his Commonplace Book, “is not singly economic nor party political, but 
moral” ... “Modem Society”, he insisted, “is sick through the absence of a moral idea”.^
But Tawney the political theorist is also the political realist. “Politics”, he declares, 
“has a business side and political business must be efficiently done”. If his socialism is 
fortified by Christian principles, the principles are reinforced with practical political 
judgement. He understands, pragmatically, that the necessary conditions for equality 
require effective political action, and effective political action demands effective political 
and economic power. As John A. Hall submits, while Tawney’s appeals for moral 
regeneration and Christian principles are ... “eloquently expressed”, (they are) “not by 
themselves much more than the staple of many previous Christian Socialists”. Tawney’s 
significance. Hall therefore argues, “lay in the interaction of Christian principles with the 
practical ejq)erience he had gained through early involvement in the labour movement - in 
particular in the work he did in adult ed u ca tio n .^
It is this interaction between moral principles and political pragmatism which 
distinguishes Tawney from many of his Christian Socialist contemporaries. His advice to 
the Labour Party, Anthony Wright perceptively argues, ... “combined both Fabian 
rationalism and socialist moralism”.^  It is an appeal not only to technicians, 
administrators and the professional classes but to all those exploited by ... “the oldest, 
toughest plutocracy in the world”. The Labour Party, Tawney insists, has a constituency 
beyond the sectional interests of the trade unions. Its function is not only to win votes ... 
“it must set hearts and wills to work”. It must demand on behalf o f ... “capitalism’s chief
* The Commonplace Book, entry for May 61912.
"  'The Roles and Influences o f Political Intellectuals, Tawney Vs Sidney Webb’, John A. Hall,
British Journal o f Sociology, VoL23, No.3, September 1977, p.356.
Socialisms, Anthony Wright, Oxford University Press, 1987, p .l 13.
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victims a life that is worthy of human beings and which no decent man will withhold from 
his fellows”. It is a protest against a premise which holds th a t... “every group and every 
individual should be free to grab what they can get, and hold what they can grab”.^  It is, 
then, not only an appeal for pragmatic political action; it is a demand for a moral cmsade.
Equality, p.210.
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CHAPTER IV
Contrasting Views; T.S. Eliot & R.H. Tawney 
Introduction
Tawney’s social vision, his arguments for equality, his demands for society of 
responsible and participating citizens organised around the notion of function derived 
6om his Christian faith. Clearly, the nineteenth rather that the twentieth century was the 
age in which social theorists sought to apply religious doctrine to social and political life. 
Nevertheless, in the last months “of a low dishonest decade”,* Tawney’s contemporary 
,the poet, essayist and social critic, Thomas Steams Eliot, was concerned with “the idea 
of a Christian society”. Although there were fundamental differences between their 
concepts of a social order predicated on Christian principles, Eliot, like Tawney, attacked 
as immoral the practices, institutions and values of industrial capitalism. Indeed, he 
acknowledged “a debt to several Christian economists and sociologists (and) in particular, 
R.H. Tawney”.^ Tawney, in return, made brief references to Eliot when after the second 
World War he reflected on the progress of equality ... “if equality is the poison to culture 
suggested by Mr. Eliot, the small doses of venom hitherto injected need time to do their 
deadly work”.^  Yet, Eliot’s attack on the existing social order, like Tawney’s, was 
uncompromising,... “a great deal of the machinery of modem life is merely a sanction for 
un-Christian aims ... it is not only hostile to the conscious pursuit of Christian life in the 
world by the few but to the maintenance of any Christian society”.*^  Eliot and Tawney, 
therefore, shared an abhorrence of what they both perceived to be the social evils and the 
moral bankmptcy of a system which raised ... “profit into a social ideal” and created a 
society whose ... “real ideals were materialistic efficiency”.  ^ Similarly, if Tawney was ... 
“engaged in the politics of moral exhortation”, Eliot, too, called for a moral reassessment
* "Sept. 1,1939’, W.H. Auden, see Collected Works, Faber and Faber, 1964.
“  The Idea o f a Christian Society, T.S. Eliot, Faber and Faber, 1939,1982 edition,p.S3.
Equality, Epilogue 1938-1950, p.226.
The Idea o f a Christian Society, T.S. Eliot, Faber & Faber 1939,1982 edition, p. 61.
V Ibid ,p53
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... “a change of spirit” ... “ a change in social attitudes”. Both men, committed Christians, 
argued for a society motivated by Christian principles, dedicated to Christian values. If 
Tawney looked to the Christian Church to cultivate the moral sensibility and expel the 
poison generated by THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY, Eliot, in turn, demanded ... “a 
Christian organisation of society” to ... “dispel the dominating vice of our time ... 
Avarice”. Both men decried the ... “machinery of modem life” and its consequent ... 
“mechanisation and atomisation of individuals”.^  Both men demanded that the Christian 
leadership oppose the increasing secularisation and materialism of contemporary society. 
Yet, if there were social issues on which they agreed, between Eliot the self-proclaimed... 
“classicist in literature, royalist in politics, and Anglo-Catholic in religion”^  and 
Tawney, “the social democrat par excellence”, there were also profound differences. 
These differences, it may be argued, derive from their respective interpretations of the 
values and traditions of the Church to which both Eliot and Tawney were deeply 
committed. Eliot’s Catholicism evolves from a tradition of discipline and obedience. 
Indeed, he acknowledges that “the inappropriate application of the catholic ideas of 
authority, of hierarchy, of discipline and order into the temporal sphere, may lead to some 
error of absolutism or impossible theocracy." Tawney’s Protestantism evolves out of a 
less authoritarian, more individualist tradition.
Eliot’s ‘Christian Community’ is grounded in a traditional order. It is predicated 
on a pessimistic understanding of man as sinful, fallen from grace. It is a community 
monitored by authority guided by an intellectual and spiritual elite “dedicated to the
* The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.l05.
^  Eliot subsequently qualified this statement. In the Page Barbour lectures delivered at the 
University o f Virginia in 1934, Eliot admitted that... "as it stands the statement is injudicious. It 
may suggest that the subjects are o f equal importance to me, which is not so, it may suggest that I
accept all three beliefs on the same grounds, which is not so, and it may suggest that I  believe that
they all hang together or fall together, which would be the most serious misunderstanding o f all" 
... "I now see the danger o f suggesting to outsiders that the Faith is a political principle or a 
literary fashion, and the sum o f all a dramatic posture". From: After Strange Gods, Faber & 
Faber, 1934, (out o f print).
"  ‘Catholicism And The International Order', Essays Ancient And Modern, T.S. Eliot, Faber &
Faber, 1936, p.118.
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development of Christian life and the salvation of souls”.^  Tawney ‘s Christian Socialism 
rejects this notion of mankind as wicked and beyond redemption. Christianity, he insists, 
“is a religion for sinners”.^ As for an authoritarian order, those who accept it, he asserts, 
“have bartered their dignity as citizens and men, have abandoned their initiative, their 
responsibility, their right to live their own lives — for a shot of morphia in the soul”.^  
Further, while Eliot’s ‘Christian Community’ pre-supposes a hierarchical order, Tawney’s 
Christian Socialism perceives “equality as a morally binding value”.^  ^ Eliot’s ‘Christian 
Community’ proposes “a small number of conscious human beings to live a conscious 
Christian life on its highest social level”.  ^ Tawney’s ‘Christian Community’ extends 
beyond a coterie of an elect. In contrast to Eliot, his Christian Socialism is permeated ly 
an ideal of individual, spiritual and intellectual development in which all are encouraged 
to participate. This ideal evolves firom an understanding that “character is social, and 
society, because it is an expression of character, is always spiritual”. For Tawney, 
individual spiritual development may be starved or fostered by the institutions of society. 
Such development, he holds, may flourish or perish in response to the moral principles 
which sustain the accepted political, social and economic arrangements. For Tawney, 
moral principles are best expressed within “a framework of collective common purpose 
and opportunity in which fellowship is the bond of a community of equality”.^  Such “a 
community of equality” recognises the equal importance of each individual: it demands, 
too, an acknowledgement of equal individual responsibility.
Eliot’s concern, as Maurice Cowling proposes, is with the education of an elite as 
distinct from the great mass of humanity. Eliot’s ‘Christian Community’, Cowling argues.
* 'Catholicism And The International Order’, p.l32.
(( 'Christianity and the Social Order’, see. The Attack, p.168.
'Social Democracy in Britain', see The Radical Tradition, p.l64.
English Ethical Socialism, Dennis & Halsey, p.115.
^ The Idea O f A Christian Society, pJS .
'Christianity And Socialism’, Christian Socialist Movement, John Smith, Spire Publications, 1993, 
p.127.
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“will preserve education within the cloisters uncontaminated by the barbarism without”.^  
Tawney rejects such elitist preservation. The aim of education, he insists, “has a terrible 
simplicity”. It is, he declares, “to secure to all the equal opportunities of cultivating the 
powers with which nature has endowed them”. Such opportunities, he argues, must be 
extended in fellowship, in a “common affection for the qualities which belong, not to any 
class or profession of men but to man himself’. “Here, if anywhere”, he submits, “the 
spirit of equality might be expected to establish its kingdom”.^ Yet, Eliot’s ‘Christian 
Community’ demands, “as a condition of culture, the persistence of social classes”. The 
ideal of egalitarianism, he argues, is inevitably in conflict with the growth and survival of 
culture. If “anyone finds it monstrous that anyone should have ‘advantage of birth’, he 
declares, “I ask him to stop paying lip-sCTvice to culture”.^  Tawney’s Christian Socialism 
evolves from the acceptance of “the greatness of God and therefore the than another”.i^  
It is a Socialism committed to an ideal of human relationships between equals in which 
equal respect is extended, equal opportunities afforded, equal conditions created. Eliot, 
as Anthony Wright asserts, attacks “the equalising trends of contemporary society”. In 
contrast, Wright proposes, Tawney in his “conception of social unity, cohesion and 
integration” dismisses Eliot’s notion of “equality as cultural poison” in favour of 
“Arnold’s assessment of equality as cultural tonic”.^
Yet, perhaps the difference between Eliot’s Christian understanding and Tawney’s 
is most clearly demonstrated by Eliot’s defence of the epigraph of St. John of the Cross 
with which he introduces his unfinished work, ‘Sweeney Agonistes*.
“Hence the soul cannot be possessed of the divine union, until it has divested itself 
of the love of created beings”. ^
* Religion & Public Doctrine in Modern England, Maurice Cowling, Cambridge University Press,
1980, p.120.
“  Equality, p.141.
Notes Towards the Definition o f Culture, p.l5ll6.
The Commonplace Book, entry for March 6,1913.
^ RM. Tawney, Anthony Wright, pages 78179.
^  St. John o f the Cross, Spanish Mystic Poet and Carmelite Friar, 154911591.
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“This doctrine that insists that one must divest oneself of the love of created beings in 
order to arrive at the love of God”, he wrote to Bonamy Dobree, “was written for people 
seriously engaged in pursuing the way of Contemplation. I believe it to be UNTRUE 
(Eliot’s capitals) that only through the love of created beings can we approach the love of 
God. I don’t think that ordinary human affections are capable of leading us to the love of 
God, but rather that the love of God is capable of informing, intensifying and elevating 
our human affections, which otherwise have little to distinguish them from the ‘natural’ 
affections of animals”.^
This doctrine affirms Eliot’s belief that only an intellectual and spiritual elite can, 
through abnegating the love of their fellows, find the love of God. It is a doctrine which 
denies to those many who are incapable of a life of contemplation and prayer, “the divine 
union with God ”. It is a doctrine which disregards what for Tawney is a fundamental 
principle of Christian faith, that in the love of one’s neighbours one may find the love of 
God. Indeed, it is precisely this Christian principle which informs Tawney’s demands for 
a Christian way of life in which men and women, bound by bonds of mutual service, may 
create the conditions of a moral community. Eliot, drawing on his Christian 
understanding, declares “the mass of the population should not be exposed to a way of 
life in which there is too sharp and frequent a conflict between what is easy for them and a 
Christian life”." Tawney, in contrast, believes that ordinary men and women guided by 
Christian principles will, in community, extend each to the other, the opportunity for 
spiritual and intellectual development. In such a community, grounded in democratic 
ideals, each individual, he believes, may equally participate as free and responsible citizens 
in the democratic process.
* T.S. Eliot letter to Bonamy Dobree, 1936, see T.S. Eliot, The Man and His Work, edited by
Allen Tate, Faber & Faber, 1967, p.84.
"  *A Christian Community’, 1939, see Points o f View, T.S. Eliot, Faber and Faber, 1941, p.l40.
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Eliot and Tawney, then, are divided not only by their understanding of the 
traditions of their church but also in the perception of what constitutes a Christian society. 
They are divided, too, on such vital questions as the purposes of education, the concept of 
equality of opportunity, the benefits of democracy. These divisions are fundamental. They 
reveal dissensions not only over the aims and values of a Christian society but also 
disagreements over the interpretation of Christian ethics. It is in these differences of 
interpretation, these differences of belief concerning the application of Christian principles 
to the social order, that their opposing visions of a Christian society is most clearly 
identifiable.
A Christian Society
From a series of lectures delivered at Cambridge in March 1939, Eliot, in 
September 1939, published an essay The Idea o f a Christian Society. The essay, Eliot 
insisted, is not a plea for a religious revival in the usual sense. It is concerned, he 
asserted, with two fimdamental questions. “What, if any, is the idea of the society in 
which we live now”? ... and ... “to what end is it arranged”? Eliot, then, is not only 
examining the values of industrial capitalism, he is questioning the existence, beyond 
materialist accumulation, of its spiritual, moral and philosophic basis. He insists that it is 
not his purpose to present a ‘blueprint* for social change. His objective rather is to 
identify the idea of a Christian society, to bring into focus what such an idea means, to 
understand what are its values, to specify its aims, its direction. Eliot conducts this 
inquiry cautiously. His method is indirect, hesitant, as though reluctant to commit himself 
to a positive position. Sometimes his very purpose is obscure; while he claims to be 
concerned to establish the idea of a Christian society, he is not only unwilling to propose 
a concrete programme for its achievement, he also appears to be loath, except in most 
nebulous terms, to define i t
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We are confronted, Eliot insists, with a choice between Paganism and Christianity. 
The industrialised nations are in danger. They will either succumb to totalitarian 
dictatorship or continue to drift towards a consumerist society of mass conformity. It is a 
choice between two evils, Eliot argues, and only a society rededicated to Christian 
morality, Christian discipline and Christian precepts can save western civilisation from 
decline and disintegration. Christianity, Eliot proposes, is the only alternative between a 
pagan totalitarianism and any equally pagan liberal democratic society. If there are 
objections ... “in the economic and political spheres” to Fascist doctrine, he suggests 
liberal democratic societies are ... “also not without fault” and ... we cannot with dignity 
object until we have set out own affairs in order”. We, in the Anglo-Saxon countries 
might be persuaded that we have a Christian society, Eliot insists, but this merely ... 
“disguises the fact that our aims like Germany’s are materialistic”.^  ^  In all the 
industrialised societies, Eliot warns, “a materialistic philosophy will create bodies of men 
and women of aU classes - detached from tradition, alienated from religion, susceptible to 
mass suggestion: in other words, “a mob”. This fear of the mass, of mass education, mass 
production... “mass society organised for profit” permeates Eliot’s work. It is manifest in 
THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY, “a mob will be no less a mob”, Eliot insists, 
“if it is well fed, well clothed, well housed and well disciplined”. In Eliot’s poetry, too, 
this hostility to ... “mass-made thought” is apparent; there is a sense of horror of ‘the 
mob, the crowd’, of the “so many” (that)... flowed over London Bridge ... “the so many 
which Death had undone”. There is a pervasive pessimism for the condition of 
contemporary man.
“We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
* The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.52.
^  In March 1939, this was a particularly ill-considered judgment. In fear o f their lives, like so
many others, Einstein had fled to Princeton, Freud to London, Thomas Mann to Los Angeles, Karl 
Popper to New Zealand, Schoenberg to New York. Whatever the faults o f the liberal democracies, 
they had not consigned to the bonfire the works o f Heinrich Heine, Franz Kafka, Erich Maria 
Remarque, Alfred Doeblin, Walter Benjamin, Marcel Proust, Emile Zola, etc.
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Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!’*^
And there is despair for mankind’s sterile, purposeless destiny,
“Birth and copulation and death
That’s all the facts when you come to brass tacks:
Birth and copulation and death 
That’s all, that’s all, that’s all says 
Sweeney Agonistes.”^
Yet, if in the verse there is fear...
“I will show you fear in a handful of dust 
The backward half-look
Over the shoulder toward the primitive terror,”^
there is in the prose, nostalgia; for while Eliot accepts that a Christian society ... “Can 
neither be medieval in form nor be modelled on the seventeenth century”, there is, 
patently, a regret for an age before ... “the machinery of modem life destroyed the 
traditional habits of the people”. Eliot looks back wistfully to an order before 
industrialism and the ideals bom of the Enlightenment challenged the established tradition. 
The ‘royalist in politics’ does not disguise his disdain for ... democracy ... in which he 
believes ... “the middle class are morally dependent upon the aristocracy, and the 
aristocracy are subordinate to the middle class which is gradually absorbing and
* The ‘Hollow Men’, T.S. Eliot 1925. see Complete Poems, Faber & Faber, 1980 Edition, p.181.
“  'Fragment o f an Agon’, Unfinished Poem, T.S. Eliot, ( undated).
‘The Waste Land’, TS. Eliot, 1922, see Collected Works, Faber & Faber, 1980, p.66.
133
destroying them”.NB The disdain is certainly a manifestation of a ‘classicist’s* contempt 
for middle class values and middle class culture, yet it is more than that. It is also an 
expression of the deeply held conviction that the European Christian cultural heritage is 
under threat from what he perceives as the corrosive and corrupting power of democracy 
and the attendant triumphant expansion of mass culture.
“Much is your reading, but not the word of God
Much is your building, but not the house of God
Will you build me a house of plaster, with corrugated roofing
To be filled with the litter of Sunday newspapers?”^
In Eliot’s view it is only through prayer and humility, by the exercise of discipline within a 
hierarchic order dedicated not only to temporal power but also to spiritual rebirth that the 
Christian heritage may be salvaged.
Eliot’s account of Christian sociology deals very precisely with the layered
character both pragmatic and moral of Tawney’s argument even though he does not
specifically attach his analysis to Tawney’s case. He insists that his interest in THE 
IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY ... “is not with spiritual institutions in their 
separate aspects” but rather with the organisation of values and the direction of religious 
thought which he acknowledges ... “must inevitably proceed to a criticism of political and 
economic systems”. His concern, he insists, is not with the means of bringing a Christian 
society into being, nor, he adds, puzzlingly, is he “primarily concerned to make such a 
society appear desirable”." His purpose, he asserts, is to identify a ‘Christian Society’ “to
^  In December 1928, Eliot in defense o f Charles Maurras wrote in Criterion, "In theory, the ’Action
Française’ does not contemplate a powerful dictator and a nominal king but the powerful king 
and the able minister’.
* ’Choruses from The Rock’, T.S. Eliot 1934. Verse III see ’Complete Poems and Plays’ Faber &
Faber 1969, p.154 
“  The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.44
134
make clear its differences from the society in which we are now living”.^  Eliot respectfully 
recognises the writings of those Christian sociologists who criticise the economic system 
in the light of Christian ethics. Yet, if Eliot is prepared to commend the appeal of 
Christian sociologists to ... “that spirit of justice and humanity with which most of us 
profess to be inspired”, he also concedes that such sociologists appeal also to pragmatic 
reason. They demonstrate that much of our economic system is not only exploitive and 
iniquitous ... “but also in the long mn, unworkable and conducive to disaster”. If the 
changes which Christian sociologists advocate are indeed ... “deductible from Christian 
principles”, they also, Eliot insists, “recommend themselves to any intelligent and 
disinterested person”.^ The changes, therefore, he suggests, require neither a Christian 
society to carry them into effect nor Christian belief to make them acceptable. But while 
Eliot grants that the changes ... “would make it more possible for the individual Christian 
to live out his Christianity”,^  he claims that he is concerned only secondarily with 
economic organisation and the life of the devout Christian. His primary interests, he 
declares, are with a change in our social attitudes, a change ... “only as could bring about 
anything worthy to be called a Christian society”.
Eliot then, like Tawney, is concerned with moral regeneration. Like Tawney, he 
denounces a contemporary industrial capitalist society in which “the acquisitive rather 
than the creative and spiritual instincts are encouraged”. Unlike Tawney, he is not 
concerned to examine the purpose of industry, nor does he question the organisation of 
economic life. His purpose, Eliot claims, is different from either the social theorists or the 
economists. Certainly he recognises that Christian principles applied to the social and 
economic life of society would compel changes in the organisation of industry as well as 
affecting the commercial and financial arrangements of society. Such changes, he admits 
... “would facilitate the life of devotion for those who are capable of it”. But, he
* The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.44
“  Ibid,p.45
Ibid, p  AS.
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reiterates, his concern is not to specify the defects of contemporary society or even to 
expose its injustices and abuses. It is rather, he insists, to ... “understand the end to 
which a Christian society, to deserve the name, must be directed”.^  Yet, if he is unwilling 
to indict, he is prepared to warn; if he will not advance solutions, he is alert to dangers. If 
... Christianity goes”, he argues in NOTES TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF 
CULTURE (1948), “the whole of European culture goes with it. We will return to many 
centuries of barbarism”. Christianity, Eliot claims, has created and sustained ... “a 
common European cultural heritage”.^  ^It is this ‘common heritage’, he argued, which has 
developed systems of law based on common perceptions of justice. From this heritage, he 
insisted, there has evolved an art and a literature permeated by Christian values, made 
significant and meaningful by Christian thought. Indeed, he declares, the public and 
private morality of the Western World is essentially a consequence of two thousand years 
of Christian heritage. For Eliot, this Christian culture is the central and unifying element 
of western civilisation. If this bond disappears or is dissipated, Eliot insists, ... “all the 
organisation and planning of the most ingenious minds will not help us or bring us closer 
together”. Eliot warns against... “the Puritanism of a hygienic morality in the interest of 
efficiency”. He is fearful of the conformity which will create ... “uniformity of opinion 
through propaganda” of ... “an art which is only encouraged when it flatters the official 
doctrines”. Western civilisation, then, must choose between its Christian heritage or the 
barbarity of the ‘massenmensch’ with its ‘regimentation’ “with its conformity without 
respect for the individual soul”. It is a stark choice, but Eliot is uncompromising; for ... 
“here, as in the hereafter, the alternative to heU is purgatory”. Against the erosion of 
Christian values, against the ‘hygienic morality in the interest of efficiency’ there stands, 
for Eliot, only Christian faith and the ... discipline, inconvenience and discomfort” which 
must sustain i t  We live, he insists, in a society driven b y ... economic determinism” which 
i s ... the god we fall down and worship’’.^ ^
* The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.43.
ÿ Notes Towards the Definition o f Culture T.S. Eliot, Faber & Faber 1948, p.122
After Strange Gods, Faber & Faber, 1934, p.l7.
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Yet Eliot’s position is ambivalent, even confusing. He argues on the one hand, 
discounting the social consequences of Christian teaching, that Christianity “is primarily a 
Gospel message, a dogma ... which demands of man a response of faith and repentance”.^  
There is, he asserts disapprovingly, “a tendency to view the problems of the day in the 
light of what is practically possible”, “rather than in the light of that truth to which the 
Church is set to bear witness”.^ On the other hand, he acknowledges that a society 
motivated by Christian principles would not only compel changes in social, economic and 
political organisation but would also influence the conduct and beneficially determine the 
relationship between individuals. Yet Christianity, he insists, is concerned ... “with the 
Glory of God and the sanctification of souls’’.^  It is not, then, to be construed as a 
religion which solves the problems of the day; it imposes a discipline, the necessity of 
living by Christian truths; it provides no practical panaceas. Eliot, then, is not concerned, 
as is Tawney, with industrial and social organisation or with the complex (social and 
political) machinery through which society expresses itself. His demand is not for equality 
or a society without privilege but rather for ... “a sense of proportion in the light of 
Christian doctrine”. It is this demand for repentance and ‘the spirit of discipline* which 
inspires Eliot’s poetry and his social vision. It is this appeal to tradition which serves him 
as a defence against what he perceives as the vacuous sterility of the mechanisation of 
modem life.
“And you see behind every face the mental emptiness deepen
Leaving only the growing terror of nothing to think about.”^^
It is, too, in this austere understanding of the Christian message that Eliot 
seeks spiritual refuge against the chaos of the wasteland.
* ‘Postscript to The Idea o f A Christian Society’, 1939, see The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.lOI.
“  Ibid, p. 101.
Ibid,p.l01.
'East Coker’, T.S. Eliot, The Four Quartets, 1940, Faber & Faber, Complete Poems and Plays, 
1969 Edition, p.180.
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“Houses rise and fall, crumble, are extended.
Are removed, destroyed, restored, or in their place 
Is an open field or a factory or a by-pass.”^
It is a stem and exacting interpretation of Christianity. It demands ... “thought, 
mortification, study, sacrifice”. “The humblest Christian layman must live what in the 
modem world is comparatively an ascetic life”.“ It is an expression of the pessimistic 
conviction that man is endowed with original sin (and that) while he can occasionally 
accomplish acts which partake of perfection, he can never himself be perfect”. ... “Le 
monde modeme avilit”, Eliot had declared; ... it debases, provincialises and corrupts”.^  
The machinery of modem life, he insists, has destroyed the traditional social habits of the 
people, dissolved their natural consciousness of individual constituents. Yet Eliot, unlike 
Tawney, does not look to fellowship and co-operation to restore ‘the traditional social 
habits’; he looks instead to order and discipline.
Man, he argues, (quoting T.E. Hulme with approval) “is essentially bad; he can 
only accomplish anything of value by discipline - ethical, heroics or political. Order is 
thus not merely negative but creative and liberating. Institutions are necessary”.^  ^^  It is 
an argument which evolves from a conservative tradition, unbroken in France since the 
Revolution; an argument grounded in the notion of the common man as innately sinful, 
irresponsible, undisciplined. It is a tradition which sees the established order threatened 
by the rationalist philosophy and the democratic tendencies engendered by the
* 'East Coker', T.S. Eliot, The Four Quartets, 1940, Faber & Faber, Complete Poems and Plays,
1969 Edition, p .l  77 
“  After Strange Gods, T.S. Eliot, 1934.
Ibid, preface
'Specifications ' Essays in Humanism and the Philosophy o f Art' TJE. Hulme, Edited by Herbert 
Read, Faber & Faber, 1924, see After Strange Gods, p 2 8  
^  T £ . Hulme, Eliot asserted, was "classical, reactionary and revolutionary, the antipodes o f the
eclectic, tolerant and democratic mind o f the last century". See The Life and Opinions o f TÆ. 
Hulme, A R . Jones, Victor Gallancz, 1960, p. 14. "At the centre o f his thought (T£ . Hulme) was a 
violent opposition to humanism, the concept o f human perfectibility and the idea o f progress". 
See The Birth o f Fascist Ideology, Zeev Sternhill, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 240.
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Enlightenment A tradition which seeks to preserve what it perceives as the European 
cultural heritage through discipline imposed by a hierarchic authority which will act as 
guardian and ensures social stability. It is a tradition which, in France has found its 
champions from Joseph De Maistre to Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, a tradition in which 
France ... “daughter of God, humiliated, defeated, bleeding, ashamed  ^ exchanged the 
exhortation of the Revolution for a sterner, more austere demand, “Work, Family, 
Country”.
It is Eliot’s fear for the disintegration of the European cultural heritage which 
prompts him to assert th a t... “tradition necessarily demands stability”. It is this longing 
for ‘stability’, for discipline and order which invoked the declaration 6om ... “one who 
had never been an admirer of Republic Government in France” that... “the device Liberty, 
Egalité, Fraternity is only a memorial of the time of revolution; Famille, Travail, Patrie, 
Eliot argued, have a more permanent value”." Such an endorsement of Petainist values 
delivered when the Swastika flew triumphant from the Eiffel Tower, derives from his 
sympathy for the monarchist and hierarchical political philosophy of Charles Maurras ^  
of which Eliot had written ... “Sa conception de la monarchie et de la hiérarchie, plus qui 
a beaucoup d’autres m’est proche, comme ces conservateurs anglais donc les idees 
demeurent intacte maigre le monde moderne”"^  It is such expressions of Eliot’s ... anti­
democratic and anti-perfectionist strain” which provoked George Orwell to accuse him in 
1942 o f ... a negative Petainism which turns its eye to the past, accepts defeat, writes off 
earthly happiness as impossible”.^  ^ Tawney’s demand for a liberty which is not merely 
formally proclaimed but practically exercisable, his advocacy of an effective equality, his
* ‘Words To The Marshall’ - Paul Claudel, December 1940, see The French Right, Roots o f The
Right, edited J.S. McClelland, Jonathan Cape 1970.
“  ‘Christian Education in France’, From Christian News Letter, 2 Sept. 1941
^  Charles Maurras (1868-1952), Monarchist spokesman for the Catholic Nationalist Right, Editor
o f L ’Action Français. After the liberation o f France, he was sentenced to life imprisonment and 
national degradation for collaboration. He was released on medical grounds in 1951.
‘Aspect’ ‘loc cit’, quoted by Roger Kojecky, From Social Criticism, T.S. Eliot, Faber & Faber, 
1971.
‘Review o f Burnt Norton’, George Orwell, see Collected Essays, Vol. 11, p.2361242
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emphasis on fraternity as a social value contrast sharply with Eliot’s perfunctory dismissal 
o f ... “la devise revolutionaire”. For Tawney... “the whole fabric and mechanism of social 
institutions is to be regarded as a means to an end ... the growth towards the perfection 
of individual human beings”.^  Eliot, however, has little faith in man’s perfectibility and a 
distinctly pessimistic view of progress. ... “The state of affairs that we enjoy today”, he 
asserts bitterly, “illustrates what happens to the aspirations of each age for a better one”.“ 
Yet these opposing visions of social purpose and the spiritual ends of man, do not derive 
only from the differences between an optimistic and a pessimistic interpretation of the 
Christian message. They evolve, too, from the differences between a religious doctrine 
which assumes man’s innate fallibility, and, in humility, recognises the authority of the 
Church to mediate between sinful man and almighty God, and a theology which demands 
of men not only that they accept responsibility for their actions, but questions the right of 
a priesthood to impose ecclesiastic discipline.
A Christian Culture
Eliot proposes, as if seeking to recreate Plato’s REPUBLIC in defence of the 
European Christian heritage, a hierarchic order of distinct groupings, each with distinctly 
defined social responsibilities. The ‘Christian State’, as Eliot conceives it, is a society ... 
“under the aspect of legislation, public administration, legal tradition and form”. The 
leaders of such a state, he suggests, are not necessarily chosen because of their ... 
“eminence as Christians” although, he insists, they must be committed to a ... “Christian 
framework”.^  Their authority, he asserts, must... “comply to Christian traditions”; their 
actions must be in accord with ... the temper of the people which they rule”. ^  While
\ Equality, p.85.
Notes Towards the Definition o f Culture, p i 8.
The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.56.
^  Karl Popper is not alone in discerning "the seeds o f totalitarianism" in ... 'The Great Leader, The
Great Classes or The Great Ideas" ... "if our civilisation is to survive", he insists "we must break
with the habit o f deference to great men" (Preface to first edition o f The Open Society and its
Enemies).
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Eliot suggests that the leaders do not have to be philosophers, he nevertheless 
reconomends that they be neither self-educated ... “nor submitted to that system of 
miscellaneous or specialised instruction which passes for education”. They would, he 
insists, have received a Christian education which would train them to think in ... Christian 
categories” in order to create ... policies for the government of a Christian society”.^  
These ‘guardians’ of Christian values would rule over a Christian Community in which the 
Christian faith would be ... “ingrained” and a Christian ethos prevail, although Eliot 
argues, it requires from the great mass of humanity only ... “a largely unconscious 
(Christian behaviour)”. This ‘great mass of humanity’, Eliot argues, has little capacity for 
... thinking about the objects of their faith”.^ Their attention, he remarks, “is occupied 
mostly by their occupied mostly by their direct relation to the soil, or the sea, or the 
machine”.^  From this ‘mass’ Eliot expects only ... “customary and periodic religious 
observance ... and ... “a traditional code of behaviour towards their neighbours”. Their 
religious and social life, he suggests, “should form a natural whole” ... “ so that the 
difficulty of behaving as Christians should not impose an intolerable strain”. It is, 
however, from ... “a small number of conscious human beings” that Eliot expects “a 
conscious Christian life on its highest social level”. It is on this ‘Conomunity of 
Christians’, a body composed ... “of both laity and clergy of superior intellectual and/or 
spiritual gifts” that Eliot places the responsibility of creating and maintaining a society 
in which ... “the natural ends of man -virtue and well being in community - is 
acknowledged for all” “and the supernatural end - beatitude - for those who have the eyes 
to see it”. The exact function of this intellectual and/or spiritually gifted elite is not 
designated; how they will influence the workings of society is not specified. They will be 
expected, it is supposed, to give moral guidance, uphold Christian values, advance 
education ... “in accord with the Christian aims of society”, that is towards a Christian 
philosophy of life. It is in this demand for an elite, in the proposal for a social system
* The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.J7.
“  Ib id ,p^8.
Î» Ibid.p.58.
Notes Towards The Definition O f Culture, p.61
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which would effectively divide the great mass of humanity from the Community of 
Christians that the differences between Eliot’s understanding of Christian doctrine and 
Tawney’s are most discernible. For Tawney, the notion of an elite is contrary not only to 
his socialist convictions but also to his Christian understanding tha t... “in the eye of God 
all men are equal because all are infinitely smaU”.i Eliot’s patronising accusation that 
Henry Dubb (Tawney’s archetypal Englishman), cannot cope with the difficulty of 
behaving as a Christian would have been rejected by Tawney whose Christian faith was 
grounded not in human division but in human fellowship. It may be argued that Eliot’s 
accusation is an expression of his conviction that ultimately the capacity for an authentic 
‘Christian life ’ depends on a conscious and reflective spirituality to which only an 
intellectual elite might properly aspire. Certainly, Tawney would concede that the 
monotony and drudgery which were features of much of industrial production did not 
inspire a life of conscious, contemplative religious reflection. However, his respect for 
those working men and women who after a day’s work in mine or mill attended evening 
educational courses was boundless, as was his contempt for those who asked ... What 
does a workman want with theatres, or books, or time to himself.?”^ For Tawney, a 
Christianity which exempts the ‘mass of humanity’ from full Christian participation and 
social responsibility is incomprehensible. His own Christian Socialism was sustained by 
the belief that ordinary men and women, in an equitable rather than an acquisitive society, 
could, in co-operation, create a moral social order. Tawney’s belief in the Gospel is 
inconsistent with a Christianity which marginalises ... “those occupied mostly by their 
direct relation to the soil, or the sea, or the machine.^ Nor would he accept that the 
sons of Zebedee^^ were incapable of that religious faith which would grant to them “the 
supernatural end - beatitude”.
The Commonplace Book, entry for Oct. 30.1912, p.43 
Ibid, entry for Oct. 30,1912 
“  The Idea O f A Christian Society, p.55
^ "He saw James the son o f Zebedee and John, his brother ... and they left their father and went
after Him". (Mark 119:20 )
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Eliot does not propose practical measures for the achievement of these somewhat 
nebulous ends. He insists that he is ... “not investigating the possible lines of action by 
which such a society can be brought into being”.^  He has little hope in effective social 
action. He warns: we are faced with either ... “slow decay or sudden extinction”.^ Mass 
society, mass culture, mass education which has come to mean mere instruction, are 
threatening cultural standards. He notes with regret... “the disappearance of a class of 
people who recognise public and private patronage as a responsibility*^ The profit 
motive, he insists, rather than artistic merit, has been allowed to determine what is 
artistically meritorious. Under the assault of this ‘clericalism of secularism’, the Christian 
heritage can only be preserved within a society in which a Community of Christians will 
recreate a respect for the religious life “for the life of prayer and contemplation”. This 
same spiritual and intellectual elite, Eliot asserts, must help us ... “recover the sense of 
religious fear so that we may be overcome by religious hope”.
In the aftermath of Munich, Eliot overwhelmed by feelings of ... “humiliation, 
repentance and amendment” confessed that he was forced to confront the unpalatable 
notion that our ... “democratic society was nothing more than a congeries of banks, 
insurance companies and industries interested only ... “in compound interest and 
maintaining dividends”. In the face of Fascist aggression, he sadly concluded our 
democratic* society had neither the moral superiority nor the social cohesion with which 
to oppose the convictions of totalitarian paganism. It was this sense of humiliation, Eliot 
insisted, which had prompted him to examine THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY. 
He insisted that he had only confined himself to a ‘slight outline* of the essential features 
of such a society. He acknowledged, too, that he ... “may have seemed to wander off 
course”. Yet, even in this ‘slight outline* Eliot’s astringent conception of a Christian 
society is manifest His vision is austere, his emphasis is on discipline, humility, order. A
Notes Towards The Definition Of Culture, p.55 
The Idea O f A Christian Society, p.66 
"  Ibid, p.66 
Ibid, p .79
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quality of ascetic renunciation, of penance, informs his social criticism just as a sense of 
fear for the Christian heritage permeates his poetry and dramatic works.
“The Church is bereft
Alone, desecrated, desolated, and the heathen 
shall build on the ruins.
Their world without God. I see it, I see it.‘
Whereas Tawney’s writings express an optimistic hope that men and women can create, 
in concert, the conditions for a life of human dignity, Eliot’s sees the world as defiled. 
“We are soiled by a filth that we cannot clean, united to supernatural vermin. It is not we 
alone; it is not the house; it is not the city that is defiled, but the world that is wholly 
foul”." Eliot’s “common man ... the men and women who shut the door and sit by the 
fireside”^  may be redeemed “by the blood of martyrs and saints”, but Eliot’s God, he 
informs us ... “is a jealous God,” and they must pray for mercy.
“Christ have mercy upon us. Lord have mercy upon us.
Blessed Thomas, have mercy upon us.”^
Eliot, ‘royalist, classicist, elitist’ argues, at a moment of national crises, that ... 
“democracy does not have enough content to stand alone against the forces you dislike ... 
it can easily be transformed by them”. ^  Tawney, however, argues for a democracy in 
which Christian teaching and Christian fellowship would be reflected in the social laws 
and the social institutions of the commonwealth. Eliot, fearful that western civilisation 
may succumb either to totalitarian paganism or “democratic mediocrity” calls for an elite
\ 'Murder in the Cathedral', Part II, T.S. Eliot, 1935, see Collected Poems and Plays.
"  Ibid, Part II
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to preserve the Christian heritage. No longer tentative, vague or ambiguous, he 
authoritatively declares ... “if you will not have God, you should pay your respects to 
Hitler or Stalin’’.^
Eliot, then, had served notice on western civilisation. Democracy, he insisted, will 
not preserve it 6om tyranny; indeed, he argued, democracy is in itself an insidious 
tyranny. Western civilisation, he asserted, must entrust its Christian heritage to an elite - 
put its faith and its fate in an intellectual and spiritual leadership which will stand as 
guardian over its ethical, cultural and religious life. Western civilisation, he insisted, must 
re-embrace ... “the eternal truths of Christianity ... “return to the eternal source of truth 
or perish.**  ^ In nineteen thirty nine, as the world plunged into war, Eliot had delivered a 
warning against the vitiating effects of democracy and a classless society*. Ten years later 
he returned to the same subject, if, in the intervening years, the immediate danger of 
totalitarianism had been overcome, for Eliot, the Christian heritage was still imperilled.
“To rescue the word culture is the extreme of my ambition**, Eliot remarked. But 
the remark concealed a larger ambition. Although Eliot admits that he is not without his 
own political convictions and prejudices, he insists that in the course of his investigation, 
he has no intention of imposing them. He is using the word ‘definition*, the fiontispiece 
informs us, (quoting the Oxford English Dictionary) as ... “setting the bounds; limitations; 
(rare) 1483**. His opening claim is that of an objective and unprejudiced researcher. 
“What I say is this; here are what I believe to be the essential conditions for the growth 
and for the survival of culture**. Yet, Eliot, having first denied political intent and then 
modestly defined his brief - “to rescue the word culture**, continues, not by dispassionate 
exegesis but by dogmatic assertion. If the reader, he suggests, “finds it shocking that 
culture and egalitarianism should conflict, if it seems monstrous to him that anyone should 
have ‘advantages of birth*, I do not ask him to change his faith. I merely ask him to stop
* The Idea o f A Christian Society, p.82
» Ibid. p.82
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paying lip-service to culture”.^  This accusation that the egalitarians are merely paying lip 
service to culture may be seen as a dismissal ‘de haut en bas* of those whose views do not 
coincide with his own. Even Eliot’s admission that he might in some circumstances feel 
obliged to support some of the arguments for social justice advanced by the egalitarians 
does not allay the suspicion that he is intent on creating and m aintain ing  an intellectual 
elite. Yet, Eliot insists, the ‘culture* which would evolve from the social engineering 
which would promote equality would not satisfy the definition which he is trying to 
establish. Advantages of birth then, which Tawney decries as an impediment to a 
‘common culture*, are to Eliot a necessary condition for the maintenance of culture. 
Furthermore, Eliot insists, his use (and his acceptance) of the phrase ‘advantages of birth* 
must not be seen as a defence of aristocracy. Indeed, it must be recognised as an 
expression of his belief in the family as a cohesive and transmissive social and cultural 
institution. The family, he argues, is the primary vehicle for the transmission of culture 
and... “if we agree that in a more highly civilised society there must be different levels of 
culture, then it follows that to ensure the transmission of culture of these different levels 
there must be families persisting from generation to generation in the same way of life**.“ 
For Eliot then, an aristocracy has an essential transmitting role; it has a cultural obligation 
to preserve the cultural tradition in which ... “the aristocracy is not subordinate to the 
middle class which is gradually absorbing and destroying them**.^ Eliot, confesses that he 
is inclined to believe that these different cultural levels are a necessary condition for a true 
democracy. These levels of culture, he suggests, should also be seen as levels of power. 
In the Christian Society he envisages, each individual would inherit greater or less 
responsibility towards the commonwealth according to the position in society which he 
inherited - each class having somewhat different responsibilities. This social structure of 
class differentiation, Eliot argues, does not necessarily produce the “higher civilisation**.
( Notes Towards The Definition Of Culture, p.60.
“  Ibid, p.48
‘Marie Uoycf, see Selected Prose o f T.S. Eliot, 1922, Edited by Frank Kermode, Faber <&. Faber, 
1975,p.l75.
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He warns, however, that when ... “these conditions of culture” are absent, “the higher 
level of civilisation is unlikely to be found”.'
The preservation of these different levels of culture serves EHot as justification for 
the maintenance of class divisions. The ‘persisting groups* will each transmit, and thereby 
sustain, the cultural activities ... interesting to their cultural level”. Eliot insists that these 
different levels of culture embrace ... all the activities and interests of a people”. His 
personal list of what he considers representative of the British cultural tradition is 
catholic; it includes such events as Derby Day, The Cup Final, the Twelfth of August, 
Henley Regatta as well as those peculiarly British predilections for boiled cabbage, 
Wensleydale cheese, nineteenth century Gothic churches and beetroot in vinegar." Indeed, 
Eliot argues, “what is part of our culture is also part of our ‘lived* religion**. Our lived 
religion, our national culture must therefore, in Eliot*s view, be presented by a class 
structure in which ... “the movements of culture would proceed in a kind of cycle, each 
class nourishing the other** “the higher levels enriching the lower**. Eliot calls for a ... 
structure of society** in which there will be “from ‘top* to ‘bottom* a continuous 
graduation of cultural levels**. In a ... “vigorous society**, Eliot claims, “there will be both 
class divisions and an elite** with some overlapping and a constant interaction between 
them.
The common culture Eliot is anxious to preserve is that culture which he identifies 
as the heritage of Christian civilisation, a culture which should be recognised as a 
sanctified, ratified province, safeguarded by a governing elite drawn from those with 
superior intellectual and/or spiritual gifts and members of an established governing class. 
It is a notion very different from Tawney*s perception of a social justice and his 
understanding of Christian doctrine. “All social systems and philosophies which 
discriminate between men on the basis, not of individual differences, but of mere
'  Notes Towards The Definition O f Culture, p.49
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externals, are anti-Christian”, he argued, “such social systems assert that economic, social 
or biological differences between men are more important that the common humanity 
which they share as children of God”.^
Eliot, however, in defence of the ‘traditional values' which had obtained before 
the ideals of the Enlightenment and the ‘machinery of modem life’ had destroyed the 
established hierarchical order, has mustered an elite dedicated to the Christian tradition as 
he conceives it. A Christian society anxious to develop its national, social and cultural 
life, must, he insists, encourage its architects and artists, must recognise their gifts and 
allow them to influence taste. Similarly, such a society must provide its scientists with the 
facilities to extend human knowledge. Above all, Eliot urges, it must make available to its 
ablest minds the time and the conditions for speculative thought. For Eliot, then, the 
duties of the governing elite extend beyond the mechanics of legislative authority. It must 
also protect the Christian cultural heritage against the declining standards of the 
‘massenmensch’ and the petty, philistine values of the middle class. Tawney also holds 
this somewhat patrician, view of the middle class values of “philistines and mill owners”. 
Unlike Eliot, however, he is not prepared to leave the responsibility for the extension of 
knowledge to an intellectual elite. The differentiation of education according to class, he 
insists, “is one of those blunders which reveal coarseness of spirit even more than 
confusion of mind”." It is, he declares “a wickedness” “to which only one answer is 
possible. Ecrasez I’infame”.^
Eliot, however, argues that an elite of talent, artistic, scientific and intellectual 
must be a permanent feature of a Christian society; its accomplishments must be 
honoured; its judgements respected ... “generation after generation”. Culture, Eliot 
insists, is not merely the sum of various activities; it is a way of life. A nation’s culture.
‘Christianity and the Social Order’, see The Attack, p.183 
‘An Experiment in Democratic Education’, 1914, see Radical Tradition, p.72 
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therefore, is an amalgam of those activities in which not everybody necessarily 
participates but which everybody recognises as peculiar to the nation. In the past, Eliot 
asserts, the chief repository of culture has been a elite chiefly drawn firom the ... 
“dominant class”. Historically this class has been ... “the primary consumer of the works 
of thought and art”. It is, therefore, he insists, the function of the “superior members of 
this class” together with the ... “superior families” to preserve the nation’s culture just as 
it is the “function of the producers to alter it”.^  In Eliot’s scheme of things it is equally the 
obligation of the fourteenth Mr. Pinter to develop the nation’s culture as it is for the ninth 
Duchess of Argyle to preserve it, while what he identifies as the ... “mass of humanity” 
must be content to allow a “governing elite” not only to assume the responsibility for the 
welfare of the commonwealth but act also as a guardian, patron and perpetuator of its 
cultural heritage”. He calls for a “healthy stratified society” ... in which ... “public 
affairs would be a responsibility not equally borne. A greater responsibility would be 
inherited by those who inherited special advantages and in whom self-interest and interest 
for the sake of their families (a stake in the country) should cohere with public spirit A 
governing elite of the nation as a whole would consist of those whose responsibility was 
inherited with their affluence and position and whose forces were constantly increased and 
often led by rising individuals of exceptional talents”."
Eliot, therefore, while disclaiming political intent, has proposed a social order in 
which an elite ... “those with inherited affluence and position” “families with a stake in the 
country would assume responsibility for public affairs”. While he has not discarded the 
notion of ‘carrières ouvertes aux talents’, he has, nevertheless, demanded a system of 
hierarchy and stratification incorporating an hereditary elite. Certainly, the demand is not 
directly endorsed by proposals for a legally constituted, legally recognised elite maintained 
and protected by the power of the state. Yet, where Tawney argues that inheritance must 
be curtailed and limited, Eliot proposes that those with ... “inherited affluence and
* Notes Towards The Definition o f Culture, p.42.
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position” be given responsible public office. While Tawney insists that the ... divisions 
brought about by a graduated system of social classes” will create ... “a kind of morbid 
obsession, colouring the whole world of social relations”,  ^Eliot demands that... families 
with a ... “stake in the country” “those who inherit special advantages” are qualified to 
exercise authority. Tawney argues, however, that ... “it was fatal to Christianity to 
regard any men as being without capacity for responsibility and autonomy,” “ whereas 
Eliot, in the formulation of the idea of a Christian society, assigns this capacity for 
responsibility only to an elite. This demand for an elite is grounded in his confident 
assessment th a t... “our period is one of decline; that the standards of culture are lower 
than they were fifty years ago”. This assessment, as George Orwell has remarked, '*may 
seem true when one thinks of Hollywood films or the atomic bomb, but less true if one 
thinks what life was like for an unemployed labourer in the East End of London in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century”.üi Furthermore, Eliot’s understanding of the 
declining standards of culture are compounded by his disdain for a classless society ... 
“even so far as it has at present adumbrated itself’. “It is mediocre”, he charges ... “It 
reduces human beings to the mass” ... “ready to be controlled, manipulated by a dictator 
or an oligarchy”.iv
Yet, Eliot, the advocate of hierarchy and tradition, does not explain by what 
sanction this ‘governing elite’ would exercise its authority. Certainly, he had neither 
respect for democracy or faith in the democratic process to remedy the human condition 
... “When a term has become so universally sanctified”, he complained, ... “I begin to 
wonder whether it means anything”.  ^Insofar as Eliot committed himself to a method of 
social change, he suggested that just as individuals should seek self-improvement in 
minute particulars, so too, should society in piecemeal fashion endeavour to improve
( Equality, R.H. Tawney, p.58.
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itself. Eliot, however, provides no master plan as to the political framework in which 
these social improvements might be achieved. While, like Tawney, he fulminates against 
the ... “immorality of competition” ... “a world manipulated by big usurers” and questions 
... “the morality of investing in bonds and debentures”, ‘ Eliot proposes no practical 
political or economic programme by which the governing elite will correct these social 
iniquities to the benefit of the ‘mass of humanity*. While Tawney postulates a society of 
function, of mutual responsibility and equitable economic distribution, Eliot, reluctant to 
enlarge on the social and political consequences of his elitist notion of culture, insists that 
... “theological writers have more to say that is relevant to this subject than political 
philosophers”.^
Christian Education
Both Tawney and EHot believed that Christian teaching had firm implications for 
education. Education Eliot remarked, “is a subject on which we all feel we have 
something to say*’.^ “ Certainly, Eliot was concerned with the subject as his principle 
writings of social criticism indicate.^ Eliot not only recognised ... “the close relationship 
between education theory and political t h e o r y * * ,^ ^  also argued that education cannot be 
discussed in a void since the subject also raises questions which are social, economic, 
financial and political”.  ^ Even the word education, he insisted, has different contexts; it 
means something different when we are talking about education as something offered to 
us, or when we are talking about it as something received. Is it, he asks, something done 
to people or something people do for themselves? There are also, he argues, the 
fundamental questions to be addressed. ‘What is the purpose of education?* ‘What are its
The Idea Of Christian Society, p.105.
\ Ibid, p.44.
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ultimate aims’? For Eliot, in a Christian society, the ends of education are clear - ‘the 
permanent values’ which education must nurture and encourage, the values which must 
influence all educational action and philosophy are ... “Wisdom and Holiness” “the values 
of the sage and the saint”.^  This somewhat idealistic and elevated notion of the purpose of 
education, Eliot reflects, has been firustrated by the tendency prevalent in the ... “decayed 
form of Christianity” which exists in the ‘Christian West’ to identify wisdom and holiness, 
education for culture and character building”. In Christian Society, he suggests, culture 
and character might be by-products of our education as technical efficiency might be 
incidental to it. Education then, for Eliot, must be inspired by Christian teaching directed 
towards a ... “Christian philosophy of life”. Yet, he complains, in the Western 
democracies our society is materialist, our religion is diluted, our culture, while it has not 
ceased to be entirely Christian, is, nevertheless, negative. While Eliot proposes that... “a 
nation’s system of education is much more important than its system of government”," he 
argues, (as did Coleridge,) tha t... “to the population education means instruction”. The 
next step, Eliot insists, is that this ... “clericalism of secularism wül inculcate the political 
principles approved by the party in power”.i" Education, he argues, must be something 
more than the acquisition of information, technical competence or superficial culture. 
Every philosophy of education, he insists, must pose the important question ... “What is 
the type of man which it is proudest to produce?” It is by this question that a society may 
identify its real ideals; it is this question which will determine the way it teaches, what it 
teaches and for what purpose it teaches. Eliot acknowledges that it may appear to some 
readers that he ... “is ready to dispense altogether, within the Christian Society, with 
everything they know and value by the name of education”. This misapprehension, he 
admits, has led many to believe that his ... “goal is in effect a relapse into barbarism”,^  ^an 
allegation which he denies. Indeed, he counters, he is not anxious to scrap anything; he
* ‘Education in a Christian Society’, (1940) see The Idea o f a Christian Society and Other Essays,
p.141.
** The Idea O f Christian Society, p.67.
Ibid, p.67.
‘Education in a Christian Society’, (1940) see Idea Of Christian Society and Other Essays, p.43.
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recognises the need for laboratories and technical schools as well as institutions for the 
study of history and philosophy and ancient and modem languages. This apparent 
readiness to accept the continuation of certain recognised institutions of education is, 
however, tempered by a proviso ... “You cannot expect continuity unless you have a 
certain uniformity of culture”, Eliot insists, “expressed in education by a settled though 
not rigid agreement as to what everyone should know to some degree, and a positive 
distinction - however undemocratic it may sound - between the uneducated and the 
educated”.^  This proviso was compounded by the suggestion that in view of the 
shortcomings of Harvard University’s ... “mass enrolment” policy, (which Eliot judged to 
be responsible for declining standards) the number of students in British higher education 
should be reduced to one third of the nineteen thirty-two level.^  In an age of social 
change, Eliot also argued, our conceptions of education should be re-examined; we 
should ... “no longer leave education to take care of itself’ but address ourselves to the 
question o f ... who should be educated and how they should be educated and to that most 
neglected question of all, why they should be educated”." Eliot’s answer to this ‘most 
neglected question’ was made manifest in nineteen thirty-nine in the face of demands that 
the school leaving age be raised from fourteen years to eighteen. Eliot insisted that he 
held no fixed opinion in this matter although he agreed that it was ... “better that boys and 
girls should be at school rather than be subject to industrial exploitation”.^  Nevertheless, 
he argued, this reform which might be good in certain circumstances was not always ... 
“a change for the better absolutely”. It is not, he asserted, necessarily a ... “good in 
itself’. Is this further education, he challenged ... “necessarily going to make the majority 
wiser or better people?”*^
* The Idea O f Christian Society, p.67.
^  This recommendation is not however included in the 1936 edition o f Eliot's Essays - Ancient And
Modern, Faber & Faber.
"  The Idea O f Christian Society, p.l66.
Ibid,p.l44.
Ibid,p.l45.
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It is, however, when Eliot’s recognition of ‘the close relationship between 
education theory and political theory’ is applied to his own education theories that his 
concept of a social order is made most apparent. His ‘Idea of A Christian Society’, if not 
completely authoritarian in the manner of a totalitarian dictatorship, is, nevertheless, 
hierarchic and paternalistic in the manner of Petainist France. A ‘governing elite’ would 
legislate to preserve what Eliot perceives as the traditional Christian culture while an 
‘educated elite’ would pursue the permanent values of Wisdom and Holiness. To this end 
Eliot urges that... “the first educational task of the ‘Christian Communities’ should be the 
preservation of education within the cloister... “a call for monastic orders uncontaminated 
by the deluge of barbarism outside”  ^ As for the ‘mass of humanity’, the thrust of 
education in the modem age, Eliot complains, has been dominated by the idea of ... 
“getting on” rather than an aid to the acquisition of Wisdom. Education has become 
something to which everybody has a ‘right’ irrespective of his capacity”. The result, he 
declares, is that ... “education is received in a diluted and adulterated form - which 
disappoints the many who discover that ‘education’ is not an infallible means of ‘getting 
on’. This disillusioned ‘mass of humanity’ wiU inevitably forsake the ‘drudgery of 
education’, Eliot argues, and devote itself to ... “pretty simple forms of leisure” “playing 
cards, watching dogs, horses or other men engage in feats of speed and skill”.“
It is a blanket judgement entirely free firom considerations of social or economic 
conditions, of environmental factors, of opportunity, of inheritance. It is a judgement 
which ignores completely Eliot’s own caveat that... “education cannot be discussed in a 
void since the subject raises questions which are social, economic, financial and 
political’.^  While Tawney acknowledges that Henry Dubb was not without faults; he 
was sometimes lazy, sometimes feckless; he, nevertheless, declared himself invoking ‘the 
Magnificat’ "an unrepentant Dubbite”. Dubb, he argued, “may one day wake up
* * Modern Education and The Classics’, see Essays Ancient and Modern, p .l 74.
» Ibid,63.
Ibid, p.161.
^  "He hath put down the mighty from their seat and hath exalted the humble and meek"
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and use such rights as he possesses of which he is more sensible than some of his 
intellectual pastors in thinking worth having” * Tawney, while admitting that Dubb could 
be both ... “pig-headed and exasperating”, still respects him for his ... “good sense, 
pertinacity, nerve and resolution”. Eliot on the other hand, oblivious of his own 
injunction towards “charity and humility”, brands the mass of his fellows as without ... 
“definite gifts or taste” capable in their leisure moments o f ... propelling balls by hand, ly  
foot or an interest in engines and various types of tools”.^ This disdainful evaluation of 
the capacities of the ‘common man ‘finds expression not only in his social criticism but 
also in his verse...
“And think of poor Albert,
He’s been in the army four years.
He wants a good time, 
and if you don’t give it him.
There’s other will, I said”.^i
Eliot’s views on education, as on society, are that of an elitist; even the egalitarian 
claims to equality of opportunity and ‘the démocratisation of education’, he insists, must 
be scrutinised very carefully. Indeed, he argues ... “equality of opportunity can be very 
dangerous if we are not severe in our standards of what it is desirable to have opportunity 
for”, As for the ‘démocratisation of education’, he asserts that as the scope of 
education has expanded ... “so have social organisation broken down and been replaced 
by the mechanisation which increases while it manipulates the atomisation of 
individuals”.  ^ If Eliot sees the ‘démocratisation of education’ as the begetter of 
‘alienated’, ‘atomised’, ‘spiritual nomads’, Tawney has a more positive vision.
* 'Christianity and the Social Revolution’, see The Attack, p .l66.
(( 'Modern Education and the Classics’, see Essays Ancient and Modern, p.163
'The Waste Land’, T.S. Eliot, 1922, see Collected Works, Faber & Faber, 1980, p.66. 
The Idea o f a Christian Society, p.l45.
V lbid,p.l44.
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Education, he proposes, “although it is much else as well, is partly, at least, the 
process by which we transcend the barriers of our isolated personalities and become 
partners in a universe of interests which we share with out fellowmen, living and dead 
alike”.^  Education, for Tawney, is not merely to impart reliable information; it has another
important purpose “to foster the intellectual vitality, to master and use it, so that
knowledge becomes not a burden to be borne or a possession to be prized but a stimulus 
to constructive thought and an inspiration to action”.^
Eliot was suspicious of the notion of ‘equality of opportunity*; he suspected that it 
was inspired not by the pursuit of excellence but rather by the ‘false lights' of achieving 
whatever in a ‘mass society* was regarded as admirable. Tawney, however, believed in 
the ... “practical equality** which would ensure the education of every citizen in order 
that ... “they might be capable of fteedom** ... “an education that would enable each 
individual to discover his own and his neighbours endowments**. For Tawney, Professor 
Titmuss insists, “the supreme consideration was everyman's uniqueness without regard to 
the irrelevancies of class and income**.^ Certainly, Eliot cannot have been unaware that 
Christianity demands of all who live by its tenets that they acknowledge the uniqueness 
and individuality of every human being. But Christianity was evidently “a house with 
many mansions** and consistent, therefore, with a wide diversity of social aspirations and 
ideals.
Community
Yet Eliot, like Tawney, understood the value of community ...
“What life have you if you have not life together?
* 'WEA and Adult Education’, see The Radical Tradition, p.84.
“  Ibid, p.84
See Introduction to Equality, Richard M. Titmuss, 1964 Edition, p.IS.
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There is no life that is not in community and no 
community not lived in praise of GOD”.^
But Eliot’s community was one of hierarchy and discipline while Tawney saw in 
community the opportunity for fellowship, for all men to exercise ... “not the class 
differences which divide but the common humanity which unites them”." Tawney believed 
that ordinary men and women had the capacity, in fellowship, to create a Christian 
Society; he saw men’s strengths even as he acknowledged their weaknesses. Eliot, 
however, saw a human nature that was innately evil a society that was inevitably corrupt. 
For Tawney, whose Christian faith urges men ... *To add to Godliness, brotherly kindness 
... and to brotherly kindness, charity” (PET:II.1.7), the values of Liberty, Equality and 
Fraternity are central to Christian teachings. For Eliot, this ‘device’ is only a memorial to 
the time of revolution: misguided, even mischievous. Certainly, as George Orwell insists, 
EHot must not be disqualified from advancing social theories shrply because he was an ... 
“Anglo-CathoHc royaHst who is given to quoting Latin”,i" or even because he was 
capable of making “reactionary statements which border on the shocking”.NBi EHot’s 
social attitudes were archaic; some of his pronouncements lay him open to charges of 
racism; his verse contains lines which are commonly acknowledged as anti-Semitic.^^ 
Ultimately, his social and poHtical theories proved to be dangerous and irresponsible. The 
authoritarianism to which he had looked to preserve Western Culture made no 
contribution to Christian civiHsation, Christian thought or Christian moraHty. Indeed it 
produced a brutaHsed, book-burning, anti-intellectual lumpen.
* ‘Choruses from The Rock! TS. Eliot, 1934, see Collected Poems and Plays, 1969, p.l52.
“  Equality, p.49.
Collected Essays, George Orwell, Vol II, p.293.
See Eliot's remarks concerning "undesirable, free-thinking Jews " and "the invasion o f culture by 
foreign races", ‘After Strange Gods', The Page Barbour Lectures, Univ. o f Virginia, 1933, Faber 
& Faber, 1934. The printed edtion o f these lectures are now out o f print.
See references in The Waste Land (1922), "Burbank with a Banker".
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Tawney and Eliot, it must be recognised, were not unique in presenting social and 
political criticism in the light of their religious understanding. Polemicists of the right had 
employed a vocabulary of militant religion in defence of nationalism, paternalism, order 
and discipline encapsulated in Marshal Petain’s ‘appeal to the French nation* which, in 
1940, called fo r... “a new order... an intellectual and moral regeneration”. Nor was there 
a shortage of socialist thinkers who invoked Christian teachings against targets which, 
curiously, they shared with their opponents, - the individualism and materialism of 
industrial capitalism. Yet, Eliot and Tawney were not only concerned to present their 
particular interpretation of Christian teaching as translated into social organisation. They 
were concerned, too, in the face of a palpable decline in the power and influence of the 
established Churches, to warn of the social consequences of a society bereft of religious 
belief, motivated solely by acquisitive appetite and materialist values.^
^  Certainly, English Ethical Socialism was more influential in the nineteenth than in the twentieth 
century. It may be argued that the horrors o f the first world war, the catalyst o f revolutions, the 
'shock o f the new' in social behaviour, sexual relationships and artistic expression served to 
weaken organised religion (and that o f Protestant non-confomity in particular).
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CHAPTER V 
The Case Against Equality
Introduction
*The men of culture are the true apostles of equality.”
Matthew Arnold
Whilst egalitarianism may never have become an orthodoxy in Britain, the positive 
advocacy of inequality was muted with the development of a Keynsian consensus. This 
consensus, David Marquand suggests, tentatively, (for it is difficult to pinpoint precise 
dates), began when the wartime coalition government (in June 1944) published a White 
Paper committing post-war governments to full employment, until in October 1976, 
James Callaghan informed the Labour Party Conference that “attempts to increase 
employment by cutting taxes and increased public spending injected more inflation into 
the system and so did more harm than good”.^  There was. Professor Marquand argues, no 
self-conscious tradition of Keynsian social democracy with which its adherents could 
identify. The term was used, he insists, as “short hand for a set of commitments,
assumptions and expectations transcending party conflicts and shared by the great
majority of the country’s political and economic leaders”.^ These commitments,
assumptions and expectations. Professor Marquand asserts, did not evolve from “an
explicit set of teachings, consciously held”.^  Conservatives who advocated Keynsian 
measures still thought of themselves as Conservatives: they belonged to a long established 
tradition and appealed to the myths and symbols of that tradition. The Labour Party 
pointed with pride and guarded jealously the educational reforms, the health care 
legislation and the welfare provision which their periods of office had engendered.
* The Unprincipled Society Jlavid Marquand, Fontana Press, 1988, p.l8.
“  Ibid, p.18.
Ibid,p.l8.
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Certainly the two parties had differences of interest and belief, different aims and values as 
well as different constituencies. Nevertheless, Professor Marquand insists, when they 
were in government “their leaders approached the management of the economy and the 
operation of the social services in a remarkably similar fashion”.^
Though these differences in interests and beliefs were real and important. 
Professor Marquand observes, what stands out in retrospect is the extent to which their 
policies overlapped in practice. It is, he argues, “a philosophy of the mixed economy”, a 
philosophy of “the middle way” in which government could intervene in the market, ... 
and “mitigate the hardships of unregulated capitalism” “ while preserving consumer 
choice. It is a philosophy committed to repudiate “the dichotomies of market versus 
state; capital versus labour, private enterprise versus public ownership; personal freedom 
versus social justice”.^  Essentially, such a philosophy is committed to the notion that 
capitalism and socialism are not inherently opposed: that it is possible to combine 
elements of both “in a synthesis more benign than either”,
Certainly, in the years which followed the war, living standards improved, 
unemployment was comparatively low: opportunities and personal freedoms expanded. 
Most people enjoyed better health, their children remained at school longer, the state 
provided a measure of security against sickness, poverty, unemployment, old age. Britain 
“became a kinder and, on most definitions, a fairer society”. ^ Yet the consensus did not 
endure: perceptions changed, opinions shifted, attitudes altered. A section of society, 
newly affluent, gradually distanced itself from its traditional ties to the Labour Party and 
socialist principles. These changes, compounded by increasing economic difficulties, led 
the Labour Party leadership in the 1960*s and 1970’s (and not without internal
* The Unprincipled Society, p.l8.
» Ibid,p.l9.
Ibid, p.l9.
Ibid,p.l9.
^ Ibid,p.40.
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opposition), to adopt a less socialistic, less radical programme. Similarly, within the 
Conservative Party a neo-liberal faction, dedicated to a philosophy of possessive 
individualism, and the free-market began to exert influence. In 1974, with the fall of the 
Heath government and the attendant sense of frustration within the Party, this faction 
became increasingly dominant. By the late 1970’s with the election of Margaret Thatcher, 
the Conservative Party leadership was firmly in neo-liberal hands.
With the election of Margaret Thatcher the already fragmenting consensus was 
shattered. ‘New Conservatism’ entered into what one contemporary supporter identifies 
as “its heroic phase”.^  The party enthusiastically embarked on a programme which 
included the privatisation of nationalised industries, new trade-union legislation, radical 
local government reforms. Economic policies were introduced which emphasised 
competition and dismissed as inefficient, economically costly, and socially damaging, the 
intervention of government in the mechanism of the market. These policies evolved out 
of a neo-liberal philosophy which exalted consumer choice, competition and free 
enterprise within a free market-place. They sought to replace the assumptions and 
expectations on which the post-war consensus had been predicated with a new culture of 
individualism. They sought confrontation rather than consensus; to create not only the 
economic conditions in which such a culture could flourish but also the philosophic 
climate in which it could thrive. Egalitarianism, which had informed so much post-war 
social policy was now discredited. The social and economic theories of the “new-right” 
were challenged. Yet for a time, in its “heroic phase”, the spirit of community withered, 
the language of the unfettered market ruled, the philosophy was triumphant
At this moment of triumph, in nineteen eighty three, ) t^iUiam Letwin edited a 
collection of essays ... 'AGAINST EQUALITY,* ^ The contributions represent
* Modern Conservatism, David Willetts, Penguin Books, 1992, p.50.
"  Against Equality, Readings on Economic and Social Politics, edited by William Letwin, 1983,
Macmillan Press in association with the Foundation for Education in Economics, London.
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conservative, liberal, libertarian and ‘new right* reactions against equality which Professor 
Letwin identified as “the leading fetish of our time’*. While many of the contributors 
attack an abstract notion of equality, some briefly distinguish between “extreme”, 
“moderate”, “judicious” and “Christian egalitarians”. Their target, however, is a catch-all 
egalitarianism, an egalitarianism for all seasons. Tawney is occasionally mentioned, and 
his ethical egalitarianism must be regarded as a dimension of equality which is under 
attack. His particular egalitarian position, therefore, offers the opportunity to present a 
critical response to Letwin’s contributors which addresses concrete rather than abstract 
anti-egalitarian arguments. This response, hopefully, allows for a more accurate 
appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of Tawney *s case for equality.
The “ideal of equality”, its practical application, its theoretical foundations, its 
effects, economic, social, legal and political, is subjected to cogent and vigorous criticism. 
Professor Letwin, in the preface, insists that “The claims of egalitarianism in the social 
sphere are as baseless as in any other, and the prospects for egalitarianism, are more 
hopeless than elsewhere”. He declares his own general opposition to ‘egalitarianism*, and 
claims that this opposition is shared by many of the contributors although they do not 
necessarily have his particular views on specific aspects of egalitarianism. Letwin asserts, 
however, that the book calls into question the philosophic arguments in favour of 
equality. The essays, he insists, “do not hew to any orthodoxy”, they are concerned not 
only with specific topics but bear also on the broader issue. Yet, if not all the contributors 
are as implacably opposed to the ideal of equality as Professor Letwin, the collected 
essays constitute a concerted and concentrated attack on egalitarianism and consequently 
on the social, political, ethical, and philosophic theories of R.H. Tawney. Though 
Tawney *s ‘EQUALITY* is regarded, if not as the Testament, at least as the Talmud of the 
egalitarian case, there are fewer direct references to Tawney than to John Rawls. Rawls, 
in “A THEORY OF JUSTICE”, advances a detailed, technical and sophisticated 
methodology in support of an equitable distribution of wealth. He employs a social 
contract mechanism in order to satisfy the moral demands of those egalitarians who insist
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that all inequalities must be justified He proposed that any departures finom equality are 
morally acceptable provided such departures result not only to the positive benefit of the 
least advantaged, but that the opportunities for such departures are equally available to 
all. Like Tawney, Rawls’s emphasis is on equitable distribution. His stated purpose, 
however, is ... “to generalise and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional 
theory of social contract as represented by -Locke, Rousseau and Kant”.^  His concern, he 
asserts, is to advance ... “a systematic account of justice that is superior to the dominant 
utilitarianism of the tradition”." Yet if Tawney has not presented as elaborate or fully 
developed a philosophic blue-print for social justice as Rawls, his egalitarian philosophy is 
nevertheless subjected to judgemental criticism by Professor Letwin and his fellow 
contributors. NB
Letwin leads the attack with an opening statement of intent, “I have designed this 
book”, he declares, “to challenge and rebut egalitarianism”. His own essay, the first (and 
longest) contribution ... *THE CASE AGAINST EQUALITY* begins with the assertion 
that most people now believe in equality and most people now believe that “many aspects 
of social life should be reformed so as to get rid of inherited inequalities”.^  That is why, 
Letwin argues, “people support redistribution of wealth and income within nations, and 
among nations”. It is, he asserts, this general acceptance of the notion of equality which 
provokes a sympathy with measures “to extend powers of decision to workers as well as 
employers, students as well as teachers, voters as well as politicians and officials”. 
These extensions of power Letwin insists are automatically perceived as 
‘démocratisation’, ‘participation’, and ‘equalisation of rights’.  ^ Egalitarianism, Letwin
\ A Theory Of Justice, John Rawls, Oxford University Press, 1983 Edition, Page VIII (Preface)
“  Ibid, Introduction, p. VII..
^  John Rawls's A Theory o f Justice is quite properly regarded as a seminal work. A comparison o f
Rawls' perception o f social justice and that o f Tawney offers abundant material for a research 
project. Such research, however, is beyond the scope o f this thesis which is concerned with the 
theories ofR.H. Tawney.
The Case Against Equality, ' Letwin, see Against Equality, p . l .
Ibid,p.l.
 ^ Ibid,p.l.
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dogmatically insists, postulating a definition of equality which contemporary egalitarians 
would dismiss as unsubstantiated fantasy, “seems to rest on three ideas:”'
1. “All persons should be equal.”
2. “AH existing inequalities can be reduced if not utterly eradicated by action of
governments or by revolutionary change in government”.
3. “AU other political objectives must give way to equaUty” (since) “EquaUty is held 
as the paramount political end”.
These three propositions Letwin beUeves to be central to the egaUtarian case, they are, he
insists, “expounded in poUtical tracts, official reports, phUosophical essays and other
considered utterances”. Letwin’s purpose is clearly stated. The book, he declares, is
designed to disrupt the consensus on the egaUtarian question. His intentions are fourfold: 
MB
1. He wiU caU into question the phUosophical argument which have been (or may be) 
advanced in favour of egaUtarianism;
2. Point out the ambiguities within the idea of equaUty;
3. Dispute the data which are supposed to reveal great and growing inequaUty;
* The Case Against Equality, ' Letwin, see Against Equality, p.3.
^  Professor Albert 0 . Hirschman identifies three principle theses invoked by groups which oppose
or criticise new policy proposals or newly enacted, policies, these are, he submits:
(1) The 'Perversity Thesis’, ... which argues that “any purposive action to improve some feature 
o f the political, social, or economic order only serves to exacerbate the condition one wishes 
to remedy",
(2) The ’Futility Thesis’, which holds that “attempts at social tranrformation will simply fail to 
make a dent".
(3) The ’Jeopardy Thesis’, which argues that “the cost o f the proposed change or reform is to 
high as it endangers some previous, precious accomplishment", see The Rhetoric o f Reaction, 
Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy, Albert O. Hirschman., Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 7. It 
may be argued that Professor Letwin’s fourfold attack on egalitarian principles derives in 
some measure from Professor Hirschman’s categories. Certainly, some o f the arguments o f 
his contributors are permeated by Hirschman’s three theses.
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4. Identify the destructive consequences which have already resulted, or may result
from, or may be expected, from policies aimed at equalisation.
Professor Letwin’s declared understanding of the egalitarian position is, it may be argued, 
simplistic. He insists that “the most persuasive foundation” for the ideal of equality is the 
premise that “all men are essentially identical”.^
It may be legitimate to create an abstract version of the case one wishes to attack. 
But such an attack has a disadvantage since it will almost always fail to address the 
arguments of any particular opponent. If Tawney is regarded as the token egalitarian, this 
is very much the case. Tawney specifically rejects this “persuasive foundation; equal, he 
holds is not tantamount to identical”. Tawney acknowledges the assertion that men and 
(women) are, on the whole, very similar in their natural endowments of character and 
intelligence but argues that such an assertion of equality is untenable. Yet while he 
concedes that individuals may differ profoundly in capacity and character, he insists that 
as human beings they are equally entitled to respect and consideration. Letwin rejects “a 
general presumption in favour of equality”; “the ideal of equality is only rationally 
defensible”, he argues, “when people are held to be equal, beforehand, in some 
predominant respect”. For Tawney an evaluation of human beings as being equally 
“Children of God” supplies this “predominant respect”. Furthermore, he argues 
pragmatically, the well being of a society is likely to be increased if it plans its 
organisation (so that) all its members may be equally enabled to make the best of such 
powers as they possess. Yet while Letwin is not exclusively concerned with the material 
consequences of egalitarianism, he pays little attention to either the moral issues which are 
central to such a philosophy or the ethical foundations which sustain them. Similarly, 
while he dismisses John Rawls’s THEORY OF JUSTICE as economically incoherent and 
inconsistent, he neither acknowledges nor gives consideration to the moral dimension of
The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality, p. 8/9.
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Rawls’s egalitarian argument. Certainly, he ignores Rawls’ recognition of the value 
of self respect as a primary social good within the egalitarian philosophy. Nor does he 
consider Rawls’ postulation of ... “the moral personality as the basis of equality”. ^B2 
Furthermore, Rawls, like Tawney does not, as Letwin insists, advance equality as the 
objective to which all other political considerations must yield. Indeed, Tawney’s 
identification of “the supreme political good” is compounded by the uncompromising 
assertion that “liberty is rightly preferred to equality when the two are in conflict”. For 
Tawney, the demand for equality is predicated upon an equal tight to liberty which, 
equally extended, and democratically endorsed, allows each individual the equal right 
(within the law) to pursue those individual ends which do not impinge on the rights of 
others. Furthermore, Letwin’s assurance for which he gives no substantial evidence, that 
the egalitarian creed demands that all persons should be equal is patently reductive. An 
unqualified claim that all persons should be equal is incoherent; no serious contemporary 
advocate of equality would advance such a proposition.
Tawney’s position is clear, he recognises that different individuals have different 
strengths and weaknesses, physical and intellectual, and that just as each individual may 
have particular skills so may each individual be deficient in particular talents. Such a 
recognition cannot accommodate the over simplistic formula, all persons should be equal. 
Indeed, if as Letwin declares his book “calls into question the philosophical arguments in 
favour of egalitarianism”, he must, in all fairness, present the arguments in terms which 
egalitarians recognise as their substantive philosophic position. Tawney would reject 
Letwin’s simplified, all encompassing definition. In the ideal of co-operation, of mutual 
tolerance and mutual confidence, Tawney’s definition of equality requires not an identical
There are 160 page-references to moral aspects in the index o f Rawls' Theory Of Justice. These 
include ... Moral principles. Moral psychology. Moral reasons. Moral sentiments. Moral worth o f  
persons. Morality o f authority. Moral personality, etc.
NB2 jf  Rawls argues, the moral personality which is entitled to equal justice. Moral persons, he 
asserts, are distinguished by two features: (1) They have a conception o f their good as expressed 
by a rational plan o f life ( or they have a conception o f their good as expressed by a rational plan 
o f life (or they have the capacity for such a conception). (2) They are capable o f the desire to 
apply the principles o f justice. See, A Theory O f Justice, John Rawls, p504l5.
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level of pecuniaiy incomes, but equality of environment, of access to education, the means 
of civilisation, of security and independence, and of the social consideration which 
equality in these matters usually carries with it. Certainly, this definition does not coincide 
with Letwin’s understanding of the egalitarian position. Similarly, Tawney (and all 
“judicious egalitarians”) would reject Letwin’s sweeping and unsubstantiated allegation 
that “judicious egalitarians” ... “have confined their ideal “to equality of income, wealth, 
esteem, political power, legal rights and education”.^  Rawl’s specifically proposes a 
‘Theory of Justice’ which allows for differences of wealth, income, power and other 
resources providing such differences work to the absolute benefit of the worst-off 
members of society. These allowable differences, Rawls insists, must be compounded ly 
such social organisation as will guarantee that the largest political liberty is equally 
extended to every individual. As for Tawney, his egalitarianism does not demand either 
equality of wealth or equality of income, indeed he recognises that expertise, application 
and responsibility, must be duly rewarded. He may insist th a t... “if a man has important 
work and enough leisure and income to enable him to do it properly, he is in possession of 
as much happiness as is good for any of the children of Adam”," yet this austere scale of 
reward for services rendered does not evolve merely from a puritan sense of ascetic 
frugality. It springs, rather, fi*om the rejection of the notion of society as a congeries of 
competing interests rather than an enterprise of co-operative effort Tawney 
acknowledges tha t... “special talent is worth any price”; indeed, he agreed (in 1921) that 
... “ten thousand pounds a year to the head of a business with a turnover of millions is 
economically a bagatelle”. Tawney’s egalitarianism does not then derive either from a 
Utopian and unattainable demand for complete equality or even a belief in equality as the 
supreme political value. His philosophy is a manifestation of his Christian faith; it is 
nurtured in the belief that in an equitable society ... “all social institutions, economic
* T'he Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality, p. 3.
"  The Acquisitive Society, p220.
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activity, industrial organisations cease to be either indifferent or merely a means to the 
satisfaction of human appetites’’.^
Letwin’s observation th a t... “various individuals make contributions of different 
kinds and consequently are entitled to different rewards” would encounter no opposition 
from Tawney. In both THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY and EQUALITY, he 
acknowledges that special skills, diligence and inventiveness should be appropriately 
compensated. If his Christian morality balks at the idea that a man should expect to be 
paid ... “what he is worth”, the same morality insists that what each man has a right to 
demand, and his fellows are obliged to ensure that he receives,... “enough to enable him 
to perform his work”." That such work be executed for the benefit of society, is an 
integral ingredient of Tawney’s moral understanding. That remuneration be based on 
service to the community is a central tenet of his ethical philosophy. It is social purpose 
and not self-interest, he insists, which gives industry and human enterprise its meaning and 
... “makes it worthwhile to carry on at all”.^
Some egalitarians. Professor Letwin charges, rest their case on the view that 
society is a common enterprise. This argument, he insists is fallacious; society is 
misrepresented when pictured as an enterprise. An enterprise, he argues, ... “entails 
entrepreneurs who launch a project in order to accomplish a goal”. Society was never 
launched; it is not a project, and, he asserts ... “human beings have never existed outside 
of it”.^ v Society is the inevitable condition of man, Letwin argues, and as an entity is 
incapable of acting; strictly speaking ... “society contributes nothing” ... “the CMily 
contributors are human beings” ... “each of whom makes contributions of different kinds”. 
Society is not, therefore, he insists, as egalitarians claim, a common enterprise to which 
“all people contribute and in whose benefits they are all entitled to share
* The Acquisitive Society. p235.
“  Ibid.p.221.
Ibid, p.49
The Case Against Equality’, Letwin, see Against Equality, p i6.
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equally”.^  ^  Letwin, then, perceives society as an amalgam of self-interested individuals 
some of whom merit special rewards, since, in pursuit of their own ends, they contribute 
their particular talents and “cater to the various desires, tastes, motives and purposes of 
different beneficiaries”.” Such contributions, Letwin asserts, “may be the same in kind, 
but they differ in degree”; “they benefit”, he argues, “not society but each other”. It is an 
image of society as an economic mechanism in which “individuals alone are ends and that 
Society is nothing but a means to those ends”.^  It is an image grounded in an 
individualist and libertarian philosophy which rejects “the organic nature of society” with 
its emphasis on “a common consciousness, a common will and common obligations”.^  ^
Furthermore, Professor Letwin’s argument that egalitarian principles derive fiom a false 
assumption concerning the structure and initial formation of society does not invalidate 
Tawney’s allegation that hierarchies of wealth, status and power constitute an impediment 
to social cohesion, and react to the disadvantage of those without economic aptitude on 
marketable talents.
Tawney would have no alternative but to plead guilty to Professor Letwin’s 
charge concerning a perception of society as a common enterprise. He would insist that 
no individual, no matter how talented, enterprising or industrious ... “even if he worked 
overtime all his life” can provide for himself those vital amenities without which man 
cannot survive. It is necessary, he argues, that society ... “make collective provision for 
immunisation from cholera, typhus and ignorance”. Security from disease, Tawney
* The Case Against Equality’, Letwin, see Against Equality, p. 6.
^  Tawney dismisses this notion o f dividing "the national income into fractions and distributing it
equally, as quite remote from reality" (see Equality, pl22). Even the extremist anarchist Michael 
Bukanin defined equality "as a primordial condition o f liberty. From each according to his 
faculties, to each according to his needs". Nevertheless, George Bernard Shaw in a lecture to the 
Fabian Society on Dec. 10, 1910 at the Memorial Hall in Farringdon Street argued that "the 
simple truth about socialism was that it meant equality o f income" ... "a state o f society in which 
the entire income o f the country is divided between all the people in exactly equal shares, without 
regard to their industry, their character, or any other consideration that they are living human 
beings ... that is Socialism and nothing else is Socialism", see Bernard Shaw, Vol. 2, The Pursuit 
o f Power, p265. Michael Holroyd, Chatto & Windus, 1989.
”  The Case Against Equality’, Letwin, see Against Equality, p i6.
The Crisis O f Liberalism, JA . Hobson, P.S. King & Co. Ltd, 1909, p74.
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remarks, demands the observance of certain mles and the performance of certain 
productive tasks designed to create a particular condition which affects equally all parts of 
the community. Similarly, he insists, it is necessary that collective action be taken ... “to 
secure the positive advantages of educational opportunity and economic security”.i ... 
“Man, that timid, staring creature”, Tawney observes, is so compounded ... “as to require 
not only money, but light, air and water, not to mention, he adds ... “such uneconomic 
goods as tranquillity, beauty and affection”.ü For Tawney, these ... “uneconomic goods” 
which make the difference between human happiness and human misery are equally 
necessary and have been equally provided by God for all his children. As for Tawney the 
social theorist, he understands th a t... “no individual can create by his isolated actions a 
healthy environment or provide the source of social income which is received in the form 
not of money but of increased well-being”. Certainly, Tawney insists, that within a 
civilised society it is the duty of the state to ensure the universal provision of public 
goods. Yet Tawney is a social democrat: he rejects as totalitarian the concept of the all- 
powerful state, acting without democratic consent in what it perceives as the interest of 
particular classes or groups to secure, on their behalf, what it considers to be socially 
desirable. He is concerned rather to ensure a democratic society in which not only will 
the institutions of the state provide the opportunity for men and women to become the 
best of which they are capable, but also sustain such social, political and economic 
arrangements as will provide these “public goods” which democratically agreed, serve the 
best interest of the community. To this end, he does not demand the total nationalisation 
of “the means of production”, but argues instead that “it is not private ownership which is 
corrupting the principles of industry” but private ownership divorced fiom work”.“  He 
does not regard nationalisation as the panacea for mismanagement or the automatic 
provider of efficiency, equity or co-operative industrial relationships just as he rejects the 
claims of theorists who insist that productivity and wealth creation can only derive fiom
* Equality p.l26.
Ibid.p.l26.
The Acquisitive Society, p  82.
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the application of libertarian principles. For Tawney, industry is “nothing more 
mysterious than a body of men and women associated in various degrees of competition 
to win their livelihood by providing the community with some service that it requires”.^  If 
he did not, in 1931, like David Miller and other contemporary egalitarians in 1993, call for 
“a theory of socialism”, which, in the name of “individual liberty, distributive justice, 
economic efficiency and consumer sovereignty”, ... “includes a full-blooded commitment 
to a market economy”,com pounded “by a commitment to the social distribution of 
benefits with reference to certain ideal standards of distribution - namely criteria of desert 
and need”^  he nevertheless asserts that the first duty of industry, irrespective of 
ownership, is that “it be subordinated to the community in such a way as to render the 
best service possible”.^ ^
Tawney’s perception of society as a common enterprise sharing common values 
united in common purpose, is open to attack. Yet even between the two world wars 
when it might plausibly have been argued that British society was unified by a 
predominant if varied and sometimes uninspiring Christianity, Tawney did not insist that a 
common culture be predicated on Christian doctrine or motivated specifically by Christian 
principles. In the last decades of the twentieth century when Britain has become a nation 
of many cultures, many faiths (or non) a social vision which lays stress on a common 
culture is admittedly even more vulnerable to attack. Yet Tawney’s socialism 
incorporates a demand for a moral community which affirms universal humanist principles 
in which each individual equally recognises, and equally discharges, his or her moral 
obligation to mutually agreed ends. It is a theory of socialism, which recognises that 
“Socialism cannot be understood singly in terms of policy outcome, -the distribution of 
consumption goods and so forth”. It is, as David Miller stresses, fundamentally 
concerned with the quality of human relationships in so far as these are affected by social
The Acquisitive Society, p.6.
Market, State and Community, David Miller, Clarendon Press, Ojford 1989, see Preface. 
"  Social Justice, David Miller, Clarendon Press, 1979 edition, p.336.
The Acquisitive Society, p. 7.
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institutions”.^  Tawney, then, has a view of society in which common purpose and 
common moral values endorse a perception of society not only as “a common enterprise” 
but as an enterprise in common, to which all contribute and in which all may share. 
Contemporary society, it may be argued, multi-ethnic, multi-religious, is confronted with 
the problem of communally identifying substantive common purpose or mutuality of 
interest Yet, ultimately, Tawney’s vision of society evolves from the moral 
understanding that each individual and each community has, in a world of finite resources, 
an equal moral worth and an equal moral entitlement, since all men and all women are 
equally children of God. It must be conceded that the broadness of such an appeal is even 
less evident now than when it was advanced.
Liberty And Equality
Central to the libertarian argument is the claim that egalitarianism threatens 
individual liberty. While, for Tawney, measures of redistribution will extend to the 
economically powerless the means by which they may shape the economic circumstances 
of their lives, the libertarians argue that such measures not only constrain individual 
enterprise, they create an all-powerful state, which, by its very nature, threatens the liberty 
of the individual. The centralization of power, they assert, will in itself menace the 
democratic process. An all-powerful state, redistributing income in the name of equality, 
they insist, will diminish the individual’s control of his or her life. Freedom, libertarians 
propose, consists in the right of the individual to pursue, without coercion or interference, 
their freely chosen ends. Freedom, they argue, secured by equal rights, is actualised in the 
recognition that each individual is equally free to pursue, within mutually respected 
parameters, those ends which they perceive as in their best interest. Individual liberty, 
they argue is assured where the power of the state is modified in accordance with 
libertarian principles. Such principles, they insist, provide the conditions in which each
Market, State and Community, David Miller, p228.
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individual has the equal opportunity to exercise that spirit of enterprise by which 
individual wealth creation reacts to the benefit of the entire society. In the notion of 
private property as an expression of individual liberty they argue, a free-market system 
wiU guarantee freedom of contract, exchange and production which will in turn create the 
conditions whereby the unfettered agent, free from restraint, may pursue his or her 
legitimate objectives. Such pursuit, in the absence of coercion, will, libertarians insist, 
facilitate progress, promote efficiency, foster initiative, extend opportunity and ratify 
personal freedom.
Letwin’s fears of enforced equalisation, the coercive effects of income 
redistribution, the restrictions on individual property rights are shared by many of his 
contributors. Yet, while these contributors narrow their criticism to specific points. 
Professor Letwin attacks an abstract notion of egalitarianism which no seriously regarded 
egalitarian holds. The “judicious egalitarian”. Professor Letwin insists, (without defining 
prudence or providing substantive evidence for the claim) demands the equalisation of 
wealth and income, esteem, political power, legal rights and education. For Tawney, 
certainly, equality is not an abstraction: his demands have clearly defined objectives. He 
seeks to extend individual liberty by the equalisation of economic power; he demands 
such equalisation as will allow for the effective exercise of fundamental political and civil 
rights. His case is grounded in a rejection of “the structure and spirit of English society”, 
which, he asserts, “has inherited and presented a tradition of differentiation, not merely ly 
economic function but by status and wealth”.^  Tawney’s demands, then, are concrete. He 
does not press, as Letwin insists for the equalisation of wealth and income. His demands 
are determined pragmatically; he seeks to end “the hierarchy of class whose graduations 
embrace those aspects of life where discrimination is inappropriate”.^ Above all, he 
demands such measures as will “make each individual capable of freedom and more 
capable of fulfilling their personal differences”. He demands, too, through the
* Equality, p.72.
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equalisation of opportunity and education an equality which will allow for “the 
enlargement of personal liberties through the discovery by each individual of his own and 
his neighbour’s endowment”.^
Letwin, like many of his contributors identifies a tension between the ideals of 
liberty and equality. For egalitarians, he submits, equality is the paramount end of good 
government. While he warns against the authoritarianism of radical egalitarians, he also 
insists that even liberal and democratic egalitarians frequently limited the force of this 
proposition by denying that equality is at all likely to conflict with the other principal ends 
of good government. Clearly, the tension between equality and freedom must be 
acknowledged. Undeniably, there is justice in the libertarian claim that the right to 
pursue, without coercion, and within the law, a chosen individual end is a necessary 
condition of freedom. Yet there is a contradiction within the libertarian argument 
Libertarians proclaim the equal value of each individual; they insist that freedom derives 
from a moral principle which extends to each individual the equal right to pursue, without 
coercion or interference, his or her legitimate ends. Yet, they are prepared to defend, in 
the name of fi*eedom, large disparities of wealth and income. But, it is precisely such 
disparities together with the inequalities of power which they engender, which not only 
repudiates the notion of equal liberty, but negates also the notion of the equal value of 
individuals.
Similarly, the libertarian notions of fieedom and equality narrowly defined in terms 
of the mutually extended right to pursue individual ends without coercion or interference 
is untenable. Clearly, the equal value of individuals as pursuers of their chosen interest 
(within the law) is, by itself acceptable. Yet so limited a definition is necessarily 
inadequate; it ignores those social factors, both physical and cultural, which, for the 
powerless, obstruct freedom of choice and inhibit fieedom of action. Indeed, it must be
Introduction to Equality, 1964 Edition, Richard M. Titmuss, George Allen & Unwin, p.15.
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argued that a system of competing interests, compounded by the pressures exerted by 
economic power and the dictates of an unregulated market renders incoherent the notion 
of autonomous action as expressed in the equal right of individuals to pursue freely 
chosen ends.
Yet, for Tawney, authentic equality and effective liberty can be secured only 
through an equalisation of economic power. The liberty which the anti-egalitarians 
commonly hold to be endangered as a result of egalitarian measures ... “to diminish or 
neutralise inequalities”, is, he asserts,... “limited and specific”.^  It consists, he insists,... 
“in the right of individuals and groups to make and execute decisions on matters relating 
to their economic interests”" without regard, he argues, for those directly affected by 
them. Tawney, does not defend liberty in the abstract, he defends those liberties which 
are enjoyed by particular individuals and groups in the face of an inequitable distribution 
of economic power. Tawney’s demands for the equalisation of economic power is 
predicated not on an abstract notion of liberty but rather on a pragmatic understanding. 
For Tawney, (in the absence of fellowship which ensures social harmony), such an 
equalisation will serve as an insurance against a definition of liberty which allows, in the 
name of freedom, the economically powerful to determine the economic lives of their 
fellows. ... “Freedom for the strong”, he warns, “is oppression for the weak”.^  Again, it 
may be argued that Tawney’s pragmatic judgement recognises that when men are equal, 
fellowship is possible. Equality, for Tawney, then, is not only a defence mechanism 
against the powerful; it promotes social harmony and encourages co-operation.
Tawney concedes that inequality of power is not necessarily inimical to liberty. In 
some circumstances, he argues, it is the necessary condition for any effective action. Yet, 
he submits,... “inequality of power may be a menace, for power which is sufficient to use.
* Equality, p228.
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is sufficient to abuse”. It is necessary, he insists against the accusations of those who 
warn of the coercion and suppression of the egalitarian state, that... “political power must 
rest ultimately on (democratic) consent, and that its exercise must be limited by rules of 
(democratic) law”.^
As for economic liberty, Tawney insists, the mass of mankind pass their working 
lives under the direction of ... “a hierarchy of power”. This ... “business oligarchy”, he 
asserts, “compels by force majeur their reluctant obedience. Men and women in such a 
condition, he argues, cannot be said to be in possession of freedom, for freedom is always 
relative to power”. ^ Political arrangements may be such as to check the excess of 
political power; yet, he argues, they may not be strong enough to resist that economic 
oppression which constrains to civil liberty. A democratic society, Tawney insists, must 
be capable of controlling the conduct of those powerful in its economic affairs, which he 
submits is ... “the economic analogy of political freedom”.^  Liberty, he asserts,... “when 
it is construed realistically ... implying not merely a minimum of civil or political rights”, 
ensures that ... “the economically weak will not be at the mercy of the economically 
strong”. When, he insists, the control of economic life will be amenable in the last resort 
to the wiU of all, a large measure of equality so far from being inimical to Liberty, is 
essential to it”. Liberty, in conditions which ... “impose co-operative rather than merely 
individual effort” ... “is in fact equality in action”.*^  For Tawney then, equality not only 
ratifies his understanding of liberty ‘realistically construed*, it extends fellowship. All men 
in such circumstances, he claims, are not only equally protected against the abuse of 
power, they are also equally entitled, he submits,... “to insist that power shall be used, not 
for personal, but for the general advantage”.^
Equality, p.165. 
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A further criticism of equality may be defined in the distinction between negative 
and positive liberty. The egalitarians argue, Letwin insists, that to ... “deprive a few 
unwilling rich benefactors” of the liberty to spend their income as they choose because of 
redistributive taxation, is offset by the enhancement of liberty of the many beneficiaries. 
This “explaining away” Letwin argues, is to “confuse liberty to do something with the 
ability or power to do it”.*
For Letwin, then, this deprivation of the unrestricted right to distribute, or not 
distribute wealth inçlies an infringement of liberty. It constitutes, in essence, a definition 
of freedom as singly the right of an individual to define, and act without restraint, in 
accordance with what he or she perceives as his or her self-interest. It is a definition of 
negative liberty which some have argued is predicated “on the crude concept, that 
freedom is the absence of external obstacles, physical or legal”." It is a definition devoid 
even of the libertarian proviso that while fiieedom inçlies the minimal constraint on 
individual freedom of action, it also demands for each individual an equal freedom which 
allows for the exercise of individual liberty in so far as such exercise does not infringe on 
the equal liberty of others.
* Against Equality, pA.
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Tawney however, since he asserts that in “England, liberty and equality have 
usually been considered antithetic”,^  he is anxious to define the meaning of equality. For 
Tawney, equality “inçlies the deliberate acceptance of social restraints upon individual 
expansion”." For the sake of the public good it demands public action to prevent 
“sensational extremes of wealth and powef”. ^  It means, too, that equal consideration be 
extended to each individual in respect of the distribution of those “goods” which allow for 
a life of self-respect and dignity. It serves also to endorse such social arrangements as will 
provide to each individual the equal opportunity to develop to the fullest extent their 
intellectual, spiritual, and physical capacities. As for liberty, Tawney insists, if it means 
“that every individual shall be free, according to his opportunities, to indulge without 
limiting his appetite (for either wealth or power) it is clearly incompatible, not only with 
economic and social, but also with civil and political equality.” ^  If this meaning of 
liberty is accepted, Tawney suggests, “it is possible that equality is not to be contrasted 
with liberty, but only with this particular interpretation of it”.^  ^ It is this interpretation 
which allows for the pursuit of individual ends without consideration of the social, 
economic or political consequences, which Tawney rejects. To Letwin’s complaint that 
egalitarians “confuse the liberty to do something with the ability or power to do so”, he 
would argue that liberty can only exist in so far as it is limited by rules which ensure that 
the pursuit of individual or even factional ambition does not create a society “in which 
freedom for some is not slavery for others”. For Tawney, there is no confusion; they are 
both liberties although a formal liberty which grants every citizen the legal right to do 
something without the practical power and ability to do so, is not in effect an equal liberty 
since lack of economic power may constrain its effective exercise by those without 
economic resources. Certainly, legislation which proclaims formal liberty and the political
* Equality, p.I64.
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rights of each individual is desirable. Yet, Tawney argues, while liberty is interpreted as 
exclusively providing to all an equal security against oppression by agents of the state or 
as a share in its government”, it does not provide protection “against those with economic 
power who exercise a preponderant influence on the economic life of the rest of society”.^  
Equality, for Tawney does not restrain liberty; he argues that the fundamental idea of 
liberty is power: the power to control one’s life, which, he insists, is a necessary condition 
for a life of self-respect and human dignity. Equality, then, entails not only a 
redistribution of wealth and income, it requires also the redistribution of power, both 
economic and political. Without such redistribution, both liberty and equality may be 
enshrined in law but remain ineffectual in practice. The liberty which allows for the fiee 
exercise of legitimate rights which do not impinge on the rights of others is not 
constrained by equality; it is strengthened and extended by i t
To Professor Letwin’s allegation that egalitarians confuse the meaning of liberty, 
Tawney argues that libertarians are equally confused as to its meaning. Their ‘confusion’, 
he suggests, may have alarming social consequences.
... “It is, often assumed by the privileged classes, that when the state refrains from 
intervening, the condition which remains as a result of its inaction is liberty. In reality, 
what frequently remains is not liberty but tyranny.” When steps to diminish equality are 
denounced as infringements of freedom, the first question to be answered, he warns, is 
“Freedom for whom?”."
Yet, for Tawney, this warning is inextricably intertwined with another question; 
freedom to do what? There is, he insists, “no such thing as freedom in the abstract, 
divorced from the realities of a particular time and place”. ^  Freedom, he argues.
* Equality, p.168.
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involves the power to choose between alternatives which are real, attainable, not merely 
nominal. For Tawney, freedom demands that the political, economic and social 
institutions of society are so organised as to make this power effective and these chosen 
alternatives attainable. It must, therefore, be a freedom which, each individual, (within 
the structures of democratically agreed restraints) can equally and effectively exercise, to 
which each have an equal right. Claims to freedom then, must be tempered by an 
understanding of a definition of frjeedom which, Tawney insists, is both “practical and 
realistic” and which he sets out clearly ... “It is the ability to do, or r e f r ^  from doing 
things, at a definite moment, in definite circumstances, or it means nothing at all”.‘ 
Freedom, then, in its most positive sense is that of a man being “his own master”, which, 
Alan Ryan insists, quoting Isaiah Berlin, “is not a concept of liberty, but the concept o f 
liberty itse lf, ^
Professor Letwin insists that egalitarians, in the face of an accusation that equality 
and liberty necessarily clash in the context of an enforced distribution of resources, either 
resort to evasive answers, or bluntly declare equality to be the higher value. Tawney, 
however, is neither evasive nor dogmatic. He would endorse John Charvet’s perception 
that “the principles of freedom and equality are as much opposed to each other as they 
require each other”.^  Yet, ultimately Tawney’s definition of liberty presents a challenge. 
Freedom he insists may be gauged by “whether the range of alternatives open to ordinary 
men,NB and the capacity of the latter to follow their own preferences, in choosing 
between them, have or have not, been increased by measures correcting inequalities or 
neutralising their effects.”*^  Tawney concedes that an answer to all the issues cannot be
{ Equality, p.228.
"  'Liberty And Socialism', Alan Ryan, see Fabian Essays In Socialist Thought, edited by Ben
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given in general terms. Yet, he argues, on any particular issue, if, employing this 
particular definition, “an affirmative reply can be given, liberty and equality can live as 
friends, if a negative one, they are condemned to be foes.”  ^ Tawney’s choice is 
unambiguous, “Liberty is the principle good”; it must not be sacrificed to equality, or 
stability, diversity, economic efficiency or any other ideal. Yet, if Tawney’s commitment 
to liberty is uncompromising, it is also firmly intertwined with his demand for equality. 
Equality, for Tawney, requires more than an equitable distribution of material “goods”: it 
demands, also, an equalisation of economic and political power. Since, with equal power, 
a realistic and practical choice becomes real and attainable, not merely nominal. 
Furthermore, Tawney’s definition of liberty rejects the narrow interpretation that 
atomistic man be allowed to pursue his own interests fiiee fix)m coercion or constraints. 
Liberty, he holds must be supported by such social, political and economic arrangements 
as will ensure a distribution of power which will allow each individual to participate 
equally in its effective exercise.
Yet Tawney’s call for effective rights to ficedom extends beyond the warnings 
that within industrial society “a hierarchy of authority” ... “consciously or unconsciously 
exercises a decisive influence on countless human lives.” “ It extends, too, beyond the 
perception that such a hierarchy, may, in its own interest, act arbitrarily and autocratically. 
Tawney’s demands for liberty are inspired not only by an understanding of the value of 
freedom but also by a passionate attachment to what he perceives to be its ultimate 
purpose ... “A society is free in so far, and only in so far”, he asserts in the final 
paragraph of EQUALITY, “as, within limits set by nature, knowledge, and resources, its 
institutions and policies are such as to enable all its members to grow to their full stature, 
and do their duty as they see it”.^  This emphasis on self development, on community duty 
undertaken by responsible and committed citizens, is crucial to Tawney’s entire
* Equality, p.229.
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philosophy. Liberty, he insists, must create the conditions for a life worthy of human 
beings. It must provide each individual with an equal opportunity to participate fully and 
responsibly in the affairs of society. This emphasis on individual development, and 
individual responsibility determined by individual conscience, may be seen as a 
manifestation of the Protestant ethic which demands of man, that, before God, he accepts 
responsibility for his action. Yet, for Tawney, this same ethic, while it encourages 
individual development and individual responsibility also seeks, in the name of Christian 
fellowship, “to reconcile individual self-development with communal solidarity”.^  Liberty, 
then, is not to be construed as absence of coercion or license to unconstrained acquisition 
but as the wellspring of that spirit of mutual obligation and social co-operation which, 
Tawney insists, are essential ingredients of community. “The opportunity to lead a life 
worthy of human beings”, which, Tawney insists, is needlessly confined to a privileged 
minority, will, by the liberty furnished by an equalisation of economic, political and social 
power, be extended, so that those ‘goods* which make for a life of human dignity may be 
more equitably distributed. “An action which causes such opportunities to be more 
widely shared”, Tawney argues, “is therefore twice blessed, it not only subtracts from 
inequality, but adds to freedom**."
The anti-egalitarian concern for equality under the law is made manifestly clear by 
Fredeiich Hayek. While Professor Hayek allows that “every law restricts individual 
freedom to someone by altering the means people may use in the pursuit of their aims**,  ^
he proposes nevertheless, that “in a free society** under the Rule of Law, “everybody, 
including the government, is bound by recognised rules**. Yet, Professor Hayek argues, 
egalitarian measures are motivated to achieve particular ends and the pursuit of such an 
end is capable of interfering with the recognised and established right of the individual. In
* This phrase is taken from David Miller's Market, State and Community. Miller employs it,
(p.233.) with reference to "William Morris and other communitarians o f certain religious views". 
It seems an appropriate expression ofTawney's view.
(( Equality Epilogue, (1938 - 1950), see the 1964 Edition.
The Road to Serfdom, FA . Hayek, see: Chap. IV. Routledge, Kegan, Paid, 1944.
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such circumstances, Hayek asserts, formal equality before the law is incompatible “with 
any activity of the government deliberately aiming at material and substantive equality of 
different people and that any policy aiming at a substantive ideal of distributive justice 
may lead tot he destruction of the ‘Rule of Law’“.^  In sum, for Professor Hayek, any 
measure which in the name of equality seeks to achieve a particular social end, will 
“necessarily and paradoxically” require treating individuals unequally.
The problems which arise in liberal democratic societies when, in an effort to 
implement the principles of liberty and equality, “these values clash” are pointed out ly 
Geoffrey Marshall. The demands of equality and one sort of liberty, (the liberty to supply 
and associate), he acknowledges, reinforce each other. Yet, he postulates, “the demands 
of equality are potentially at odds with another sort of liberty (the liberty to withhold, 
withdraw or disassociate).^ He proposes as example circumstances involving segregation 
of races or classes which, he asserts, can be argued both in terms of the liberty of one 
particular race or class to associate, or not to associate, with another race or class. There 
is, it is supposed, Marshall suggests, “a sphere of private relationships which ought not to 
be subject to official enforcement provisions”.^  Yet, he insists, the distinction between 
public or state discrimination, and private or individual discrimination, has been a difficult 
and disputed one. He warns of the difficulties which evolve from a departure from 
identity of treatment arising out of a concern for equality. Departures of treatment, he 
argues, are sometimes undertaken out of respect for the principle of equality; such 
departures seek to equalise individuals who are regarded as at a disadvantage in 
comparison with others. There are other departures, he insists, which reflect a deliberate 
and justifiable rejection of the claims of equality to satisfy the claim of “some other value 
such as hberty or security”.^  ^ Marshall recognises, too, that in the legal and moral 
arguments concerning the concept and the application of liberty there are similar
The Road to Serfdom, F A . Hayek, see: Chap. IV. Routledge, Kegan, Paul, 1944. 
'Liberty under The Law', Geoffrey Marshall, 1971, see Against Equality, p207  / 225. 
“  Ibid,p.218.
Ibid, p.224.
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temptations. He argues that because there is a general recognition that liberty does not 
mean unfettered licence, there has evolved a tendency to regard all restraints on freedom 
of action, as “part of the concept of liberty properly so called”. In these discriminations 
and restraints on equality and liberty, Marshall perceives a danger. For, he argues if all, or 
too many justifiable restraints and justifiable discriminations are fed into the ideas of 
equality and liberty, then the specific roles of equality, liberty, security and justice as 
distinct and “potentially clashing segments of morality, are obscured”.
Marshall, it must be agreed, has quite properly identified a tendency within liberal 
democratic societies to feed restraints and discriminations into the ideas of equality and 
freedom. If, as he suggests, these restraints and discriminations create the conditions for 
a “clash” between these values (a notion which John Charvet cogently addresses),^ ^  
then it is essential that these values be defined. Marshall defines equality concisely; it is, 
he proposes, “a matter of eliminating differences of treatment between persons which are 
based on irrelevant differences”. As for fireedom, while Marshall does not define it, he 
allows in respect of the claims of equality that restraints on actions may sometimes be 
justified in terms of protecting the liberty of others.
Tawney would concede Marshall’s succinct definition of equality, for although his 
own definition encompasses a more eclectic vision, he argues, as does Marshall, that 
every departure from equality demands a relevant and authentic justification. Yet the 
values of freedom and equality are expressed within a social structure; they are not
A Critique o f Freedom and Equality, John Charvet, Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Tawney would certainly not dispute Marshall's perception that restraints on individual action are 
sometimes justified in respect o f the liberty o f others. Marshall's fear, however, that too many 
justifiable restraints and justifiable discriminations may be fed  into the ideas o f equality and 
liberty to the detriment o f other values must be seen as a classic-libertarian postulation. Under 
the 'rule Of Law' in "a free country". Professor Hayek proposes, "every law restricts individual 
freedom to some extent by altering the means which people may use in pursuit o f their aims". Yet, 
Professor Hayek insists in the name o f individualism and libertarian principles,... "it is essential 
that the discretion left to the executive organ wielding coercive power should be reduced as much 
as possible". See The Road To Serfdom, FA. Hayek, 1944. Routledge, Kegan Paul, see p.54, 
1976 edition.
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abstractions. Many of the freedoms held by anti-egalitarian libertarians to be imperilled by 
the restraints of equality, Tawney argues, “commonly consist, within industrial capitalist 
societies, of the rights of individuals and groups to make and execute decisions relating to 
their economic interests.”  ^They are rights, he insists, concerned with the acquisition and 
the free disposal of property anterior to, and independent of, any service which may be 
rendered to society. These fiercely defended rights, he argues, extended without 
responsibility or obligation, “have no standards for discriminating between those types of 
private property which are legitimate and those which are not”." They are rights grounded 
in a Lockean perception of property which, endorsed by libertarian theorists, acclaims the 
possession, acquisition and accumulation of property as the very root of freedom. For 
Tawney this is a fioedom which is not exercisable by the majority of the population. This 
majority driven by the necessity of earning a living wage receives no dividends fiom 
investment or fix>m property yields. They live within a hierarchy of power fix)m which 
they are excluded; without capital, without ownership and accumulated assets, they are 
economically powerless. Tyranny already exists, Tawney proposes, in a society in which 
the majority are precluded by lack of economic power from the control and the direction 
of their own lives. Citing Professor Pollard, he insists, “oppression is no less oppressive 
when it is derived from superior wealth, than when it relies on a preponderance of 
physical force”.^ "
Tawney, however, is not content simply to constrain the economic power of the 
economically powerful, nor is he willing to transfer such power either to an omnipotent 
state, or to those who “appear to conceive the best life for men is one in which they are 
regimented by experts”. A social philosophy inspired by the ideals of individual self­
development and a responsible and co-operating citizenry, cannot transfer the control 
over economic life to ‘police collectivists’, or well-intentioned ‘paternalists’. Such
\ Equality, p228.
“  The Acquisitive Society, pJ5 .
Equality, p. 228.
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transfers of economic power serve merely to replace the hegemony of Capital with 
another equally oppressive power. For Tawney, the answer lies in a redistribution and 
equalisation of that economic power which in capitalist societies “involves a concentration 
of ownership and the rights and authority which ownership confers”.^  For Tawney, the 
conditions of economic freedom demand a redistribution of economic power which will 
end the “autocracy of the workshop” and the “dictatorship of the property owner”.^ 
They demand, too, the “intelligent co-operation of contentious human beings”, moved to 
co-operation “by mutual confidence alone”. It demands too, that in democratic 
consultation economic power be employed responsibly, “for ends that are not personal, 
but public”.*^
Certainly, egalitarians must ensure that demands for equality do not compromise 
other values, other ‘goods’. They are obliged to defend those institutions and practices 
which allow them and their fellow citizens to function as self-determining human beings. 
They must evaluate between those constraints on individual actions which are either 
justified or unjustified in the name of individual freedom. To Professor Frankel’s 
assertion that “equality of opportunity remains a demand that we can only evaluate if we 
ask” ... “Equality for what?”, must be added the equally relevant questions, freedom for 
whom? Freedom for what? Tawney’s evaluation of freedom above all political ‘goods’ is 
uncompromising. Yet it is a freedom which he is prepared to define as the “power of 
choice between alternatives, a choice which is real not merely nominal” ... “between 
alternatives which exist in fact, not merely on paper’’.^  ^This definition is fundamental to 
an evaluation of what constitutes, in respect of the claims of equality, a justifiable restraint 
or discrimination. This evaluation, Tawney insists, must be accompanied by an essential 
question ... “it is whether the range of alternatives” open to ordinary men and women, and 
the capacity of the latter to follow their own preferences in choosing between them, have.
* Equality, p.161.
“ Ibid.p.l79.
Ibid,p.l88. 
Ibid,p228.
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or have not been increased by measures conecting inequalities or neutralising their 
effects”.  ^ Yet, beyond the liberties, which Tawney argues, are fundamental within a free 
society, (liberties secured by law to all citizens, liberties which constitute the principles on 
which the State is founded,) are other liberties, less crucial in their content, narrower in 
their range. Such liberties, he insists, must be regarded as secondary. They may be 
extended or curtailed according to circumstances; they are desirable conveniences, but 
they do not constitute liberties essential to the principles of a democratic State. These are 
freedoms primarily invested in the right to property: they are concerned, Tawney asserts 
with the earning and expenditure of incomes. They are freedoms connected with the 
acquisition and administration of income yielding property, the employment to the best 
advantage of profitable assets”." There are however, and Tawney is ready to identify 
them, fundamental and inviolable liberties, ... “freedom of worship, of religious 
organisation, freedom of speech, study, teaching, and writing, of movement, choice of 
occupation, freedom to meet and associate for political and other purposes”. ^
Clearly, economic power has a special significance in industrial societies; it derives 
from the concentration of ownership and the rights which ownership confers. It allows a 
small number of men to take decisions upon which the conduct of economic affairs, and 
therefore, the lives of their fellow men depend. While the rights to equal liberty are 
enshrined in law, it is only the economically powerful who can exercise many of them.NB 
Furthermore, such rights which are proclaimed in the interest of every citizen, in effect 
allows the powerful to exercise power to the disadvantage of the powerless, to the 
detriment of social cohesion. For Tawney, therefore, liberty is not impaired by
* Equality, p.229.
“  Ibid.p.228.
Ibid. p.229.
^  Tawney does not directly address the question o f equality before the law. He acknowledges that 
within liberal democratic societies every citizen has an equal right, formally enshrined in law, to 
engage in legal action. It may be argued, however, that lack o f economic resources which 
Tawney identifies as lack o f economic power, precludes some citizens from the exercise o f this 
formal 'right'.
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democratic actions which seek to diminish, remove or neutralise economic and social 
inequalities. Such actions, he insists, do not curtail liberty, rather they augment i t
Tawney’s concern with the differences between what the citizen is legally 
permitted and what he is effectively able to do, underlines his understanding of liberty and 
equality. Liberty, the control over one’s life, he contends, cannot be the prerogative of the 
economically powerful who have invested the privilege to certain freedoms with a moral 
status. Indeed, it may be argued that within industrial capitalism with its emphasis on 
acquisition, this moral status is accepted even by those who are the victims, rather than 
the beneficiaries of these legal, but often non-exercisable, rights. Certainly, these rights 
do not always, in practice, allow equal liberty. The distribution of political and economic 
power establishes an imbalance of those options available between those with economic 
resources and those who through economic necessity are forced to accept the options 
offered to them by the economically powerful. For Tawney, liberty is not threatened by 
restraints imposed on those groups and individuals whose economic power allows them a 
decisive and coercive influence over the lives of their fellow citizens. For Tawney, those 
who in the name of freedom oppose such restraints, are not upholding liberty, they are 
perpetuating tyranny. They are, in the name of the generally accepted abstract principle 
of nominal rights, endorsing particular and concrete privileges. Liberty, as Tawney 
perceives it, demands more than a proclamation of equal rights; it demands more than the 
absence of restraints. It demands an equalisation of power.
Tawney, as early as 1912, had recognised this requirement. The “fundamental 
idea of liberty”, he wrote in his Commonplace Book, “is power”. “Power to control the 
conditions of one’s own life.”  ^This power, he recognises is ambiguous ... it is identified 
with political power, and political power is treated in a category by itself’. Certainly, 
Tawney agrees, “political authority is a genuine form of power”, but, he argues, it is not
The Commonplace Book, entry for May 4,1912.
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the only form. Power, he insists, “may be defined as the capacity of an individual or a 
group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups” Men exercise 
power, he submits, only when they are allowed to exercise it by other men. Its “ultimate 
seat”, he asserts, “is in the soul” ^ ... “it rests on hope and fear”, ... “it foundations vary 
from age to age” ... it has had source in religion, in military strength in a myriad of forms.
It is not the case, therefore, he argues, disputing the Marxist theory of Historical 
Materialism, “that all forms of power are in the last resort economic”. Nevertheless, he 
concedes, since economic interests are the “most generally continuous in their operation”,
... “most forms of power have economic roots” and produce economic consequences. 
This economic power, Tawney insists, is a source of tyranny for through the consequent 
inequality of economic power, society is faced with “friction and the recurrent breakdown 
of the economic mechanism”.^
In certain respects, Tawney’s proposals for a Functional Society share an affinity 
with the Guild Socialism as projected by S.G. Hobson, A.J. Penty or A.R. Orage. They 
share, too, some common ground with the co-operative theories of G.D.H. Cole and 
Hilaire Belloc’s notion of ‘distribi^^i’, although Tawney would reject the strongs 
traditionalist and hierarchical elements of Belloc’s system .^ In the early 1920’s, Tawney 
declared a broad sympathy for such schemes “... though possibly an unorthodox Gild (sic) 
Socialist”, he stated, and certainly disagreeing with some of its opponents ... “I welcome 
it because it has drawn English Socialism into the mainstream of the socialist tradition
* Equality, p.l59.
“  Ibid,pJ59.
^  See Restoration Of The Guild System. A J . Penty, 1906. see also S.G. Hobson National Guilds
and other works. The Servile State, Hilaire Be^oc (1912), GD.H. Cole, Guild Socialism Restated 
. and other works, see also the writings o f^ .^O ra g e , editor o f the literary and political journal ,
NeM0 ^ ^ ^ ^ h o  also wrote for G.K. Chesterton's 'Distributor League'. See Rodney Barker,
^  PolüîcafJ^as In Modern Britain. Methuen & Co, 1978. p98-104 passim.
Curiously, Orage, an early Fabian and member o f the Independent Labour Party "became an 
ardent Theosophist, a disciple o f Gurdjiejf." Holbrook Jackson, the literary historian and critic 
(1874-1948) wrote in 'The Windmill', Vol HI, No. 11, 1948, that Orage wanted "to create a 
Nietzsche circle in which Plato and Blatavsky, Fabianism and Hinduism, Shaw, Wells and 
Edward Carpenter should be blended, with Nietzsche as the catalytic", see Madame Blavatsky's 
Baboon. Peter Washington, Seeker and Warburg, 1993, p202.
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which has as its object not merely the alleviation of poverty but an attack on the theory of 
the functionless society.” ^
How, then, in a democratic society, to protect the citizen finom the inequalities of 
power which restrain individual freedom? How to ensure the preservation of that liberty 
which allows for individual initiative and autonomous decision? How to abolish an 
economic system of reward without contribution, in which the power of property 
perpetuates a hegemony of capital, a hierarchy of class? For Tawney, a redistribution of 
economic power secured by democratic process will end this hegemony, destroy this 
hierarchy, prevent the illegitimate use of economic power, and, in the name of equality, 
extend individual liberty. Such democratic process requires democratically agreed laws 
which can be neither immaculate nor written in stone. They must respond to changes in 
power relationships, to changes in the political, social and economic structures; they must 
be subject to new interpretations, responsive to new technologies; to each of the 
constantly changing conditions of mankind. No society can resolve these problems to the 
full and permanent satisfaction of all parties. Yet in a community dedicated to the 
extension of liberty and equality, an attempt to implement such legislation, to enforce it, 
to improve it, is a democratic and moral duty. Legislation so created, must give grounds 
for the exercise of individual enterprise, must increase the options and the opportuitities 
open to every citizen just as it must protect society fiom the excessive or predatory 
exercise of power. It must be legislation which will uphold the right of each individual to 
pursue his own legitimate ends: a right which John Charvet insists, “is necessarily, an 
equal right”.^ Yet such legislation must not be content to define fioedom only in terms of 
an absence of external obstacles, physical or legal. It must be legislation which is 
balanced by the understanding “that all that makes existence worthwhile to anyone, 
depends on the restraint on the actions of other people” but it must be guided also by “the 
principle that the sole end for which mankind is warranted individually or collectively in
* The Commonplace Book, entry for Aug 9,1914.
“ Critique o f Equality and Freedom. John Charvet, p.l66ll67.
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interfering with any of their number is self protection”.' It must be legislation imbued 
with the perception that the individuals rights are rights to which he or she is entitled as a 
member of a community, and only as such. It must be legislation aware that in its duty to 
safeguard liberty, it may be necessary to impose obstacles which react not only against the 
illegitimate interest of the powerful, but also against individuals or groups who infringe 
upon the rights of others or threaten the social peace. It demands such legislation as will 
provide to all those facilities which he ironically reminds Burke, “are necessary to all of 
nature’s children”, ... “light, fresh air warmth, rest and food”. “
But what if, as Tawney fears freedom is pursued patemalistically, granted from 
above by an intellectual elite? For Robert Nisbet the notion of individual liberty is 
menaced by “egalitarian intellectuals”, who not only assume to instruct the individual as to 
“where his own good lies”, but seek also to persuade a population against its conscious 
will, that it is in fact, living in immorality and injustice”. Such a mission, Nisbet suggests, 
is “messianic”, “it requires not only the politicisation” “of the question of income 
inequality, “but also an alteration in people’s basic assumptions about the extent they are 
responsible to their neighbours and their neighbours, for them”. This problem, Nisbet 
asserts, confronted “St Paul, and a long line of Christian missionaries after him, down to 
the Beirigans”.^  It is, Nisbet insists, “a formidable problem” which finds expression in 
what contemporary zealots preach as “the only true good”, the gospel of equality. 
Certainly, for Tawney, it is a moral problem: it is bound up not only with the rights of the 
individual, the boundaries of government, the obligations of citizenship; it encompasses 
also a vision of an ethical community. It is concerned not only with the rights of the 
individual and the obligations of the collective, but ultimately with the moral direction of 
society.
'  Professor Fred Rosen, quoting Charles Taylor and indirectly John Stuart Mill, see Professor
Rosen’s Inaugural Lecture, Thinking about Liberty. U.CL. 1990.
“ Equality, p.136.
The Pursuit o f Equality’, Robert Nisbet, 1974, see Against Equality, p.l27.
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Tawney is confronted with three problems. First, how to avoid the gross 
inequality which might result when a people is coerced into, or patemalistically provided 
with, equality? Second, is power genuinely equalised within a society in which ultimate 
power is concentrated in the hands of a state no matter how democratic that state may be? 
Third, if as Tawney argues a moral social order is a necessary condition of equality, will 
not its creation invade the fieedom of dissidents? The first question is answered by 
Tawney’s universally acknowledged social democratic credentials which reject both state 
coercion and Fabian paternalism. For Tawney, the answer to the second question resides 
in the notion of a functional and decentralised economic, political and social order which 
would, through democratic measures, achieve an equalisation of power. Finally, in 
reference to the invasion of the freedom of the dissenting, Tawney’s answer is 
unequivocal. Socialism and a moral order, he insists, must only be achieved by 
democratic process; it must never sacrifice “the supreme goods of civil and political 
liberty in whose absence no Socialism worthy of the name can breathe”.'
There are, Tawney argues, some laws and traditions which serve not to unite men 
in co-operative purpose, but to divide them in competitive striving. Such circumstances, 
Tawney insists, demand a re-examination of the ethical assumptions of society as well as 
its accepted doctrines, values, codes and practices. All these must submit to a judgement, 
Tawney declares, which assesses a civilisation by ... “the institutions which it creates, the 
relations between human beings which these institutions establish, and the type of 
character, individual and social which is fostered by those relations”." A society in which 
men and women, confront each other in a competitive struggle of self interest, cannot, in 
Tawney’s view, create institutions, or human relationships in accordance with moral 
principles. Such a society does not foster those relations which are essential to social 
cohesion, individual development, and fellowship. It is, indeed, these beliefs, which give 
moral content to Tawney’s egalitarian philosophy so that Nisbet’s allegation that the ideal
* 'Christianity and the Social Revolution', 1935, see The Attack, pp.l65.
« Ibid, p .m .
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of equality “has all the requisites of becoming a religious idea” is, in Tawney’s case, 
justified In a society concerned with “the manipulation of forces and interests”, 
Tawney’s commitment to a political philosophy which insists that society should be not 
“an economic mechanism” but a community of wills” ... “capable of being inspired ty 
devotion to common ends” is indeed, “a religious one”.^
Tawney, then, contends that the causes of what Nisbet recognises as the “present 
disaffection”, “the spreading alienation”, the social unrest are “not simply economic, nor 
party-political, but moral”." They evolve out of a deeply held conviction that the external 
arrangements of society appear to contradict what men feel to be morally right. Men feel 
too, that these arrangements, since they result from human action, are capable of 
alteration. Where Nisbet quotes De Tocqueville to support his claim that in those 
societies which have eradicated the most blatant inequalities, “the slightest inequalities are 
marked enough to be noticed”,^  Tawney, concerned with what Nisbet designates 
disapprovingly as “the politics of virtue”, calls into question “the moral attitude produced 
in society by the present system.”i  ^ It is this rejection of the prevailing moral attitudes 
which actuates Tawney’s perception of liberty, just as it causes the greatest problem in his 
defence of i t
Equality, Despotism And Coercion
Now, in the last decade of the twentieth century, political philosophers of both left 
and right are confronted with the irrefutable evidence of the barbaric despotism of 
totalitarianism. They are, then, properly concerned in the name of justice and freedom, to 
contain the authority of government and are, with reason, fearful of despotic power. 
Equality, libertarian theorists insist, threatens freedom, its creation demands coercion.
The Acquisitive Society, p.227.
The Commonplace Book, entry for Oct. 6,1912.
"The Pursuit o f Equality'. Robert Nisbet, see Against Equality, p.l26. 
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They see freedom as something belonging to the individual which must be defended 
against the intrusion of the state. Coercive action by the state, they argue, is illegitimate 
when applied to inhibit the conduct of the individual in what they identify as the “private 
sphere”. By contrast, they contend, egalitarians see the state as the central instrument of 
social justice and individual development. The egalitarians, libertarians submit, will, 
through this all-powerful agency, curtail the freedom of the individual in the interest of 
equality. For libertarians, freedom consists “in that condition of society in which the 
coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible”.  ^ The task of a policy of 
freedom, they argue, is to minimise coercion and its harmful effects even if, it cannot be 
completely eliminated. In a free society, libertarians submit, the state wül limit its powers 
of coercion. It will act, within the rule of law, to uphold those rights which guarantee 
equally, to each individual the freedom to engage in the pursuit of legitimate ends. It will 
act, by the same rule of law, to frustrate those, who, in self-interest impinge on the rights 
of others.
Freedom to acquire and accumulate private property (within the rule of law) 
libertarians insist, must be recognised as an extension of the private sphere. In a free 
society, they argue, commercial competition in a free market, monitored by mutually 
agreed laws of contract and exchange, will protect the individual from the power of a 
coercive state. Freedom, they assert, demands resistance to coercion which they identify 
as the imposition of the arbitrary wiU of another (or others) by which the individual is 
“forced to act, not in accordance with a coherent plan of his or her own, but to serve the 
ends of another”. They reject, as dangerous, the egalitarian notion that liberty must be 
identified with the economic power. Once this identification is accepted, they assert, 
there is no limit to “the sophisms by which the attraction of the word liberty can be used 
to support measures which destroy individual liberty”.^ Where the state is all powerful, 
libertarians warn, the individual is obliged to forsake a chosen plan of action in what is
* The Constitution O f Liberty, FA . Hayek, Routledge, 1960, p.l2.
“  lbid,p.l6.
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perceived as the interest of the collective. Such power, they insist, constrains individual 
fireedom, reacts against individual initiative and impedes self-development Such 
paternalism, even despotism, weakens that sense of personal responsibility which is a 
necessary condition of freedom.
In the tradition of von Humboldt, Lord Acton, Sir Henry Maine, Herbert Spencer, 
Fredeiich Hayek and other libertarian thinkers. Professor Letwin fears “the tyranny of the 
state”. It is not a fear exclusive to libertarians, indeed it is shared by Tawney and all 
democrats.^ Nevertheless, Professor Hew warns “even the milder engineers of the soul” 
will establish a power elite which must by itself, in its total control over society, constitute 
“the greatest possible offence to any genuine ideal either of personal equality, or even of 
equality of outcome”.! J.R. Lucas is even more frightened of the consequences of 
egalitarianism, which he suggests, leads easily to totalitarianism, and a state apparatus of 
absolute power. If we abhor totalitarianism, he argues, “we must be prepared on 
occasion to rebut the presumptions of the egalitarians, and concede that not everything in 
our society can be justified”.^ Furthermore, Lucas insists, that within egalitarianism there 
is ... “a trend which is dangerous because it makes the state answerable for every social 
arrangement”, and, he warns, not everything is possible to the state, nor, he adds, “should 
it be”.^  In the effort to create equality, Lucas argues (conceding the deficiencies of 
inequality) there is the danger of imposing a totalitarianism which represents a far greater 
evil than the evils which the egalitarians seek to eliminate”. John Charvet, too, in his 
concern to elaborate a coherent system of ethical thought in connection with the ideals of 
fireedom and equality, warns that the notion of equality requires either the abohtion of 
classes or, “the destruction of the necessary conditions for the free development of the
^  George Orwell, who did not share Professor Letwin's anti-egalitarian views argued, "collectivism 
is not inherently democratic, but on the contrary, gives to a tyrannical minority such powers as 
the Spanish Inquisition never dreamed o f .  Review o f F A . Hayek's The Road to Freedom. 
George Orwell, Observer. April 9, 1944. See The Collected Essays Vol. Ill, Seeker Warburg, 
1968, p. 118.
The Procrustean IdeaV, Antony Flew, 1978, see Against Equality, p  1481166.
'Against Equality Again', J. R. Lucas, see Against Equality, p .78.
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personality,... the family”.^  This judgement is echoed by Charles Frankel who also insists 
“if we want everyone to begin at the same place, we must, as Plato asserted, abolish the 
family**.^  Robert Nisbet is even more alarmist Indeed, Nisbet has argued that the new 
Deal, in which governmental intervention sought to bring the United States out of the 
1930's Depression, was “the West’s first taste of Fascism”.^  Nisbet warns, that “using 
the rhetoric of equality as window-dressing, power might pass to tyrants” ... “as it did to 
Augustus, Napoleon, Torquemada, or even Hitler”.
Whilst Tawney and the social democratic tradition have always been fiercely anti- 
totalitarian, attention must be paid to warnings against the all-powerful state. A state, 
answerable to no one, may in the interest of equality or any other proclaimed end, impose 
a set of values and promote a culture of obedience, which will not tolerate dissent. Such a 
state may proscribe the right of the individual or of particular groups to pursue chosen 
ends which the state judges, in the name of equality, to be against its interest Certainly, 
history endorses Lucas’s submission that egalitarians, to satisfy egalitarian principles, have 
sometimes unwittingly created a totalitarianism which exceeded in evil, the evil they 
sought to end. Lucas, then, argues that to struggle for egalitarian principles is to expose 
society to the dangers of totalitarianism. Yet such an argument carried to its logical 
conclusion would not only have opposed the abolition of slavery on the grounds that it 
might lead to perpetual civil disobedience, but also have rejected adult suffirage because 
an electorate might ultimately endorse fascism, anarchy or totalitarian communism. This 
philosophy of leave ill-alone, appears to owe something to the Burkean understanding 
that those natural laws and entrenched customs which evolve out of historical process, 
may be imperilled by well-meaning yet unrealistic social theorists, who, in the name of 
progress, or social justice, seek to change the social order to the detriment of social 
stability. Moreover, such an understanding of ‘natural law’ can, in the name of stability.
* A Critique o f Freedom and Equality, John Charvet. Cambridge University Press, 1969, p.l86.
“  Equality o f Opportunity', Charles Frankel, see Against Equality, p.186.
Conservativism, Ted Honderich, Hamish Hamilton, 1990, p .ll2 , quoting Fascism, Noel 
O’Sullivan, 1983, Dent, p.l49.
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discipline, and the preservation of the established order be used as a spurious justification 
to impose totalitarianism.
As for Lucas’s warning that egalitarians may involuntarily sow the seeds of 
totalitarianism, Tawney, “the social democratic par excellence”, like Henry Dubb will not 
lightly surrender those fundamental, constitutional, civil and political democratic rights so 
long and strenuously fought for. Furthermore, in Tawney’s vision of an egalitarian, social 
democratic society, men and women will not be penalised for pursuing their own, 
legitimate, self-chosen ends. Such choice will be encouraged, individual talent will be 
fostered acknowledged and respected.
Tyranny and economic injustice, Tawney proclaims, are both abominations”. 
Christians, he insists, are not compelled to choose between them; they can, and should, 
repudiate them both”  ^ It is the essence of Christianity, he declares, that “when conscience 
and authority collide, it is to God, not to man that obedience is due”." Totalitarianism, he 
asserts, regards loyalty to the State as the cardinal virtue and loyalty to principles which 
are repugnant to the State are liable to entail severe penalties, “which only the most heroic 
will venture to incur”. The resulting subordination to ofiRcial dictates, he argues, “is 
ruinous to the integrity of the soul”. Capitalism, with its exploitive nature and its 
totalitarian rivals, he insists, are both in contradiction to Christian ethics, both he argues, 
“emphasise the supreme importance of material riches” ... “both have the characteristics 
of a counter-religion”.^
Tawney abhors totalitarianism. He saw in the Soviet Union ‘a dictatorship of the 
proletariat’ that was indeed a dictatorship, tyrannous and repressive. He saw there an all- 
powerful state which... “advertised police collectivism as not only a convenient device for
* 'Christianity and The Social Order', see The Attack, p. 172.
» Ibid, p. 171.
Ibid, p. 165.
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keeping the toilers on their toes, but also the last word in proletarian freedom”.* Tawney 
cannot accept a conception of ‘socialism* which is ready to control and nationalise the 
means of production yet unwilling to cede the political power on which all else depends. 
Such a conception not only negates the purpose of Socialism which seeks to extend 
political power, equalise economic power and foster the spirit of co-operative 
participation in the industrial, social and economic life of the community. It replaces the 
old exploiting class with a new power-elite equally irremovable by action fiom below. It 
is a ‘Socialism* which in the name of social justice imposes a hierarchy of authority, which 
suspends the liberties of the individual in what it claims is the interest of the collective. It 
is a ‘Socialism* which will “put Dubb on a chain** and deprive him of “those fragments of 
liberty and equality** for which he has so fiercely fought. This rejection of such a 
‘Socialism* is an expression of Tawney*s belief that a democratic Socialism, (“the only 
socialism worth aspiring too**) depends “not on the impersonal forces beloved by 
doctrinaires, but on human minds and wüls**... “on the good sense pertinacity, nerve and 
resolution of the loveable, pig-headed, exasperating Dubb.** “
As for German totalitarianism, Tawney castigates it as “political primitivism bom 
in the mist of pre-history**.*  ^ It endorses a cult of force, fostered “a belief in violence; 
substantiated the ideal of “a community of culture for the mere physical relationship of the 
human herd’*. It embraces “a half-tribal conception of national unity” and “repudiated as a 
gigantic aberration two thousand years of European history”. It denies the common 
humanity of man and replaced it with a savage dogma of race and intolerance. It has, 
Tawney accuses, attempted to eradicate Christianity, for in Christianity, he argues, “it 
recognises a creed which holds that one must obey God rather than man”.*^  Tawney’s 
rejection of the all-powerfiil German State rests, then, not only in its suppression of the 
values of liberty and equality. It rests, too, on a moral repugnance for any political system
‘Christianity and The Social Order', see The Attack, p. 165. 
Ibid, p.l66.
** Equality, p.l92.
‘Christianity and The Social Revolution', see The Attack, p.174.
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which “idealises the chief who represents the blood bond and persecutes the alien who is 
unprotected by blood brotherhood”.^  Such a system must see in Christianity an 
irreconcilable enemy and it is Christianity which permeates Tawney’s philosophy. It is 
Christianity, too, which enjoins men to fellowship and commands them to “Let brotherly 
love continue. Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby, some have entertained 
angels unawares. (The Epistle of St Paul to the Hebrews 13:1).
Professor Letwin concedes that most egalitarians recognise that perfect equality is, 
or may be, unobtainable. They have, settled for a more confined and therefore defensible 
position. They argue, he insists, that equality is man-made, a product of human vice, of 
unsatisfactory and inequitable social arrangements. For egalitarians, he asserts, these 
badly fashioned social arrangements can be refashioned in the interest of equality. It is 
not, therefore, “the moral reform of individuals on which egalitarians rely to bring about 
equality. They pin their hopes”, Letwin insists, “on enforced equalisation by 
government”. Certainly Tawney commends those actions by which badly fashioned 
social arrangements have been refashioned in the interest of equality. He welcomes each 
step towards equality. It is his understanding of the purposes of equalisation and the 
goals of egalitarianism which distinguish his views from Professor Letwin’s.
In response to Letwin’s allegation that egalitarians will enforce equalisation by 
government legislation it may be argued that all government legislation is in a sense 
enforced. Even those laws which have the support of the majority are, if ignored by those 
who oppose them, enforced by government. Letwin’s terse assessment of the egalitarian 
position as “enforced equalisation by government” has ominous, even sinister implications 
and is in part simply rhetoric. Does he contend that a government inspired by such
Equality, p. 192.
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egalitarians as R.H. Tawney and Richard Titmuss would enforce e q u a l i s a t i o n ? ^ ^ !  With 
what repressive measures does Letwin believe such a government would “compel or 
impose” equalisation? Indeed, to lump together all egalitarians as advocates of enforced 
equality fails to differentiate between The British Fabian Society and the Khmer Rouge, 
between George Lansbury and Pol Pot.
Nevertheless, as if to endorse Letwin’s argument. Professor Hayek has chosen as 
his target, not the economics of socialism “but the political and cultural nemesis which, he 
is convinced it entails”. Yet, Tawney argues, in Great Britain (in the third year of a 
Labour government) there is no need to fear for civil and political liberty. The sole 
security for the preservation of such liberties, Tawney argues, “is a public opinion which 
is determined to preserve them”.* There is no reason, he insists, placing his faith in the 
democratic institutions of Britain and Henry Dubb’s determination to defend them, to 
regard that security to be weakened merely because steps are being taken to extend to the 
whole population those privileges, economic and social, which have previously been 
enjoyed by a minority.^^ As for civil liberty which Letwin regards as threatened ty 
“egalitarian coercion”, Tawney argues that it, “depends on freedom of worship; freedom 
of speech and writing; freedom of meeting; freedom in the choice of occupations; and 
freedom to combine”.^ Political liberty, he proposes, depends on civil liberty, partly on 
the existence of constitutional arrangements for the maintenance of representative and
It should be remembered that the Labour Government (1945-1951) introduced what were 
regarded as radical measures o f redistribution and equalisation. Lord Beaverbrook saw St. 
George in chains, Sir Winston Churchill warned o f a Gestapo. In the event there was no 
repression. Certainly no public resistance which compared to the Poll-Tax riots (1989-1990). 
Furthermore, to compound the riots the resistance to payment was unprecedented in 
contemporary British history. "In Scotland, during the collection year (1989-1990), 1,420,825 
summary warrants for non, payment were taken out against the approximately 3 million people 
registered for the community charge" (Convention o f Scottish Local Authorities. COSLA, 
Edinburgh 1991). "By January 1992, an estimate o f?  million was given for the number o f similar 
orders issued in England and Wales". (Independent, 23 January 1992). See 'Legitimacy in the 
United Kingdom: Scotland and the Poll Tax'. Rodney Barker, p522. British Journal o f Political 
Science, 1992.
* 'Social Democracy in Britain', Tawney, 1949, see The Radical Tradition, p.165/166.
See Social Democracy In Britain R.H. Tawney, 1949. In this essay Tawney briefly addresses 
arguments advanced by Professor Hayek in The Road To Serfdom'. Routledge, 1944.
"  Social Democracy in Britain, Tawney, 1949, see The Radical Tradition, p.l65H66.
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responsible Government. While Tawney confesses that he regards “confident predictions 
from history, as mostly sciolism”, he nevertheless, insists that while it is not certain, “it is 
probable, that Socialism in England can be achieved by methods proper to democracy”. It 
is certain, however, he concludes, that “it cannot be achieved by another”, nor even if it 
could”, he warns, should the supreme goods o f civil and political liberty, be part of the 
price”^
The State, Tawney concedes, addressing the fears of Professor Hayek, is a 
powerful and important instrument* “but it is an instrument, and nothing more. Fools will 
use it, when they can, for foolish ends, and criminals for criminal ends. Sensible men will 
use it for the ends which are sensible and decent We, in England, have repeatedly re­
made the State”. ... “Why assume despotism?” ... “Why should we be afraid of it”? “ Yet 
Tawney argues “history is a stage where forces which are within human control can 
contend and co-operate with forces which are not”.^  His prediction from history, 
therefore, are tempered by his experience of what he defines as the “historian’s task”. 
Idealism and the highest aspirations of mankind, history teaches, have sometimes 
degenerated into tyranny.
Equality And The Right To Property
The right to acquire, accumulate, inherit and bequeath property within a fiee 
market system is, for the critics of equality, a necessary condition of freedom. Indeed, if 
“the roots of libertarianism are defined as a categorical opposition between the Individual 
and the State”,^  ^then, for libertarians, an attack on property is an attack on liberty. The 
equal right to property, secured by law, they argue, resides in that “private sphere”.
‘Social Democracy in Britain', Tawney, 1949, see The Radical Tradition, p i  65II66.
Ibid, p. 164.
"  Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism, pJ274.
A Review Of The Rise And Decline O f Western Liberalism, Anthony Arblaster, Basil Blackwell, 
1984, see Raymond Williams, The Guardian, Sept 21,1984.
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which, in the interest of individual liberty, must remain free fiom state interference. 
Ownership, they argue, is a means of self authentication; private property, they insist, is a 
concrete expression of enterprise and the just deserts of personal application. The desire 
to bequeath property, they argue, derives from a natural instinct to transmit the economic 
benefits of a life’s work to one’s children.^ The instinct, they contend, is both socially 
and economically beneficial; it encourages prudence and diligence to the economic 
advantage of the entire society. The right of inheritance, it is submitted, allows for “the 
preservation of the heritage of civilization”. The family function of “passing on standards 
of education and traditional values”, it is proposed, “is closely tied up with the possibility 
of transmitting material goods’’.^  Individuals, it is conceded, differ in capacities; some, it 
is acknowledged, will acquire more property than others. Coercive laws, exercised in the 
interest of equality, wiU destroy initiative, discourage invention, react against productive 
efficiency and endanger democratic process.
Indeed, Professor Harry G. Johnson warns that while “Democracy is necessary for 
the preservation of personal freedom”, “government has been increasingly extending itself 
into the economic sphere”, counterpoising the rights of property and specifically the right 
of the owner of property to the enjoyment of income from such property. There has 
evolved, Johnson alleges, a system which allows the right to vote about the disposition of 
other people’s property based on the single fact that the voter is a “human being, qualified 
by law to the rights of fi:anchise”. The justification for democratic government Johnson 
argues, is that “people must have equal political rights as persons'^ the dilemma, he
^  Michael Quinn identifies a contradiction in the libertarian argument. “I f  the fruits o f an 
individual's efforts, good or bad. are automatically secured to their children, initially in a form o f 
a favourable developmental environment and then by the direct transfer o f entitlement to 
property", he argues, "it is difficult to discern how a model o f justice which seeks to reward free 
individuals on the basis o f their individual deserts can be maintained". Since the generation o f 
desert-bearing talents and capacities is not an autonomous process "mmune from determination 
by differential contextual conditions", Quinn proposes, "it seems highly unrealistic to suppose that 
the eventual rewards will be congruent with individual deserts". See Justice And Egalitarianism 
Formal and Substantive Equality in Some Recent Theories o f Justice, Michael Quinn, Garland 
Publishing Co. N.Y.
* The Constitution Of Liberty, FA . Hayek, p.90l91.
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insists, is that “these political rights are used to demand equal rights over property, 
though as property owners (as distinct from human beings) they are by no stretch of the 
imagination equal”.^
Tawney attacks the libertarian arguments concerning the rights of property. There 
are those, he insists, “who will endeavour to preserve all private property even in its most 
degenerated form”. There are also, he argues, those who while they recognise the 
perverse power of property within industrial capitalism have no desire to establish “a 
visionary communism”. They realise, he insists, that “the free disposal of a sufficiency of 
personal possessions”, (and enough for subsistence to enable men to do their work), is 
“the condition of a healthy and self-respecting life”.“ It is, he asserts, “a naive philosophy 
which would treat all proprietary rights as equal in sanctity”. There is, he suggests, a 
difference between property which is used by its owner in the conduct of his household or 
in pursuit of his profession, and “property which is merely a claim on wealth produced by 
another’s labouf’.^  Tawney demands that ownership involve the discharge of definite 
personal obligations. It is a demand submitted in the conviction that 'functionless’ 
property undermines creative energy, and, “sustains a system of rights without service”. 
Indeed, he argues, the laws of inheritance, in spite of death duties, still serve to maintain a 
hereditary economic status between different classes.
Tawney recognises the value of property ownership as an instrument of personal 
authenticity, as a means of validating the individual’s own and particular chosen life. He 
understood, too, the relationship between property and security,^ to the majority of
'Equality and Economic Theory', Harry. G. Johnson, 1975, see Against Equality, p276l276.
The Acquisitive Society, p.94195.
Ibid,p.94/95.
^  The emphasis on security creates problems for some anti-egalitarians. Robert Nisbet proposes 
that the majority would intuitively come up with security or protection as "the single sovereign 
virtue" ... "it would not be justice, he asserts, however defined". Nevertheless, in the same essay, 
while he insists that "the desire for equality is insatiable among a substantial number o f 
intellectuals", he proposes that the notion o f "hitting it big" and "the risk taking sensibility" 
appeals to the majority o f the people at large". See The Pursuit o f Equality', Robert Nisbet, 1974, 
Against Equality, p. 124H47.
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property owners, he suggests,... “its meaning is simple, it is not wealth, or power or even 
leisure from work. It is safety.”  ^ If by property he asserts, “is meant the personal 
possession, which the word means to nine tenths of the population, the object of socialists 
is not to undermine property, but to protect and increase it”.“ It is not, then, private 
property which Tawney opposes; it is rather an economic system which not only accords 
the acquisition of property an undue respect but also provides it with an economic power 
which negates democratic principle. As for the provision of capital, Tawney recognises 
the need of capital within any system which seeks to supply men efficiently with “things 
that are necessary, useful and beautiful and thus bring life to body or spirit”.^  Capital, he 
submits, must be paid for, yet, he argues, “it must be employed on the cheapest terms 
possible”.^  ^ Further, he insists, those who own it and advance it can have “no authority 
over production for which merely as an owner of capital, he is not qualified".^
The character of ownership under such circumstances, Tawney argues, would 
change in three advantageous ways. It would abolish the government of industry by 
property. It would end the payment of profit to functionless shareholders; it would “lay 
the foundation for industrial peace ... since industry would be carried on for the service of 
the public, not for the gain of those who own capital".^ It would facilitate “the 
Liberation of Industry”. It would give that dignity which comes from the sense of 
common purpose. It would endorse Tawney’s understanding of property as a trust over 
the notion of property as a right.
* The Acquisitive Society, p.8213.
“ Ibid, p .70187passim.
Ibid, p.9.
Ib id ,p .ll7 .
V Ibid, p.114.
Ibid. p.9.
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Equality And Equality Of Opportunity
Equality of opportunity “the minimal egalitarian goal”,^  is dismissed by its critics 
as an unattainable. Even if the notion is accepted as a principle of justice, it is argued, it 
remains incoherent, incapable of realization within human society. In a liberal democratic 
society, it is proposed, each individual has, secured by equal rights and the rule of law, the 
opportunity to develop his or her natural abilities. The resulting benefits, in a free society, 
will inevitably refiect the differences of individual talents, capacities and application. 
Further, any attempt to implement this unrealisable principle demands unlimited and 
economically crippling resources. The redistribution of such resources, from the 
advantaged to the less advantaged, it is contended, entails coercive intervention on the 
part of an authoritarian state which will stifle individual enterprise, impede progress and 
efficiency and react to the detriment of freedom.
Indeed, Professor Letwin insists the egalitarian term, equality, is a “misnomef 
The principle, he insists, because it demands that certain rights be enjoyed universally, is 
mistakenly assumed to mean that “everyone should possess and exercise these rights in 
equal degree”. It may be argued, Letwin insists, that equality of opportunity inylies the 
equal right of any individual to freely compete for any post for which he or she has the 
necessary qualifications. Yet “properly understood”, he deduces without reference to any 
egalitarian source which endorses this deduction, “everyone should have the right to enter 
any occupation for which he or she is qualified by skill and that nobody should be denied 
access to an occupation arbitrarily or capriciously: that is, on grounds of personal 
characteristics, other than his (or her) ability to do the job.^ Nobody, therefore, 
according to Professor Letwin’s understanding of egalitarian principles, can be excluded
\ Anarchy, State, And Utopia, Robert Nozick, Basil Blackwell, 1974, p235
“  The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality', p.46.
Ibid, p.46.
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from work for which he or she is qualified “Confusion reigns”, Professor Letwin insists, 
“when such a right is held universally”.
Plainly the tension that exists between the values of equality and freedom inçinges 
on the notion of equality of opportunity. Clearly, “confusion reigns” where, as in 
Letwins’ interpretation of the principle, a universal right always takes precedence over a 
democratically agreed common good. Tawney’s notion of equality of opportunity is not 
centred, as Letwin deduces, on the right of each individual to any post to which they are 
qualified by skill. Patently, it demands such social organisation as will extend to all the 
equal opportunity to acquire such skills and develop to the full their human capacities. 
Yet the sentiment of justice is satisfied ... “not by offering to every man and woman 
identical treatment, but by treating different individuals, in so far as being human, they 
have requirements which are the same, and, in different ways, in so far as being concerned 
with different services, they have requirements which differ. Tawney’s demand for 
equality of opportunity does not, then, entail identical treatment; indeed, he insists that 
“different kinds of energy need different conditions to evoke them”. Ultimately, for 
Tawney these “different conditions” are “grounded in differences in the power to 
contribute to, and share in the common good”.^
Letwin’s conclusions concerning the notion of equality of opportunity are 
invalidated by the moral context of Tawney’s understanding of the principle. Equality of 
opportunity is authenticated not within a society of competitive individuals and competing 
interests but within a society in which each is concerned to contribute to the agreed and 
socially beneficial common ends. For Tawney, equality of opportunity ‘^ ghtly 
interpreted”, means more than an equal opportunity for the qualified to apply for a 
desirable post or even that the best qualified should get “the prizes of life”. It means, in 
addition, that equal provision must be made of those environmental conditions which
* Tawney, quoting Professor Ginsburg, The Problem o f Colour in Relation to the Idea o f Equality', 
Supplement to the Journal o f Philosophical Studies, 1926, p.l4.
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shape individual lives so that none may be disadvantaged by poor housing conditions, lack 
of health care, inadequate educational facilities. It means, the establishment of those 
conditions in which men and women shall, in community, ... “be able to live a life of 
dignity” and “be firee to make the most of their common humanity”.^  Equality of 
opportunity, Tawney insists, does not consist of “the equal power to scramble ashore 
undeterred by the thought of drowning companions”.^ The Christian injunction to 
brotherhood is without meaning within a society in which men are impervious to the 
plight of their fellows, a society which honours and rewards only those individuals with 
exceptional capabilities.
Professor Letwin reasonably argues that it is impossible to know to what extent 
the excellencies and deficiencies of normal adults have resulted from capacities which they 
have inherited genetically, and to what extent fiom the subsequent development of their 
potential capacities. Radical egalitarians, he insists, as he surprisingly acknowledges the 
diversity of arguments for equality, have aimed at equalising people’s skills - as distinct 
from raising everybody’s skills however unequal the end result. Peter Bauer in support of 
Professor Letwin even identifies “moderate Fabian egalitarians, notably Tawney” who, he 
insists, happily acknowledge that “equality of opportunity would result in substantial 
equality of income”. Any differences, he submits, would be seen to “reflect merit and 
therefore be widely respected and readily accepted. ^
Tawney, in 1931, had identified ‘The Tadpole Philosophy’, a vision of society 
which he vigorously rejected as immoral. “It is possible”, Tawney wrote, “that intelligent 
tadpoles reconcile themselves to the inconvenience of their positions by reflecting that, 
though most of them will live and die as tadpoles and nothing more, the most fortunate of 
them will one day shed their tails, distend their stomachs, hop nimbly on to dry land, and
Equality, p.l04.
Ibid, p.I06.
“  The Grail o f Equality', Peter Bauer, 1983, see Against Equality, p. 370.
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croak addresses to their former friends on the virtues by which tadpoles of character can 
rise to be frogs’’.^  Professor Frankel, however, dismisses Tawney’s “tadpole theory” as an 
expression of the notion of equality of opportunity as proposed by “idealists, socialists, 
and apostles of the welfare state”.
Sympathy for unsuccessful tadpoles, Frankel argues, must have limits. There are 
particular occupations, he observes, in which the capacity to perform at an extraordinary 
level of ability is quite properly recognised as the sole qualifying factor. Yet, Frankel 
insists, there are circumstances (family pressures, wrong environment, etc.,) which may 
militate against the opportunity to develop a potential talent, and, in consequence, a 
potential ability is unrealised. Is not the possessor of such undeveloped talent, Frankel 
demands, entitled to complain that circumstances have deprived him of the opportunity to 
develop his talent? We use the term ability, Frankel observes, in two different contexts ... 
“the here and now” context, and the potentiality context in which the primary desideratum 
is developmental and educational. In this context, Frankel proposes, we distinguish 
between an individual’s ‘natural ability’ and his existing performance. We concede, 
Frankel suggests, that natural ability is not, except within narrow limits, ‘modifiable’, just 
as we recognise that in the latter context, ability may develop and potential realised in 
response to training and education.
From these different contexts of the term ability, Frankel insists, there arises 
different conceptions of the notion of equality of opportunity which depend on whether it 
is performance or potential which is being stressed. The first conception which he 
designates the meritocratic, allows competition, regardless of physical hindrance or 
economic stature and the equal opportunity to demonstrate the quality of performance. 
Such an interpretation of equality of opportunity, he proposes, is compatible with sharp 
hierarchical differences as long as there is social mobility. It will ensure too, that the level
Equality, p.105.
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of individual ability will ultimately determine that the individuals social and economic 
position results from meritorious performance within his or her particular field. Yet, 
Frankel argues, this meritocratic concept of equality of opportunity can be seen as unfair, 
since, while it rewards merit, it does nothing to stimulate it other than eliminate these 
glaring disadvantages which prevent a man or woman from competing. And, Frankel 
asks, if it is regarded as unfair that an individual cannot compete because he or she cannot 
afford to travel to the test place, why is it not equally unfair that they are denied the 
education, which is available to others, which would enable them to prepare for such a 
test? Furthermore, is it not equally an exan:ç)le of inequality of opportunity to “leave 
them in an environment which deprives them of even the desire to seek such an 
education”? i So, Frankel asserts, there evolves a second concept of equality ‘the 
educational conception*. The advocates of this interpretation argue that if opportunities 
should be limited only by ability, then, unless “ we successfully modify those aspects of an 
individuals situation which prevent them from performing up to the level of their natural 
abilities” we cannot make a valid claim to equality of opportunity.
Frankel sees no way of adjudicating between these two conceptions. There is, he 
concludes, no fixed formula which can be applied universally: each case must be judged 
separately. It must be recognised that each context has a different primary objective and 
that both contexts represent a potentially legitimate claim which must be considered in the 
formulation of public policies. There are circumstances with which we cannot 
compromise, Frankel quite properly insists, “we cannot put up with inferior brain 
surgeons or airline pilots”.^  In such instances, ability must be the essential deciding 
factor. There are other circumstances, Frankel suggests, in which the encouragement, 
training and development of talent is the primary requirement and in between “there are 
aU sorts of circumstances in which a concern for both efficiency and education are
* 'Equality o f Opportunity', Charles Frankel, see Against Equality, p.l83.
“  Ibid,p.l83.
Ibid, p.184.
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possible”. “In such circumstances we must decide what weight to give to each”.^  The 
factors, not only of economic cost, but psychic cost, energy expended, and the 
probabilities of disappointment must all be considered. As for modifying environmental 
factors, Frankel argues that not only are these difficult to change, but “such modification 
probably lies beyond our existing resources in people, funds, general patience and 
goodwill”, Under these circumstances Frankel suggests, “certain limits wül have to be 
placed on the broad ‘educational’ version of equality of opportunity”.^  It is he insists, 
necessary to strike a balance to consider, for instance, how much a society should expend 
to change the environment of poor people so that they may contribute (say as 
mathematicians) when, without expenditure, the more favoured classes of the population 
can supply mathematicians adequate to the needs of society. We must weigh the social 
costs, on the one side we must evaluate the cost of maintaining an opportunity structure 
that limits horizons, on the other we must consider the social cost of “a socially isolated 
elite”. Clearly, as Frankel sees it, both concepts of equality of opportunity, the 
‘meritocratic’ and the ‘educational’, demand from those responsible for public policy a 
constant adjudication between social needs and social costs. He is not however, without 
an understanding that the claims of both concepts are ‘potentially legitimate’. Ultimately, 
he proposes, equality of opportunity “remains a demands we can evaluate only if we ask: 
Equality of opportunity for what?” it is, in this evaluation that the fundamental 
differences between those who “are mainly sceptical of equality as an ideal” and the 
ethical socialist egalitarians are most apparent
Tawney does not specifically identify Frankel’s two contexts of equality. 
Nevertheless, he recognises that the concept must always accommodate the essential, 
never to be compromised requirements of society. Clearly, the educational and 
developmental aspects of equality of opportunity are central to his egalitarian argument
* ‘Equality o f Opportunity’, Charles Frankel, see Against Equality, p.184.
“  Ibid,p.l85.
Ibid,p.l85.
Ibid, p.188.
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Yet, even if as contemporary critics claim, (see Chapter VI below) that Tawney neglected 
to address the inequalities of race, or gender, or geography, he would judge FrankeFs 
question “equality of opportunity for what?” to be superfluous, valid only within “the 
acquisitive society”. For Tawney, the dynamics of industrial capitalism inexorably create 
and deliberately sustain gross and avoidable inequalities. His Christian Socialism demands 
that the system give way to a social order in which economic power is equitably 
distributed and equality is equally extended. Such a social order, he contends, will 
encourage individual spiritual and intellectual development: Industrial capitalism which 
promotes “self-egotism” and “the exercise of unfettered strength” thwarts it. Frankel, in 
defence of inequality, presents an “ideal of equality” which “lies beyond our existing 
resources in people, in funds, in general patience and goodwill”. Tawney, 
notwithstanding that his egalitarian argument is motivated by moral principles, 
pragmatically proclaims, “it is not that equality should be completely attained, but that it 
should be sincerely sought”.^
Equality And Equality Of Educational Opportunity
Those who desire in the interest of justice that all should be made to start with the 
same chances. Professor Hayek declares, are pursuing an ideal that is “literally impossible 
to realize”. The ideal of equality of educational opportunity, it is asserted, is “confused”. 
It involves two conflicting objectives. It attempts not only to equalize opportunity, it 
seeks to adjust opportunity to capacity, which, it is argued, “has little to do with merit in 
any moral sense”.^ Professor Letwin is also concerned to demonstrate the inconsistency 
and the impracticability of the ideal, which he insists is “unachievable and approachable 
only at the cost of adopting gross repressive policies”.^  Letwin asserts the incontestable 
fact that different children emerge from the same school with very unequal skills, not to
\ Equality, p. 56.
“ The Constitution Of Liberty, FA . Hayek, p.384.
The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality,. p.54.
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mention the differences of average skills in different neighbourhoods between children 
educated within the same comprehensive school system which is ostensibly aimed at the 
equal education of all children. Letwin suggests that radical egalitarians would argue that 
this is because children come to school from different home environments. John Charvet, 
a contributor to ‘Against Equality’ endorses this view. Charvet, argues in * A Critique of 
Freedom and Equality* a work more concerned with the moral interrelation between the 
two values than the economic implications, that “the major factor producing this 
inequality of opportunity will be in the first instance, the home environment background”. 
Convinced that a degree of inequality of opportunity will depend primarily on the degree 
of inequality of conditions that exists between the classes in the first place, Charvet argues 
that the home background “will ensure that a public education system not designed to 
favour children fix>m the higher classes will nevertheless be used to the greater advantage 
of the latter”.i
Professor Letwin agrees that most people concede that every child should be 
taught to read, write and do arithmetic and receive enough schooling “to actualise the 
potential for reasoning which every normal person enjoys”. But he argues, it is beyond 
these usually agreed minima, that a serious debate ensues, as to whether further education 
should be available to those whose performance is deficient or to those whose 
performance is superior. He properly judges that there are differences in mental 
capabilities (as indeed there are in other capacities, physical, moral and spiritual). In these 
circumstances, he asks “Bluntly is success or failure the better guide as to who should get 
more education”? " This question demands definition; by what standard, and by which 
criteria are success or failure to be measured? Further, it prompts another important 
question; concerning the purpose of education.
( A Critique o f Freedom and Equality, John Charvet, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.l84l5.
“  The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality, p53.
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Professor Letwin’s agreement that a provision of rudimentary education should be 
available to even the deficient is universally accepted. Certainly it is a move towards 
Tawney’s demand for an educational system which provides “for all the nation’s sons and 
daughters an education, generous, inspiring and humane”.^  Tawney insists that civilisation 
is not the business of an elite alone. A life of dignity and culture is the entitlement of all 
men and women and it must be provided “in a common affection for the qualities which 
belong not to any class ... but to man himself’. While he would readily acknowledge that 
not every individual has the capacity, or even the inclination for success, no matter how it 
is defined, his concept of equality of opportunity demands an educational system which 
equally encourages, and equally offers, the opportunity for self development to all 
Indeed, Tawney, in 1922, had sought in the face of anti-egalitarian opposition to secure 
“Secondary Education for All”." Such an educational reform he insisted, would provide 
“a common set of standards and hence of expenditure” to “a variety of types of school” 
which would make provision for children with creative and practical abilities as well as the 
academic child. For Tawney this provision of universal secondary education serves a 
social purpose beyond a commitment to the academically gifted. It was “one of Tawney’s 
major themes”, Rodney Barker insists, “that education should provide a meeting place for 
diverse social origins and hence a common basis for an integrated social life”.
These attacks on the notion of equality of educational opportunity do not properly 
address themselves to Tawney’s egalitarian position. He does not demand, as Professor 
Letwin asserts, “that all children should get an identical schooling whereby all would 
acquire more nearly equal skills”. Tawney’s argument for equality of educational 
opportunity derives from his understanding that egalitarian measures will ensure a moral 
order which will provide each child with the social conditions which allow for equal 
advantage. Indeed Tawney, like Letwin, believes that “there are diversities of gifts, which 
require for their development, diversities of treatment.” Equality of opportunity, he
\ 'A National College O f All Souls', R.H. Tawney, 1917, see The Attack, p 28134.
“ Secondary Education For All, R. H. Tawney, Labour Party Pamphlet, 1922.
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suggest, will seek to do justice to all, by providing facilities which are at once various in 
type and equal in quality. Certainly, Tawney is not concerned to endorse an educational 
system so undifferentiated that it will, by its uniformity, frustrate the development of 
special gifts and exceptional talents. His objective is not to create homogeneity but to 
ensure that “the common school of the whole population should be so excellent and so 
generally esteemed, that all parents desire their children to attend it”. Tawney’s demand 
is neither for uniformity, nor even, for the abolition of private schools “providing they are 
equally accessible to all children qualified to profit by them, irrespective of the income and 
social position of their parents”.' That there should exist in England “a special system of 
schools, reserved for children whose parents have larger bank accounts than their 
neighbours”, seems to Tawney, not only an “education monstrosity” and “educationally 
vicious” but “socially disastrous”, for “it perpetuates the division of the nation into classes 
of which one is almost unintelligible to another”." Tawney deems this perpetuation of 
class division, this educational arrangement which interacts on the culture of the entire 
society to be unworthy of a civilised society. It sustains an educational structure “which 
is determined not by the requirements of the young, but by the facts of the class 
system”.'" It serves, too, as Rodney Barker asserts, “as an instrument of social and 
political hierarchy”.'^ Such an education system is not only inequitable, it acts against the 
nation’s interest. No nation, Tawney cautions, has at its command such a plethora of 
ability that it can afford “to leave uncultivated and under cultivated the talents and 
potentialities of four fifths of its children”. But beyond the waste of human potential, 
beyond the economic interests of the nation, such an education system with its class 
division and its class bias, constitutes “a hereditary curse” on English education.
Tawney’s egalitarian demands, advanced in the name of morality for the 
recognition of man’s common humanity, does not constitute a claim that men are
'  Equality, p.l45.
"  Ibid.p.l45.
Ibid,pJ45.
Education and Politics, 1900-1951, Rodney Barker, p.101.
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essentially identical.^ Nor is it to concede that men are identical in talent, capacities or 
aspirations. Certainly, Tawney recognises that between men there are differences, yet in 
spite of them, he argues it is imperative that men and women of varying characters and 
capacities be given the equal opportunity to develop those qualities which “in their 
common humanity are worth cultivating’’.^  To place emphasis, or grant privilege on 
account of wealth or birth or social position is for Tawney morally indefensible. He cites 
both Mill and Arnold who had “commended equality to their fellow countrymen as one 
source of peace and happiness”.^ Tawney’s demand for equality of education 
opportunity, then, is motivated not only by his sense of equity but also by his revulsion of 
an educational system which was “created in the image of our plutocratic class-conscious 
selves, and still faithfully reflects them”.hi The demand, therefore, is permeated by an 
understanding that the inequalities of the class system not only perpetuate privilege, they 
deny to the majority the facilities of a civilized life. These inequalities deny also the equal 
opportunity of education which, as it fosters individual developments, serves to benefit 
the community. “The tragedy of English education”, he ruefully insists, “is the tragedy of 
English social life; it is the organisation of society upon the lines of class”.^ ^
^  "It cannot be repeated often enough that a relation o f equality and a relation o f identify are not
the same thing. As D. Thomson argues ... "to say that men are equal is not to say that they are
identical. Even in its most basic mathematical meaning equality does not really mean identity. 
No mathematician ponders for long the equation X = X, but it is important for him to know 
whether X  = 8. Such an equation is, in fact, a statement about the value ofX". Michael Quinn, 
quoting D. Thomson. Equality, 1941. see Justice and Egalitarianism. Formal and Substantive 
Equality in Some Recent Theories o f Justice". Michael Quinn, Garland Publishing Co. N.Y. 
1991, p.33134.
\ Equality p  56.
“  Ibid,p.56.
A  National College Of All Souls', Tawney, 1917, see The Attack, p.34.
“The Public Schools And The Older Universities', R.H. Tawney, see The English Public School 
(JM. Whitehouse, Editor) London, 1919, p.72.
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Equality, Class Distinction And Envy
There will always be. Professor Hayek proposes, “the most profound differences 
about the issue of class’’.^  Indeed, amongst the critics of equality there are some who deny 
its significance while others praise its usefulness. Professor Letwin argues that within a 
democratic society in which the autonomous agent has, without coercion, the equal 
opportunity to pursue his or her fieely and rationally chosen ends, the traditional notions 
of class, it is argued, are eroding. In a free market system under the rule of law where 
equal rights extend equality of opportunity to each individual, the issue of class, it is 
submitted, is becoming increasingly irrelevant Indeed, ‘Professor Letwin asserts, the 
importance of class is only sustained by the erroneous and “arbitrary theoretical 
assumptions of historians who lean toward egalitarianism”. Such historians, Letwin 
insists, contend that “every community consists fundamentally of ‘classes’; that every 
class defines the interest of its members; that the several classes are at war with each 
other”,“ a theoretical assumption which Professor Letwin strongly rejects. Nevertheless, 
in spite of what is clearly regarded by come anti-egalitarians as the diminishing importance 
of class, there are social theorists who not only acknowledge class distinctions, they are 
prepared to defend them.
Egalitarians, J.R. Lucas argues, find class distinctions offensive since they fail to 
recognise that such distinctions are manifestations of “deep social needs”. Such 
distinctions, he proposes, are expressions of the “human need to classify people in order 
that we may know what to expect from them, and, how far it is safe to relax our guard 
against them”. Egalitarian principles, he argues, remove the signs by which we may 
identify friendliness and trustworthiness, so that within an egalitarian society, “each man is 
treated as every other man’s enemy”.^  Class distinctions he therefore concludes, allow
* The Road To Serfdom, F A  Hayek, p. 87.
(( The Case Against Equality’, Letwin, see Against Equality, p. 5.
'Against Equality Again', J. R. Lucas, see Against Equality, p.IO l.
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every man “to know where he stands”. The weak man, he adds comfortingly, “need not 
necessarily fear that the strong are ready to trample on him and use him discourteously”.* 
Clearly then, for Lucas, class distinctions act as an emollient and necessary feature of 
social life. Indeed, he remarks, ethnologists have found that in some cultures, men 
reserve their enmity for their equals, and are remarkably forbearing on those evidently 
weaker than themselves.
Lucas’s depiction of an egalitarian society in which “each man is treated as every 
other man’s enemy” is, although submitted without evidence, chilling. Yet although he 
claims that class-distinctions are morally justified, his desire for social cohesion and 
solidarity shares a remarkable affinity with Tawney’s desire for fraternity. “We are not all 
brothers”, Lucas insists, “but fraternal feelings is nevertheless a good thing”." “We are 
not all brothers,” Lucas insists. Yet, he submits, “fraternal feeling is nonetheless a good 
thing”.^  The preservation of class-distinctions will serve as a means by which “we may 
identify the signs of friendliness and trustworthiness”. For Tawney, on the other hand, the 
class distinctions which Lucas insists are an expression of a “deep human need” are 
“immoral”, “un-Christian”, indeed “anti-Christian”,*^  “an erection of divisions within the 
human family” ... based on “income and economic circumstances”, which, he insists, “are 
more ruinous to the soul than most of the conventional forms of immorality”.  ^ While 
Lucas urges a hierarchical society on the grounds that “the principle of Universal 
Humanity requires us to pay attention to the differences between men as well as the 
resemblances”, Tawney rejects class divisions as “noxious to the human soul”, “the parent 
of insolence and of servility”.^
* 'Against Equality Again J. R. Lucas, see Against Equality, p.101.
**' The Acquisitive Society, p.I66.
*" 'Against Equality Again', J. R. Lucas, see Against Equality, p.87.
'Christianity and The Social Order', see The Attack, p .l 70.
V Ibid,p.l70.
V* Ibid, p.m .
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Lucas is especially critical of those “rich egalitarians”, who retain their riches, even 
as they argue that “the whole system ought to be changed”. It is their moral duty, he 
asserts, to recognise that there are indeed, “significant inequalities in our society” and 
accept that since they are the principal beneficiaries, they are formally bound to discharge 
the responsibilities which such benefits engender. Moral reasoning, he argues “is best 
based on facts as they are”, and rich egalitarians should “operate within a scheme of 
thought which enables them to come to terms with things as they are”.^  This argument 
presents itself as a further expression of Lucas’s resolve to preserve the established social 
order, for fear that out of social change there may come social instability, even anarchic 
chaos. It must be conceded that there are few egalitarians possessed of that degree of 
saintliness which inspires men to “forsake all worldly goods” and heed Christ’s injunction 
to “Follow ME and be a fisher of men” (MATH 4:19). Even “the quality of Tawney’s 
goodness” (which) “was such that it never embarrassed you” “ can only be used as 
evidence of his own unique character. Sadly, humanity as a whole has neither his 
principles nor his moral committment
Equality And Envy
Critics complain that envy is both the cause and justification of egalitarianism. 
Professor Letwin subjects to examination the notion that envy the third deadly sin,... “the 
most depraved of vices”, corrodes the social fabric and creates disruption and social 
confi*ontation. This egalitarian notion, Letwin argues, maintains that equality is the 
necessary price of social stability. It is, he asserts,... “an argument which founds the ideal 
of equality on convenience, rather than on right”.^  Letwin challenges the egalitarian 
assertion that inequality leads to envy; there is no historical evidence for this claim, he
\ 'Against Equality Again', J. R. Lucas, see Against Equality, p . l01.
"  An Appreciation, Hugh Gaitskell, Address at a Memorial Service for RH Tawney, St Martins-in-
the-Fields, February 8,1962.
The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality, p.l8.
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argues. In fact, he insists, ... “the evidence seems to point in the opposite direction”.^  
Envy, he suggests, “is not the principle cause of social instability; it results more from 
such groups as dissidents in the Soviet bloc. Black African Nationalists, Irish or Arab 
terrorist groups than from the ‘relatively deprived’ in the Liberal Democracies.^ 
Furthermore, he argues, psychology also fails to establish that inequality must inevitably 
result in envy. Talent and achievement, he suggests, may inspire admiration and respect 
as readily as it arouses envy or resentment. To argue that equality is a cure for envy, 
Letwin declares, is to assume that inequality is an evil and that envy is therefore natural. 
If, however,... 'inequality is natural” (a notion which he assiduously pursues) ... “and if 
envy is corrupt, then the entire argument for equality as a cure for envy collapses”."
Letwin is not alone in identifying envy as a prime motivator of the egalitarian case. 
Egalitarianism, Professor Bauer argues, has given envy ... “a spurious legitimacy”,^  based 
on a wide-spread guilt feelings of the economically successful who are made to feel that 
not only are economic differences abnormal, they are also reprehensible, the result of 
exploitation. Similarly, George Polanyi and John B. Wood insist that the general 
condemnation of differences of wealth and income which evolve from the egalitarian 
thesis ... “makes it easier for politicians and commentators to invoke the latent feelings of 
envy and resentment which is present in most societies at most times’’"'^
Anti-egalitarians, then, claim that egalitarians use envy and the threat of the social 
disruption which envy generates as a weapon in their egalitarian argument. But, anti­
egalitarians contend, envy has socially beneficial consequences. It not only acts as a spur 
to ambition, it fosters the spirit of healthy competition which benefits the entire society. 
Yet Tawney’s egalitarianism is so firmly grounded in moral principles that even as he
* The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality, p .l9.
^  The expression 'relative deprivation', Letwin asserts, "combines both melodrama and
technicality". He dismisses it, therefore, as ..."an emotional device employed by egalitarians in
the more affluent societies in which inequalities cause no real hardship".
(( The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality, p.l9.
The Grail o f Equality', Peter Bauer, 1983, see Against Equality, p.382.
'How Unevenly is Wealth Spread Today?', Polanyi and Wood, see Against Equality, p259.
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supports his moral argument with pragmatic reason he can never be accused of presenting 
a case for equality which is founded merely on a narrow appeal to convenience. As to the 
assertion with regard to the benefits inequality, it cannot be satisfactorily substantiated. 
To recognise or dismiss the benefits of competition and ambition are ultimately matters of 
moral choice. It is impossible to deduce conclusively from historical evidence the validity 
of this anti-egalitarian claim.
Equality And Industrial Efficiency
It is an article of libertarian faith that inequality is a necessary condition of 
industrial efficiency. Indeed, Professor Hondeiich identifies a “Conservative Incentive 
Proposition,” which, he proposes, holds that “a certain unequal distribution of income and 
wealth is necessary, in our societies where people are not forced to work or enslaved, if 
we are to achieve a certain economic level”.^  It is this principle which anti-egalitarians 
promote against what they perceive as the dangerous effects of egalitarian measures on 
industrial efficiency. Professor Johnson, therefore, is concerned that “the transfer of 
popular economic attention from efficiency and growth to equality and grace” will react 
to the detriment of economic expansion. Professor Keyfitz argues that for the sake of 
productivity, and in order to encourage enterprise, society must not only financially 
reward the economically proficient... “but find some way to give power to those of its 
members who are innovative or otherwise competent”.^ Professor Bauer insists economic 
efficiency depends on the performance of people, and it is best served by “such 
arrangements which guarantee “that those who produce more should enjoy higher 
incomes”.^  For the anti-egalitarian, then, with economic expansion as the overriding 
priority, individualist competition and the pursuit of self-interest engendered by industrial 
capitalism are necessary conditions of economic efficiency. In the name of economic
Conservatism, Ted Honderich, p.29.
Van Inequality Be Cured?', Nathan Keyfitz, 1973, see Against Equality, p.321. 
“  The Grail o f Equality', Peter Bauer, see Against Equality, p.372.
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expediency, they argue, social divisions, sustained by the individualist ambition to outdo 
one’s feUows, promote both economic efficiency and economic growth.
Professor Letwin develops this argument on what he perceives as egalitarian 
economic policy. Inequality, Letwin argues, aids productivity. Rather than raising the 
income of some, by lowering the income of others, economic efficiency, he insists, will 
raise the income of all, discourage the indolent, and inspire the indigent to effort. 
Certainly, economic efficiency and a concomitant rise in everybody’s living standards, will 
not meet with opposition. Indeed, as Tawney remarks, “The object of industry is to 
produce goods, and to produce them at the lowest cost in human effort”.^  But, as he 
further insists, confidence is necessary to the effective performance of labour by men 
whose sole livelihood depends on it. It is necessary, he argues, to organise industry in 
order to secure the efficient service, and promote the confidence of those engaged in i t  
Class confrontations and industrial disputes, do not inspire confidence and while the threat 
of unemployment may spur a reluctant workforce to productivity, it also incites 
resentment and disruption. Efficiency, he argues, rests ultimately on psychological 
foundations ... “It depends, not merely on mechanical adjustments; but on the intelligent 
co-operation of contentious human beings whom hunger may make work, but mutual 
confidence alone can enable to co-operate”.^
Tawney recognises the benefits of industrial efficiency. Indeed, he acknowledges 
“the splendid achievements of practical energy and technical skill” released by the 
industrial revolution”. Nevertheless, he argues, “if economic amibitions are good 
servants, they are bad masters”. Ultimately, he insists, industrial capitalism with its “naive 
and uncritical worship of economic power”^  is destroying efficiency itself. It is being 
strangled by “an old fashioned industrial establishment, whose obsolete machinery and
* The Acquisitive Society, p. 79.
“ Equality, p .l 89.
Religion And The Rise O f Capitalism, P2761277.
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ineffective organisation depresses the standard of output and working conditions”.^  The 
solution, he asserts, lies in the notion of service and co-operative participation in the 
productive process. “If power divorced 6om responsibility is the poison of states”, he 
submits, it is improbable that it is the tonic of economic effort”.^
For Tawney, there is an argument stronger than the utilitarian one against equality. 
Economic activity, he insists, should be an act of social purpose; it must be performed, as 
a responsibility to society: it is to be judged efficient in respect of its service to 
community purpose or common benefit Social well being (which is not the same as 
Professor Letwin’s 'rise in income’) depends on social cohesion and social solidarity. 
This understanding is compounded by the perception that “standards of well-being are 
relative”. It may well be, Tawney postulates, that a ... “lower average wage with more 
equality may make a happier society than one with a higher average income, with less well 
being”.^  As for the argument that equality will create low output and inefficiency, 
Tawney asserts that industrial capitalism, while its champions may laud it as efficient and 
while, pro-tem, ... “it still works” ... “it works unevenly, amid constant fiiction and jolts 
and stoppages”. He quotes Professor Wedgwood’s postulation th a t... “the hostility and 
suspicion, envy and resentment resulting from inequality are themselves one cause of low 
industrial productivity”. Furthermore, he argues th a t... “the complex of hopes and fears 
and ignorance and patient credulity and passive acquiescence” which had, in the past, 
secured industrial efficiency, could no longer be relied upon to secure it. It is, he insists, 
an elementary economic truism to say that active and constructive co-operation on the 
part of the rank and file of workers would do more to contribute to industrial efficiency... 
“than the discovery of a new coal field or a generation of scientific d i s c o v e r y ’ ’ .^^
Equality, p  .173 
Ibid,p.l88.
"  Ib id ,p .ll3 . 
Ibid, p.l84.
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Professor Letwin seeks to illustrate the contradictions which would arise if the 
government set out to equalise pay by assuring every worker the same wage. He argues 
that this ‘ideal’ (which no contemporary egalitarian proposes), is strictly unattainable. He 
insists that a policy which ensured that all workers were paid equally would be untenable 
because of the different number of hours each worker worked, as well as from the failure 
of some to work, either from sickness, disinclination, or even the inability to find 
employment No one can disagree; the ideal is not only unattainable, it is incoherent and 
most important it is chimerical, since no contemporary egalitarian seriously proposes 
i t ^ l  Letwin further insists, extending the false assumption that egalitarians demand that 
all workers be paid equally, that ultimately, through their different propensities to save, 
there would evolve an inequality of wealth. If, he argues, validly, inheritance was also 
permitted, these inequalities in wealth would be further enlarged. Inequality would be 
further accentuated if people were permitted to invest their savings or their inheritance. It 
is, therefore, clear, Letwin concludes, that to prevent unequal accumulation of wealth 
“continuous and all pervasive repression” would be r e q u i r e d . N B 2  Furthermore, he 
accurately observes, “if all workers were paid equally this would entail unequal ‘sacrifice* 
by different workers” since, he correctly insists “ some jobs are more burdensome, more 
dangerous than others”. Similarly, his argument that to pay the same increment to highly 
skilled, highly trained specialists, or those engaged in unpleasant or dangerous work as 
those performing pleasanter, safer, more easy to qualify for jobs, is “to contradict the 
notion of equality of effort”,^  would not be disputed by Tawney who concedes that special 
talents are in some instances, “worth a great deal more than even the exorbitant salaries” 
which they now command. For Tawney, however, remuneration is beside the point No
Tt^re have been, John Charvet properly remarks, some extremist, even idiotically romantic 
concepts o f equality. Babeuf in Conspiracy o f Equals (1796) advances ideas o f equality which 
would be rejected as meaningless and totally impractical by contemporary egalitarians.
Again, Letwin lumps together every strain o f egalitarian thought. Certainly Trotsky, Moa Tse 
Tung, Pol Pot et al might apply continuous and all pervasive repression. It is difficult, however, 
to imagine the Fcdtian Society exercising such measures. The notion o f Tawney as Beria is an 
absurdity.
* The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality, p.35.
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one, he insists, “has any business to be paid what he is worth, for what he is worth is a 
matter between his own soul and God”.^
Equality And Welfare Provision
Anti-egalitarians oppose Welfare provision with seven main arguments. It does 
not achieve its purpose; it damages industrial efficiency; it fosters dependency; it is 
unnecessary; it infiringes on the liberty of the individual to dispose of their resources; it 
strengthens the power of the state; it fuels inflation. Professor Letwin’s contributors draw 
on all these arguments. Some essays are highly technical, Polanyi and Wood, for instance, 
break down into age groups various types of “capital holdings”. They analyse the 
differences between personal wealth and the assets of corporations; they evaluate the 
effects of both inheritance and investment Professor Boulding illustrates income 
graduations and trends of wealth distribution over four decades.^ Professor Wagner 
seeks to demonstrate by means of statistical tables and data which incorporates 
classifications according to class, occupations and factors of probability, that the tax 
structure (in the United States) designed to extend equality, in fact, not only “penalises 
earned income, but also reacts against enterprise”."
In spite of the expertise with which the economists present their evidence, there 
are clearly differences of opinion between them on the extent of economic inequality 
within industrial capitalist societies. Some contributors even question whether any 
meaningful inequality, in fact, exists, indeed Professor Letwin declares “the evidence 
normally presented (to prove inequality) is illusory, much less than most believe”. 
Nevertheless, if the economist differ as to the extent of equality, they all share certain
* The Acquisitive Society, p.222.
^  The Stability o f Inequality', K £ . Boulding, 1975, see Against Equality, p.261-275.
"  The Egalitarian Imperative', Richard E. Wagner,1977, see Against Equality, p297.
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views; they all resist measures of redistribution designed to extend economic equality. 
They all oppose “Welfarism”.
Professor Bauer, for instance, concerned by the “increasing role of the state”, 
insists that provision for old age, ill health, housing, unemployment and the responsibility 
of bringing up children have been taken over by state agencies, which, through taxation, 
finance such provision. This tax system, he asserts, “treats people as if they were 
children”,i since he argues it is the duty of adults to manage their own incomes and 
assume responsibility for the contingencies of life. Furthermore, he insists, prudent 
people, even if poor, can normally provide for such contingencies by saving and insurance 
but only, he warns, if the value of money is protected fix>m the excess of welfare 
expenditure. For Bauer, then. Welfarism promotes inflation (through heavy state 
expenditure), encourages dependency, penalises the economically productive and extends 
the power of the State. Professor Flew is even more critical of the notion of welfare 
which is dependent on taxation which he identifies as “compulsory exaction”." These 
exactions, he argues, in defence of what he perceives as individual freedom, “must involve 
some possible restrictions on liberty”. Furthermore, Flew claims, those egalitarians who 
are opposed to more choice on selectivity in welfare service, demonstrates their 
attachment to the value of equality over liberty, or even welfare. Professor Frankel, too, 
is suspicious of Welfarism. He perceives the egalitarian argument “that all men should be 
insured of the m in im um  conditions of a decent life” as in reality, a demand for equality “in 
a highly attenuated state”, which, he insists, “is singly an argument for a more adequate 
welfare state”.^  Professor TuUock argues that welfare redistributory measures do not 
necessarily benefit the poor.^^ Such measures, within industrial capitalist societies, he 
insists, are essentially transfers of funds between the middle classes who are the greatest 
beneficiaries both as individuals, and as a class. Professor Keyfitz admits that egalitarian
The Grail o f Equality', Peter Bauer, 1983, see Against Equality, p 368!369.
\ The Procrustean Ideal’, Antony Flew, 1978, see Against Equality, p.1601161.
"  ’Equality o f Opportunity’, Charles Frankel, see Against Equality, p .l 76.
^ ’The Charity o f the Uncharitable’, Gordon Tullock, 1971, see Against Equality, p. 3281345.
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demands for redistribution through graduated taxation are well intentioned, but, he 
argues, such tax arrangements inevitably extend the control of government over economic 
affairs, since the authorities believe that “they can spend our money for us better than we 
can ourselves”.^  In the interest of production, industrial efficiency and individual 
enterprise, Keyfitz, insists a tax system must allow its citizens to retain the profits of their 
enterprise and this method of “natural selection” can act as a means by which those 
“competent in production are self-selected to exercise power**."
Collectively, these objections constitute more than an attack on ‘Welfarism*. They 
serve also as a defence of a society of competitive individualism, they endorse a free- 
market economy which rewards in terms of income and approbation, those with economic 
aptitude or marketable talents. Some of the objections seek, in the name of freedom, to 
protect the individual*s right to pursue his or her self-interest from the interfering state. 
Some objections to welfare provision are grounded in the notion that public provision is 
socially debilitating, it encourages indolence, saps individual initiative, reacts against 
industrial efficiency.
These arguments that welfarism is not so much undesirable as ineffective cannot 
be resolved by a recourse to moral principles. Neither can unsubstantiated claims 
concerning impediments to industrial efficiency, the benefits or disadvantages of various 
tax arrangements, or speculations which entertain the notion of “natural selection** as a 
method of determining economic competence. Such arguments do not address the 
concerns of an egalitarian such as Tawney whose demand for welfare provision is 
motivated by ethical rather than economic considerations. Conversely, arguments 
advanced in the exclusive interest of productive efficiency find little common ground with 
social philosophies which are motivated by moral principles. Nevertheless, the perception 
that welfare measures do not necessarily achieve their objective, or that some benefits
* Van Inequality Be Cured?', Nathan Keyfitz, see Against Equality, p.326.
» Ibid, p. 321.
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accrue to the advantage of the middle-classes rather than to the most needy, has provoked 
a response from egalitarian defenders of welfare provision. They have in the last quarter 
of the present century developed theories of redistribution which, while they recognise 
the efficiency of a market economy, are committed to the distribution of social benefits in 
accordance “with the criteria of desert and need”
Yet the most important questions concerning Tawney’s commitment to public 
provision are posed by a sympathetic critic, Anthony Wright “Why”, Wright asks, 
“should welfare necessarily strengthen a culture of independence and self-confidence 
rather than one of dependency and subordination? Why should welfare act as a stimulant 
to equality rather than a substitute for it? Perhaps Wright proposes, Tawney’s “socialism 
of ‘minds and wills’ required that it should”.^  Tawney’s Christian Socialism is not 
predicated solely on welfare provision. Its first requirement is moral regeneration; its 
objective is a co-operative community of participating and responsible citizens sustained 
by the recogitition of mutual responsibility. Public provision extended as a right, accepted 
as a duty, will endorse that recognition. For Tawney, public provision is an instmment of 
enablement It will, he argues, “dissolve the servile complex” which “is a capital obstacle 
to effective action”. It will present the opportunity for self-direction, “create a 
population with the nerve and self-confidence to face the immense task of socialist 
reconstruction”.^
^  Market, State and Community, David Miller, see Introduction to this thesis. Furthermore, Julian 
Le Grand concludes after an examination into "four areas o f social policy: health care, education, 
housing and transport that public expenditure as a whole favours the better o ff rather than the 
poor". As a result. Le Grand asserts, "equality however defined has not been achieved". The 
Strategy o f Equality*, Julian Le Grand, 1982, Unwin Hyman, p.4. There are other defenders o f 
the Welfare State, including Richard Titmuss, Albert O. Hirschman, who have examined this 
thesis. Whilst Hirschman agrees that other social groups "with more clout" may benefit from 
'tranter payments', he insists that "it requires a special gift o f sophistry to argue at one and the 
same time that welfare payments have those highly advertised perverse effects on the behaviour 
patterns o f the poor and they do not reach the same poor". See the Rhetoric o f Reaction, Albert 
O. Hirschman, Harvard University Press, 1991, p.62. Julian Le Grand in spite o f his finding that 
'back-door' methods o f redistribution are now powerful enough to overcome the social and 
economic forces maintaining equality does not call for an end to redistribution. He urges instead 
that 'These forces have to be tackled another way".
\ RH . Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.llO.
"  Equality, p.l20.
227
Equality, Desirability, Achievability
Egalitarians “of all shades”, Professor Letwin insists, “are deluded by loose 
thinking and utopian fantasies”.^  For J.R. Lucas, “equality as a general goal of political 
endeavour is impossible to achieve”," while John Charvet argues that the principle of 
equality of opportunity imposes conditions for individual development which are absurd 
fantasies”.^  Professor Letwin and his contributors, then, not only dismiss egalitarianism 
as theoretically weak, intellectually incoherent and economically inefficient, they challenge 
its goals as unattainable, its vision as utopian.
Egalitarians, then, are confronted not only by those who question the desirability 
of equality but also by those who dismiss the notion as unachievable. Ultimately, 
however, this confrontation may be seen as a disagreement between opposing sets of 
unbelievers, those who hke Professor Letwin describe egalitarians as victims of utopian 
fantasies, “grotesquely optimistic in supposing that equality will bring in its train” ... 
“liberty, wealth, justice and general virtue” '^^  and those who like J.R. Lucas, “discern 
positive merits in some forms of inequality”.  ^ Tawney is not “grotesquely optimistic”: yet 
he argues that to dismiss the pursuit of equality as an unachievable goal stands on a par 
with “using the impossibility of absolute cleanliness as a pretext for rolling in a manure 
heap”.vi
Yet, if Tawney has little faith in the ability of “egotistic, greedy, quarrelsome man” 
to create a Utopia, he insists, nevertheless, that “a change of system or machinery can 
create an environment in which the causes of social malaise are not encouraged”.^"
\ The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality', p.69.
(( 'Against Equality Again ', JJi. Lucas, see Against Equality, p.105.
The Idea o f Equality as a Substantive Principle o f Justice', John Charvet, 1969, see Against 
Equality, p JIG!111.
The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality', p. 70.
^ 'Against Equality Again', J. R. Lucas, see Against Equality, p .74.
Equality, pJ6.
The Acquisitive Society, p  .222.
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Equality, he concedes, may be outside the ability of man to achieve but since all men and 
women are members one of the other, we are bound in common humanity to strive 
towards it. To ignore this obligation, Tawney asserts, “is like denying the importance of 
honesty because no one can be wholly honest”.^
This assertion is not an expression of a belief in mankind’s ultimate capacity for 
perfectibility. It is, rather, a manifestation of a conviction that economic, social and 
political institutions, informed by moral standards can create a more equitable society. It 
is, an expression, however, of Tawney’s belief that although few ordinary men and 
women can aspire to the spiritual grace of Mother Theresa or Mahatma Ghandi, they may, 
nevertheless, in concert, strive to create a society in which all may equally aspire to a life 
of dignity and self respect. Certainly, Tawney’s life bears wimess to his understanding that 
“the day is short and the work is great” (yet) “it is not thy duty to complete the work, 
neither art though &ee to desist from it”." Tawney “did not desist from the work”; his 
commitment to equality is tempered by the pragmatic understanding that a perfect 
application of every egalitarian principle is unattainable. Nevertheless, as Ross Terrill 
insists, “Tawney did bring equality nearer in England”.^  Furthermore, his moral 
commitment to a philosophy which respects the rights of all men and considers each man 
worthy of equal consideration must encompass within it the resolve to improve, if not 
bring to perfection, the conditions of the disadvantaged. Certainly, Tawney has no quarrel 
with Professor Letwin and his contributors who demonstrate that the ‘ideal’ of absolute 
equality is chimerical. But, as Michael Quinn judiciously argues, “to admit that something 
is not ultimately attainable, even logically, is not equivalent to an admission that the 
pursuit of that thing is irrational at least as long as that thing admits of relative degrees of 
achievement”"^ In a moral society, Tawney submits, “social institutions, economic
* The Acquisitive Society, pJ6.
"  The Funeral Service, see The Authoritative Daily Prayer Book o f The Hebrew Congregation o f
the British Empire, Eyre and Spottiswood, 1968 edition, p.422.
RH . Tawney and His Times, Ross Terrill, p.l93.
Justice and Egalitarianism, Michael Quinn, p .l80, Garland Publishing Inc. 1989.
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activity, industrial organisation” ... “are judged by standards of right and wrong”. Such 
“institutions, activities, organisations, derive a certain sacramental significance from the 
spiritual end to which ... they are ultimately related”. “They beconie”, he asserts, “stages 
in the progress of mankind to perfection”.^  NB
Equality And ‘The High Moral Ground’
J.R. Lucas resents “the high moral line” taken by many egalitarians who tell him 
not to set his heart on mere monetary values”." He recognises that “there are greater 
things in life than money”, but, he argues, “if in spite of this evaluation I greedily pursue 
riches and I am successful in acquiring them”, egalitarians “ought not to bellyache at ray 
having done better than they”. If “I ought not to be greedy”, he argues, “they ought not 
to be envious”: “high mindedness about money”, he asserts, with indignation, “falls into a 
category which counsels perfection”, which, he insists, is the private concern of each 
individual”. It is not, he asserts, in defence of what he perceives as the freedom of the 
individual, “the right of one person to dictate to another the conduct of his life, or to 
propose which goals and ambitions it is morally proper for him to pursue”.^  The 
wrongness of riches, he insists, has not been established; not all gains are ill gotten, and 
since “the institution of money is defined by rules,” its legitimate acquisition breaks no 
moral or legal code. For Lucas, therefore, the egalitarian moral argument appears to be 
valid only because of the “confusion” in modes of moral discourse. Lucas concludes his 
judgement with the declaration that “wealth is a ‘good’ which men often seek, and at 
least sometimes legitimately and sometimes to the general benefit of society.
* The Acquisitive Society, p.235.
^  This submission is endorsed by Ernst Cassirer ...'Tt follows from the nature o f  ethical thought".
Cassirer proposes, "that it can never condescend to the ‘given' ... the ethical world is never
'given', it is forever in the making". Quoted by Irving Howe, “The Spirit o f the Times', Dissent, 
Spring 1993, p.133.
“ 'Against Equality Again ', JJR. Lucas, see Against Equality, p.104.
Ibid, p.10314.
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“Millionaires are like marquises”, he claims (ignoring all republican sentiment or 
egalitarian qualification), “one wants them to exist, although not be one oneself*.^
Lucas perceives a “confusion in the modes of moral discourse”. Yet critics who 
oppose equality on the grounds that it constrains individual liberty can hardly complain 
when under the rule of law and within a democratic society, egalitarians present what they 
regard as the moral case for equality. Nevertheless, Tawney must confront the charge 
that he is “engaged in the politics of moral exhortation” nor can he deny his belief “that 
socialism is morally superior to capitalism”. Tawney, the economic historian, 
acknowledged that in the name of equality men and women had defended repressive 
dictatorship and excused the suppression of liberty. Can he, then, escape Lucas’s 
allegation that “high minded egalitarians” threaten the individual’s liberty to fieely pursue 
a legitimately chosen end or that they “assume to dictate to another the conduct of his 
life”? Tawney is a Christian Socialist; his political philosophy is predicated on the 
persuasive content of his ethical argument. Equality, he insists, can only be sanctioned ty 
consensual agreement. Legislation, democratically approved, must legitimise every 
egalitarian measure. He offered, as Anthony Wright proposes, “the prospect of a moral 
consensus as the basis of a socialist society of common ends”." Ultimately, Tawney must 
“appeal to principles”. He is concerned to establish a moral community in which 
industrial organisation, social institutions and economic activity are judged by moral 
standards. Such a Socialism insists that its objectives must only be achieved “by the 
methods proper to democracy”.^  Such a Socialism cannot countenance the enforced 
imposition of equality, or any other perceived social good.
\ Against Equality Again, p.l04.
RJH. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p,147.
'Christianity and the Social Order', 1935, see The Attack, p,165.
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Tawney, Equality And Christianity
Tawney’s egalitarianism is ultimately grounded in the tenet of Christian faith 
which proclaims that “since all men are the children of God all men are equal”. For 
Tawney, this tenet, while it concedes inequalities of personal capacities, will not tolerate 
unjustifiable inequalities which evolve out of the social and economic environment and 
serve to “emphasise the differences which divide men, rather than strengthen the common 
humanity which unites them”.^  Professor Letwin admits that “Christianity may have been a 
powerful influence in propagating the beliefs that underlie contemporary egalitarianism”.^ 
Nevertheless, he points to a theological variation in the egalitarian argument, the doctrine 
of election within Calvinism, he insists, opposes the ideal of equality. Indeed, there are 
interpretations of Christianity which endorse a rigid, hierarchical social order.NBl Yet, 
Professor Letwin argues, even if the present vogue for egalitarianism owes much to 
Christian teaching, this historical truth cannot now be mustered as a rationally compelling 
argument in favour of equality. He dismisses, as “a perplexing manifestation of 
unreasoned faith “the declaration that all men are equal in the sight of God”. Powerful as 
faith is”, he concludes, “it cannot perform the office of reason”.^  NB2
Yet every sincerely held political view involves a dimension of faith and conviction 
just as it involves a dimension of reason. Moral values do not derive from pragmatic 
investigation, and practicalities and possibilities are not generated by moral principles.
\ Equality, p.49.
“  The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality', p54.
See Chapter III An Examination o f the Writings ofT.S. Eliot.
The Case Against Equality', Letwin, see Against Equality', p.54.
There are, however, political theorists who would challenge the basis o f  Professor Letwin's 
proposition. T. D Weldon, for instance, denies "the usefulness or even the possibility o f providing 
a foundation o f a political viewpoint". Weldon argues that reason always rests, ultimately on non 
rational premises ..."either they are logically empty and thus have no consequences, or they are 
mistaken and harmful empirical generalisations open to refutation". Weldon, in what Phillip 
Cummings describes as the first full-scale analytic treatment o f the problems o f political 
philosophy argued that "a great deal needs to be done about the language in which discussions o f 
political philosophy are conducted". The Vocabulary o f Politics'. TD . Weldon, Harmondsworth 
Press, 1953, p.l72. See Encyclopaedia o f Philosophy, Vol. VI, Macmillan Publishing Co, 1972 
edition, p.385.
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Tawney’s constant appeal to moral values is clearly underpinned by his Christian faith, but 
the appeal is not addressed solely to Christian values nor does it demand unquestioning 
faith. Tawney, as has been noted, did not “generally frame his writings in Christian terms 
or present them as exemplifications of Christian doctrine”.^  The appeal, then, is addressed 
to the humanist spirit which cherishes fellowship, respects the common humanity of all 
mankind and is dedicated “to cultivate in all men the powers which make for energy and 
refinement”.^
While various of Professor Letwin’s contributors briefly acknowledge a religious 
dimension in the egalitarian case, it is Professor Johnson who notes “how thoroughly the 
current discussion of the inequality of the competitive system and the inequality of income 
distribution is penetrated by Christian precepts”. Since, Johnson suggests, so many 
advocates of redistribution pride themselves on their liberation from religious beliefs “it is 
strange that these liberals uphold social views which are based on the supreme 
commandment of the New Testament” - “Love Thy Neighbour as thyself’. As for the 
Marxists and “the more radical egalitarians”, their views are derived, Johnson insists, from 
the Old Testament, which he claims, “is also preferred by bigoted and violent 
fundamentalists”, who endorse its emphasis on the superiority of ‘the chosen people’ “its 
callousness towards murder, plague and the pestilential persecution of the unwashed”.^  
Religion, Johnson asserts, is a consumption, “not a productive activity”; it contributes 
only prayers for the success of the productive effort against the hazards of nature and the 
benign negligence of God Himself’. Yet, he argues, “it claims its material title frx>m the 
harvest”, and Johnson insists society may be badly advised to take its advice on economic 
morality from “parasites on the social surplus whatever the claims for moral entitlement to 
that position may be”. Indeed, while Tawney notes with regret that the very conception 
of religion as an inspiration and standards of social life and corporate effort has been
* R Ji. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p,19.
“  Equality, p,85.
Equality and Economic Theory', Harry G Johnson, 1975, see Against Equality, p283.
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forgotten, Johnson questions, why, in a secular society, any popular social policy 
discussion should remain a religious activity?
It is a question which Tawney addresses. Since, he insists, “social institutions are 
the visible expression of the moral values which rules the minds of individuals” ... “it is 
impossible to alter social institutions without altering that valuation”.' For Tawney it is 
ultimately moral values which determine the nature of society, for, he asserts, no 
discussion on social policy can be separated from ethical consideration. While Professor 
Johnson, decries the ultimate dominance of religious concepts which permeate egalitarian 
arguments, Tawney insists that it is not mere poverty which produces the dissensions 
which divide society. They result, he declares, finom “the consciousness of a moral 
wrong”, “from the feeling of abhorrence against an outrage against what is sacred in 
man”."
Tawney’s social philosophy is predicated upon this understanding of “what is 
sacred in man”. He would accept with pride the allegation that his social views are 
penetrated by Christian concepts, determined by Christian values, directed by moral 
consciousness. He, would not deny that his philosophy endorses “the supreme 
commandment of the New Testament”. He would, however, compound the 
commandment to “Love Thy Neighbour”, with the injunction of St Paul to “Bear ye one 
another’s burdens and so fulfil the law of Christ” (Gal: 6:2).^® Tawney regards obedience 
to this injunction as a fundamental Christian duty. It is an injunction which demands of 
Christians a contribution beyond prayers for the productive effort, for it imposes on them 
the obligation “to try the institutions and procedure of society by the standards of 
[Christian] faith”.'"
'  The Commonplace Book, entry for 10 June 1912.
"  'Christianity and The Social Order', see The Attack, p.l67.
^  Tawney in defence o f communal medical provision quotes the first part o f this verse. It is not he
suggests "merely the voice o f piety" ... "but also o f economic prudence". Equality p .l 39.
Equality, p.l70.
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Tawney sees in Christianity “at its best” ... “as a dynamic and revolutionary force”. 
The Capitalist system which Professor Johnson insists provides “the politically free and 
affluent society we are accustomed to”, he regards as “not so much unchristian but anti- 
Christian”.* Capitalism, he insists, has created a society in which the violation of the spirit 
of community is compounded by mthless economic exploitation. Certainly, the 
competitive system as Tawney perceives it, with its emphasis on the supreme importance 
of material wealth, the intensity of its appeal to the acquisitive appetites does not equate 
with the supreme commandment of the New Testament”. Nor, for Tawney, can men 
within a society of privilege, exploitation, and self interest, fulfil those “laws of Christ” 
which enjoins them to brotherhood. Tawney, in ‘The Attack’ invokes the “unbreakable 
spirit of comradeship” expressed by William Morris ... “fellowship is life, and lack of 
fellowship is death”. Tawney, too, committed of “the law of Christ”, understands that 
one cannot regard men as brothers unless in some measure one shares their lives.
Tawney, then, fortified by Christian faith exercises “the moral entitlement” to 
advise on economic morality. It is this faith which provides him with the moral authority 
to demand “a right order of society, in which “the disease of inequality” would not longer 
support “an economic liability of alarming dimensions”. But it is a demand advanced not 
only in the name of Christian fellowship, but also in the pragmatic understanding that 
“common sense and a respect for realities are not less Graces of the spirit than moral 
zeal”.^ It is a demand animated by a scale of moral values which not only rejects the 
notion of gain without service, but “assigns to economic activity its proper place as the 
servant, not the master of society”.^ * Indeed, Tawney proposes, the burden of our 
civilisation is not merely the inequitable distribution of wealth, the tyranny of privilege or 
even class dissension. The burden, he insists, derives firom the exclusive predominance of 
materialistic values the obsession with economic issues, which, to the detriment of “the
( Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism, p.276.
“  The Acquisitive Society, p241.
Ibid, p J  14,
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dignity and refinement “of the human beings who compose it thwart the spiritual ends and 
distort the moral values which are the mark of a civilized society”. He is instead, rejecting 
its ‘moral’ principles which insists that “the free exercise of rights is the main interest of 
society and the discharge of obligations a secondary, incidental consequence which may 
be left to take care of itself’.^  He is, too, challenging Professor Johnson’s assertion that 
democratic society requires a “convention which draws a clear line (if this is possible) 
between political activity as concerned with people and economic life as concerned with 
capital”.^ It is, curiously, a distinction which Tawney has already identified, “Capital”, he 
argues, “consists of things and labour consists of persons”, “the only use for things, he 
insists is to be applied to the service of persons”.^  He does not demand, therefore, that 
“economic life”, be divorced fi*om “political activity”, and be allocated a separate sphere. 
Indeed, Tawney’s appeal for a recourse to moral principles, leads him to conclude that “a 
society must so organise its industry that the instrumental character of economic activity 
is emphasised by it subordination to the social purpose for which it is carried on”.
For Tawney, these “ends” of economic activity must necessarily be agreed within 
a society in which “each has the power to contribute and in which each may share in the 
common good”. These same “ends” demand also a standard of moral values which 
determines not only the purpose to which such endeavour should be applied, but also “the 
criteria by which its success may be judged”. It is this standard of moral values which 
prompts Tawney’s attempt to reawaken the historic determination of the Christian Church 
... “its effort so often corrupt and pettifogging in practice”, to assert, once again, “the 
superiority of moral principles over economic appetites”. Ethical thought, Isaiah Berlin 
proposes, “consists of a systematic examination of the relations of human beings to each 
other”. “These conceptions of how life should be lived are objects of enquiry”. “They are 
called, (when applied to mankind) political philosophy, which is but ethics applied to
* 'Equality and Economic Theory', Harry G Johnson, see Against Equality, p. 285.
“ Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism, p. 279.
Ibid,p.279.
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society”.^  It is a proposition which Tawney would not dispute. Into his own “conception 
of how life should be lived”, he sought to revive Christian values, and “work, once more, 
the Christian virtues into the spotted texture of individual character and social conduct”.^
Professor Johnson’s complaint, therefore, that questions of inequality and 
redistribution within a competitive system are penetrated by the Christian precepts of 
those who seek to apply religious principles to a secular society, are not, as far as they go, 
imreasonable. Certainly Tawney’s social philosophy derives fiom his own religious 
convictions. His appeal to principles, however, is not addressed solely to those who share 
his Christian faith. It is directed to the universal humanist spirit which, he insists, “is not 
the exclusive possession of either those who reject some particular body of religious 
doctrine or of those who accept it”. It is a spirit, directed towards an end, and that end, 
Tawney proclaims,... “is the growth towards perfection of individual human beings”.^
\ Isaiah Berlin, New York Review o f Books, June 1989.
“  Religion and the Rise o f Cc^italism, p.279.
Equality, p. 85.
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CHAPTER VI 
The Contemporary Relevance Of The Social 
And Political Theories Of R H Tawney
I have in this section of the thesis sought to defend the contemporary relevance of 
Tawney’s thought in the light of the social, economic and political changes which have 
occurred since he first formulated his social theories and political philosophy. I have 
sought to demonstrate, drawing on Tawney’ writings, the necessity of co-operative and 
collective effort within a world of finite resources and economic and ecological 
interdependence. Again, utilising Tawney’s writings to support my thesis, I have sought 
to assess Tawney’s egalitarianism in the tight of libertarian arguments of contemporary 
conservative thinkers who argue that the economics of the fi*ee-market, and the 
recognition of equal political rights have invalidated the egalitarian case. I have employed 
this same method with the views tike those tike Atisdair McIntyre who accuse him of lack 
of “political intelligence and imagination”, and “high mindedness”. I have argued, ly 
reference to Tawney’s writings, the necessity of such social organisation as will ensure a 
society of co-operation and mutual obligation in the face of new technology and new 
methods of production which are transforming the established relationship between capital 
and labour. I have examined Tawney’s egalitarian views in relation to the legitimate 
concerns of those, who tike Anne Phillips, seek to extend the notion of equality beyond 
the narrow and traditionally male-orientated understanding of ‘fraternity’. I have 
examined the analyses of those, who tike David Marquand and Anthony Wright have 
sympathetically, but not uncritically, analysed and assessed the contemporary relevance of 
Tawney’s thought. I have sought to demonstrate that while Tawney’s philosophy is 
derived from his Christian faith and sustained by the attendant moral values, he is also, 
based on his understanding of the English character, a pragmatic thinker in the English 
philosophic tradition. In conclusion I hope to reach some judgement concerning the
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enduring value of Tawney’s philosophy, and to indicate the tensions, the weaknesses and 
the strengths of his thought.
Consensus Reached, Consensus Broken
In the eighty years since Tawney, in his COMMONPLACE BOOK, set out the 
foundations of his social philosophy, the world has been witness to revolutions, the 
overthrow of dynasties, the end of empires. The ... “world made by and for the liberal 
middle classes in the name of progress and civilisation”  ^has seen the barbarities of death 
camps, the horrors of Auschwitz, of Kolyma, of Hiroshima ... “Christ walks again”, the 
poet cried,
... “He walks on the Sea of Blood,
He comes in the terrible Rain”."
Out of the class confrontation, the fear, the envy and the resentment, which Tawney 
identifies in THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY, came ruthless totalitarianism dedicated to 
the destruction of the ... class enemy... the racially impure ... the counter-revolutionary ... 
the left wing... the right wing deviationary.
Then, after ‘the age of anxiety’ which bridged the two world wars, after the 
hardship and the hunger of mass unemployment, after the victory over fascism, there 
emerged a new demand for social justice and a new resolve to achieve it. The British 
people who had endured the unavoidable terrors of war were no longer willing to endure 
the avoidable miseries of peace, and then...
“the lost travellers.
* The Age O f Empire, Introduction, Eric Hobsbawm, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987.
"  The Shadow o f Cain, Edith Sitwell, circa 2942.
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with sun bleached hair dazed
upon the gangway,
came home again with all the applauding windows open”.^
and a newly elected government, in accordance with its mandate, committed itself to 
provide what it perceived as ... “those requirements which make the essentials of a 
civilised life a common possession”.^ The nation which had been united in common 
purpose endorsed, although not without some opposition, the provision of communal 
health care, of improved environmental conditions, of an extension of educational 
opportunity and such social organisation as would create that sense of security which 
makes possible a life of dignity and self-respect. Slowly, through democratic process, the 
concept of collective provision was generally accepted, its purposes acclaimed, its 
methods established. There was, T.H. Marshall argues,... “an urge in the wide currency 
of the term welfare state, to find in the concept of ‘welfare’, a single axial principle for the 
new social order.”ü^  The majority of the electorate, it was widely acknowledged by all 
political parties, approved of state provided social benefits and would guard their rights to 
them jealously.
In the aftermath of war, Tawney’s vision of moral regeneration, of a society 
without privilege of a society of obligation and function, was not realised. While (in 
1950) he welcomed the post-war expansion of public provision, he insisted, quoting 
Professor Richard Titmuss, “that the conversion of a cheap makeshift provided for the 
lowest class in a society based on competitive individualism into a vast co-ordinated plan 
for the betterment of an entire community is still at an early stage”.^  ^ Certainly, Tawney’s 
ideal of a society in which men and women might share an equality of responsibility in the
* ’Armistice', see The Terrible Rain, John Lehmann, 1945, The War Poets, Methuen, 1966, p.l88.
“  Equality, p .l 34.
Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays, TH. Marshall, Cambridge University Press, 
1950, p.56.
Equality, 1952, Chapter Vll, Epilogue 1938-1950.
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economic direction of their lives and an equality of individual liberty which evolves fiom 
an equality of economic power did not materialise. The continuing inequalities of 
environmental conditions and educational facilities had not engendered an equality of 
opportunity or facilitated the establishment of an authentic common culture. Clearly, 
Tawney declared “the time of congratulations has not yet come”, but, he asserted, “the 
significant fact is that it is on the way”.^  Nevertheless, over the concept of welfare, 
where, for so long there had been sharp division, there was now broad agreement. Where 
there had been opposition, there was now consensus. This consensus, David Marquand 
suggests, ... “prevailed for about thirty years”. In the face of changing social and 
economic conditions, of rising living standards and the blurring of the traditional class 
divisions, the consensus was gradually eroded. It has now plainly broken down, ... “but 
no new consensus has replaced it”." The consensual commitment to the welfare state and 
the co-existence of large public and private sectors in the economy has been challenged by 
a libertarian philosophy which rebuts post-war Keynesian economic practices and 
advocates, instead, a fijee market economy with limited government intervention. It is a 
philosophy which, in its dedication to individualist values, seeks to create the conditions 
for a property-owning, share owning society. It is a philosophy with no enthusiasm for 
collective provision; certainly it is not concerned to extend it. It is a philosophy which 
rejects Tawney’s social and political theories. It is a philosophy which raises a question: 
what in a society which has replaced the priority of common purpose with the pursuit of 
private ends, is the contemporary relevance of the philosophy of R.H. Tawney?
Tawney, in a critical review of M.H. Dobson’s STUDIES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORY, recommended, in the interest of scholarship and 
impartial judgement, that “respect for a thinker is shown not by respecting what two 
generations ago he said, but by considering what, in the light of knowledge acquired since
* Equality, 1952, Chapter VII, Epilogue 1938-1950.
"  The Unprincipled Society, David Marquand, Fontana Press, 1988, p.l8.
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he wrote, he might now be disposed to say”.^  Certainly, in the light of the changes, social, 
pohtical and economic of the last decades, with the application of ‘New Right’ economic 
and social theories, in the face of the apparent acceptance of a new libertarian spirit of 
individualism, it is proper to consider what Tawney “might now be disposed to say”. It is 
appropriate, also, to re-examine Tawney’s social philosophy in a world in which the 
‘globalisation’ of the market place, the emergence of new centres of industrial production 
and revolutionary technological advances have presented a challenge to the hegemony of 
the established industrial powers. Yet a world which has seen the collapse of the 
erstwhile Soviet Union, the failure of Maix-Leninism and the end of the ‘cold war’, is still 
confronted with disease, poverty, unemployment, hunger and inflation. It faces, too, the 
unprecedented dangers of ecological disaster in the wake of unregulated and irresponsible 
economic expansion. In such a world, threatened, insecure, it is indeed proper to “pay 
respect” to the thought of R.H. Tawney and consider, what, “in the light of knowledge 
since acquired he might now be disposed to say”.
Tawney’s philosophy was first formulated in what, in retrospect, was a more 
stable age. Yet, if the peace proved to be fragile and the stability insecure, the principles, 
rooted in Christian faith which inspired the philosophy, remained unchanged and the 
resolve to realise them undiminished. From this philosophy there emanated the conviction 
that the &st requirement for ... “ a reconstruction of society” is a recourse to moral 
principles. From this philosophy there evolves, too, a vision of a society of ‘function’, a 
community of mutual obligation, of common purpose, of a common culture, of fellowship 
and co-operation. From these same principles came Tawney’s uncompromising 
commitment to equality. Yet, even as he acknowledged in 1950, that without the ... 
“alarms and excursions” forecast by the anti-egalitarians there had been achieved through 
democratic process a progress towards a more egalitarian society, and conceded th a t... 
“it was legitimate to feel a modest pride that a course in the right direction had been
The History o f Capitalism', R.H. Tawney, History & Society, Routledge &. Kegan Paid, 1950,
p211.
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held”, he regretfully complained that ... “the devils of insolence and servility” which ... 
“the poison of inequality engenders, had not yet been eliminated”.^  There still existed a 
society which did not extend equally to each individual the fieedom to responsibly 
participate in decisions which directly affected their lives. There still existed inequalities 
of opportunity, of education, of environment. ^
Most disappointingly for Tawney, there still existed a misunderstanding of a 
cardinal egalitarian argument... “the disparities of life which cut deepest”, he insisted, 
“are a matter not merely of income, but of life”.“ It is currently claimed by egalitarians 
that these complaints are still valid. However, some anti-egalitarians dispute this claim. 
There is, they argue, and there always will be, a hard core of social misfits unable or 
unwilling to cope with normal social conditions. There remains, too, it is submitted, an 
underclass, deprived, uneducated, perhaps uneducable, which resist every attempt to 
absorb them into the mainstream of conventional life. Yet, it is proposed, that with the 
exception of these minority groups, a gradual yet relentless process of equalisation has 
made obsolete the traditional notions of an exploited and subservient working class. We 
have witnessed, it is postulated, a social and economic revolution. In the face of the 
inexorable equalisation it is asserted, the bastions of privilege and the hierarchies of power 
are visibly crumbling. Thus, it is argued, the egalitarian case, at least in democratic 
industrial societies, is irrelevant and anachronistic. Certainly, Tawney recognised that 
there had been progress towards a more equal social order. He acknowledged the 
improvements in social conditions which resulted from the post-war welfare legislation. 
He was quick to point out that against the warnings of the anti-egalitarians, this legislation 
had been effected without repression. Yet, it may be argued, to assess Tawney’s social 
theories merely in reference to whether or not there exists a persistent tendency towards
* Equality, p222.
NB Tawney's concern for education is still relevant when in 1994, in England, one hundred and
seventy-seven o f the top two hundred schools ranked by A level results are private. See The Seven 
Cultures Of Capitalism, Charles Hampden Turner and Alfons Trompenaais, Piatkus Books, 1994.
“  Equality, p222.
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equalisation and whether or not this tendency is irreversible, is to underestimate the range 
of Tawney’s thought. As Anthony Crosland argued, (in 1974) in spite of the great social 
and economic changes which followed the war “even after six years of Labour rule Britain 
is conspicuous for its persistent and glaring class inequalities” ... “extreme class 
inequalities remain”.^  There were still gross inequalities of wealth and income and the 
consequent inequalities of power.
Some Critical Views: An Attack From The Left
Tawney’s political philosophy is not only subject to the criticism of libertarian 
ideologists and advocates of laissez-faire economics. When Alisdair McIntyre insists that 
Tawney’s social theories are irrelevant," he attacks 6om the left While McIntyre grants 
that Tawney was “full of high moral purpose”, he declares Tawney’s ... “cliché ridden 
high mindedness” to be suspect. McIntyre argues that the ‘socialist’ policies implemented 
after 1945 were not, as Tawney had suggested, ... “the deliberate choice of the Labour 
Party” but were coincidental to Tawney’s recommendations. Indeed, he claims that in 
spite o f ... “the frustrations and disillusionment of its working class supporters, the Labour 
Party had provided ... “the necessary and inevitable solution to the problem of laying a 
new basis for British capitalism”. Tawney, McIntyre argues, not only underrated ... “the 
resources of an intelligent conservative defence of capitalism”, he also overlooked the 
capitalism of the big corporations which may, for its own purposes, accept trade 
unionism, the welfare state and even measures of state intervention and public control. 
Furthermore, McIntyre insists, the orthodox Labour Party on which Tawney pinned his 
hopes for social change was increasingly the political expression of technocrats and 
managers rather than of the workers. It was, McIntyre suggests,... “merely an alternative
* Socialism Now, Anthony Crosland, Jonathan Cape, 1974, p.23.
^  Contemporary statistics are not encouraging. "An analysis o f Department o f Employment
statistics showed the gap between the lowest and average earners is widening". "Nearly ten
million British workers earn less than the European Decency Threshold*. See Report o f the Low 
Pay Unit, Sept., 1992.
"  *The Socialism o f RM. Tawney*, Alisdair McIntyre, New York Review o f Books, Sept., 1964.
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Conservative Party”, a fact... “ which Tawney succeeded in concealing tiom himself and 
others”. This attack not only charges Tawney with complacency, it compounds the 
charge with an alleged... “lack of political imagination and intelligence”.^ ^
Curiously, as if in response to Tawney’s recommendation concerning the “respect 
due to a thinker” for ... “ what he might be now disposed to say”, McIntyre questions 
whether it may ... “perhaps be absurd to criticise Tawney for being limited by the horizons 
of this period”. Yet, having quite properly posed the question, he proceeds with the 
criticism on the grounds of Tawney’s ... “profound misunderstanding of the role and 
achievements of the post-war Labour government”. Plainly, an assessment of the role 
and the achievements of the post-war Labour government is beyond the scope of this 
thesis; yet, it may reasonably be argued that McIntyre’s perception of a working class ... 
“frustrated and disillusioned” because they had been denied a more radical socialism by 
the political ineptitude of high minded moralists is open to q u e s t i o n . N B 2  Similarly, 
McIntyre’s criticism of Tawney’s failure to press for the complete public ownership of 
industry evolves from a profound misunderstanding of Tawney’s position on 
nationalisation. Certainly, Tawney demands the nationalisation of the key industries, ... 
“the mines, the railways, the canals, etc.”  ^ Yet, nationalisation, Tawney argues ... “ is not 
by itself an end, it is a means to an end”, (and)... “when the question of ownership has
The assessment was advanced in 1964. It is possible ... "in the light o f knowledge since 
acquired", that after the disintegration o f the Soviet system and the reappraisal and more general 
acceptance o f social democratic policies, Mclntyre*s condemnation o f Tawney’s position might be 
less severe.
Indeed, it may be argued that McIntyre’s perception derives from  ... "a profound 
misunderstanding" o f what, (in 1945), was the political temper o f the British working-class. 
True, the five post-war priorities and expectancies o f the British people were "Less class 
distinctions. Education reforms. Levelling o f income. More state control. Increased social 
services". See ’Mass Observation’ report 1943.
Nevertheless, in the 1945 election the Communist Party o f Great Britain committed to 
achieve precisely these priorities, presented a "radical socialist programme" which included 
the public ownership o f industry, the banks, etc. The party polled 102,780 votes a minuscule 
0.04% o f the national total. They gained one parliamentary seat, bringing their total to two. In 
1950, with 100 candidates, the party vote fell to 91,746, (o.03% o f the national total) They lost 
both seats. See Parliamentary Elections Aspects o f Britain. See HMSO Publication, I99I, 
p.41142.
* The Acquisitive Society, p.I49.
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been settled the question of administration still remains”.^  Unequivocally, Tawney asserts, 
public accountability is essential to ensure that the purpose of industry is efiBciently 
realised Nevertheless, he insists, it is the understanding that the overriding purpose of 
industry is the provision of public service, rather than private gain, which must determine 
the ownership structure of any particular enterprise. Tawney, in spite of McIntyre’s 
complaint concerning his attitude to ... “the big corporations”, perceives the dangers of an 
over centralised public sector and of an all-powerful state of excessive bureaucratic 
control. The administrative body which succeeds private ownership, he insists, must not 
be a department dependent on the government but rather ... “ an authority which 
represents those who supply the service and those who use it”." Tawney is committed to 
the decentralisation of power and the extension of local government, he proposes that the 
control of certain industries be invested not in Whitehall but in ... “the little republics of 
Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds”.^  Furthermore, he suggests, the Co-operative 
Movement can also provide an efficient distribution of goods and service without a 
commitment to the maximisation of profit. His concern, then, is to divert industry fiom 
the acquisition of private gain to the performance of public function. To this end he 
proposes worker and consumer participation in the processes of production and 
distribution, the “professionalisation” of industry in an effort to ensure standards of 
excellence, efficiency and dedication. The essential condition is ultimately public control, 
he argues, but there are ways of replacing private ownership other than by nationalisation. 
There are, he observes, “more ways of killing a cat than drowning it in cream”.^ ^
... “The heart of the matter for Tawney”, McIntyre judges, “is the moral deficiency 
of capitalism”. It is a perceptive judgement. Tawney was an Ethical Socialist, a 
Christian. He argued that a ... “moral regeneration was the necessary condition of a 
reorganisation of society”. He had. Professor Halsey and Norman Dennis insist, ... “a
* The Acquisitive Society, p.l55.
» Ibid,p.l49.
Ibid,p.l55.
Ibid,p.l55.
246
vision of society embodying a set of ideals”; these ideals illuminated his social philosophy. 
Yet, if Tawney’s demands for moral regeneration coincided with the declining authority 
and weakening influence of the Christian Church, he had, bom of experience, an 
understanding of ... “the good sense, pertinacity, nerve and resolution of the loveable, 
pigheaded, exasperating, Henry Dubb”.‘ He had, too, a pragmatic understanding of the 
British Labour Movement, its strengths and its weakness. ^  Indeed, his research into 
the American Labour Movement had deepened his understanding of its British 
counterpart. He recognised how the working class movement in Britain had developed, in 
the face of industrialisation, its own peculiar traditions, values and loyalties.
It is not, then, as Alisdair McIntyre alleges “a lack of political intelligence and 
imagination” which undermines Tawney’s political convictions. Dubb, Tawney asserts, 
will not lightly surrender such hard-won rights as he possesses: he will guard them 
jealously; for Tawney insists,... “He is more sensible than some of his intellectual pastors 
in thinking them worth h av in g ”."  Furthermore, as David Reisman insists, Tawney is 
committed to a socialism which is democratic. His belief in democracy, Reisman argues, 
... “extends not only to its conception but also to its mode of operation”.^  For Tawney, 
Reisman asserts, democratic socialism pre-supposes ... “not a revolution led by a 
vanguard of activists ..*. but rather a peaceful and democratic revolution radiating out fiom 
polity to e c o n o m y ” .^ v  Such a revolution finds its inspiration ... “not in inexorable 
evolutionary laws of historical and political economy” but in the evaluation and rejection 
of the values of the acquisitive society.
Tawney’s social vision, then, rests on this understanding of social democracy: the 
democratic rights which sustain it and the need to defend them. It rests, too, on the
* 'Christianity and The Social Revolution', 1935, see The Attack, p.I66.
^  'The American Labour Movement', R.H. Tawney, 1942, see The American Labour Movement and
Other Essays, Ed. JM . Winter, Harvester Press, 1979.
(( 'Christianity and The Social Revolution', 1935, see The Attack, p.166.
State and Welfare: Tawney, Galbraith and Adam Snuth, David Reisman, Macmillan, 1982, p29. 
Ibid, p.29.
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perception that an all-powerful state threatens that concept of liberty which is an essential 
condition for the exercise of individually chosen ends. It rests on the rejection of a 
‘socialism’ which places the sovereignty of the all-powerful state above the legitimate 
freedom of the individual. Such a rejection endorses what William Temple held as an 
essential ‘Christian Social Principle’ which insists tha t... “the person is primary, not the 
society: The State exists for the citizen, not the citizen for the State”.^
Yet, ultimately Tawney’s social vision rests on a notion of democratic 
government, which, Anthony Arblaster suggests, is expressed “in the idea of popular 
power, of a situation in which power and perhaps authority rests with the people”. Such 
authority, Arblaster argues, “while it may look to the people as the ultimate political 
authority need not be exclusively political. It often takes the form “of the idea of popular 
sovereignty”,^ which, Tawney argues, “extends to the majority the democratic right to 
make or unmake governments”.^  It rests, too, on the proposition that a social 
philosophy concerned with the “muddled soul of Henry Dubb”, permeated by a morality 
which emphasises fellowship, community, and mutual obligation, cannot, in an 
increasingly materialist world, be irrelevant
Nevertheless, the possibility of achieving broad acceptance of such a philosophy 
within a society in which Henry Dubb is no longer the archetypal citizen is perhaps the 
most vulnerable part of Tawney’s social vision, and the one most open to Mclntryre’s 
charge of “cliche-ridden high-mindedness”. The proposal for a common culture and a 
common ethical basis for social and political life clearly faces complex problems in a 
pluralistic, multi-cultural, post modem society. On the other hand, it is a feature of such 
societies that in the interest of social harmony, principled proposals for political and public 
life proliferate.
* Christianity and The Social Order, William Temple, 1942, Shepheard-Walwyn, 1976 edition, p.67. 
Democracy, Anthony Arblaster, Open University Press, 1987, p.8.
'Social Democracy in Britain’, 1949, see Radical Tradition, 1964, p.l58.
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A Feminist Critique: Anne Phillips
A contemporary reader sympathetic to Tawney’s philosophy cannot fail to 
respond to the somewhat qualified respect he pays to ... “the loveable, pig-headed, Henry 
Dubb”. Yet the same reader, confronted each day with the urgent claims for equality and 
equity engendered by the concerns of race, religion, ethnicity, sexual preference and 
gender, will note that Tawney does not address these issues. While he confesses that he 
... “has not yet despaired of Henry”, he appears to have forgotten Henrietta. Anthony 
Wright draws attention to ‘this sin of omission’ and quite properly comments that while... 
“no doubt Tawney was entirely typical of his generation, there is a conspicuous absence 
of women in his socialist argument.” The social focus, Wright proposes ... “was on class 
... this focus is too narrow for a contemporary socialism, which, nourished by feminism, 
has learned to extend its range of vision fix)m class to gender”.* Wright’s proposition is 
given emphasis by Anne Phillips in her perceptive critique of the notion of fraternity. In 
an increasingly individualist world. Professor Phillips insists, socialists ... “cast around ... 
for some surviving signs of collective feeling”." There is, she argues, a sense of regret at 
the loosening of the traditional socialist bonds of solidarity, co-operation and community. 
Phillips, after an examination of the historical background, argues that the notion of 
fraternity which evolved out of the medieval guilds and the peripatetic lives of the 
journeymen was essentially predicated ... “upon a community of single males bound 
together ... by their shared experience as From this root, she suggests, there grew 
the traditional definition of the working class as a male, and therefore, ... “solidarity 
became almost inextricably linked with masculinity”. Class unity, she asserts,... “became 
the prerogative of male workers”. Now she proposes, as the traditional centres of male 
employment decline, the new industrial sectors increasingly require the skills and services 
of women. The changed circumstances in which women now compose over 40% of the 
work force, Phillips insists, demand a more realistic concept of solidarity, which she
* R Jl. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.l47.
"  Traternity', Anne Phillips, see Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought, edited by Ben Pimlott, Fabian
Society, 1984, p 230-241.
249
sagaciously recommends, must accommodate itself to the new social, economic and
industrial environment^B1
There exists, too. Professor Phillips recognises, in spite of the understanding that 
women share a common identity as women, a division which separates working class 
women from middle class women, women with children from those without children and 
the myriad differences arising from race, religion, sexuality, etc. The notion of sisterhood, 
she suggests, even as it creates a bond, conceals these divisions. But if these differences 
exist. Professor Phillips argues, the problem of solidarity still remains, and the solution 
must reject a politics based on the self-interest which derives finom gender or background, 
or special groupings. Certainly, a notion of solidarity based on an ideal of brotherhood 
which is concerned with the exclusive and particular interests of men is inadequate. It 
must give way, as PhiUips suggests, to ... “a more complex unity that stems 6om 
recognising and facing those conflicts which can divide us”. Professor Phillips is 
concerned with contemporary issues; she is concerned to confront contemporary 
problems. While she does not directly reprimand Tawney for his failure to address the 
question of gender, in her demand for a reinterpretation of the notions of fraternity, of 
unity and solidarity she properly observes “how conspicuous is the absence of women in 
Tawney’s socialist a r g u m e n t ” . N B 2
Tawney, it must be conceded singularly failed to address the issue of gender. In 
his classic attacks on the inequalities and exploitation within industrial capitalism he 
neglected to evaluate how radically the system had effected the lives of working women. 
The changes were fundamental: “over the last fifty or sixty years as Anne Witz
NBl jfiig account o f Anne Phillips' critique is necessarily brief, her case is cogently argued, her 
complaint is justified. It is however, because o f the relevance o f her arguments in reference to 
Tawney's 'sin o f omission' that I  have gratefully enlisted her assistance.
Tawney, however, was not insensitive to the bitter struggle for women's rights ... "Women, who 
fifty years ago would have been regarded as dependent almost as completely as i f  femininity were 
an incurable disease with which they had been born ... now receive an education, support 
themselves in the professions". The Acquisitive Society, p.85.
250
demonstrates, women, in most industrial capitalist societies, have made up an increasing 
proportion of the total labour force”.* Certainly, the twentieth century has irreversibly 
transformed the role of women in society, yet, as Gisela Kaplan proposes, in spite of the 
dramatic increase in women’s participation in paid employment, “the domestic field has 
generally remained women’s work”.“ Li western industrial economies. Professor Kaplan 
agrees, “household technology has eased the burden of domestic chores. Yet, she argues, 
“such technology has not only turned the household into a consumer entity”, it has 
supposedly “fireed” women to seek employment outside the home and supplement the 
family income”.^
Yet, as Professor PhiUips recognises, solidarity is not exclusively work-based. A 
solidarity grounded in the notion of equality demands not only equal rights and equal 
opportunities, it demands equal respect This respect must be extended to those women 
whose labour, child bearing, child caring, the creation of a stable domestic environment, is 
unpaid. Inevitably, the traditional work-based unity is, in the face of changing economic 
and productive processes, beginning to lose its power. Under these circumstances. 
Professor Phillips argues, “we have to look to alternative sources of strength and 
solidarity. “Whatever solidarity we build on for the future”, she insists, “must rest on new 
foundations”.*'^  Certainly, Tawney’s vision of community equality, co-operation and 
mutual respect cannot be realised where “class unity is the prerogative of the male 
worker”.'^  Indeed, the contemporary feminist argument which rejects the male 
assumptions of competitive individualism in favour of an ethic of care and solidarity 
endorses the social values which Tawney proposes. Ironically, traditional semantic 
restriction encourages the use of the inadequate, but generally employed adjective
* 'Women at Work', Arme Witz, see Women's Studies, edited by Diane Richardson and Victoria
Robinson. Macmillan, 1993, p.274.
\\ Contemporary European Feminism: Gisela Kaplan, U.CJL. Press 1992, p.37-40 passim.
*** Ibid, p.37-40 passim.
**' 'Fraternity', Anne Phillips, see Fabian Essays in Socialist Thought, edited by Ben Pimlott, Fabian
Society, 1984, p.230-241.
V Ibid, p.236.
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fraternal, to define a moral concept which extends the ethic of care and co-operation 
beyond the boundaries of sorority.
It may be argued that Tawney’s work was concluded before the women’s 
movement of the 1960’s aroused a wide public awareness of the issues of women’s rights. 
Yet, Tawney had witnessed the struggle for women’s franchise; witnessed the exploitation 
of female labour in East End sweat-shops. He had seen, too, the changes brought about 
in employment patterns by the introduction of the typewriter and the influx into the 
workforce of female labour which were features of both the first and second world wars. 
Under these circumstances it is diffrcult to understand his failure, if not to stress, at least 
to acknowledge the importance and urgency of women’s claims to effective equality. 
Curiously, in an analysis of ‘Inequality and Social Structure’, Tawney stated (in 1931) 
that whilst class remained a salient division in Britain, gender did not, ... “for men and 
women are treated as political equals”.^  It is a statement which sadly fails to acknowledge 
that the status of women as “political equals” did not protect them from the 
discriminatory practices and prejudices of some employers and even some trade unions in 
matters of wages, promotion and equality of opportunity. Certainly, it is curious that 
while Tawney attacks those arrangements, social, economic and political which sustain 
class division, perpetuate class privilege and militate against the notion of a common 
culture he makes no explicit and direct demand for women’s rights. Yet, if there is no 
specific commitment to such rights, there is commitment to a social order... “in which, as, 
within the limits set by nature, knowledge and resources, its institutions and policies are 
such as to enable all its members to grow to their full stature,”" to realise their full 
capacities. It may be argued, in defence of the theory of community set out by Tawney, 
that such a social order, such institutions and policies, cannot exclude women. It must be 
argued, too, that such a commitment is necessarily extended, by the tenets of Tawney’s 
Christian faith, to ... “all the children of God”. Perhaps, this failure should be considered
I Equality, p57.
« Ibid,p235.
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in accordance with Tawney’s own advice, ... respect for a thinker”, he proposed, “is 
shown not by respecting what two generations ago he said, but by considering what in the 
light of knowledge acquired since he wrote, he might now be disposed to say”.^
Some Sympathetic Criticisms
While Alisdair McIntyre finds little of contemporary relevance in Tawney’s 
thought there are thinkers who, not without criticism, are prepared to defend him. 
Inevitably, they recognise the profound changes, social, economic and political of the last 
decades. They perceive that new problems require new solutions; demand new insights, 
ethical, cultural, even psychological. If they approve the accolades directed at Tawney’s 
thought,^ 1 they must consider the brickbats.^^ They must, too, after four decades, 
remember Tawney’s advice, ... “from generation to generation”, he insisted, “the system 
of valuations, preferences and ideals - the social environment within which individual 
character functions - is in process of continuous change”.^
Nevertheless, Anthony Wright, while he considers Tawney “capable of saying 
some of the most important things that need to be said in constructing a case for 
democratic socialism”^  presents a cogent, though sympathetic critique. Tawney’s aim, 
Wright argues, was to mobilise for socialism “a moral community, rooted in traditional
* The History o f Capitalism', RH . Tawney, 1950, see History and Society,p.211.
"Tawney is the one twentieth century British socialist thinker who can be saluted from every 
quarter, Bevanite left, Gaitskell right, guild socialist, Marxist, Fabian, Christian Socialist ... he 
fertilised them all" ...(he was) "the philosopher who most nearly provided an overall socialism in 
British conditions and according to British temper". See 'RH. Tawney and His Times', Ross 
Terrill. Andre Deutsch, 1974, p.277.
Martin J. Weiner, in English Culture and the Decline o f the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980, quotes 
G JR. Elton's letter to the Times Literary Supplement (1112177) in which Elton insists that Tawney's 
Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism ..."has some claims to being one o f the most harmful books 
written in the years between the wars. At least one generation, and that a crucial one, was given 
grounds for believing that everything that contributed to the greatness and success o f their 
country derived from sinful selfishness and money grabbing wickedness". Pelican edition, 1985, 
p.l96.
\\ Religion and The Rise o f Capitalism, p272.
R H . Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.l50.
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values, expressed in its code of morality, its religious institutions and its structures of 
private life”.^  How, Wright asks, can one reconcile the ideal of a community around 
common ends in combination with democratic pluralism and functional freedom? Is such 
a moral unity around common ends practicable, or even desirable? Can a moral 
consensus be maintained as Tawney’s notion of democratic socialism demands, within a 
pluralistic society of individual functional freedom? Tawney’s socialism, Wright asserts, 
“depends on his belief in God: he is a Christian”. How, then, in an increasingly secular 
society in which moral diversity and religious plurality flourish, can a coherent moral 
community be sustained? Is it possible that “an appeal from the established values of 
private life to a recognition of their implications for public life”," can survive in a society 
in which the structure and the values are constantly contested and “the vitality of the 
established order” is steadily eroded? Further, as if in answer to Tawney’s demands, the 
Church and other moral authorities within our multi cultural society are increasingly vocal 
and progressive in their social policies. Yet, the crisis of liberal humanism is accentuated 
by their failure to exercise their moral authority on behalf of Tawney’s basic message, 
both Christian and Humanist, that men and women by virtue of their common humanity 
have claims each upon the other.
Certainly Wright exposes an inconsistency in Tawney’s thought. Inevitably 
Tawney’s desire for a morally rooted social unity encounters problems of ethical diversity, 
social pluralism and political freedom. To avoid these problems, Wright submits, “a 
philosophy of common ends comes perilously close to being a philosophy of loose 
ends”.^  Indeed, Wright has anticipated the concerns of John Rawls who asks how, 
within liberal democratic societies, can a stable system of co-operation be maintained 
“between free and equal citizens who are deeply divided by the reasonable and 
comprehensive religious, philosophic and moral doctrines which they affirm”?
RM. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.147-150.
Ibid, p.147-150.
« lbid,p.88.
Political Liberalism, John Rawls, Columbia University Press, 1993, p.44.
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Plainly it must be conceded that democratic socialism cannot necessarily secure a 
moral unity or guarantee a moral consensus around common ends. Nor, it must be 
argued, can any ... “religion be relied upon to lead the believer in the direction of a 
socialism of common purpose of common humanity”.^  Even Tawney’s socialism, which is 
... “so explicitly legitimised by his High Church Christianity”^ cannot, David Reisman 
insists, in an increasingly secularised society which is both religiously and ethnically 
pluralistic, be relied upon “to lead the believer in the direction of a socialism of common 
humanity”. How, then, to achieve enduring social unity within a society which allows for 
the free expression of views which are unorthodox, dissident or even eccentric? How, 
then, to avoid confrontations when sectional interests react against the notion of a 
community of common purpose?
Certainly, libertarians will reject Tawney’s concept of a society which seeks a 
moral consensus around common ends for they see morality realised in the pursuit of 
freely chosen individual ends. Furthermore, the simplistic conservative perception ... “of 
a common culture evolving from a shared history, shared values and unspoken 
assumptions”,^  is unacceptable to Tawney. For Tawney, the foundations of a common 
culture, as Raymond Williams submits, are essentially economic. ... “Their condition is a 
large measure of equality”.*'^  Nevertheless, the most sympathetic critic must recognise the 
unresolved tension between Tawney’s vision of morality realised within a community of 
common purpose and a morality expressed in the free exercise of individual rights. 
Further, when the notion of a common culture predicated on ... “a large measure of 
equality” confronts the new-right claim th a t... “in liberal democratic societies for moral 
and constitutional purposes we are all egalitarians now”,^ the tension is accentuated.
* State and Welfare, Tawney, Galbraith and Adam Smith, David Reisman, Macmillan, 1982, p.33.
“  Ibid, p.33.
Modern Conservatism, David Willetts, Penguin Books, 1992,p .l  10.
Culture and Society, Raymond Williams, Hogarth Press, 1958, see 1987 Edition p.220.
^ Modern Conservatism, David Willetts, Penguin Books, 1992 p .llO  / 111.
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Tawney is not unaware of the potential clash between fundamental values. He 
recognises that within liberal democracies “liberty, the supreme political value”, may be 
constrained by lack of economic power. Certainly, he would not abandon the notion of 
democratic pluralism. He sees it as the agency by which the democratically agreed ends 
of a responsible citizenry may be fulfilled. He sees it, too, as a necessary condition of 
individual freedom; a bulwark against the economic and political power of particular 
interest groups.
Furthermore, in spite of David Reisman’s anxiety concerning Tawney’s ‘High 
Church Christianity’, Tawney is not locked into a narrow Christian sectarianism. 
Although his social philosophy is grounded in Christian values, he recognises the spiritual 
strength and the social contribution of Humanism, which he asserts, “is neither the anti­
thesis of Christianity nor of theism”.^  The “humanist essence,” as Tawney identifies it, is 
close to his own Christian understanding. It is expressed, he proposes, “in the belief that 
the machinery of existence ... the whole fabric and mechanism of social institutions is to 
be regarded as a means to an end ... the growth towards the perfection of individual 
human beings”." Such a humanism for Tawney can only evolve out of a democratically 
approved consensus, which, in the name of equity, “judges the externals of life by their 
effect in assisting or hindering the life of the spirit”.^
Tawney recognised in China an example of a common culture which did not 
depend on any one religion or sectarian basis. He saw there a spiritual unity which, he 
proposed, had existed during the greater part of her history. Such a unity, he submitted, 
“is the unity of a civilisation rather than a political system”.^  ^ It is a unity unsustained by 
individual political rights or a formal legal structure: a unity cemented by shared practices 
and traditional values. It creates, it may be argued, a social cohesion which, in England,
* Equality, p.82-88 passim.
"  Ibid, p.82-88 passim.
Ibid, p.85.
'China', 1930-1931, RM. Tawney, see The Attackp36-37passim.
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preceded the “growth of individualism” and “the triumph of the economic virtues”. Such 
a unity, Tawney insists, does not derive from a common language or “a community of 
economic conditions”. Further, he asserts, it does not rest on religion, for, he remarks, 
“in China the gods are not jealous and there is no national creed”. Ultimately, he argues, it 
rests on a philosophy which makes personal relations, not rules of law, the centre of its 
scheme”.*
Tawney, then, the Christian moralist, finds common ground with the Humanist 
principle which encourages the growth towards individual perfection. The “man of deep 
Christian faith”,** recognises in a non-Christian society, an affinity with his own 
philosophy of co-operation, fellowship and personal relations. Tawney’s social 
philosophy is motivated by demands for equality, for co-operation, for individual 
development. These demands, he insists, can only be realised within a socialist and 
democratic society. Yet, Britain today, as Anthony Wright reminds us, is religiously 
pluralistic, multi-ethnic and increasingly secularist. It is, too, a society which must, in the 
name of equity, acknowledge the legitimate claims of feminism which Tawney, unhappily 
failed to address. Yet a co-operating and responsible citizenry, may, in a democratic 
society, reach a consensus. A responsible and co-operative citizenry sharing an ethic in 
which every citizen, broadly, enjoys an equal opportunity for legitimate self expression 
may, in a democratic society, reach a consensus. Such a consensus does not necessarily 
demand that a society be united in basic religious, philosophic belief although, as Tawney 
insists, reciprocity, tolerance and mutual respect are necessary conditions of social 
cohesion. Yet, as John Rawls argues, consensus may evolve where “the political 
conception of justice is a focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines endorsed by the main religious, political and moral doctrines that endure over 
time in a well ordered society”. “*
* 'China', 1930-1931, R.H. Tawney, see The Attack, p 36-37passim.
“  Introduction to Tawney's Commonplace Book, JM . Winter and DM . Joslin, Cambridge
University Press,1970, pJCIII.
“ * Political Liberalism, John Rawls, Columbia University Press, 1993, p.l92.
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Tawney Today
"7 believe that man will not merely endure; he will prevail. He is immortal, not 
because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible voice, but because he has a soul, 
a spirit capable o f compassion and sacrifice and endurance”.
Wm. Faulkner; Address upon receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature; 
Stockholm; Dec. 10,1950.
Over the last two centuries of wars and revolutions, through technical and 
scientific advance, through concessions gained and privileges yielded, there has evolved in 
Western industrial societies a marked and general improvement in the material conditions 
of life. There has been an extension of firanchise, and an extension of education. There 
now exists, though often gmdgingly extended and stringently monitored, a wide, if not 
universal, acceptance of the notion of welfare provision. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
improvements within these developed economies, they are subject to recurring 
recessionary economic crises which result, inevitably, in unemployment and social tension. 
This problem is compounded by the drive towards more efficient and competitive 
production which necessarily demands the introduction of new technological methods 
which make old skills redundant. Such methods, while they require the expertise of a 
small highly-trained technical class, perpetuate class division, create unemployment with 
its attendant miseries of rejection, insecurity and social distress. These methods 
accentuate the division between the skilled and the unskilled. They create an underclass, 
with all that inçlies for social unrest, for envy, for resentment, for a narrow and twisted 
‘patriotism*.
There exists, too, the problems of the ‘underdeveloped* world. With modem 
communication technology, burgeoning international investment, an expanding world 
market, the nations of the world and the economies of the world are increasingly
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interdependent. Now, with the demise of the ‘Soviet Bloc*, hopefully free of global 
confrontation, we are confronted by global problems which demand global solutions. 
Vast areas of an interdependent world face the miseries of starvation; we face the dangers 
of over-population, of mass migrations, of disease. We face the perils of ecological 
disaster brought on by ecological mismanagement We waste precious, diminishing 
resources. We live in a world in which a welding fracture at Sosnovy Bor threatens the 
health, the life expectancy, indeed the lives of millions. Threatened by tyrannies and 
revolutions, by the arbitrary caprices of natural disasters, the population of the ‘third 
world* (now over seventy percent of the global population) place in jeopardy, by their 
numbers, by their desperation and their despair, the fragile security of the entire world.
The solution to these problems, it is generally recognised, demand international 
co-operation. They demand the intervention of internationally funded agencies, 
empowered to act, not in the narrow interest of individual or corporative gain, but in the 
wider interest of global stability, perhaps even global survival. ^  A world so threatened 
cannot entrust its future to the mechanics of an unrestricted market economy. Such 
mechanics are designed to identify a market, to invest capital in that market on such terms 
as will, commensurate with prudent investment practice, secure the highest financial 
return. Its first priority is to maximise profit; its dynamic is expansionist Its objective is 
not to safeguard finite resources but rather to market those resources in the best interest 
of capital accumulation. Such a dynamic is not concerned with the control of population 
explosion or with the social and cultural consequences of mass migrations; it cannot 
subordinate its objectives and its interests to the solution of global problems. It has 
neither mechanism nor brief to correct those imbalances of power and wealth which exist 
between the developed and underdeveloped countries, between the affluent and the
^  Tawney, in 1924, had recognised the need for international co-operation. 'Tnternationalism has, I  
am well aware, a Utopian sound. But policies must be based on the realities o f human 
intercourse (and since) economic civilisation is supernational, the real romantics are those who 
continue to brandish the political formulas o f a vanished order, the line which separates national 
from international interests requires to be redrawn'*. International Affairs, 1924, see The British 
Labour Movement And Other Essays, RJl. Tawney, Yale University Press, 1925.
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poverty stricken. Certainly, a dynamic motivated by the spirit of competition and 
acquisition is not, by its very nature, disposed towards co-operative endeavour nor are its 
first concerns for community or common purpose. Men may, indeed, be as Doctor 
Johnson suggests ... “never more innocently employed than in getting money”, but in so 
doing, they are rarely concerned, in the interest of mankind, to solve those problems 
which threaten the planet
The world, Tawney argues, ... “continues in scarcity” because it is too grasping 
and too short sighted to seek tha t... “which maketh men to be of one mind in a house”. 
The well intentioned schemes for social reorganisation ... “are abortive”, he suggests, ... 
“because they endeavour to combine incompatibles”.^  They seek to diminish poverty and 
its attendant social evils by pursuing more vigorously the very policies which have created 
both the poverty and the social disorder. They fail to understand th a t... “poverty is a 
symptom of social disorder”, while the disorder itself is something at once ... “more 
fundamental and more incorrigible”," the inevitable result of the false values of a social 
economic organisation which encourages possessive individualism rather than the spirit of 
community. The conditions for a right order of industry, Tawney argues,... “are the same 
in all essentials, for a society which is poor as for a society which is rich”. The differences 
of economic endowment may determine what an industry may yield; they do not alter the 
ends at which industry should aim, or, he insists, ... “the moral standards by which its 
organisation should be tried”.^  Tawney in 1921 had warned that ... “the period of 
increasing returns has ended and the period of diminishing returns has begun”.^  ^ He 
recognised that in a world of finite resources, the industrialised nations, in order to secure 
... “the foodstuffs and raw materials” essential to economic survival, must organise an 
economic order not only with regard to economic expediency but on ... “such moral
* The Acquisitive Society, p5 .
“  Ibid,p.7.
Ib id ,pJ.
Ib id ,pJ.
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principles as would justify themselves to the consciences of decent men”.^  Such moral 
principles for Tawney are necessarily grounded in the notion of community and common 
purpose. They evolve 6om a perception th a t... “a poor society cannot be too poor to 
find a right order of life, nor a rich society too rich to have need to seek it”.^ In an 
increasingly interdependent world in which there is not yet an international agency which 
effectively addresses the global problems of environmental damage, diminishing resources 
and endemic poverty, Tawney’s injunction “to seek a right order of life” is relevant
Yet to embrace “a right order of life” demands of men and women that they make 
an existential choice. Certainly Tawney, as Anthony Wright argues, always believed and 
always assured others that “the labour movement represents a moral revolt against 
capitalism, a demand by human beings to be treated as ends not as means”. ^  Yet 
Tawney’s insistence that any reform of the prevailing system must incorporate “an 
adequate conception of human nature and human aspirations”, may be expressions of his 
own sense of outrage at the moral deficiencies of capitalism. Perhaps, Wright proposes, 
Tawney ... “in claiming to know what people felt and cared about was claiming too 
much”? Certainly, it is possible that Tawney’s assessment of what moved men and 
women to political action was mistaken. Perhaps his judgement of what men and women 
... “felt and cared about” was erroneous, predicated not on ... “human nature and 
aspirations”, as they are, but on his own highly developed sense of justice? Perhaps his 
Christian faith, his sense of morality, his commitment to a politics of moral exhortation, 
had blinded him to the ... “instrumental” attitude of working men and women? It is 
certainly possible that Tawney’s plea for moral regeneration derived from the false 
assumption that ordinary men and women have the moral capacity for such a 
regeneration. It is conceivable that his appeal for moral regeneration is a futile exercise, 
an appeal addressed to men and women concerned not with morality, but only to approve
* The Acquisitive Society, p. 7.
“  Ibid.p.7.
RJH. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.l42.
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such social changes which they perceive to coincide with their own interests. Perhaps 
Tawney’s ‘understanding’ o f ... “the muddled soul of Henry Dubb” had led him to ascribe 
to th a t... “exasperating, loveable creature”, a capacity for unselfish action which he did 
not, and never wül, possess? Tawney’s philosophy is grounded in the belief that narrow 
personal or sectional interests must be set aside in the name of fellowship, for the sake of 
community. Yet, within a society of competitive and isolated individualism, is not such a 
vision utopian? How, it may be legitimately asked, can such a philosophy be relevant 
within a society in which men and women strive to authenticate their lives by economic 
achievement in an impersonal market-place?
Tawney’s social vision resides in the notion of a society in which a collective ethic 
sustains a democratically defined perception of the common good. In such a society a 
redistribution of economic power will preclude the exploitation of the economically 
powerless by the economically powerful. Yet, it must be argued that while a newly- 
empowered majority may accept the services and the advantages which derive from re­
distribution, they may not necessarily embrace the ethic which motivates it. Clearly, men 
and women may lack the capacity for moral regeneration which Tawney insists is a 
necessary condition of social reconstruction. Equally, he may have overestimated the 
sense of social solidarity which evolves from shared disadvantage. Clearly, while every 
individual desires the power to control his or her life, not every individual is prepared to 
accept the mutual responsibility and co-operative spirit of the collective ethic. Plainly, 
Heiuy and Henrietta Dubb, even without the guarantee of economic security, may reject a 
social ethic which seeks to promote intellectual and spiritual development in favour of an 
ethos of materialist acquisition and individualist competition.
Tawney, in 1921, reflected on the outcome of the war in which, for four years, 
millions had endured the extremes of misery,... “for ends which they believed to be little
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tainted with self interest”.^  In spite of the sacrifices and suffering, he argued, the values of 
Macht-Politik and the ‘acquisitive society’ still persisted ... “as the victors continue the 
process of ruining themselves in order to more completely ruin the vanquished”. It was 
an illusion, he insisted prophetically, to suppose that such terms, imposed in the name of 
such values would preserve a lasting peace. Unless ... “mankind succeeded in basing its 
social organisation upon some moral principle which commands general acceptance”, he 
asserted, the same values will permanently ensure ... “an embittered struggle of classes, 
interests and groups”.^ It may be argued that the contemporary relevance of Tawney’s 
thought emanates precisely from this demand fo r... “social organisation based on a moral 
principle which commands general acceptance”. The demand, however, is not merely a 
manifestation of dangers perceived by a prescient social theorist in the aftermath of war. 
Certainly, the demand endorses the judgement of an economic historian who argues that 
mankind, because it supposes prosperity is to be achieved by the destruction of an 
economic rival,... “has tom itself to pieces every century, or oftener, since 1648”. Yet, 
the demand for a ... “moral principle” is more than a warning of perceived danger, more 
than historical judgement. Certainly, it is an expression of his own moral understanding, 
the assessment of a philosopher who, invoking the tenets of his own Christianity, is 
committed not just to solve a contemporary problem but to persuade men and women to 
live by those moral values which he perceives as both universal and fundamental to 
religious faith. There is, he insists, already ... “a principle we recognise in part and which 
we ought to recognise everywhere^ and There exists, he proposes, in a short
critical examination of utilitarian principles, ... “a law higher than the well-being of the 
majority, and that law is the supreme value of every human being as such”.^ v are 
moved to condemn or approve the actions of men and women by a principle which is ... 
“transcendent, religious or mystical”. We are moved, he declares, by an understanding 
th a t... “the most divine thing we know is the personality of man” ... and ... “to encroach
* The Acquisitive Society, p224.
» Ibid.p.225.
The Commonplace Book, RJH. Tawney, entry for July 29,1913. 
Ibid, entry for July 29,1913.
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on it is to efface the very title deeds of humanity”.^  This declaration is for Tawney an 
article of faith. It is to an expression of a transcendental humanism. He supports it with a 
verse from the Gospels which encapsulates a fundamental precept of Christian belief. 
(Math. 18:6, Mark 9:42, Luke 17:2) “Whosoever shall offend one of these little ones 
who believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck and 
that he were drowned in the depth of the sea.” This verse (not exactly verbatim) is 
repeated three times in the New Testament.
For Tawney, the principle is transcendental because it rejects the repulsive and 
immoral notion that one man, for his own ends, may use the one God-given life of his 
neighbour. The principle is religious because it is at the heart of an ethic which proclaims 
that all men and women are equally the children of God. The principle is mystical because 
it has the power to inspire that “spirit of compassion and sacrifice and endurance” which, 
without regard to self-interest, evokes that universal human feeling which is mysteriously 
capable of binding together men and women in an understanding of their common 
humanity. Yet, Alisdair McIntyre proposes, in the age of such tiny and impotent figures as 
McDonald, Bonar Law, Baldwin and Chamberlain, Tawney, “the essentially English 
idealist” assumed “the appearance of great moral stature”. However, McIntyre insists, 
“the Socratic question of whether one would rather have ones shoes mended by a good 
cobbler or a good man has relevance in politics, too”.“ Tawney, Mcintyre concedes, lived 
up to his own high-minded ideals, but, he assertively concludes, “Goodness is not 
enough”.
Indeed. But it is not ‘Goodness* on which Tawney relies. Certainly his political 
philosophy, sustained by his Christian faith, demands a social order which recognises that 
“certain types of society and certain types of life are fit for human beings and others are
\ The Commonplace Book, RH . Tawney, entry for July 29,1913.
“  The Socialism ofR.H. Tawney', Alisdair McIntyre, New York Review o f Books, 1964, p 38-42.
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not”^, but, if this is “high-minded idealism” it must not be mistaken for naiveté. Tawney's 
perception of a social order in which “the ultimate tribunal by which aU forms of 
organisation and poHcy are to be tried is not economic expediency but the conscience of 
individuals”,^ finds no favour with the powerful interest groups who defend the values of 
the ‘acquisitive society*. Similarly, he understood that a socialism, “obstinately and 
unashamedly ethical”, which placed individual liberty before what the ruling faction 
proclaimed as the overriding interest of the state, would be derided, as “bourgeois 
Philistinism” by his “enlightened friends with philosophies of history”.^  Indeed, Alisdair 
McIntyre who complains of Tawney’s failure to deal adequately with Marxist theory, 
declares that The Radical Tradition, “a book designed to celebrate the Social Democrat 
par excellence”, is in fact, “a monument to the failure of ideas”. However, in spite of 
attacks from both the Left and the Right, Tawney’s commitment to a society of 
responsible men and women working without fear in comradeship remains undiminished. 
Tawney offers no vision of Utopia, instead “this essentially English idealist” pragmatically 
insists that the important thing is not that equality should be completely attained, but that 
it should be sincerely soughL^  ^ As Leszek Kolakowski proposes, “goals now 
unobtainable will never be realised unless they are articulated when they are still 
unobtainable” ... The existence of Utopia as a utopia” he insists, is the necessary 
prerequisite for its eventually ceasing to be a utopia”.^
The world today, Tawney declared “will not last” ... “the forces undermining it, 
forces which are moral and intellectual even more than economic are too strong”.^  While 
capitalism, in its present form is a brief episode in the history of man, the “validity of the 
Christian doctrine of man, his dependence on God, and the relations which, as a 
consequence are to be desired between different members of the human family is universal
'British Socialism Today', RM. Tawney, Radical Tradition, p.l68.
Ibid, p.l69.
“  Ibid, p.m .
Equality, pJ6 .
^ Concepts o f the Left, Leszek Kolakowski, New Haven Press, 1976, p.686.
'Christianity & The Social Order', see The Attack, p.l89.
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and permanent”.^  This declaration is more than an expression of religions faith. For can it 
be that “man, who climbed out of the slime on all forms and stood upright**" will, in the 
face of global problems which threaten his very existence, find no solution beyond the 
uncertainties of free-market capitalism? Can a system “which takes as its premise that 
every group and every individual shall be free to grab what they can get and hold what 
they can grab “survive the waste, the ill will, the anarchy ... “which threatens to 
overwhelm us**.^  What faith can man place in a social and economic order “which even 
now, in the hour of its triumph, has not yet learned to master itself *?^  ^ Tawney, in a 
world threatened perhaps by terminal crisis, sought to remind mankind that “because men 
are men they are bound to acknowledge that man has claims on man**.^  In a world of 
“grab and hold**, of “hoard and snatch**, Tawney, “the best man I ever knew**,^  devoted 
his life and employed his scholarship, in the service of a socialism whose foundations, he 
insisted, were ultimately ethical He was committed to promote those “activities of the 
spirit** and ignite that “energy of the soul** which units mankind in fellowship, just as he 
was resolved to reduce those “insignificant differences** which divide it. Of Richard 
Henry Tawney, it must be truly said,
“He fought the good fight.
He finished his course.
He kept the faith** (Timothy H, 4:7)
Tawney: The Language Of Community
The Left, David Marquand argues, has...
Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism, p.280.
Notes for an Address to the Nobel Prize Committee, William Faulkner, Stockholm, 1950. 
“ Equality, R.H. Tawney, p.210.
V Ibid,p.280.
^ The Commonplace Book, entry for March 6,1913.
Postscript', Hugh Gaitskell, see The Radical Tradition, 1962, p.214.
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**in the past been in many respects as individualist in assumption and behaviour as 
The Right. It has advocated public intervention but as a means of satisfying 
private interests; it promised entitlement but said little about responsibilities. Its 
trade union allies represented the narrow sectional interests of their clienteles and 
rarely acknowledged a wider social interest”.^
In sum, the Left, according to Marquand’s assessment, has behaved exactly as 
Tawney regretfully expected. ... “Is it any wonder", he declares,... “that the creed which 
affirms the absolute rights or property should sometimes be met with a counter­
affirmation of the absolute rights of labour"." When, he argues, a section of the working 
class use their strategic position to extort extravagant terms for themselves at the expense 
of their fellow workers, ... “might not such action” be described ... “as exploiting the 
community?” Tawney answers his own question without equivocation. At present, he 
argued, (in 1921) the statement is meaningless because ... **before the community can be 
exploited, the community must exist, and its existence in the sphere o f economic relations 
is today not a fact but only an aspiration'*,^ This unequivocal assertion is of 
contemporary importance especially in view of Professor Marquand’s perception of “a 
shift in the public mood to ... a language of community”. While, Marquand proposes,... 
“in the realm of policy, private interest still holds sway”, there is a growing sense of regret 
at the erosion of the community spirit”. After a decade in which neo-liberal doctrine 
seemed to be unassailable, all political factions now proclaim a concern for such values as 
... “citizenship, responsibility and stewardship”.
Such widely acclaimed values, however, do not necessarily mean the same thing to 
all parties. The meanings are determined by such factors as a view concerning the role of 
government, a definition of liberty, an understanding of what constitutes equal rights and 
the emphasis placed on collective, rather than private interests. The moral quality and
* 'A Language o f Community', David Marquand, see The Alternative, edited by Ben Pimlott,
Anthony Wright and Tony Flower, WM Allen, 1990, p.3-13.
"  The Acquisitive Society, p.31.
lbid,p.31.
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social impact of this “neo-collectivism” has yet to be determined, and, Marquand 
proposes ... “it can be authoritarian or participative, repressive or tolerant. High Tory or 
social democratic”. Indeed, he insists there is no reason to assume that the Left is by 
definition “better fitted to work the grain of a neo-collectivist era”, in a society in which 
... “private interest still held sway”.
Tawney would not dispute Professor Marquand’s assessment. His contemporary 
relevance does not rest on a defence of sectional interest nor in explanations of why, in 
‘an acquisitive society*, the behaviour of particular groups is self-seeking and without 
regard for the common good. His relevance rests now, as it did in the past, on the 
convictions from which his social philosophy derives. The industrial problem, he argues, 
“is a moral problem” and “the cause of the present unrest is not simply economic, nor is it 
party political: it is moral’*.i Certainly, within a materialist culture which neglects 
common ends in favour of private gain, an understanding that an ethical foundation is a 
necessary condition for an equitable society, is relevant. When, too, as Professor 
Marquand warns, the moral quality of this neo-collectivism is yet to be determined, 
Tawney’s injunction that “the conception of right and wrong must apply to all relations of 
life” (and that) “all social behaviour must be judged by strict moral standards”" is 
relevant
The hollowness of the ideology of neo-liberalism. Professor Marquand insists, has 
become increasingly apparent. Certainly, he argues, is has not ended the century-long 
relative decline of the British economy, and meanwhile, he proposes, its social costs have 
become more obvious and less tolerable.^ Yet, as Tawney argues, ... “the smiling 
illusion which has erected into a philosophy the conception that industry is a mechanism.
* The Commonplace Book, entry for May 6,1912.
"  Ibid, entry for May 6,1912.
^  "There were in the five poorest wards o f Manchester 1,446 more deaths per year than the national
average ... 14% o f babies were born underweight as opposed to 3% in the affluent areas.
Tameside Metropolitan Borough Policy Research Unit. 1988, Tameside.
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moving by quasi-mechanical laws and adjusted by non-moral forces"/ is lodged deep 
within the public consciousness. If there is, as Marquand suggests, a new demand for ‘a 
language of community’; the ideology of consumerism, and the acclaimed triumph of the 
free-market, has not been seriously challenged, and as the poet observes,
"... In the supermarkets, things are still buying people’’.^
Sadly, it must be acknowledged, that in Britain what Tawney identified as "the 
disease of inequality” has not been eradicated, nor has the acquisitive society given way to 
society of social obligation and co-operative purpose. Certainly, the new liberal 
enthusiasm which Professor Marquand detects for ‘citizenship’, ‘responsibility’ and 
‘stewardship’ is welcome. Yet citizenship involves more than responsibility and 
stewardship, more than "the worthy endeavours” of individuals provoked into social 
action by "the new climate of voluntarism”. It assumes a sense of mutual obligation; it 
requires, as Tony Wright insists, the understanding "that social life is more than a 
maelstrom of atomic individualism. It demands not only the acknowledgement that 
"public affairs (are) everyone’s concern”. i“ It calls for a redistribution of economic 
power, an alteration in economic relationships. Indeed, as David Willetts concedes, "in a 
modem market economy it is difficult to see how someone can participate properly 
without command over resources”.*'^  Precisely. Welfare provision, as Desmond S. King 
and Jeremy Waldron note "is now seen in western societies as a core element in 
citizenship”, (it is regarded) "as integral to the contemporary sense of citizenship’’.^
* The Conditions o f Economic Liberty', see The Radical Tradition, p.101.
“  Contra Viento y Marea, Eduardo Galleano, Minerva, 1989, translated by Cedric Belfrage, p.207.
Citizens And Subjects,Tony Wright, Routledge, 1994, p.12 7.
Modern Conservatism, David Willetts, Penguin Books, 1992, p .llS .
^ 'Citizenship, Social Citizenship and The Defence o f Welfare Provision’. Desmond S. King and
Jeremy Waldron, see British Journal o f Political Science. 18,1988 p.4151443 “An analysis o f the 
normative stakes o f claims to the social rights o f citizenship in the light o f New-Right criticism'’.
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Indeed, as David Marquand submits, one cannot practice citizenship or participate in a 
common culture if you are trapped in a despairing and alienated underclass”.^
For Tawney, therefore, ‘the practice of citizenship’ demands “a large measure of 
equality”. Welfare provision, as a social right, equally extended, will redress the 
inequalities of economic power inherent in industrial capitalism. Such an entitlement will 
react against the grave inequalities, in health care, in education, in environment Such an 
entitlement, Tawney insists, together with civil and political rights, “is the essence of 
citizenship”.^ Certainly, welfare provision if minimally and begrudgingly extended cannot 
rescue an alienated underclass. Yet, Tawney insists, social provision “makes a 
contribution to equality”, “it changes social psychology”.^  It creates, too, a climate of 
mutual responsibility and stewardship. It endorses “the notion of reciprocity of rights 
against, and duties towards the community”, which, David Held argues, is the meaning of 
citizenship”.!'^
Yet, now in an era in which, Raymond Plant insists, “the idea of empowerment is 
at the centre of the political debate”, neo-liberals argue that individual empowerment is 
best pursued through the market mechanism. The social provision which Tawney 
demands as “a necessary condition for a life worthy of human beings” is increasingly 
attacked “as an illegitimate extension of rights”.'^  While Tawney defines empowerment as 
the capacity of the individual to control the economic circumstances of his or her 
economic life, a contemporary libertarian declares “the market mechanism to be quite an
* David Marquand in a review o f 'Citizenship and Community' by Adrian Oldfield and other books
concerned with citizenship, public co-operation, etc. see New York Review o f Books, December, 
1991.
“  Equality, Chapter XII, in which Tawney pays tribute to the perceptions o fTJl. Marshall.
Ibid,p.219.
i '' 'Citizenship', David Held, see Between State and Civil Society, edited by Geoff Andrews,
Lawrence and Wishart, 1991,p.21.
^ Citizenship and Rights in Thatcher's Britain, Two Views, Raymond Plant, Norman Barrie. I £ A .
Publication 1990, see Raymond Plant, p.4.
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egalitarian device.”' While Tawney is fearful for “the traditional liberties of Englishman” 
in an industrial environment solely determined “by the decisions of a Committee of half-a- 
dozen Directors”, ^ Professor Norman Barrie, a spokesman for the ‘new-right* claims, 
“that the market process, i f  left undisturbed^ shows a tendency to the equalisation of 
income**.'^
Tawney’s assertion th a t... “plenty is good and scarcity is evil”''' can be regarded 
as a maxim for all seasons. T hat,... “the neglect or perversion of these rights and duties” 
... constitutes ... “oppression”, are judgements of contemporary relevance, as is the 
demand for a reappraisal of the purposes of industry. But Tawney’s concern extends 
beyond the perimeters of economic life.... “Englishmen”, he proposes,... “must repudiate 
an inhuman philosophy of politics”.'' Where social relationships and methods of 
organisation are determined by considerations of economic efficiency and economic 
convenience, that sense of fellowship, and that common culture, which, for Tawney, are 
necessary conditions for a civilised society cannot survive. The contemporary dedication 
to the creation and fulfilment of consumer’s ‘wants’ stimulated by an increasingly 
aggressive and ‘sophisticated’ advertising industry creates a culture of possessive 
individualism. Such a culture, Tawney warns, ... “erects an artificial barrier between the 
economic life of society and its culture, ... “its religion and its art”, its sense of 
community. The moral traditions, he warns, are degraded; the spirit of fellowship and ... 
“the kindly feelings of human beings are sterilised”.''' The emphasis on consumerism and 
“considerations of economic convenience” has increased, not abated, in the decades since 
Tawney delivered these warnings, yet, ... “In the light of knowledge acquired since he 
wrote”, the warning is still relevant
'  Citizenship and Rights in Thatcher’s Britain, Two Views, Raymond Plant, Norman Barrie. IÆA.
Publication 1990, see Raymond Plant, p.58.
“  The Acquisitive Society, p.I63.
Citizenship and Rights in Thatcher’s Britain, Two Views, Norman Barrie, p.59.
The Acquisitive Society, p.5.
V Ibid,p.l01.
' ' '  ’The Conditions for Economic Liberty’, see Radical Tradition, p .lO l.
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Conclusions
"/ suspect that we will not discover the way out o f the present impasse until we 
find an economics that projects a moral vision along with a technological diagnosis”. 
Robert Heilbronner; New York Review o f Books; 3 March, 1994.
The current international commitment to a new era of peaceful co-operation, it is 
claimed, will engender a new social, political and economic order. It is also claimed 
(although not without dissent) that with scientific and technological advances, the growth 
of the service industries and new methods of industrial production the traditional notions 
of class are redundant. The confrontations of the past, it is asserted, are obsolete relics of 
a less politically sophisticated age. In the aftermath of the collapse of the centralised 
command economies, a world no longer divided by opposing ideological differences, it is 
held, will inevitably turn, in the interest of prosperity and abundant provision, to a free- 
market economy. The superiority of the free market mechanism, it is declared, is self 
evident. A neutral free-market mechanism identifies and satisfies consumer needs and 
demands, and through economic efficiency creates a rise in the general living standards. 
The system, it is conceded, is not perfect There may be periodical recessional troughs 
just as there will be periods of above average prosperity. Certainly, there are divisions of 
opinion as to how freely such a free market should operate. There are political and 
economic theorists who insists that there must be absolutely no governmental interference 
with the free market process. There are others who argue that a degree of governmental 
intervention in the national interest is imperative, although there are factional differences 
concerning the extent of this intervention. The system, its libertarian champions insist, 
will, with the minimum of interference, offer not only the maximum opportunity for 
individual enterprise, it will also allow for the fi:ee exercise of the competitive spirit 
Indeed, its advocates insist, a free market system is a necessary condition of freedom, a 
democratic right, and to interfere unduly with its mechanism is to constrain the rights of
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the individual or the group to pursue their freely chosen en d s.^  Furthermore, it is 
proposed that since the market system is ... “open ended” ... “and because it is open, 
everyone can thrive without injuring others”.^  Yet, whatever the political and economic 
differences, in the light of the failure of the state controlled centralised economies, it is 
argued that a market economy is (with, some insist, a degree of control) the most efficient 
economic mechanism for the effective satisfaction of consumer demands. Now, when 
respected egalitarian scholars, in the interest of consumer and community, seek to 
formulate “a theory of socialism that includes a full-blooded, unapologetic commitment to 
a market economy”,^ what, it may be asked, is the contemporary relevance of Tawney’s 
philosophy?
Tawney’s thought, it has been argued, is “derivative” ... “he was not an abstract 
thinker of high quality”^  ... (he was) “a wholly hrç)ractical and inexperienced visionary”. 
Certainly, he did not “carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional theory of social 
contract” nor did he present “a systematic theory of justice”. Tawney it is proposed, “was 
obviously not, in any but the vulgar sense, a philosopher^’, i  ^ Tawney’s “case for 
socialism” is curiously insular. It is, as Anthony Wright proposes, “located entirely within 
the framework of a single national economy”. ^ Clearly, it fails to take into account the 
technological, economic and social development which has followed the 
internationalisation of the capitalist structure. Furthermore, Wright submits, while Tawney 
rejected a socialism based upon “a theory of class formation”, he did assume the existence 
of a traditional proletariat as an indispensable social agency, which, Wright properly
^  "It is interesting to note", George Orwell observes, that Mr (Joseph) Kennedy, USA ambassador
to London remarked on his return to New York in October 1940 that as a result o f the war, 
"democracy is finished". By "democracy", Orwell insists, he meant "private capitalism", see The 
Lion and The Unicorn, George Orwell, 1941, Vol. 11 Seeker & Warburg.
\ Modern Conservatism, David Willetts, p.82.
ii Market, State and Community, David Miller, see Introduction.
R.H. Tawney and His Times, Socialism As Fellowship, Ross Terrill, Cambridge University Press, 
1973, p.lO.
The British Political Tradition, Vol. 11, The Ideological Heritage, WM. Greenleaf, Routledge, 
I983,p.440.
^ RM. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.l46.
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insists, "is scarcely adequate for a modem socialism preoccupied with the analysis of the 
decomposition of a traditional class structure”. Certainly, the “decomposition of the 
traditional class structure” has accelerated with the triumph of the free-market philosophy. 
Patently, the retreat from public ownership, the emphasis on deregulation, the removal of 
trade barriers and capital investment controls, the growing competition from capital 
intensive technology at home and low labour costs abroad have all combined to erode the 
traditional class structure. Where, and Who, as Wright properly asks, is Henry Dubb 
now? i Indeed, it is not only the traditional class structure which is altered by the 
changing order. New methods of production are transforming the processes of 
production, making old skills redundant, demanding new habits of labour, changing the 
make up of the work force.
Clearly, technology has created a new work ethic, a new relationship between 
management and labour. In manufacturing industries there is an increasing dependency on 
specialised sub-contractors and the casualised services of the self-employed. 
Contemporaneously, in the expanding service sector, there is an increasing tendency (at 
the unskilled and semi-skilled level) to rely on the part-time labour of a low-paid, 
predominantly female work-force. Simultaneously, at the highest level, efficiency in both 
sectors demands the expertise of the professionally qualified technician. In the face of 
these factors the power of organised labour diminishes and the traditional working class 
solidarity which derives from shared work experience is weakened. There is, too, a 
decline in support of collectivist measures from the beneficiaries of the changing order. 
Restrictions on industry have little appeal to those who, with the spread of equity share 
ownership, perceive their interest in the maximisation of profit Similarly, the ethic of 
individualism has fuelled a reluctance to support measure of taxation necessary to welfare 
provision.
R Jl. Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.l46.
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Such changes inevitably have social implications which challenge the conventional 
standards of social behaviour, dispute the authority of the established institutions, 
question the traditional values of family and community. The structural changes create 
social as well as economic disruption. A capitalism competitively engaged in a global 
market which seeks productive capacity in the labour force which will provide the 
greatest return on capital employed necessarily affects individual working lives, loosens 
local loyalties, alters the established relationships of the work place. Plainly, “a socialism 
located in a single national economy” predicted on the existence of a traditional (mainly 
male) working-class, is ill equipped to confront a capitalism which, with which minimum 
restraint, pursues maximum economic profit with the minimum of social obligation. 
Tawney, as economic historian had, perhaps uniquely, examined the impact of the political 
and social changes of the reformation on traditional doctrine and values. Yet, curiously, 
Tawney the social philosopher in proposing “a socialism of moral choice” neglected “to 
trace the significant connections” and examine the economic and social consequences 
which evolve fiom the rapidly changing structure of industrial capitalism. Plainly, such an 
examination is crucial to a contemporary theory of political thought. Certainly, as 
Anthony Wright insists, “a modem socialism ought to be properly concerned with both”. ^
Furthermore, “a large measure of equality” is central to Tawney’s social thought; 
it is, he insists, a pre-condition of a common culture, the foundation of social equity. He 
perceives the democratic process as the only instrament by which “a large measure of 
equality” may be morally and peacefully attained. Yet, plainly, while democratic process 
has in the interest of equity extended equality, it has not produced a common culture; 
rather it has served to fragment it. Indeed, in liberal democratic societies an increasingly 
marginalised underclass is excluded by social and economic factors from the democratic 
process. Yet, while democratic process has provided improved access to education, to 
health care and housing, a significant section of the traditional socialist constituency has
R J i Tawney, Anthony Wright, p.l46.
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been won over to an ideology which fosters competitive individualism rather than co­
operative effort. Ironically, Tawney’s chosen instrument has served to sustain, by 
democratic process, the values and aspirations of industrial capitalism.
Tawney’s experience was of a largely homogenous culture which validated itself 
by respect for what it defined as liberty. Tawney rejected this narrow libertarian definition. 
The liberties of the powerful, he insists, cannot singly be construed as liberty. Liberty, he 
argues, extends beyond the freedom to buy and sell in the market place. For Tawney, 
liberty is not an abstract, value-free concept. His social philosophy evolves fiom an 
understanding of morality as a collective ethic motivated by a vision of the common good. 
The extension of liberty within such an ethic demands as a moral imperative, the equal 
distribution of the concrete and external conditions for personal growth and self 
development. Clearly, such a distribution and such empowerment will gain the support of 
the relatively powerless. Yet, while the disadvantaged may accept the advantages of 
public provision and enjoy the benefits of health care, educational access and social 
housing, they may not share Tawney’s vision of the common good or of morality as a 
collective ethic. Indeed, they may perceive their interest served in the pursuit of private 
rather than communal ends. Tawney, “scholar, saint and social reformer”  ^is in danger of 
overestimating the spirit of social solidarity created by shared disadvantage. Similarly, he 
may have overestimated the desire or the ability of Henry and Henrietta Dubb to 
withstand the rampant privatisation of every aspect of social life within a society in thrall 
to libertarian ideology.
Yet ultimately, Tawney’s vision of the common good may be realised or rejected 
by the accuracy of these estimates. Clearly, where a conception of industry as a 
mechanism adjusted by the play of non-moral laws is elevated into a philosophy in which 
“organisation and social relationships are determined solely by considerations of economic
* The Diary Of Beatrice Webb, VolJV, 1924-1943, edited by N. J. Mackenzie, entry for Dec. 8, 
1935, Virago Press, 1985.
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convenience and productive efficiency”,  ^ there is little scope for the notion that each 
individual has a claim on his or her fellows by virtue of a common humanity. Ultimately, 
Tawney’s moral exhortation may require the support of an individualist argument 
Pragmatically, an appeal to self-interest may prove more effective than “an appeal to 
principles”. Plainly, Henry and Henrietta’s interests are jeopardised by the spirit and 
values of competitive individualism. Patently, their economic security is undermined and 
social cohesion is threatened by the dynamics of an impersonal market mechanism.
Yet, a market mechanism does not operate in a vacuum. Its mechanics are 
determined by the economic system in which it functions. It’s methods and its objectives 
are organised, sustained or amended by legislation or regulation coincidental to the 
interests of the prevailing social, political or economic order. The free-market 
mechanism of modem industrial capitalism, Tawney insists, creates “an economic life 
which is in a perpetual state of morbid irritation”^ . It creates, he asserts, “a climate of 
fear in which ... “workers and employers” ... in ... “two compactly organised armies” ... 
“are only restrained from collision by the fear of its possible consequences”.^  It creates a 
culture which fosters individual competition, a culture in which the percentage of return 
on capital invested is perceived as the only yardstick by which economic efficiency must 
be measured. It perpetuates those rifts between classes, which, Tawney asserts, ... “are 
obvious and unmistakable” and derive ... “from the inequality of economic power by 
which certain groups exercise authority over others”.^  ^ It cannot provide the conditions 
for a society of fellowship and social cohesion. It creates instead, a culture “in which 
wealth becomes the foundation of public esteem and the mass of men who labour, but 
who do not acquire wealth, are thought to be vulgar and meaningless and insignificant”.^  
There evolves a market psychology, a set of assumptions and values which permeate the
The Acquisitive Society, p.225. 
Ibid, p.225.
» Ibid, p.225.
Equality, p.112.
The Acquisitive Society, p.38.
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public consciousness. Individual and competitive struggle come to be regarded as 
essential components of the all-important market system. To succeed within the system 
comes to be recognised as an endorsement of personal validity, of self authentication.
Yet, where some have a greater appetite for competitive economic enterprise, 
there are, inevitably, winners and losers: unequal abilities create an unequal distribution of 
wealth. There is poverty and there is affluence; there is, too, an unequal distribution of 
power so that even within liberal democratic societies, equal rights do not translate into 
equal power or the equal capacity to exercise them. Certainly, welfare provision remains; 
it is, after all, not only preserved by a sense of moral obligation and social responsibility, it 
has been ceded after generations of political pressure. Yet its extent is dictated, and its 
application determined, by the social and economic philosophy of the ruling faction. Such 
provision, while it alleviates the harsher aspects of social deprivation does not, in a society 
of drastic economic disparities, create the conditions for ... “moral regeneration” and a 
society of common ends. Instead, the ‘acquisitive society* is made legitimate, its values 
and its practices approved. There still remains a hierarchy of wealth and a hierarchy of 
power. Class divisions persist; there remain inequalities of education facilities, of medical 
provision, of environmental conditions. Undeniably, the decades between the publication 
of Tawney’s major works have brought about dramatic social and economic changes, but, 
as Richard Hoggart argues,... “society is not destroying but reforming and relabelling the 
ridges between classes”.^  If we are ... “now less divided by the traditional indicators of 
birth, property and inherited wealth, we are still divided by status differences, consumer 
group differences, differences in standards of living”.^
Tawney sought to end these differences. His output of essays and articles, lectures 
and pamphlets are testimony to his commitment to social justice. His major works of 
political theory, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY and EQUALITY, informed by a sense
* An Imagined Life, Richard Hoggart, Chatto & Windus, 1992, p.6.
"  Ibid, p.6.
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of moral conscience continue to influence democratic socialist thought. His perception 
that “the only adequate history is Thistoire intégrale”  ^ is reflected in his dedication to 
trace “the significant connections” between religious doctrine and social, political and 
economic development. His understanding of the power of moral ideas to bring about 
social change is an expression of the Christian faith which permeates his writings both as 
economic historian and social philosopher. Clearly, some of his assessments and 
assumptions have been overtaken by changing social, economic and political 
circumstances. Regrettably, he neglected to address the issues of race and gender just as 
he apparently failed to recognise the rapidly changing structure of capitalism and the 
gradual transformation of the traditional, mainly male, working class. Some of his 
concerns, the English public schools, the Church of England, the peculiarities of the 
English class system, indeed, “his case for socialism”, are curiously parochial. While his 
chosen instrument of social change, the democratic process, has brought about some 
social benefit, it has not created a commitment to “the common good”. Similarly, his 
“politics of moral exhortation” have not demonstrably extended the spirit of fraternity nor 
have they fostered a sense of community or engendered a common culture. Nevertheless, 
as I have sought to demonstrate, Tawney’s moral authority, his rebuttal of the anti- 
egahtarian case, his passion, his pragmatism and above all the moral dimension of his 
thought continue to contribute to the contemporaiy egalitarian argument
There are, today, within liberal, democratic, societies, political theorists dedicated 
to a more equitable social order. There are thinkers who insist that in an age in which the 
prosperity of the nation is dependent on human capacities the public good of consensual 
and social peace becomes ever more valuable. In an age “in which the successful 
economies are the ones that most closely approximate to the model of economic co­
operation, possessive individualism is self-stultifying”.ti They demand, in the name of
\ The Study o f Economic History', RH . Tawney, 1933, see History And Society, p.64.
“ Review o f Citizenship and Community, Civic Republicanism and the Modern World, Adrian
Oldfield, Routledge 1991, David Marquand, New York Review o f Books, Dec.1991.
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democracy, constitutional reforms which will allow every citizen through a redistribution 
of legislative power to participate more fully in the democratic process. In the name of 
equity, they insist it is necessary to monitor the anti-social tendencies of the market 
mechanism. Such thinkers, while they vigorously confine utopian visions to the wilder 
shores of political thought, seek, nevertheless to promote and extend egalitarian 
principles. To these thinkers, motivated by the spirit of social justice and committed to 
the democratic process, the philosophy of R.H. Tawney is not only relevant, it is 
inspirational. ^
NB "jg Tawney‘s Equality now out o f date?" ... "Have we in Britain reached such cm egalitaricm 
position that further siAstantial measures o f collective redistribution are not called for, 
economically and morally?" Richard M. Titmuss. Introduction to 1964 edition ofR.H. Tawney*s 
Equality. "Richard Henry Tawney has been the crowning figure o f ethical socialism in the 
twentieth century" ... "he enjoyed pre-eminence as the source o f exemplary wisdom for the British 
Labour Party for forty years from the First World War". English Ethical Socialism. Norman 
Dennis and A.H. Halsev. Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 149.
2)"He is capable o f saying some o f the most important things that need to be said in constructing 
a case for democratic socialism ... "his treatment o f the relationship between equality and liberty 
has provided a reference point for all subsequent discussion". R.H. Tawnev. Anthony Wright. 
Manchester University Press, 1987, p.150/151.
SyThe last important voice in that tradition which sought to humanise the modern system o f 
society on its own terms". Culture and Society (1780-1950). Raymond Williams^. Penguin 
Books 1961, p.223.
4) "The last great restatement o f the intrinsically moral dimension o f social democracy was 
developed by R.H. Tawney", Andrew Vincent, Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship. Andrew 
Vincent and Raymond Plant, Basil Blackwell, 1984, p.l80.
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